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This compilation of essays was created for a proj-
ect conducted by the Center for Terrorism Law, 
St. Mary’s University School of Law supported 
by a 2006 “Congressionally-Directed Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support Threat Information 
Collection” grant administered by the Air Force 
Research Laboratory under agreement FA8750-
06-1-0243. This compilation is the result of a dis-
cussion had by subject matter experts at the State 
Open Government Law and Practice in a Post-
9/11 World: Legal and Policy Analysis symposium 
held at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 
on November 15 and 16, 2007. This compilation 
is intended to serve as a companion publication to 
State Open Government Law and Practice In 
a Post-9/11 World: Changes in State Public 
Information Laws in the United States Since 
the War on Terrorism & Selected Changes 
in the National Public Information Laws 
Since the War on Terrorism in Colombia, 
France, Israel, and the United Kingdom (Jef-
frey F. Addicott, Loren A. Cochran, Lucy A. Dal-
glish, & Nathan Weingar eds., Lawyers & Judges, 
2007) [hereinafter Open Government Guide].
 This compilation is organized into chapters 
that compliment the Open Government Guide. 
Each chapter consists of papers written by sub-
ject matter experts in the appropriate field who 
elected to participate in the Center for Terrorism 
Law project. Each author presented their paper 
and discussed the pertinent topics at the sympo-
sium in 2007. The Center for Terrorism Law is a 
nonprofit, nonpartisan, academic research center. 
The work presented herein is entirely that of the 
authors and the ideas, conclusions, and opinions 
do not reflect those of the Center for Terrorism 
Law or the Air Force Research Laboratory. 
 This compilation is separated into seven (7) 
chapters based on the subject matter. To help 
the reader understand the focus of each chapter, 
a short description of the subject of each chapter 
follows. 
 Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the top-
ic of open government laws. The first author dis-
cusses the laws that currently exist both at the fed-
eral level and in the individual states. The second 
essay provides a detailed overview of the changes 
in open government laws in Florida. These essays 
serve as general summaries of the topics covered 
by the remainder of the authors. 
 Chapter 2 is focused on Critical Infrastruc-
ture. Critical infrastructure, for the purposes of 
categorizing essays includes building and archi-
tectural plans, vulnerability assessments, energy 
and public utilities information, mass transit, and 
telecommunications systems. Most of the authors 
have defined critical infrastructure as they have 
used the term in their works. 
 Chapter 3 is focused on Public Health. Pub-
lic health in this context includes bioterrorism, 
medical, pharmaceutical and health laboratory in-
formation, hazardous materials, and government 
response to public health emergencies. 
 Chapter 4 is focused on Cyber Security. By 
cyber security, the editors have included geo-
graphic information security (GIS) maps, person-
ally identifiable information and identity theft, 
security investigations, and security procedures, 
codes, surveillance and cyberterrorism.
 Chapter 5 is focused on Political Structure. 
This broad topic area covers the expanded ex-
ecutive powers; legislation proposed by not yet 
enacted, confidentiality based on federal regula-
tions, federal programs, or Homeland Security 
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Commissions; and the closure of otherwise pub-
lic meetings for security reasons. Many authors 
discuss the interaction between federal and state 
laws covering open government in this area and 
provide insights as to the workings of these laws. 
 Chapter 6 is focused on Terror Investigations. 
In this chapter, the author discusses law enforce-
ment investigations, expanded wiretapping pow-
ers, and general criminal intelligence information. 
The author looks to the history of terror investiga-
tions and the use of open government information 
to aid or hinder these efforts. 
 Chapter 7 is focused on an International Ap-
proach to open government laws. The authors take 
an in depth look at the laws and workings of the 
Israeli and French open government laws to offer 
readers an alternate perspective of the issues cov-
ered in this book.
Jeffrey F. Addicott and Ema Garcia
San Antonio, Texas, March 2008
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General Overview
Synopsis
1.1	State	Law	and	National	Security	by	Pete	Weitzel
1.2	Florida’s	Response	to	9/11:	The	Impact	on	Open	Goernment	by	
Barbara	Petersen
1.1 State Law and National Security
by Pete Weitzel
In the wake of 9/11, most of the 50 states wrote 
new laws designed to deal with the concerns and 
fears raised by the terrorist attacks on New York’s 
Twin Towers and the Pentagon. The majority of 
those new laws sought to assure greater security 
by imposing some measure of greater secrecy, 
sealing both existing records and new information 
being gathered about infrastructure, security mea-
sures, and response planning. Some states created 
new governmental units to deal with security is-
sues; others expanded the authority of existing 
units or made other operational changes. 
However, three states – Hawaii, Mississippi and 
South Dakota – adopted no new laws. The only 
new law passed in Wisconsin and in Rhode Is-
land dealt with federal information sharing; the 
only new law in Minnesota allowed for closure of 
meetings where security matters were discussed. 
New York’s legislature debated exemptions for 
infrastructure information but in the end simply 
asked power companies to submit security plans 
for review. It did approve an exemption for infor-
mation about information technology assets.
Nevada’s new laws may have been the most de-
tailed and comprehensive. The infrastructure pro-
tections, for instance, cover not just the usual sus-
pects but the state’s gaming establishments – and 
places of worship. 
In many of the states, the laws adopted include 
individual provisions that fall into several of the 
six categories selected for separate review in this 
study. For this overview, we have shortened the 
provisions into summary descriptions and sorted 
these by category and subcategory. We hope this 
will provide a sense of the overall sweep of the 
laws enacted after 9/11 while allowing for the 
more detailed analysis of the individual categories 
sought by the conference sponsors.
State Laws and Infrastructure Security
All but ten states enacted legislation providing, in 
some manner, for the safeguarding of sensitive in-
formation related to their state’s infrastructure. 
These new laws exempted information falling into 
one or more broad, sometimes overlapping, cat-
egories of information about public and private 
facilities: 
Building plans and blueprints for public 
and certain private facilities.
General security plans developed by agen-
cies and security plans specific to public 
buildings and public facilities.
Vulnerability assessments for public and 
private facilities and for infrastructure, and 
for companies making or using chemical 
and other hazardous materials.
Critical infrastructure risk assessments and 
protection plans. 
•
•
•
•
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Missouri and Ohio, among others, followed the 
federal pattern and provided exemptions for secu-
rity plans and vulnerability assessments that are 
voluntarily submitted by private owners to gov-
ernment agencies for review.
Some states pointed specifically to public water 
systems, utilities, transportation facilities, or to 
arenas and stadiums. Delaware passed a law ex-
empting from its public records laws information 
on telecommunications facilities and switching 
equipment. 
Most of the exemptions laws are broadly written, 
but several states were quite specific. New Mexi-
co created a single new exemption, for tactical re-
sponse plans and procedures. Nevada established 
an exemption for information about “special 
equipment used in emergency operations.” It also 
limited its vulnerability assessment exemption 
to analyses involving fire and law enforcement 
headquarters and critical energy and water infra-
structure. Florida protected manuals developed 
for security personnel. Nebraska’s law included 
only “specific, unique vulnerability assessments.” 
Similarly, West Virginia’s new law provided that 
the vulnerability assessments and security plans 
being exempted must be specific and unique.
Louisiana was the only state to specifically exempt 
pipeline security information. With its critical eco-
nomic dependence on its ports, it also exempted 
from the public records law information on port 
security plans, vessel or fleet security plans, port 
or facility vulnerability assessments, security and 
safety plans, and “other information related to se-
curity plans, procedures, or programs for facilities 
or vessels.” But two other key cargo port states, 
New York and California, saw no such need. 
Indiana lawmakers, perhaps as confused as we by 
the proliferation of designations for sensitive in-
formation, covered all the possible bases, exempt-
ing vulnerability assessments, risk planning docu-
ments, needs assessments, threat assessments, 
intelligence assessments, and domestic prepared-
ness strategies. 
The language safeguarding security plans was of-
ten general but sometimes specifically included 
both protection and response plans. Iowa’s law 
specified both government security procedures 
and employee preparedness, and tossed in “codes 
and combinations, passwords, restricted area 
passes, keys, security or response procedures; and 
emergency response protocols.” 
 
Kansas wrote into its statute a very broad defini-
tion of terrorism security: “criminal acts intended 
to intimidate or coerce the civilian population, in-
fluence government policy by intimidation or co-
ercion or to affect the operation of government.” 
The security measures protected included “intel-
ligence information, tactical plans, resource de-
ployment and vulnerability assessments.”
What is the Critical Infrastructure that Needs 
Protecting? 
Most of us, I suppose, would know critical infra-
structure when we saw it. But there is no official, 
or consistent, definition in federal or state law. The 
critical infrastructure lists that have been drawn 
might provide some guidance, by showing what 
has been selected, but these are confidential and 
not available to anyone without an official need 
to know.
At one point, the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) produced a list said to be 77,000 in-
frastructures strong, but when some of the entries 
leaked, the response was derisive. Rep. Jane Har-
man, chair of the House Intelligence, Information 
Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment subcom-
mittee, said she didn’t think miniature golf cours-
es and public swimming pools warranted a lot of 
national concern. She called the National Assets 
Database “almost useless to the private sector and 
first responders.” 
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At mid-summer, she said she’d been shown a 
new and improved list at a classified briefing and 
thought it wouldn’t “make people’s eyes roll.” 
The Congressional Research Service offers this 
lawyerly definition, nicely open to a lot of inter-
pretation: “Systems and assets, the destruction or 
incapacity of which would:
• cause catastrophic health effects or mass 
casualties comparable to those from the 
use of weapons of mass destruction;
• impair Federal departments and agencies’ 
abilities to perform essential missions or 
ensure the public’s health and safety;
• undermine State and local government 
capacities to maintain order and deliver 
minimum essential public services;
• damage the private sector’s capability to 
ensure the orderly functioning of the econ-
omy;
• have a negative effect on the economy 
through the cascading disruption of other 
critical infrastructure; or
• undermine the public’s morale and confi-
dence in our national economic and politi-
cal institutions.
DHS has compartmentalized critical infrastruc-
ture into 17 sectors for both operational and infor-
mation sharing purposes. If anything, these sector 
designations just make it that much more difficult 
to get a handle on what needs to be protected, be-
cause the 17 categories sum to nearly everything. 
The sectors are: Food, Meat and Poultry, Banking 
and Finance, Drinking Water and Water Treatment 
Systems, Public Health and Healthcare, National 
Monuments and Icons, Energy, Industrial Base, 
Transportation Systems, Postal and Shipping, In-
formation Technology, Communications, Com-
mercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste, 
Chemical, Dams, Commercial Facilities, Gov-
ernment Facilities, Emergency Services, and All 
Other. 
Here’s a recap of the exemptions in current state 
laws covering critical infrastructure:
No Specific Safeguarding Provisions (10)
Colorado
Hawaii
Minnesota
Mississippi
New Hampshire
New York
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Wisconsin
Exemptions for Security Plans (28)
General to security plans and discussion of 
security plans. (AL)
Security plans: Maintaining, or restoring 
security in the state. (AK)
Security plans; broadly stated. (CA)
Internal security audits of government-
owned or leased facilities…Security and 
training manuals. (CT)
Manuals for security personnel, emergen-
cy equipment, or security training…Secu-
rity system plans for: property owned by 
or leased to the state or its political subdi-
visions; or privately owned or leased prop-
erty held by an agency. (FL)
Any plan for protection against terrorist or 
other attacks whose effectiveness depends 
upon a lack of general public knowledge of 
details;…security measures, and response 
policies or plans. (GA)
Security measures, and response policies 
or plans. (ID)
Information on security procedures of 
government property or emergency pre-
paredness of government employees. In-
cludes vulnerability assessments; security 
and response plans, codes and combina-
tions, passwords, restricted area passes, 
keys, and security or response procedures; 
emergency response protocols. (IA)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Emergency or security information or pro-
cedures of a public agency; Security in-
formation on systems, facilities or equip-
ment used in the production, transmission 
or distribution of energy, water or com-
munications services; Private property or 
persons, if the records are submitted to the 
agency. Security means measures that pro-
tect against criminal acts intended to in-
timidate or coerce the civilian population, 
influence government policy by intimida-
tion or coercion or to affect the operation 
of government. Security measures include 
intelligence information, tactical plans, 
resource deployment and vulnerability as-
sessments. (KA)
Antiterrorism protective measures and 
plans; Counterterrorism measures and 
plans; Security and response needs assess-
ments. (KY)
Security procedures, terrorist activity intel-
ligence, threat or vulnerability assessments, 
including physical security information, 
proprietary information, operational plans, 
internal security information. (LA) 
Security plans, security procedures or risk 
assessments prepared specifically for the 
purpose of preventing or preparing for acts 
of terrorism. (ME)
Security and emergency preparedness 
measures. (MA)
Security planning, records related to pro-
curement, spending of public funds on se-
curity systems. (MO)
Information on the public safety or secu-
rity of public facilities, including building 
plans, alarms systems, and facility staff-
ing. (MT)
Records related to protection of public 
property and persons on the property. Spe-
cific, unique response plans. (NE)
Tactical response plans or procedures. 
(NM)
Specific emergency response plans, spe-
cial equipment used in emergency opera-
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
tions, the security of radio-transmission 
frequencies, information systems vulner-
ability assessments, security measures, re-
covery plans. (NV)
Emergency or security information or pro-
cedures for any buildings or facility secu-
rity measures and surveillance techniques. 
(NJ)
Sensitive public security information: Se-
curity plans and arrangements; detailed 
plans and drawings of public buildings and 
infrastructure facilities; response plans, to 
the extent such records set forth vulner-
ability and risk assessments, potential tar-
gets, specific tactics, or specific security 
or emergency procedures. (NC)
Port and waterway security plans. (OH)
Records on details for deterrence or pre-
vention of or protection from terrorism. 
(OK) 
Security Programs of the Energy Facility 
Citing Council; county elections security 
plans; utilities, telecommunications, data 
systems, and hazardous materials. (OR) 
Records classified by an agency that in-
volve security measures to protect persons 
and property, public or private, including 
building and public works designs of pub-
lic facilities. (UT)
Terrorism prevention and response plans. 
(VA)
Protection plans, deployment plans, re-
sponse plans. (WA)
Records assembled, prepared or main-
tained to prevent, mitigate or respond 
to terrorist acts or the threat of terrorist 
acts.…Security or disaster recovery plans, 
risk assessments, tests, or the results of 
those tests. (WV)
Safety, security related records of any pub-
licly owned or leased buildings. (WY)
Exemptions for Vulnerability Assessments (20) 
Vulnerability assessments. (CA, ID, IL, 
WY) 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Any specific vulnerability assessment. 
(DC)
Threat assessments, threat response plans. 
(FL)
Vulnerability assessments for utilities, 
technology infrastructure, public build-
ings, facilities, or activities. (GA)
Vulnerability assessments; risk planning 
documents; needs assessments; threat as-
sessments; intelligence assessments; do-
mestic preparedness strategies. (IN)
Criticality lists (from consequence assess-
ments). Vulnerability assessments. (KY) 
Emergency plans including vulnerabil-
ity assessments, specific tactics, specific 
emergency procedures, or specific secu-
rity procedures. (MD)
Threat and vulnerability assessments. 
(MA)
Specific, unique vulnerability assessments. 
(NE)
Vulnerability assessments of fire and law 
enforcement stations, critical energy and 
water infrastructure. (NV)
Voluntarily contributed vulnerability as-
sessment or other security-sensitive in-
formation a public office receives is not a 
public record. (OH)
Vulnerability assessments of critical assets 
in water and wastewater systems made 
by public utilities or state environmental 
agencies. Vulnerability assessments of 
government facilities and public improve-
ments. (OK)
Vulnerability to terrorism assessments of 
critical infrastructure. (TX)
Vulnerability assessments, operation and 
security manuals for public buildings. 
(VT)
Vulnerability assessments…operational, 
procedural, transportation, and tactical 
planning or training manuals, staff meet-
ing minutes or other records. (VA)
Vulnerability assessments and underlying 
data…Vulnerability assessments of local 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
schools. Vulnerability and security assess-
ments/plans involving water supply. (WA)
Specific or unique vulnerability assess-
ments, specific or unique response plans, 
data, databases, and inventories of goods 
or materials assembled to respond to ter-
rorist acts. (WV)
Exemptions for Building Plans (9)
Government building plans and drawings. 
(CT) 
Blueprints, schematic drawings, diagrams, 
operational manuals and other security re-
cords for buildings where hazardous ma-
terials are used or stored…Buildings or 
structures operated by the State or any of 
its political subdivisions, revealing safety 
and support systems, surveillance tech-
niques, alarm or security systems or tech-
nologies, operational and evacuation plans 
or protocols, or personnel deployments. 
(DE)
Building plans, blueprints, schematic 
drawings, and diagrams which depict the 
internal layout and structural elements of 
a building, arena, stadium, water treat-
ment facility, or other structure owned or 
operated by an agency…Building plans 
for attractions and recreation facility, en-
tertainment or resort complex, industrial 
complex, retail and service development, 
office development, or hotel or motel de-
velopment, which documents are held by 
an agency. Does not apply to comprehen-
sive plans or site plans, approved under 
local land development regulations, local 
zoning regulations, or development-of-re-
gional-impact review. (FL)
Any plan, blueprint, or other material 
which if made public could compromise 
security against sabotage, criminal, or ter-
rorist acts. (GA)
Buildings, facilities, infrastructures and 
systems records held by a public agency. 
Sport stadiums, convention centers, and all 
•
•
•
•
•
•
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government owned, operated, or occupied 
buildings (Architects’ plans, engineers’ 
technical submissions, construction-relat-
ed technical documents for projects). (ID)
Building and public facility plans, draw-
ings, specifications for buildings, facili-
ties. (KA)
Structural plans of public property. (MO) 
Building plans. (VT) 
Building plans, etc. that reveal the build-
ing’s or structure’s internal layout, spe-
cific location, life and safety and support 
systems, structural elements, surveillance 
techniques, alarms, security systems or 
technologies…Building Plans, etc. for 
structures where hazardous materials are 
stored. Building plans, etc for arenas, stadi-
ums and waste and water systems. (WY)
Exemptions for Infrastructure Information 
(14)
State infrastructure…detailed description 
or evaluation of systems, facilities, or in-
frastructure in the state. (AK)
Infrastructure risk assessments done for 
federal government. Emphasis on drinking 
water systems. (AZ)
Arenas, stadiums. (DE)
Critical asset protection plan and informa-
tion gathered in producing the plan. In-
cludes, but is not limited to, surveys, lists, 
maps, or photographs. (IA)
Infrastructure vulnerabilities: includes 
IT, communication, electrical, fire sup-
pression, ventilation, water, wastewater, 
sewage, and gas systems; public building 
vulnerabilities -- detailed drawings, sche-
matics, maps, or specifications of structural 
elements, floor plans, and operating, util-
ity, or security systems. The exact physical 
location of hazardous chemical, radiologi-
cal, or biological materials. (KY)
(Oil and gas) pipeline security information: 
physical security information, proprietary 
information, vulnerability assessments, 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
operational plans and analysis of such in-
formation, and internal security informa-
tion. Any such records in the custody of 
the office of conservation. (LA)
Building plans and security information 
for airports and other mass transit facili-
ties, bridges, tunnels, emergency response 
facilities or structures, buildings where 
hazardous materials are stored, arenas, sta-
diums, waste and water systems, and any 
other building, structure, or facility. (MD)
Any other records relating to the security 
or safety of persons or buildings, struc-
tures, facilities, utilities, transportation or 
other infrastructure. (MA)
Infrastructure records, security and per-
sonal safety information, safety of public 
and private buildings. (MI) 
Infrastructure information voluntarily sub-
mitted to any public governmental body 
for safety. (MO) 
Infrastructure, including airports, the Cap-
itol Complex, dams, gaming establish-
ments, governmental buildings, highways, 
hotels, information technology infrastruc-
ture, lakes, places of worship, power lines, 
public buildings, public utilities, reser-
voirs, rivers and their tributaries, and wa-
ter facilities. (NV)
Critical infrastructure security system 
plans. (ND)
Security or infrastructure records, includ-
ing vulnerability assessments. (OH) 
Critical infrastructure building plans…en-
gineering or architectural records. (VA)
Exemptions Involving Water Systems (6)
Records, including analyses, investiga-
tions, studies, reports, recommendations, 
requests for proposals, drawings, dia-
grams, blueprints, and plans, containing 
information relating to security for any 
public water system. (AR)
Water company vulnerability assessments. 
(CT) 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Waste and water systems, electric trans-
mission lines and substations, high-pres-
sure natural gas pipelines and compressor 
stations.
Water treatment facilities. 
The location of community drinking water 
wells and surface water intakes; infrastruc-
ture records that disclose the configuration 
of critical systems such as communication, 
electrical, ventilation, water, and wastewa-
ter systems. (IN)
Sewer or wastewater treatment systems, 
facilities or equipment. (KA)
Exemptions Involving Utilities (3) 
Maps and other records regarding the lo-
cation or security of a utility’s generation, 
transmission, distribution, storage, gather-
ing, treatment, or switching facilities. (ID)
Utility, including fuel and communications 
facilities, plans, drawings. (KA)
Utility records, plans reflecting structural 
or operational vulnerabilities, or that would 
permit unlawful disruption to, or interfer-
ence with, the services provided. (TN)
Exemption Involving Telecommunications 
Networks (1)
Facilities and switching equipment. Response 
procedures or plans prepared to prevent or 
respond to emergency situations. (DE)
Exemptions Involving Transportation (6)
Plans for mass transit facilities, bridges, 
tunnels, emergency response facilities or 
structures. (DE)
Airport facilities…Security portions of 
system safety programs, investigation re-
ports, surveys, schedules, lists, data, or in-
formation compiled, collected, or prepared 
by or for the Regional Transportation Au-
thority. (ID)
Detailed drawings, specifications of any 
building or facility of a public airport. 
(IN)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Transportation systems. (KA)
Public and private port security plans, ves-
sel or fleet security plans, port or facility 
vulnerability assessments, security and 
safety plans, or other information related 
to security plans, procedures, or programs 
for facilities or vessels shall not be deemed 
a public record. (LA)
Personnel deployments for airports and 
other mass transit facilities, bridges, tun-
nels, emergency response facilities. (WY)
State Laws and Cybersecurity
Most states took no legislative action in the area of 
cybersecurity, or in any way related to technologi-
cal information contained in public records. New 
laws in the 22 states that did act, largely focus on 
protecting government computer and communica-
tions systems. 
For the most part, the new laws cover information 
that would normally be considered sensitive and 
protected by rule or policy, such as access codes, 
passwords, ID numbers, and similar routine secu-
rity mechanisms. Several states protected infor-
mation about systems that serve critical services 
such as energy, water and communications.
Connecticut, in safeguarding information on 
“standards, procedures, processes, software and 
codes” provided that the information exempted 
must be “not otherwise available to the public.” 
Maine, on the other hand, exempted information 
related to design, architecture, encryption, tech-
nology infrastructure and systems, and any other 
information that might jeopardize the integrity, 
availability, confidentiality, or corrupt the data in 
IT systems. 
Illinois established an exemption for geographic 
systems information and three states, North Dako-
ta, Oregon and Delaware, specifically identified 
telecommunications systems. 
•
•
•
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At the same time, in a number of states, cyberse-
curity also became one of the areas of attention 
for law enforcement personnel in fusion centers 
that were set up. Several of these intelligence/in-
formation centers have enlisted the participation 
of computer industry experts. 
There are multiple aspects to the cybersecurity 
equation – prevent spying, protect systems that 
control critical infrastructure, and avert the inter-
ruption of critical services, including the computer 
networks themselves. 
To most of the threats, the solutions are widely 
seen to be overcoming technical challenges that 
require an open source, information sharing ap-
proach. 
Cybersecurity is also an area where the private 
and public systems are interdependent, where the 
primary protective measures and response actions 
must span geographic and public-private sector 
boundaries, and where resiliency – the ability to 
come back quickly – may be more critical than 
protection. 
We need only think back a few years to the elec-
trical grid failure which paralyzed the Northeast, 
shutting down communications systems, crippling 
financial networks, hampering emergency response 
operations, to understand the interdependencies. 
Or extrapolate just a bit on the cyber attack on 
Estonia earlier this year when someone – Rus-
sia is the likely suspect – sought to shut down the 
government and that nation’s banking system by 
flooding their computer systems with a form of 
spam. For a few hours, it worked.
This, more than any other factor, may explain the 
limited and narrowly-focused legislative response 
by the states. As with several of the areas we will 
be discussing, new laws may be needed far less 
than a new culture of cooperation and information 
sharing. 
“Information is the coin of the economic realm, 
and information that is used is information that 
moves about. Winners have the most information 
in play,” risk services consultant Daniel Greer told 
the House Homeland Security subcommittee in 
April. 
“On the Internet, every sociopath is your next door 
neighbor,” he said. “You can never retreat to a safe 
neighborhood. Your ability to defend depends on 
your ability to know what the current threat pro-
file is, both generally to all and specifically to 
yourself.”
O. Sami Saydjari, president of Professionals for 
Cyber Defense, told that same subcommittee that 
what is needed is a Manhattan Project-like pro-
gram that is not shrouded in secrecy. “Doing so 
would be unnecessary and deleterious to the pro-
gram goals. The nation’s best minds must work 
on this difficult problem, and many of them are to 
be found outside government in academia and in-
dustry. Excluding those minds by making the pro-
gram secret would only decrease our chances of 
success…A design that counts on its own secrecy 
to succeed isn’t a robust design at all: we all know 
how fleeting secrets can be.”
The role of the states would logically seem to be 
in ensuring information partnerships that bring to-
gether those who need work together at the local, 
state levels and regional levels.
It may be necessary to shield some information 
as a deterrent, but the greater challenge will be to 
foster the sharing of intelligence and technical in-
formation with those who can use it to make us 
more secure. 
No Specific Statutory Provisions (29)
Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
District of Columbia
•
•
•
•
•
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Florida 
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Wisconsin
Exemptions for Cybersecurity Information 
(22)
Measures, procedures, instructions, or re-
lated data used to cause a computer or a 
computer system or network, including 
telecommunication networks or applica-
tions thereon, to perform security func-
tions, including, but not limited to, pass-
words, personal identification numbers, 
transaction authorization mechanisms, and 
other means of preventing access to com-
puters, computer systems or networks, or 
any data residing therein. (AL)
Measures and procedures related to com-
puter and computer network security func-
tions, including, but not limited to, pass-
words, personal identification numbers, 
transaction authorization mechanisms, 
and other means of preventing access to 
computers. (AR) 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Records of standards, procedures, pro-
cesses, software and codes, not otherwise 
available to the public. (CT)
Telecommunications networks facilities 
and switching equipment. (DE)
Security plans and vulnerability assess-
ments for…technology infrastructure. 
(GA)
Computer geographic system information. 
Maps showing the location of utilities. 
(IL)
Infrastructure records that disclose the 
configuration of critical systems such as 
communication, electrical, ventilation, 
water, and wastewater systems. (IN)
Systems, facilities or equipment used in 
the production, transmission or distribu-
tion of energy, water or communications 
services. (KA)
Infrastructure records that expose a vul-
nerability referred to in this subparagraph 
through the disclosure of the location, con-
figuration, or security of critical systems, 
including information technology and 
communications. (KY)
The architecture, design, access authenti-
cation, encryption or security of informa-
tion technology infrastructure and sys-
tems…Information technology systems. 
Records describing security and informa-
tion technology system plans and security 
procedures; and…data integrity. Records 
or information that will jeopardize the 
security, availability, confidentiality, in-
tegrity of, or corrupt the data residing in, 
information technology systems including 
records describing the architecture, data 
model, design, access, encryption or user 
authentication of information technology 
systems and infrastructure, including se-
curity features for preventing duplication, 
alteration and substitution of licenses and 
identification cards. (ME)
Computer and telecommunications system 
or network information. (MO)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Property; computer or communications 
network schema, passwords, and user 
identification names, guard schedules; or 
lock combinations. (NE)
Records related to information technol-
ogy assets, such assets encompassing both 
electronic information systems and infra-
structures. (NY)
Infrastructure and security of information 
systems, including, without limitation: (1) 
Access codes, passwords and programs 
used to ensure the security of an infor-
mation system; (2) Access codes used to 
ensure the security of software applica-
tions; (3) Procedures and processes used 
to ensure the security of an information 
system; and (4) Plans used to reestablish 
security and service with respect to an in-
formation system after security has been 
breached or service has been interrupted…
Assessments and plans that relate specifi-
cally and uniquely to the vulnerability of 
an information system or to the measures 
which will be taken to respond to such vul-
nerability, including, without limitation, 
any compiled underlying data necessary to 
prepare such assessments and plans…The 
results of tests of the security of an infor-
mation system, insofar as those results re-
veal specific vulnerabilities relative to the 
information system. (NV)
Public records do not include plans to pre-
vent or respond to terrorist activity, to the 
extent such records set forth vulnerability 
and risk assessments, potential targets, spe-
cific tactics, or specific security or emer-
gency procedures, the disclosure of which 
would jeopardize the safety…a governmen-
tal…information storage system. (NC)
Critical infrastructure information is ex-
empt. “Critical infrastructure “means…
telecommunications centers and comput-
ers. (ND)
Information technology of a public body 
or public official but only if the informa-
•
•
•
•
•
•
tion specifically identifies: 1. Design or 
functional schematics that demonstrate the 
relationship or connections between de-
vices or systems; 2. System configuration 
information; 3. Security monitoring and 
response equipment placement and con-
figuration; 4. Specific location or place-
ment of systems, components or devices; 
5. System identification numbers, names, 
or connecting circuits. (OK)
Telecommunication systems, including 
cellular, wireless or radio systems. Data 
transmissions by whatever means provid-
ed. (OR)
Information is confidential if the informa-
tion…relates to the details of the encryp-
tion codes or security keys for a public 
communications system…Information, 
including access codes and passwords, in 
the possession of a governmental entity 
that relates to the specifications, operating 
procedures, or location of a security sys-
tem used to protect public or private prop-
erty. (TX)
Information regarding the infrastructure 
and security of computer and telecommu-
nications networks, consisting of security 
passwords, security access codes and pro-
grams, access codes for secure software 
applications, security and service recovery 
plans, security risk assessments, and secu-
rity test results to the extent that they iden-
tify specific system vulnerabilities. (WA)
Computing, telecommunications and net-
work security records, passwords, security 
codes or programs used to respond to or 
plan against acts of terrorism which may 
be the subject of a terrorist act…Architec-
tural or infrastructure designs, maps and 
plans that show computing and telecom-
munications infrastructure. (WV)
Information regarding design, elements 
and components, and location of state IT 
security systems and physical security sys-
tems. (WY)
•
•
•
•
•
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State Laws and Political Structure 
Modification
The most common legislation in this category pro-
vided for increased information sharing, usually, 
but not exclusively with the federal government.
Sixteen states adopted the new laws to create ex-
emptions from state open records laws for sensi-
tive information received from federal officials. In 
several cases, the legislation also authorized the 
sharing of sensitive information among agencies, 
breaking down state stovepipes. 
Texas, for example, provided that the head of a 
government agency could share otherwise con-
fidential information with disaster task forces. 
Florida added language that allowed the inclusion 
of private entities in the information sharing net-
work. Iowa highlighted the driving force behind 
its information withholding, authorizing exemp-
tions as needed to avoid the loss of federal funds, 
but “only to the degree necessary.” 
Ten states created homeland security units or 
similar new entities to prepare for possible terror-
ist attacks and eight others legislated operational 
changes such as HAZMAT incident reporting, 
commissioning a ports security report, and ex-
panding emergency powers. 
Fourteen states made changes in meetings or re-
cords procedures to safeguard information on se-
curity preparations, with a number clearly strug-
gling with concerns about the public’s right to 
know as they restricted the availability of infor-
mation. 
Iowa lawmakers decided that lists of critical assets 
could be inspected but not copied. Iowa also man-
dated roll call votes by governmental bodies before 
closing meetings to discuss sensitive security in-
formation, as did Ohio. And Iowa said that closed 
discussions should be limited to matters involv-
ing critical infrastructure. It required that detailed 
minutes and a taped record of the closed meeting 
be kept; those records to be made available in the 
event of litigation. New Hampshire also mandat-
ed that minutes be kept but sealed until there is 
no longer a threat related to the matter discussed. 
Texas also required a full record be kept. 
Oregon provided that journalists could attend any 
closed meeting on security issues provided they 
do not publish what they observe. This unusual 
step of was intended to allow reporters to chal-
lenge the meeting’s closure in court, if they ob-
serve any discussion or action that goes beyond 
the legal bounds for closure. 
And Texas, aware of the importance of commu-
nications in emergency situations, permitted the 
monitoring of emergency communications by 
“bona fide” local news media. 
Nevada wasn’t prepared to say that “restricted” in-
formation was totally off limits, but it clearly felt a 
need to impose some limits on who might access 
the information. So lawmakers set up a request 
procedure that requires the requester to identify 
himself and provide a statement of purpose. If the 
request is approved, a government official must 
be present to observe while any restricted docu-
ment is reviewed. 
No Statutory Provisions (15)
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Hawaii
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Mississippi
Nebraska
New Mexico
New York
New Jersey
North Carolina
North Dakota
South Dakota
Vermont
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Specific Information Sharing Provision (16)
Provides for federal information shar-
ing and protection of federal documents. 
(DE) 
Provides for information sharing, main-
taining confidentiality of information, 
from both other governmental and private 
sources. (FL)
Exempts records that are specifically re-
quired by the federal government to be 
kept confidential. (GA)
Exempts any public record also exempt by 
federal or regulations. (ID)
Exempts information specifically prohib-
ited from disclosure by federal or rules and 
regulations adopted under federal law. (IL)
Exempts records required to be kept confi-
dential by federal law. (IN)
Allows for an exemption if the loss of fed-
eral funds is threatened, but only to the de-
gree necessary. (IA) 
Exempts records received by any public 
body from the federal government or re-
cords may be kept confidential to the ex-
tent required by federal law. (OK)
Exempts records, reports, opinions, infor-
mation, and statements required to be kept 
confidential by federal law or regulation. 
(RI)
Exempts records required to be kept con-
fidential by federal statute or regulation as 
a condition for the receipt of federal funds 
or for participation in a federally funded 
program. (TN)
Allows the head of a government unit to 
disclose confidential information dur-
ing a “state of disaster” to a task force as 
needed…Exempts information, other than 
financial, prepared for a US agency report, 
or related to terrorism, that is confidential 
under federal law or as part of an informa-
tion sharing program. (TX)
Exempts records not subject to public dis-
closure under federal law that are shared 
with the state. (WA)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Exempts national security records shared 
by federal agencies. (WV) 
Exempts any record specifically exempted 
from disclosure by federal law. (WI)
Exempts information that is exempt under 
federal law. (WY)
Information provided by the federal gov-
ernment, or another government, and des-
ignated in writing as confidential. (UT)
New Entities (10)
Created a state Department of Homeland 
Security but left its records subject to ex-
isting state and federal laws. In 2005, in-
cluded a meetings exemption for discus-
sion of homeland security plans. (AL)
Created an emergency response commis-
sion and empowered it to adopt modifica-
tion to the administrative procedures act as 
it related to the handling of public infor-
mation requests, implementing chemical 
emergency planning and preparedness and 
right to know programs, and reporting on 
toxic releases. (AZ) 
Created an office of preparedness, secu-
rity, and fire safety to develop terrorist 
preparedness plans and for the sharing and 
protection of specialized details of gov-
ernment information on security arrange-
ments and investigations. (CO)
Established a counterterrorism and secu-
rity council; other agencies may consult 
with it on whether to disclose sensitive re-
cords. (IN)
Established a homeland security and emer-
gency management division. (IA)
Created Governor’s Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Preparedness. 
(LA) 
Established the Maryland Security Coun-
cil. (MD) 
Established a division of homeland secu-
rity. (OH) 
Created Oklahoma Office of Homeland 
Security. (OK)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Established regional emergency response 
task forces. (PA)
Operational Changes (8)
Created a HAZMAT incident or accident 
reporting system. (AR)
Governor and the state public health de-
partment empowered to declare a public 
health emergency in event of bioterrorism 
attack. (GA) 
Directed those who store hazardous waste 
to analyze security measures and imple-
ment improvements as necessary. The 
analyses must be submitted to the state, 
but remain confidential. (MD) 
Governor gets expanded emergency pow-
ers in event of disaster, natural or man-
made, or an act of terrorism. (MO)
Officials directed to designate respective 
records as essential for emergencies and 
reestablishment of normal government 
operations. Then provide for their security. 
(MT)
Directed Department of Natural Resourc-
es to set up confidential security plan for 
ports. (OH)
Directs governor to prepare appropriate di-
saster plans and in doing so to withhold pri-
vate information voluntarily submitted…
Requires the Department of Emergency 
Management, working with local emergen-
cy agencies, to provide an annual report to 
the legislature that is confidential. (VA) 
“Omnibus Terrorism Protection and Home-
land Defense Act of 2002” criminalizes 
aid to a terrorist or terrorist organizations, 
increases penalties for various terrorist 
activity and increases the government’s 
power to conduct roving wiretaps. (SC)
Procedural Changes (13)
Legislative meetings can be closed for 
“security” reasons…Legislative commit-
tee assignments can be conditioned on 
confidentiality agreements. (AK)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Water distribution boards may meet in ex-
ecutive session. (AR)
Makes it a crime for officials to disclose 
information discussed in closed meeting. 
(CA)
Provided that lists of critical assets may 
be viewed but not copied…Allows closed 
meetings to discuss sensitive information 
involving airports, cities, public utilities 
and water districts but only after a public 
vote. Detailed minutes and taped record 
must be kept, with court to review if clo-
sure is challenged. (IA)
Permits public bodies to close meetings 
when receiving security briefings and re-
ports. However, all financial issues related 
to security matters must be made open to 
the public. (MN)
May close meetings, records and votes for 
security reasons but procurement records 
must remain open. Board/agency must af-
firmatively state in writing that disclosure 
would impair their ability to protect the 
security and that public interest in non-
disclosure outweighs the public interest in 
disclosure…Agency must review records 
submitted voluntarily within 90 days and 
return if information is not needed for se-
curity purposes. (MO)
Gave governor the authority, by executive 
order, to withhold release of specific se-
curity related records. Provided criminal 
penalties for unauthorized release of those 
documents. Set up a request procedure 
that requires identification of the requester 
asking to see a restricted document, in-
cluding providing a statement of purpose. 
A government official must be present to 
observe while a restricted document is be-
ing reviewed. (NV)
Allows for closed meetings to consider 
emergency issues related to terrorism. 
Must keep minutes, but sensitive portions 
can be withheld until threat no longer ex-
ists. (NH)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Board must hold roll call vote to go into 
executive session to discuss security and 
emergency response information. (OH)
May close meeting to discuss those secu-
rity issues. Must keep a full record. (TX)
“Bona fide local news media” may moni-
tor emergency communications. (TX)
Permits journalists to attend but not to 
publish what they observe at closed meet-
ings to discuss security issues (this allows 
reporters to challenge in court any inap-
propriate use of the executive session ex-
emption.). (OR)
Government bodies may hold an executive 
session or close records pertaining to the 
discussion of terrorist plans or protection 
against terrorist attacks. (OK)
State Laws and First Response
The exemptions written by states dealing with first 
response efforts are primarily designed to protect 
information on planning and procedures for re-
sponding to a terrorist attack. They cover every-
thing from the emergency protocols to sheltering. 
The language of some of the laws might be inter-
preted in ways that could hinder effective response 
because it withholds from the public information 
such as evacuation procedures and shelter details 
that people will need in any emergency or natural 
disaster. 
Some of the exemptions also raise questions about 
the extent of public’s knowledge about emergency 
procedures, and their degree of confidence: Will 
citizens make correct, instinctive responses in a 
post-attack situation if vital response information 
is withheld until after the fact? And now, in ad-
vance of any possible attack, will they press for 
and support needed changes and resources? 
Ohio law makes information on trauma center ca-
pacity confidential. Is it reasonable to assume that 
government, on its own, in the absence of pres-
•
•
•
•
•
sure from an informed public, will act to make the 
changes needed to increase center capacity where 
needed? 
Another example: Virginia exempts school safety 
audits. That’s information I’d want and demand 
as a parent concerned about my child’s welfare. 
And it is information I’d use as a parent to force 
improvements, if needed. 
By way of contrast, Arizona created a new agency 
to establish procedures for handling information 
the public must have and to establish right to know 
reporting requirements. 
First Response Laws
No Statutory Provisions (21)
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Georgia
Hawaii
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico
New York
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Vermont
Wisconsin
Exemptions for Emergency Response Plans, 
Records (28)
Protocols and procedures concerning the 
prevention of, preparation for, response to, 
and recovery from any terrorist threat, ter-
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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rorist act, or other terrorist-related activity; 
or terrorist training activity. (CO)
Government training manuals on emer-
gency plans or security equipment; emer-
gency plans and emergency recovery or 
response plans. (CT)
Response procedures or plans prepared 
to prevent or respond to emergency situ-
ations. Records prepared to prevent or re-
spond to emergency situations. (DE)
Any specific response plan. (DC)
Emergency evacuation plans; sheltering 
arrangements; manuals for security per-
sonnel, emergency equipment, or secu-
rity training. Hospital Security systems or 
plans, emergency evacuation transporta-
tion, sheltering arrangements, emergency 
equipment. (FL)
Emergency evacuation, escape or other 
emergency response plans. (ID)
Plans designed to identify, prevent, or re-
spond to potential attacks upon a commu-
nity’s population or systems, facilities, or 
installations. (IL)
Emergency contact information of emer-
gency responders and volunteers. (IN)
Emergency preparedness information de-
veloped and maintained by a government 
body for the protection of governmental 
employees, visitors to the government 
body, persons in the care, custody, or un-
der the control of the government body, or 
property under the jurisdiction of the gov-
ernment body. (IA)
Emergency records, security information 
and procedures of public agencies. (KA)
Response procedures or plans prepared 
to prevent or respond to emergency situa-
tions, the disclosure of which would reveal 
vulnerability assessments, specific tactics, 
specific emergency procedures, or specific 
security procedures. Records prepared to 
prevent or respond to emergency situa-
tions identifying or describing the name, 
location, pharmaceutical cache, contents, 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
capacity, equipment, physical features, 
or capabilities of individual medical fa-
cilities, storage facilities, or laboratories. 
(MD)
Security measures, emergency prepared-
ness. (MA)
Emergency response plans, risk planning 
documents, threat assessments, and do-
mestic preparedness strategies. (MI)
Operational guidelines and policies devel-
oped, adopted, or maintained by any pub-
lic agency responsible for…first response. 
(MO)
Document, record or other information 
prepared and maintained for the purpose 
of preventing or responding to an act of 
terrorism, including: documents, records 
or other items of information which may 
reveal the details of a specific emergency 
response plan or other tactical operations 
by a response agency and any training re-
lating to such emergency response plans 
or tactical operations…Resort hotel emer-
gency response plans that include: 
(a) a drawing or map of the layout of all areas 
within the building or buildings and grounds that 
constitute a part of the resort hotel and its sup-
port systems and a brief description of the purpose 
or use for each area; (b) a drawing or description 
of the internal and external access routes; (c) the 
location and inventory of emergency response 
equipment and resources; (d) the location of any 
unusually hazardous substances; (e) the name and 
telephone number of the emergency response co-
ordinator for the resort hotel; (f) the location of 
one or more site emergency response command 
posts; (g) a description of any special equipment 
needed to respond to an emergency at the resort 
hotel; (h) an evacuation plan; (i) a description of 
any public health or safety hazards present on the 
site; (j) any other information requested by a local 
fire department or local law enforcement agency 
whose jurisdiction includes the area in which the 
resort hotel is located or by the Division of Emer-
gency Management. (NV)
•
•
•
•
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Records pertaining to the preparation for 
and the carrying out of all emergency 
functions, including training…developed 
by local or state safety officials that are di-
rectly intended to thwart a deliberate act 
that is intended to result in widespread or 
severe damage to property or widespread 
injury or loss of life. (NH)
Emergency or security information or pro-
cedures for buildings or facilities. (NJ)
Specific security or emergency procedures 
plans. Emergency response plans adopted 
by a constituent institution of The Univer-
sity of North Carolina, a community col-
lege, or a public hospital. (NC)
A security system plan kept by a public 
entity. “Security system plan” includes….
emergency evacuation plans. (ND)
Deployment plans of law enforcement or 
emergency response personnel; trauma 
center reports on preparedness and capac-
ity to respond to disasters, mass casualties, 
and bioterrorism. Provides for information 
sharing with appropriate first responders. 
(OH)
Records including details for response, re-
mediation after act of terrorism. (OK)
Contingency plans of law enforcement 
agencies prepared to respond to any vio-
lent incident, bomb threat, ongoing act of 
violence at a school or business, ongoing 
act of violence at a place of public gath-
ering, threat involving a weapon of mass 
destruction, or terrorist incident. (TN)
Staffing requirements of an emergency re-
sponse provider, including a law enforce-
ment agency, a fire-fighting agency, or an 
emergency services agency; tactical plan 
of the provider. Lists of pager or telephone 
numbers, including mobile and cellular 
telephone numbers, of the provider. (TX)
Division of Emergency Services and 
Homeland Security records of emergency 
plans or programs. (UT)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
School safety audits and school crisis, 
emergency management, and medical 
emergency response plans (the local school 
board retains authority to withhold or limit 
the release of any security plans). (VA)
Those portions of records assembled, 
prepared, or maintained to prevent, miti-
gate, or respond to criminal terrorist acts, 
including specific and unique emergency 
and escape response plans at a city, county, 
or state adult or juvenile correctional facil-
ity. Emergency/escape response plans for 
detention facilities. (WA)
Those portions of records containing…
deployment plans of law enforcement or 
emergency response personnel. (WV)
Specific tactics, emergency procedures 
or security procedures. Personnel deploy-
ments for airports and other mass transit 
facilities, bridges, tunnels, emergency re-
sponse facilities or structures, buildings 
where hazardous materials are stored, 
arenas, stadiums and waste and water sys-
tems. (WY)
New Agencies (2)
Created an emergency response commis-
sion to establish procedures for handling 
public information requests, community 
right-to-know program reporting require-
ments, release reporting requirements. 
(AZ)
Created regional counterterrorism task 
forces, including first responders to de-
velop response plans. (PA)
State Laws and Public Health
Only 16 states enacted new legislation in the area 
of Public Health, and half of those did so to safe-
guard prevention or response plans. Florida, in 
exempting emergency response plans, also called 
for appropriate information sharing, a concerned 
that also surfaced in legislation approved in other 
states. Louisiana approved a new law that pro-
•
•
•
•
•
•
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vided for the tracking and sharing of health emer-
gency information while also providing penalties 
for breaching confidentiality. 
New laws were written in four states to protect 
records that listed the locations of hazardous ma-
terials, although Texas noted that some of this in-
formation is already public. It limited the non-dis-
closure to “unpublished information.” 
Only one state, Utah, offered special records pro-
tection for risk assessments in the public health 
area. And only two dealt with health investiga-
tions. Missouri said public health officials could 
keep secret some information about their investi-
gations and Ohio mandated that names of people 
and businesses under investigation be kept confi-
dential until a case is completed. 
Two states made structural changes related to pub-
lic health, with Arizona setting up an emergency 
response commission and Georgia giving the gov-
ernor new power to declare a health emergency if 
there is a bioterrorism attack. 
The relative inactivity in this area may come from 
recognition that advance public knowledge is crit-
ical and that open communication is vital to rapid 
and effective response to public health concerns. 
It may also be an acknowledgement that the fed-
eral government has an existing oversight role on 
biomedical issues and disease prevention. More-
over, Congress passed a sweeping “Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Re-
sponse Act of 2002,” shortly after 9/11. 
Also, there is considerable controversy over the 
desirability of restrictions on information shar-
ing within the scientific and medical communi-
ties. The National Academies said in a 2004 re-
port, Seeking Security; Pathogens, Open Access 
and Genomic Data Bases, that there should be 
no change in current policies that allow scientists 
and the public unrestricted access to genome data 
on microbial pathogens. Access, it concluded, 
improves the nation’s ability to fight both bio-
terrorism and naturally occurring infectious dis-
eases.
Public Health Laws 
No Specific Statutory Provisions (33)
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
Public Health Records Exemptions (16)
Records that could reasonably be expected 
to endanger the life or physical safety of 
an individual or to present a real and sub-
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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stantial risk to the public health and wel-
fare. (AK)
Communicable disease reports and similar 
records are deemed confidential but can be 
released to FBI, federal law enforcement 
agencies or prosecutors to investigate or 
prosecute bioterrorism. (CO)
Confidential prevention plans filed with 
Health Department. (CT)
Records that identify and locate pharma-
ceutical caches, or security information 
about medical facilities, storage. (DE)
Comprehensive emergency response plan, 
including hospitals, are deemed confiden-
tial, with an information sharing provision. 
(FL)
Plans for responses to bioterrorism, and 
proposed or actual plans and responses 
involving the National Pharmacy Stock-
pile…Notices sent to the state health de-
partment regarding certain illnesses or un-
usual prescription trends. (GA)
Medical examiner records and reports, in-
cluding preliminary reports, investigative 
reports, and autopsy reports. (IA)
Established procedures to detect, track, 
and share information on public health 
emergencies focusing on the immediate 
reporting of incidents. Provides penalties 
for unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
information. (LA)
Information in the newly established Bi-
ological Agents Registry program. Also 
records prepared to prevent or respond to 
emergency situations identifying or de-
scribing the name, location, pharmaceuti-
cal cache, contents, capacity, equipment, 
physical features, or capabilities of indi-
vidual medical facilities, storage facilities, 
or laboratories. (MD)
Meetings, records and votes on opera-
tional guidelines and policies of public 
health agency for first response…Infor-
mation reported and evaluations of the 
reports to trauma centers are not public 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
record…State public health officials may 
keep secret some information about health 
investigations of the suspected origins of 
bioterrorism attacks. (MO)
The identities of people and businesses 
under investigation in bioterrorism cases, 
until the case is completed…Information 
reported by trauma centers to the public 
health council on preparedness and capac-
ity to respond to disasters, mass casualties, 
and bioterrorism, and evaluations of those 
reports. (OH)
Unpublished information about the loca-
tion of a chemical, biological agent, toxin, 
or radioactive material and about any po-
tential vaccine or to a device that detects 
biological agents or toxins. (TX)
Information regarding food security or 
risk, and vulnerability assessments per-
formed by the Department of Agriculture 
and Food. (UT)
Records of the State Health Commission-
er relating to the health of persons under 
quarantine. (VA)
Records assembled, prepared or main-
tained to prevent, mitigate or respond to 
terrorist acts or the threat of terrorist acts, 
the public disclosure of which threaten the 
public safety or the public health. (WV)
Records prepared to prevent or respond to 
terrorist attacks or other security threats 
identifying or describing the name, loca-
tion, pharmaceutical cache, contents, ca-
pacity, equipment, physical features, or 
capabilities of individual medical facili-
ties, storage facilities or laboratories estab-
lished, maintained, or regulated by the state 
or any of its political subdivisions. (WY)
New Agency or Plan (3)
Established an emergency response com-
mission including the Department of 
Health Services. (AZ)
Mandated a response plan to deal with 
threats of bioterrorism. (DC) 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Gave the governor the power to declare a 
public health emergency in bioterrorism 
cases and provided for notification to the 
state health department of certain illnesses 
or unusual prescription trends. (GA)
State Laws and Terror Investigations
State and local law enforcement agencies have 
historically declined to disclose sensitive inves-
tigative and intelligence information, a position 
supported by common law, state public records 
law and local ordinance. That tradition and con-
fidence in law enforcement’s existing authority to 
withhold intelligence information likely explains 
why fewer than half of the states took any action 
in this area after 9/11. 
Most states that did write new law did little more 
than codify or update traditional law enforcement 
exemptions, such as exemptions for investigato-
ry reports and intelligence files and reports and 
information related to sources and methods and 
surveillance. Illinois did expand an exemption for 
investigation reports to include a regional trans-
portation authority. 
The most specific new law involving investiga-
tions may the one in Texas, which makes confi-
dential information that is collected, assembled or 
maintained by emergency response providers to 
prevent, detect, respond to, or investigate an act 
of terrorism. 
Five states adopted information sharing legisla-
tion focused on terrorism investigations. 
Only two states wrote legislation in the area of 
surveillance programs. 
Terror Investigation Laws
No Specific Statutory Provisions (28)
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
•
•
•
•
Connecticut
Hawaii
Idaho
Kansas
Kentucky
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Washington
Wyoming
Wisconsin
Exemptions for Intelligence Files and Informa-
tion (3)
Law enforcement intelligence files. (DE)
Terrorist intelligence information. (LA)
Reports, records that contain intelligence 
and investigative information; information 
on investigative techniques and procedures 
not known by the general public. (ME)
Exemptions for Surveillance (2)
Information on surveillance techniques 
and procedures or personnel. (FL)
Expanded pen registers and other wiretap-
ping provisions. (MD)
Exemptions for Investigation Reports (10)
Records of state and local security com-
plaints and investigations. But requires 
disclosure of non-sensitive incident infor-
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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mation to victims and insurers, and public 
disclosure of basic incident information, 
including identity information on those ar-
rested, and details of arrest, and basic inci-
dent information. (CA)
Investigation reports prepared by or for the 
Regional Transportation Authority. (IL)
Investigatory records and intelligence and 
threat assessments. (IN)
Medical examiner records; preliminary, 
investigative and autopsy reports. (IA)
Law enforcement investigative informa-
tion, information on confidential sources, 
and methods of investigation. (NY)
Any record assembled, prepared, or main-
tained by a public office or public body to 
prevent, mitigate, or respond to acts of ter-
rorism. (OH)
Investigative evidence of a plan or scheme 
to commit an act of terrorism and of an act 
of terrorism that has already been commit-
ted. (OK)
Makes confidential information that is 
collected, assembled, or maintained by to 
prevent, detect, respond to, or investigate 
an act of terrorism. (TX)
Records assembled, prepared or maintained 
to prevent, mitigate or respond to terrorist 
acts or the threat of terrorist acts. (WV)
Exemptions for Sources and Methods (3)
Information identifying confidential 
sources or disclosing confidential surveil-
lance or investigations or investigative or 
prosecution material. (GA)
Investigatory records that identify confi-
dential sources and their information, or 
reveals investigative techniques and pro-
cedures not generally known outside the 
government, or endangering safety of law-
enforcement personnel. (DC)
Law enforcement records that identify 
informants, disclose investigatory tech-
niques, and reveal contents of wiretaps or 
other surveillance. (SC)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Provisions for Information Sharing (5)
Allows for information sharing of spe-
cialized details of security arrangements 
or investigations. Also for communicable 
disease reports by a new office of pre-
paredness, security and fire safety. Re-
quires disclosure of records on the funding 
of security arrangements and investiga-
tions. (CO)
Allows for release of information from 
investigative files on a limited basis to 
persons whose health and safety may be 
affected. (NH)
Provides for law enforcement information 
sharing. (VA)
Intelligence information and investiga-
tive records dealing with terrorist acts or 
threats may be shared with federal and 
international law-enforcement agencies. 
(WV)
Specific intelligence information and spe-
cific investigative records shared by fed-
eral and international law enforcement 
agencies. (OH)
Other (2)
Expanded the exemption for security re-
cords of public safety agencies to other 
public bodies and includes meetings. 
(OR)
Permits closure of regional counterterror-
ism task force meetings called to discuss 
sensitive law enforcement, threat assess-
ment, or facility safety information. (PA)
Protecting Our Security – On All Fronts
When victory in our nation’s third great war was 
finally in sight, though still a long way off, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt used his 11th State of 
the Union address to urge the country to turn its 
thinking from the demands of wartime security to 
longer term concerns – to the nation’s “economic 
security, social security and moral security.” 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Only when we have established each of these, he 
said, will we have gained true and total national 
security. 
Today, our nation is engaged in a self-declared 
“war” against terrorism, a very different kind of 
conflict involving hostile ideologies that tran-
scend nation-state boundaries. The weapons and 
methods are unconventional. It is a war, as we saw 
on Sept. 11, 2001, that involves using our assets as 
weapons against us. 
The governmental response to this new threat, es-
pecially at the federal level, has followed a more 
traditional path. It has at times created its own 
threats to individual security – the loss of our civil 
liberties and rights. And it has endangered another 
form of security critical to our democratic system 
and our way of life – the public’s right to know. 
States Moved More Cautiously than 
Washington
Many of our states have stronger open records and 
open meetings traditions than those found in Wash-
ington, and so it is not surprising that these states 
were more cautious than the federal government 
as they acted following 9/11 to protect informa-
tion that might be useful to terrorists. In drafting 
safeguarding legislation, many state lawmakers 
tried to anticipate the collateral consequences. In 
doing so, they set standards for the withholding 
of information, establishing criteria designed to 
avoid unnecessary secrecy. Sometimes lawmak-
ers put in critical caveats or disclaimers, hoping 
to insure that security concerns would not over-
whelm other public health, welfare and account-
ability concerns. 
For example, North Carolina provided that the 
new exemptions did not cover budget authoriza-
tions and expenditures used to implement public 
security plans and security measures, or for the 
construction, renovation, or repair of public build-
ings and infrastructure facilities. 
Similarly, Missouri, in protecting operational 
guidelines and policies for first responders, made 
it clear that it was not exempting records on ex-
penditures, purchases, or contracts – areas critical 
to maintaining the accountability of the agencies 
involved. 
Missouri also added an important caveat in setting 
out a protection for security-related information 
that is voluntarily submitted. It said the exemption 
does not apply to information already in the public 
record, thus preventing agencies and private enti-
ties from using a security exemption to seal non-
sensitive information they would prefer the public 
not know about. 
West Virginia, in providing for the withholding of 
information on terrorism security, declared that 
the new law did not create an exemption for infor-
mation related to any immediate threat to public 
health or safety that is unrelated to a terrorist act 
or the threat.
Kentucky, after laying out a long list of exempt-
ed information, added this important qualifier: 
“Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the obliga-
tions of a public agency with respect to disclosure 
and availability of public records under state envi-
ronmental, health, and safety programs.”
Iowa sought to balance its concerns about terror-
ism with the public’s right to know which facili-
ties are considered critical infrastructure by pro-
viding that lists of critical assets could be viewed 
but not copied
Connecticut, in exempting water company vulner-
ability assessments, said those documents must be 
maintained as separate and discrete from other re-
cords about the facilities that the public is entitled 
to see. 
Some states presented their security-based exemp-
tions as a last option.
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Oklahoma exempted certain technology informa-
tion but “only if” that disclosure revealed such 
sensitive information as functional schematics 
and system configuration.
Similarly, Maryland provided that inspection of 
sensitive records could be denied “only to the 
extent” that disclosure would jeopardize security 
or facilitate the planning of a terrorist attack or 
endanger the life or safety of an individual. At a 
minimum, that language suggests a need to care-
fully review individual documents and redact sen-
sitive information, rather than broadly withhold 
records.
Tennessee said its new exemptions should not be 
construed by non-affected agencies to limit access 
to their public records.
Virginia said its exemptions should not be read 
to prohibit disclosure of information relating to 
the structural or environmental soundness of any 
building, nor to prevent disclosure of information 
in connection with an inquiry into building per-
formance after it has been subjected to fire, explo-
sion, natural disaster or other catastrophic event.
Ohio insisted that its new law safeguarding vulner-
ability assessment information should not be con-
strued to allow the owner or operator of chemical 
facility to withhold information the public is en-
titled to review under other state or federal laws.
Setting the Bar for Non-Disclosure 
Decisions
In the wake of 9/11, Florida and a few other states 
adopted specific, narrow statutory exemptions 
to their public records and meetings laws. Most, 
however, exempted categories of information, an 
approach consistent with their existing records 
laws. In doing so, they all but universally pro-
vided qualifying language that reflected concerns 
about the new restrictions on the public’s right to 
know. These new laws set out standards or crite-
ria for officials to meet in making non-disclosure 
decisions.
For example, Nevada provided that the governor 
establish specific exemptions by executive or-
der, and in doing so find that the each disclosure 
“would create a substantial likelihood of compro-
mising, jeopardizing or otherwise threatening the 
public health, safety or welfare.”
These standards, I believe, offer important insights 
into concerns that state lawmakers had in trying to 
find the appropriate balance between national se-
curity needs and other public interests, including 
everyday safety, governmental accountability, and 
the public’s right to know. 
In the language of many of the state post 9/11 stat-
utes there is a clear indication of concern about 
the consequences that secrecy measures may have 
on other societal and democratic values. For in-
stance, the authority to withhold information from 
the public in Alaska, Idaho, Illinois and Maine is 
granted “only to the extent” that release of infor-
mation jeopardizes security interests. That lan-
guage serves to narrow both the scope of the ex-
emption and the frequency of its use. 
Most states used the auxiliary verb “would” in 
setting the standard for non-disclosure, thus man-
dating that officials find that the release of infor-
mation would create a clear and present danger, 
rather than allowing withholding of records sim-
ply when harm is theoretical or hypothetical. 
Lawmakers then went further, using a variety of 
phrases to establish the criteria for non-disclosure. 
These measures provided an exemption if disclos-
ing the information would
Compromise security (ID & IL) 
Impair a public body’s ability to protect 
the security or safety of persons or prop-
erty. (MI) 
Create a substantial likelihood of endan-
gering public safety or property; computer 
•
•
•
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or communications network schema, pass-
words, and user identification names; guard 
schedules; or lock combinations. (NE)
Substantially threaten the public’s safety. 
(NV)
Be likely to compromise, jeopardize or 
otherwise threaten safety of the public. 
(NV)
Jeopardize security or would create a risk 
to the safety of persons, property, electron-
ic data or software. (NJ) 
Jeopardize the safety of governmental per-
sonnel or the general public or the security 
of any governmental facility (or) informa-
tion storage system. (NC)
Jeopardize the security of any building, 
structure, or facility; facilitate planning 
of a terrorist attack; endanger the life or 
physical safety of an individual.
Threaten public safety or the public health. 
(WV)
Have a substantial likelihood of threaten-
ing public safety. (WA) 
In a few instances, state lawmakers chose the more 
conditional “could,” allowing non –disclosure if 
there was a possibility rather than the certainty of 
harm. In those instances, however, they imposed a 
standard of reasonableness: 
Could reasonably be expected to be det-
rimental to the public safety or welfare. 
(AL)
could reasonably be expected to interfere 
with the implementation or enforcement 
of the security plan; disclose confidential 
guidelines for investigations; endanger 
life or physical safety; present a real and 
substantial risk to the public health and 
welfare. (AK)
Could reasonably be expected to jeopar-
dize such employees, visitors, persons, or 
property. The information, if disclosed, 
would significantly increase the vulner-
ability of critical physical systems or in-
frastructures. (IA)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Could reasonably be expected to interfere 
with the implementation or enforcement 
of the security plan, would disclose confi-
dential guidelines for investigations. (AK)
Several states required subsequent reporting on 
records taken off the books as a result of the new 
authority granted to state and local agencies. 
Nevada lawmakers, in giving the Department of 
Information Technology the authority to withhold 
sensitive information, insisted on full reporting of 
the records made confidential. The department’s 
director must keep a list of every record and por-
tion of a record declared confidential, and review 
each every other year, reporting to the legislature 
on whether each should remain sealed. 
Missouri, in granting agencies the authority to re-
strict access to information about computer sys-
tems and security plans, mandated that agencies 
“declare in writing” that disclosure of the infor-
mation would jeopardize public safety and secu-
rity and that the security risk involved outweighs 
the public interest in disclosure.
Several states imposed sunset provisions, allow-
ing the new laws to expire unless subsequently 
reenacted. Arkansas sunset a bill safeguarding 
water system security records and Florida and 
Missouri sunset bills exempting building and se-
curity plans. 
Defining Terrorism
A few states put a definition with their safeguard-
ing provisions. In doing so, they spelled out the 
scope of their concerns.
Maine said it was protecting against “conduct de-
signed to cause serious bodily injury or substantial 
risk of bodily injury to multiple persons, substan-
tial damage to multiple structures, or substantial 
physical damage sufficient to disrupt critical in-
frastructure; 
•
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Nevada defined terrorism as “any act that in-
volves the use or attempted use of sabotage, co-
ercion or violence intended to cause great bodily 
harm or death to the general population; or cause 
substantial destruction, contamination or impair-
ment buildings, infrastructure, communications, 
transportation, utilities or services; any natural re-
source or the environment.” 
Kansas described terrorism as more than physi-
cal violence. It is “an act intended to intimidate 
or coerce a public agency or the civilian popula-
tion; disrupt a utility or communications system; 
destroy a public building or facility.”
All this legislative activity aimed at the prevention 
or mitigation of potential terrorist attacks raises 
obvious questions. 
Are we safer? 
Should we do still more? 
Have we gone too far? 
Are We Safer?
The answer to the first question is that we sim-
ply do not know. That is both the nature of the 
threat and a consequence of the response, which 
has wrapped so much of what federal and state 
governments are doing to prevent terrorism in a 
shroud of secrecy. 
The Congressional Research Service all but threw 
up its hands in its March 2007 report to Congress 
on implementation of critical infrastructure safe-
guards. CRS said it is still unclear how many criti-
cal sites there are, how many of those sites have 
been visited, how many have had their vulnerabil-
ities assessed, and how many have developed and 
implemented buffer zone protection plans. That 
means, of course, that most members of Congress 
don’t know the status of the infrastructure security 
measures. It also means the public is even further 
in the shadows. 
•
•
•
The Department of Homeland Security has yet to 
report, for instance, on how many infrastructure 
owners (85% of the nation’s critical infrastructure 
is privately owned) have provided security related 
information and how many protection plans have 
passed muster. The only public information comes 
from the DHS response to a lawsuit almost three 
years ago. In February 2005, the department said 
it had received all of 29 voluntary submissions of 
sensitive security information from private infra-
structure owners and that it had accepted 22 of 
those as Critical Infrastructure Information that 
would be held as confidential. 
The public remains very much in the dark, and in 
the absence of any new terrorist incident, that lack 
of knowledge on the efficacy of the existing pro-
grams is likely to make it difficult to gain public 
support for any new secrecy-expanding legisla-
tion. 
Should We Do Still More?
It’s doubtful you will find anyone involved with 
national security or anti-terrorism who would an-
swer “no.” There is, however, considerable dis-
agreement on what is most needed, at both the 
national and the state levels. 
After 9/11, there was a wave of legislation pro-
mulgating measures that followed a traditional 
risk averse approach to the safeguarding of infor-
mation considered potentially useful to a terrorist 
intent on causing public harm. The quick and easy 
solution was more secrecy. But as the intelligence 
and law enforcement efforts leading up to 9/11 
were more fully analyzed and the nature of the ter-
rorist threat more fully assessed, the national se-
curity conversation has turned to risk assessment 
and the need to significantly improve information 
sharing across all levels of government and with 
appropriate private sectors. 
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“Poor information sharing was the single greatest 
failure of our government in the lead-up to the 9/11 
attacks,” the 9/11 Commission Vice Chair, Lee H. 
Hamilton told Congress in November 2005. “The 
failure to share information adequately, within and 
across federal agencies, and from federal agencies 
to state and local authorities, was a significant 
contributing factor to our government’s missteps 
in understanding and responding to the growing 
threat of al Qaeda in the years before the 9/11 at-
tacks.”
In recent months, there have been several con-
gressional hearings on information sharing prob-
lems and possibilities, focusing on shortcomings 
at both the federal and state levels. This confer-
ence may wish to consider how state efforts could 
be improved. The state laws put in place after 9/11 
do not speak to the quantity or quality of informa-
tion shared, or to the effectiveness of its use once 
received. Most do little more than permit state and 
local officials to treat as confidential shared infor-
mation, something they are required to do anyway 
under federal non-disclosure agreements they 
must sign to get the information. 
What many states have done, without specific new 
legislative authorization, is move to create fusion 
centers – multi-agency intelligence units designed 
to integrate information streams from national 
intelligence sources with those of the local and 
state agencies and to make sure that each of the 
agencies involved has the information it needs to 
be effective. There are now some 40 such centers 
across the country. 
These fusion centers, described in one recent re-
port as “maturing,” are learning about a kind of in-
telligence far different than traditionally practiced 
by law enforcement, and about its very different 
uses. Through the working partnerships, they are 
developing the mutual trust that is a predicate to 
the sharing of information. But many state offi-
cials feel the federal government is still not shar-
ing enough information, or the “right” informa-
tion, limiting the terrorism-related work of the 
centers. One result is that the centers are diver-
sifying, evolving from their initial terror intelli-
gence missions to full-service intelligence sharing 
operations with increased emphasis on non-terror-
ist crimes. 
The hearings over the spring and summer also sug-
gest that Congress is no longer focused on expand-
ing secrecy but rather on limiting it and expand-
ing the sharing of information. Given these shifts 
in outlook, it may be appropriate, as we consider 
possible new state laws that make structural and 
procedural changes to enhance national security, 
to also think about measures that would enhance 
the prospects of genuine information sharing and 
permit more thoughtful risk-assessment analysis 
and response. 
Have the states got the statutory balance right? The 
Heritage Foundation and the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies offered this caution in a 
December, 2004 report: “It is necessary to strike 
the right balances in sharing information with or 
withholding information from the public. Policies 
that are either overly neglectful or overzealous ill 
serve efforts to enhance homeland security.” 
John Gilligan, a former chief information officer 
for the Air Force, put national security and terror-
ism in a strong information sharing context at a 
November 2005 conference sponsored by the In-
formation Security Oversight Office and the Uni-
versity of Maryland: “Today, the concern is global 
terrorism, an amorphous threat with no geographic 
or national base, with a potential for small, focused 
attacks. In that environment, information sharing 
is the best way to protect against the threat.”
To which Joe Markowitz, a 24 year veteran of the 
CIA, added, “Running faster is better than keeping 
secrets.” Stephen Hannestad, director of research 
at Maryland’s College of Information Studies 
said, “Information sharing is and must be unstruc-
tured and dynamic. There’s a far greater need for 
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a shift of information down to the local commu-
nity, to the first providers, because the threat has 
changed.”
Gilligan said that as a nation we must move from 
a risk-averse system that tries to hide information 
from all but the chosen few to a risk management 
approach that deals proactively with potential 
threats. That risk management approach was ad-
vocated a few days later by William P. Crowell, 
who headed the Markle Task Force on National 
Security in The Information Age. “We need to 
create an Information Sharing Environment that 
fundamentally changes the way we think about 
the business of national and homeland securi-
ty,” he told a House Intelligence subcommittee. 
“There are security risks not only from informa-
tion falling into the wrong hands, but also from 
information failing to find its way into the right 
hands. The risk of release and sharing should be 
balanced with the risk of not sharing.” He added, 
“The government’s current approach to protecting 
classified information does not recognize this risk 
from failing to share. As wrenching as it is, the 
government must move to a risk management ap-
proach…You cannot connect dots that you cannot 
access.” While Crowell was aiming his remarks at 
the federal government, its cumbersome classifi-
cation system and the insularity of its intelligence 
community, his point has strong applicability to 
the states. 
Do the current state laws need to be rethought? 
Are they the product of the same outdated, risk-
averse culture of information safeguarding and 
classification that grew out of the Cold War? Or 
do they in fact provide ways to manage those risks 
that a broadly troubled world thrusts upon us? Do 
they facilitate the “need to share” and minimize 
the structural stovepipes that secrecy’s “need to 
know” constructs as an impediment to effective 
security intelligence, planning and response? 
The series of congressional hearings on informa-
tion sharing and terrorism included an April field 
trip to Seattle where several robust local-state-na-
tional-private sector information sharing partner-
ships have been established. Officials involved 
with those fusion centers repeatedly told their 
representatives that federal agencies aren’t shar-
ing enough information and often make things too 
complicated for local officers not trained in fed-
eral intelligence ways and means. 
Seattle Police Chief R. Gil Kerlikowske said the 
biggest impediment to information sharing is that 
“we remain tethered to the federally centered vi-
sion of intelligence information management…
For all the stated commitment to derive intelli-
gence requirements and priorities from the ‘bot-
tom up` – the front lines of local law enforcement 
– many decisions still originate from somewhere 
inside the beltway, and specifically within DHS 
and the FBI.”
Kerlikowske said it is difficult for local law en-
forcement officials to get security clearances in a 
timely manner. He added that sharing is prohibited 
for vast categories of information unless brokered 
by the FBI, noting that even though he has top se-
cret clearance, he does not have direct access “to 
even the most benign information.” At that and 
the other hearings, state law enforcement officials 
made the point that fusion centers are rewriting 
the intelligence practices of local and state law en-
forcement agencies and creating new information 
sharing paradigms that may require the states to 
look again at their laws to make sure they facili-
tate rather than hinder the new approaches. 
Mark Zadra, Assistant Commissioner, Florida De-
partment of Law Enforcement, talked about that 
shift. “Prior to 9/11, law enforcement agencies at 
all levels had little need to share sensitive informa-
tion with non law enforcement agencies…We had 
limited experience with federally classified infor-
mation. Little consideration was given to sharing 
sensitive information outside the law enforcement 
community, and sharing information with the pri-
vate sector was generally not done.” 
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“The paradigm shifted after 9/11 when it became 
known that fourteen or more of the hijackers had 
lived, worked, traveled and trained across Florida 
while planning the atrocities they would ultimate-
ly commit. In their daily activities they left many 
clues that, if viewed together, may have predicted 
the plan and given authorities an opportunity to 
avert the catastrophic consequences.” 
The FBI’s Wayne M. Murphy, Assistant Direc-
tor, Directorate of Intelligence Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, told members of Congress in June 
2007 that the government has “the capacity” to 
rapidly make information available to a broad set 
of partners. The trick, he said, is to make the shar-
ing a benefit to the partners, not a burden.
Then he added a caution: “Most important of all, 
we must respect the power of that information and 
the impact it holds for the rights and civil liberties 
of the American people who have entrusted us as 
its stewards. That also means that we must never 
use ‘control’ as a way to deny the public access to 
information to which they are entitled.” 
Have We Gone Too Far?
A principal concern of many, including this au-
thor, focuses on the unintended consequences 
of secrecy – the withholding of information that 
restricts our knowledge of both government and 
private operations that have traditionally been 
subject to public oversight. That oversight instills 
an accountability that works to prevent or restrain 
misfeasance. In the absence of that oversight and 
accountability, we worry about the extent to which 
this new security-induced secrecy may be manip-
ulated for reasons that have nothing to do with na-
tional security. Without openness and traditional 
public oversight, including media reporting, how 
do we ensure: 
Operational and fiscal integrity of public 
facilities.
Effective regulatory review and decision-
making of private facilities.
•
•
Safety and public health protections unre-
lated to terrorism issues. 
These elements speak to a different but very im-
portant kind of security. We call this Critical Over-
sight Information (COI), and we believe it must 
be given significant consideration in the writing of 
any legislation governing the public’s security. 
To a major degree, these oversight activities take 
place at the state and local levels, which may ex-
plain why the Department of Homeland Security 
has been largely oblivious to them in crafting its 
critical infrastructure and transportation security 
regulations, and why it so blithely talks about pre-
empting state records laws that facilitate citizen 
oversight. This past spring, DHA adopted an In-
terim Final Rule on chemical plant security, stat-
ing that any “law, regulation, or administrative 
action” of a state or local government, or any ac-
tion of a state court is invalid if it “conflicts with, 
hinders, poses an obstacle to or frustrates the pur-
poses” of its new rule. 
DHS reassured that it does not intend to preempt 
existing health, safety and environmental regula-
tions “at this time” but warned that it plans to re-
view future local and state law promulgated “un-
der the rubric of health, safety or environmental 
protections” to make sure they aren’t in conflict 
with the new DHS rule. 
Then it took a further step to demonstrate that it has 
little concern about those issues that most concern 
local and state governments -- the fears of the sur-
rounding communities. It rejected “at this time” a 
request to keep local communities informed about 
plant compliance with security requirements.
It is important to the safety of our communities 
and the health of our local and state governments 
that robust public oversight continues, whatever 
the security concerns. This conference would per-
form a special public service if it were able to of-
fer recommendations designed to encourage and 
•
2	 Selected	Essays	on	State	Open	Goernment	Law	and	Practice	in	a	Post-9/11	World
guide approaches that would boost security with-
out restricting Critical Oversight Information. 
The last of the COI elements listed above is the 
public’s health and safety. Unfortunately, some 
laws enacted in the name of national security since 
9/11 have come into conflict with state laws and 
local regulations designed to inform and guaran-
tee citizen safety. 
Some examples:
Last January, journalists and civic activists visited 
more than 400 local emergency planning offices 
across the country, asking for a copy of the Com-
prehensive Emergency Response Plan – a docu-
ment containing information on protections against 
and response to hazardous materials spills.
Community, labor and environmental organiza-
tions had fought hard in the 1980s for the pub-
lic’s right to know about hazardous chemicals 
and safety provisions in their communities. That 
fight resulted in the federal Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EP-
CRA). The act requires that each local planning 
office update an emergency response plan annu-
ally and then let the public know the plan is avail-
able for inspection. Yet when asked in 2007 for a 
copy of the plan, more than one-third of the local 
offices refused and another 20 percent provided 
only a portion of the document. Most cited nation-
al security for their refusal. Many local officials 
believed releasing the information violated state 
law adopted since 9/11. 
In July, the House Subcommittee on Infrastruc-
ture Protection heard testimony on chemical plant 
safety. John Alexander, a safety specialist for the 
United Steelworkers, complained that workers, 
those most affected, were being kept in the dark. 
He made a strong argument for thoughtful separa-
tion of sensitive information, which must be kept 
secret for security reasons, and not so sensitive 
information, which could be shared to enhance 
the workers sense of security and personal safety 
measures.
“There is no question that some information should 
be protected from public disclosure. Which tanks 
contain which chemicals is an example,” he said. 
“At the same time, a potential terrorist with knowl-
edge of chemical engineering will almost always 
be able to determine what chemicals may be on 
the site taken as a whole. Hiding that information 
from the public serves no legitimate purpose.” 
He went on to argue that there are good reasons 
for the public to know about the dangers posed by 
nearby chemical facilities. “Community residents 
should have the right to know the risks they face, 
so they can work to reduce those risks.” That, of 
course, was one of the purposes of the EPCRA 
legislation 21 years earlier.
In the summer of 2007, after the collapse of the 
35-W bridge in Minneapolis, hundreds of news or-
ganizations obtained bridge inspection data from 
the Federal Highway Administration and reported 
to their readers on the condition of local bridges. 
Those records showed hundreds of bridges around 
the country in the same or worse condition as the 
Minneapolis bridge that collapsed. 
State transportation officials in Florida and Texas 
initially refused requests. In fact, the Texas De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) even said “no” 
to the chair of the state Senate’s transportation 
committee. A spokesman for the department of-
fered this explanation: “If a legislator requests 
such information in writing AND indicates the in-
formation is for legislative purposes, information 
may be provided. There must be an agreement or 
understanding that the requested information may 
not be shared further or with the public."
Virginia’s Department of Transportation (VDOT) 
said it would continue to make available the over-
all inspection ratings and definitions that explain 
why one structure may be rated higher than another 
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but that it would not release specific information 
on which bridge components were the weakest. 
VDOT officials said they are concerned that the 
specific information could provide terrorists with 
details that would permit them to inflict significant 
damage with relatively little effort. “We’re trying 
to balance the public’s right to know with its need 
to know,” Malcolm T. Kerley, the department’s 
chief engineer. “If we have a bridge in a certain 
structural condition, we’re not going to show peo-
ple where the weakest points might be.” 
The U.S. Department of Transportation sent a 
memo to state transportation agencies in August 
cautioning against release of detailed information, 
such as drawings and inspection reports, saying 
that concerns had been raised “that while release 
of such information might be useful to educate 
and inform the public, the information might also 
be used by persons planning to conduct terrorist or 
criminal acts.” 
Many government inspection records on “critical 
infrastructure” were taken offline after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks for security reasons. 
The Dallas Morning News reported this summer 
that the Army Corps of Engineers has not released 
dam inspection data since shortly after 9/11. Dams 
are required to be inspected every five years. The 
2002 report showed there were 700 dams locat-
ed near large population areas that had not been 
inspected for at least 10 years. Have those dams 
been inspected since then? Are they safe? Is gov-
ernment doing its job? That information is not 
public.
Does this sealing of information actually protect 
the public? Or does it put the public at greater 
risk? When information like this is kept secret, 
citizens are forced to rely on the respective agen-
cies to properly monitor safety and inspection data 
and then to see that the problems are fixed once 
identified. We know from Hurricane Katrina in 
New Orleans, the Big Dig in Boston, and most re-
cently the bridge collapse in Minneapolis that this 
doesn’t always happen.
It is essential, as we look at the state laws that 
have been written since 9/11 and discuss new leg-
islation, that we consider the relationship between 
national security and other forms of security and 
that we strive for a balance that maximizes each. 
We must perform a risk assessment that balances:
The protection of infrastructure and popu-
lation from terrorist acts.
The sharing of information between pub-
lic sectors and private sectors to assure 
both effective prevention and effective re-
sponse.
The daily and continuing health and safety 
of the citizenry. 
The operational integrity and efficiency of 
publicly run or regulated facilities. 
This may involve some new techniques and infor-
mation approaches, such as the applying the intel-
ligence community’s tear line approach to certain 
public records, finding other ways to segregate 
sensitive information without sealing entire docu-
ments and retraining public employees in the han-
dling of these new form of records; creating vetted 
inspectors general who would assume a fiduciary 
oversight in areas where the public access to ac-
countability information must preempted for se-
curity considerations; and adopting sunset provi-
sions designed to reopen information to the public 
as quickly as its short-term sensitivity has passed. 
Suzanne Spaulding, a consultant and former as-
sistant general counsel for the CIA, told Congress 
this spring that “the danger of not classifying in-
formation that is indeed damaging to national se-
curity is well understood. What is not as widely 
appreciated in the national security risk of over-
classification.”
Similarly, I believe we need to be concerned about 
the tendency to over-legislate secrecy in the be-
•
•
•
•
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lief it will solve our terrorism security problems. 
It won’t, but it will put at risk other securities that 
are very important to our way of life. 
Should There Be a Model Law?
There is still another question raised by this review 
and the explorations of this conference: Should 
there be a model law? 
My own view is that a model law is neither a prag-
matic nor a wise outcome. Its drafting would be 
a largely academic exercise that could constrain 
rather than advance the many valuable ideas we 
expect this conference to generate. 
While the states generally start from the presump-
tion that records and meetings are public unless 
exempted, even the quickest review of the volu-
minous report compiled by the Reporters Com-
mittee on existing state laws demonstrates how 
varied the states are in statutory approach and lan-
guage. And some legislatures, like Florida’s, oper-
ate within the very specific constraints set out in 
their constitutions. No “model law” is going to fit 
neatly within many, if any, existing state codes. 
Nor is it likely that a single, “model” answer will 
emerge in all of the areas that are being explored, 
or that there is a single best approach for each state. 
The diversity of the states and of the laws adopted 
after 9/11 clearly suggests the states weigh their 
security and other public needs quite differently. 
Similarly, we suspect there will not be a consensus 
in many of the subject areas covered in this con-
ference, and there will be insufficient agreement 
to fashion model legislation for that mythical “any 
state.”
We need also keep in mind that the federal gov-
ernment has been moving inexorably to preempt 
state decision making, and the availability of state 
records and information, quite possibly making 
more restrictive state law unnecessary. Indeed, the 
discussions at this conference may lead us to con-
clude that the best outcome in some subject areas 
is to suggest the states push back or hold back the 
federal efforts to turn what is and should remain 
public oversight information into new secrets. 
The conference should consider not the drafting of 
a model law but rather the formulation of a set of 
broad principles designed to balance the compet-
ing values and interests, and a set of guidelines 
on the individual areas where our conversations 
suggest new or modified legislation might be 
needed. 
This approach will be far more helpful, and almost 
certainly less polarizing.
1.2 Florida’s Response to 9/11: The Impact 
on Open Government
by Barbara A. Petersen
It is time also to assert certain American funda-
mentals, foremost of which is the right to know 
what government is doing, and the corresponding 
ability to judge its performance
—Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan1
Introduction: Florida’s Open Government 
Laws
 Florida has a very long, very rich tradition of 
open government—our first open meetings law 
was enacted in 19052 and the first public records 
law in 1909.3 This exceptional tradition of public 
1 U.S. Congress, Senate Comm’n on Protecting 
& Reducing Gov’t Secrecy, S. Doc. 105-2, 103d Cong. 
(1997). 
2 The 1905 open meetings law, ch. 5463, applied 
only to municipalities and was rendered virtually meaning-
less by a Florida Supreme Court decision nearly 50 years 
later. See Turk v. Richard, 47 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1950). The 
current law, § 286.011, F.S., was enacted in 1967. Fla. Ch. 
No 67-356.
3 Ch. 5492, 1909 Fla. Laws. Actually, the very first 
public records law, which provided that all records of the 
clerks of court “shall always be open to the public…for 
the purpose of inspection thereof, and of making extracts 
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access to government information culminated in 
the 1992 general election with passage of a new 
constitutional amendment guaranteeing a right 
of access to the records of all three branches of 
state government4 and to “[a]ll meetings of any 
collegial public body of the executive branch of 
state government or of any…county municipality, 
school district, or special district at which official 
acts are to be taken or at which public business…
is to be transacted or discussed.”5
 The breadth of Florida’s open government 
laws is most apparent when the definition and 
interpretation of key words used in the statutes 
are considered. “Public records,” for example, is 
broadly defined in statute as:
…all documents, papers, letters, maps, 
books, tapes, photographs, films, sound 
recordings, data processing software, or 
other material, regardless of the physical 
form, characteristics, or means of transmis-
sion, made or received pursuant to law or 
ordinance or in connection with the trans-
action of official business by any agency.6
therefrom” was enacted in 1892. Fla. Rev. S. 1390 – 1391.
4 Fla. Const. Art 1, § 24(a). Specifically, the 
amendment guarantees the “right to inspect and copy any 
public records made or received in connection with the 
official business of any public body, officer, or employee of 
the state, or persons acting on their behalf,” including “the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government 
and each agency or department created thereunder; coun-
ties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional 
officer, board and commission, or entity created pursuant 
to law or th[e] Constitution.” Id. Under the amendment, 
all exemptions in effect on the amendment’s effective date 
– July 1, 1993 – remain in force until repealed, as are all 
rules of court adopted prior to the November 1992 elec-
tion which control access to judicial records. The Florida 
Supreme Court adopted rules restricting access to certain 
judicial records, and the Legislature passed legislation 
regulating access to its records during Special Session 
1993 B. See In re Amendment to Rules of Judicial Admin. 
– Public Access to Judicial Records, No. 80-419 (Fla. Oct. 
29, 1992) (amending Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.051) (subse-
quently renumbered as Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.420); and 
Fla. SB 20-B (1993).
5 Fla. Const. Art 1, § 24(b).
6 Fla. Stat. § 119.011(11) (2007). The Florida Su-
preme Court has interpreted this definition to include any 
material made or received by an agency “which is intended 
 A “meeting” for the purposes of the Sunshine 
Law is “any gathering, whether formal or casual, 
of two or more members of the same board or 
commission to discuss some matter on which fore-
seeable action will be taken by the public board or 
commission.” 7
 The word “person”- those who have a right of 
access to the records and meetings of government- 
is defined in §1.01(3), of the Florida Statutes, to 
include not only individuals, but also “firms, as-
sociations, joint []ventures, partnerships, estates, 
trusts…corporations, and all other groups or com-
binations.” Prior to 1975, the right of access to re-
cords was limited to state citizens, but today “the 
law provides any member of the public access to 
public records, whether he or she be the most out-
standing civic citizen or the most heinous crimi-
nal,”8 and a requestor’s “motive in seeking access 
to public records is irrelevant.”9 Additionally, as 
a general rule, a person who makes a public re-
cords request or simply attends a public meeting 
cannot be required to provide identification. Thus, 
to perpetuate, communicate or formalize knowledge” 
having to do with public business. See Shevin v. Byron, 
Harless, Schaffer, Reid and Associates, Inc., 379 So. 2d 
633, 640 (Fla. 1980). This includes “all of the information” 
stored on a computer. Seigle v. Barry, 422 So. 2d 63, 65 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1982), pet. for review denied, 431 So. 2d 
988 (Fla. 1983).
7 Office of the Att’y General, Florida’s Govern-
ment-in-the-Sunshine and Public Records Law Manual 15 
(Vol. 29 2007) [citing Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1973); City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 
So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971); Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Broward 
County v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); and Wolfson 
v. State, 344 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)] (emphasis in 
the original) [hereinafter 2007 Manual].
8 Church of Scientology Flag Service Org., Inc. 
v. Wood, No. 97-688CI-07 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. February 27, 
1997).
9 Timoney v. City of Miami Civilian Investigative 
Panel, 917 So. 2d 885, 886 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). See 
also Curry v. State, 811 So. 2d 736, 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2002); Staton v. McMillan, 597 So. 2d 940, 941 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1992), review denied sub nom, Staton v. Austin, 605 
So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1992); Lorei v. Smith, 464 So. 2d 1330, 
1332 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), review denied, 475 So. 2d 695 
(Fla. 1985); and News-Press Publishing Company, Inc. v 
Gadd, 388 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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anyone seeking access to Florida government - 
whether through a request for public records or at-
tendance at a public meeting - can do so virtually 
anonymously.10 
 Furthermore, there is a presumption of open-
ness under Florida law - that is, we presume that 
all agency records are subject to public disclosure 
and that any meeting of two or more members of 
the same collegial body at which public business 
is to be transacted or discussed will be open to the 
public. Because the Florida Constitution provides 
that only the Legislature can create exemptions 
to the public records and sunshine laws, there’s 
no balancing of interests by a government agency 
or even the courts: a request for records can be 
denied or a meeting closed only if an agency has 
specific statutory authority.11 
 Finally, the Florida courts have consistently 
held that the right of access conferred by both the 
public records law and sunshine law - which were 
enacted for the public benefit - must be liberally 
construed in favor of open government and that any 
exception to that right of access must be narrowly 
construed and strictly applied. The right of access, 
then, “is virtually unfettered, save only the statutory 
exemptions designed to achieve a balance between 
an informed public and the ability of the govern-
ment to maintain secrecy in the public interest.”12
10 See 2007 Manual, p. 42 (meetings) and pp. 112 
– 113 (records).
11 See Fla. Const. Art 1, § 24(c). Under Art. I, 
s. 24(c), only the Florida legislature is allowed to create 
exemptions to the records and meetings requirements. Any 
exemption, however, must (1) pass by a two-thirds vote of 
each chamber, (2) contain a specific statement of public 
necessity, (3) be no broader than it’s stated purpose, and 
(4) be in a single subject bill. Id. “Exemption” is defined as 
“a provision of general law which provides that a specific 
record or meeting, or portion thereof, is not subject to the 
access requirements of § 119.071(1), § 286.011, or § 24, 
Art. I of the State Constitution.” Fla. Stat. § 119.011(8) 
(2007). Prior to enactment of the constitutional guarantee 
of access, the Florida Supreme Court had held that only 
the Legislature could create exemptions to the state’s open 
government laws. See Wait v. Florida Power and Light 
Company, 372 So. 2d 420, 425 (Fla.1979).
12 Times Publishing Company v. City of St. Peters-
burg, 558 So. 2d 487, 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). See also 
 As the horror of 9/11 unfolded, public offi-
cials at all levels of government all over Florida 
scrambled to ‘find’ an exemption that would al-
low them to deny access to sensitive, security - 
related documents and to close meetings at which 
security measures were to be discussed and evalu-
ated. The tension caused by the state’s historical 
presumption of openness in a suddenly security - 
conscious government was palpable, and govern-
ment officials and employees began to seriously 
question the efficacy of Florida’s long tradition of 
public access.
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: FLORIDA REACTS
 The most tangible change in Tallahassee post 
- 9/11 was the obvious and dramatic increase in 
security. Having grown up in security-conscious 
Washington, DC, I was surprised by the lack of se-
curity in the capital city - only our public schools 
and the Supreme Court had metal detectors prior 
to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. This meant that the 
thousands of visitors to the state Capitol could 
freely enter and wander the halls pretty much at 
will, watched over only by a handful of armed and 
friendly capitol police officers. On a typical day it 
was not unusual to see the Governor or Attorney 
General walking to or from their capital offices or 
grabbing a cup of coffee in the basement cafeteria 
and it was entirely possible that you might meet 
the Senate President or House Speaker on one of 
the building’s many elevators.13 
Krischer v. D’Amato, 674 So. 2d 909, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1996); Seminole County v. Wood, 512 So. 2d 1000, 1002 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 
1988); Tribune Company v. Public Records, 493 So 2d 480, 
483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), review denied sub nom., Gillum v. 
Tribune Company, 503 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1987); and Board 
of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So. 
2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
13 Security in the state capitol had been relatively lax 
prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In January 2000, two 
members of the Legislature’s Black Caucus, Sen. Kendrick 
Meek (D-Miami) and Rep. Tony Hill (D-Jacksonville), 
took over the Governor’s office suite for 20 hours, angry 
over the Governor’s position on affirmative action and his 
refusal to meet with them to discuss the issue. The Gov-
ernor eventually made several concessions, but only after 
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 This relaxed atmosphere abruptly changed. 
Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon the physical security of 
public buildings became critically important - par-
ticularly in Tallahassee, home to President George 
W. Bush’s brother, Jeb Bush, Florida’s governor. 
All entrances to the Capitol but one were closed, 
forcing everyone to enter and exit through the 
same door. A metal detector was installed, manned 
by heavily armed law enforcement officers, and 
everyone – lobbyists, school children, legisla-
tive and administrative staff – was individually 
screened before allowed into the building. Many 
of the stairways were locked, and for the first time 
in at least recent memory, there was an armed 
guard protecting the entrance to the Governor’s 
office.14
 Within hours of the terrorist attacks the morn-
ing of 9/11 government officials around the state 
began to review security system plans, and called 
emergency meetings to discuss existing plans and 
the obvious need for heightened security mea-
sures. Governor Jeb Bush quickly declared a state 
of emergency, signing Executive Order 01 - 262 15 
that same day “giving the state almost unrestricted 
power for 60 days to ‘regulate the movement of 
any and all persons to or from any location’ as 
well as ‘seize and utilize any and all real or per-
sonal property’.”16 Three days later, on September 
about 100 people supporting the two legislators waged a 
day-long sit-in outside the Governor’s office in the Capitol. 
See Steve Bousquet & Lesley Clark, Sit-In Ends, The Mi-
ami Herald, Jan. 20, 2000. 
14 See Editorial, The Daytona Beach News-Journal, 
Oct. 22, 2001. The new capitol security was truly tested 
during the Terri Schiavo controversy, when a small number 
of state Senators, opposed to legislation that would have 
allowed Ms. Schiavo’s parents to reinsert her feeding tube 
requested armed escort from their legislative offices to 
the Senate Chamber after threatening “wanted” posters 
with the Senators’ pictures were hung in the state Capitol. 
See Mark Caputo, Security Tightens Around Capitol, The 
Miami Herald, Mar. 23, 2005.
15 Fla. Exec. Order 01-262, Emergency Manage-
ment, Sept. 11, 2001.
16 Diane Roberts, Op-Ed: Sunshine Laws Remain 
Intact – So Far, St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 4, 2001 [here-
14, the Governor directed the Florida Department 
of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and the Florida Di-
vision of Emergency Management (FDEM) “to 
immediately complete a comprehensive assess-
ment of Florida’s capability to prevent, mitigate, 
and respond to a terrorist attack,” requesting a full 
report within two weeks.17
 The report contained a series of rather obvi-
ous and practical recommendations that included 
implementation of regional anti-terrorism task 
forces, a significant increase in law enforcement 
training and the purchase of necessary equipment, 
the collection and sharing of information, and co-
ordination of communication between state and 
federal agencies.18 Other recommendations which 
became a lightening rod for criticism by civil lib-
ertarians and a number of conservative legislators 
included a proposal that would allow law enforce-
ment “to detain for a reasonable period of time 
those individuals suspected of terrorist activities 
and involvement” and expansion of wiretap and 
surveillance capabilities.19 The report also made a 
inafter Roberts Nov. 4 Op-Ed]. The order was set to expire 
in November 2001, but was subsequently expanded until 
January 2002. See Lesley Clark, State Makes Security a 
Priority Despite Cost, The Miami Herald, Dec. 16, 2001.
17 See Florida Department of Law Enforcement and 
the State Division of Emergency Management, Assessing 
Florida’s Anti-Terrorism Capabilities, p. 1 (Sep. 2001) 
[hereinafter FDLE Report]. See also Fla. Exec. Order 01-
300, Oct. 11, 2001.
18 FDLE Report, p. 3 (implementation of regional 
anti-terrorism task forces; appropriate training for all 
response personnel); p. 4 (identify and obtain appropriate 
equipment); p. 4 (enhance retrieving, storing and sharing 
vital intelligence and investigative information); and p. 5 
(coordinate communication between responding agencies).
19 Id. at pp. 5–6. Larry Spalding of the American 
Civil Liberties Union expressed grave concerns not only 
about the expansion of police powers and the creation of 
secret files, but also the loss of privacy as government of-
ficials proposed “to lengthen the period suspected terrorists 
could be detained, conduct background checks on people 
who work in airports and seaports, and provide immunity 
from lawsuits for those who inform police about suspi-
cious activity or people.” Laura Zuckerman, Civil Liberties 
Groups Fear Loss of Privacy, The Daytona Beach News-
Journal, Oct. 3, 2001. Sen. Alex Villalobos, R-Miami, in 
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series of recommendations regarding the public’s 
right of access to government records.20 These 
recommendations would prove extremely contro-
versial in the coming months.
 In the meantime, concern among public offi-
cials in Florida rose to near panic as news reports 
about the terrorists’ activities in the weeks and 
months prior to 9/11 began to emerge. Fifteen of 
the nineteen terrorists involved in the attacks lived 
or trained in Florida. Thirteen had valid Florida 
drivers’ licenses. The state began to view itself “as 
a hotbed of terrorist training.”21 In response, the 
Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles shut down access to motor vehicle and 
driver history records, asking that “all agents of 
[the] department…refrain from processing public 
[record] requests” for such records “until further 
notice.”22 Attempting to justify the Department’s 
action, a spokesman for the department said the 
records had to be withheld in order to avoid com-
promising ongoing investigations and noted that 
response to the proposal to hold suspected terrorists while 
their arrests remained secret, expressed the concern “that 
we have a balancing question here about the right of the 
public to be protected but also the right of the accused to 
know what they are accused of.” In direct contrast, Sen. 
Ron Silver, D-North Miami Beach, had this response to the 
same proposal: “I know the constitution is out there, and I 
know we want to abide by it, but there’s some wiggle room 
there.” See Nancy Cook Lauer, Senate Panel Scrutinizes 
State Security, Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 11, 2001.
20 See FDLE Report at pp. 5 – 6.
21 Joe Follick, State Security Panels Born in Legis-
lature, Tampa Tribune, Sept., 25, 2001 [hereinafter Follick 
Sept. 25 Article]. See also Mark Silva and Maya Bell, 
Floridians are Living in New State of Alert, The Orlando 
Sentinel, Oct. 11, 2001.
22 Memo from Sandra C. Lambert, Director, Di-
vision of Driver Licenses, and Carl A. Ford, Director, 
Division of Motor Vehicles, Sept. 18, 2001. Similarly, the 
Florida Department of Agriculture refused to release a list 
of 150 “aerial applicators” pursuant to a public records 
request from The Palm Beach Post, giving the list instead 
to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, which also 
denied the Post’s request. See Jim Ash, Security Concerns 
Threaten State’s Open Records, Meetings Law, The Palm 
Beach Post, Sept. 26, 2001 [hereinafter Ash Sept. 26 Ar-
ticle].
law enforcement agencies had asked for a nar-
rower embargo, that only those records of “cer-
tain nationalities who obtained their licenses dur-
ing a certain period of time” be withheld.23 There 
was also the added concern that the media was 
one step ahead of law enforcement, and Florida’s 
top law enforcement officer “complained that 
‘[s]ometimes…the media get to a suspect or a ma-
terial witness before the police do, alerting others 
who may be involved in terrorist activity and al-
lowing them to escape’.”24
 The Florida Legislature acted quickly as well. 
Within just a few days of the terrorist attacks it 
created special committees - the Select Commit-
tee on Public Security and Crisis Management in 
the Senate, chaired by Sen. Ginny Brown-Waite, 
R-FL/Brooksville, and the House Select Commit-
tee on Security, chaired by Rep. Dudley Goodlette, 
R-FL/Naples, to perform the dual task of studying 
state security and coordinating Florida’s response 
to the national emergency. 25 According to a press 
release from House Speaker Tom Feeney, R-FL/
Oviedo, “[t]he tragedies of Sept. 11 have prompt-
ed a nationwide effort to improve security mea-
sures, and it is important that the [Florida] House 
23 Steve Bousquet, Drivers Records Put on Hold, St. 
Petersburg Times, Sept. 20, 2001 (quoting Bob Sanchez, 
spokesman for the Department of Highway Safety and Mo-
tor Vehicles).
24 Roberts Nov. 4 Op-Ed (quoting Tim Moore, Com-
missioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement). 
Criticism of the Department’s action was swift and furious. 
See, e.g., Steve Bousquet, Drivers Records Put on Hold, 
St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 20, 2001; Editorial, No Time to 
Seal Records, The Orlando Sentinel, Sept. 24, 2001; and 
Editorial, Public Records Are Public, Period, St. Peters-
burg Times, Sept. 26, 2001. Under Florida law, a govern-
ment agency can deny a request for public records only 
if there is a specific statutory exemption applicable to the 
records requested and at the time, motor vehicle and driver 
history records were subject to public disclosure. Thus, 
the Department’s action was a direct and clear violation 
of Florida’s constitution and the records withheld by the 
Department were clearly subject to public disclosure under 
Florida law. See Fla. Const. Art. I, § 24. See also, Memo-
rial Hospital-West Volusia v. News-Journal Corporation, 
729 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1999).
25 Follick Sep. 25 Article.
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of Representatives is equipped with the most cur-
rent knowledge and technological information on 
anti-terrorism available.”26 
 After anthrax was discovered at the American 
Media, Inc. headquarters in Boca Raton, FL in late 
September,27 Florida’s economy, deeply dependent 
on tourism, experienced an immediate downturn. 
Faced with a $1.3 billion budget shortfall as a re-
sult of the drop in tourism, Governor Bush called 
a special session of the Legislature, set to run from 
October 22 through November 1, 2001, “for the 
sole and exclusive purpose of considering the re-
ductions to this fiscal year’s appropriations from 
the general revenues of the state that are needed to 
deal with the anticipated decline in revenue in the 
aftermath of [the] acts of terror.”28 
 But as “[t]he terrorist assaults of Sept. 11 and 
unexplained anthrax attacks…created a sense of 
emergency about protecting everything from sea-
26 Ash Sept. 26 Article. In creating the new security 
committee, House Speaker Feeney raised the possibility of 
closed-door committee meetings. See Id., and Letter from 
Tom Feeney, Florida House Speaker, to the First Amend-
ment Foundation (Sept. 25, 2001) [hereinafter Feeney 
Letter]. (Letter on file with the First Amendment Founda-
tion, Tallahassee, FL.) The Speaker eventually backed 
away from the idea and ultimately urged moderation as the 
Senate considered sweeping changes to Florida’s public 
records law and amended its rules to allow closed-door 
meetings, as did Governor Jeb Bush. See, e.g., Lesley 
Clark, Senators Approve Secret Committee Meetings, The 
Miami Herald, Oct. 26, 2001; Mark Silva, Vote Oks Meet-
ing in Secret on Terror, Sun-Sentinel, Oct. 26. 2001; and 
Editorial, Feeney’s Stand, The Orlando Sentinel, Dec. 9, 
2001 [hereinafter Orlando Sentinel Dec. 9 Editorial]. See 
also pp. 24 – 27, supra.
27 Barbara Perez, The Latest, The Orlando Sentinel, 
Oct. 17, 2001. American Media is publisher of The Sun and 
other supermarket tabloids. Ultimately, seven of company’s 
employees became ill after exposure to the anthrax bacte-
ria, and one, Robert Stevens, died on October 5, 2001. Id.
28 Executive Office of the Governor, Proclamation 
to the Honorable Members of he Florida Senate and House 
of Representatives, Oct. 10, 2001. After meeting with state 
tourism officials, Gov. Bush also hit the publicity trail, 
exhorting visitors to return to Florida. See Editorial, Mr. 
Tourism, Jeb Bush, The Orlando Sentinel, Oct. 3, 2001, and 
Roberts Nov. 4 Op-ed. 
ports to water utilities,” and Florida’s chief law 
enforcement officer Tim Moore, pushed hard 
for “new exemptions to Florida’s public records 
law…needed to keep sensitive information from 
the hands of terrorists,”29 the Governor expanded 
the legislative call to include consideration of 
“legislation necessary for security and economic 
stimuli.”30 
 Ultimately, it took two special legislative ses-
sions to achieve the Governor’s goal, as the first, 
Special Session 2001 B, ended in partisan bick-
ering and legislative “hissy fits,” and without a 
meaningful fiscal fix.31 And although Governor 
Bush called the first special session “a qualified 
success,”32 he nevertheless called the Legislature 
back to Tallahassee for a second attempt at deal-
ing with “security and economic stimuli matters 
important to Florida.”33
29 Mark Silva, Sunshine Law Faces Shadow, The 
Orlando Sentinel, Oct. 29, 2001 (quoting Tim Moore, 
Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforce-
ment). A number of law enforcement officers “pledged 
‘to work like the dickens’ to add new exemptions” to the 
public records law “and at least one legislator suggested 
‘a complete suspension of the public records act during an 
emergency.’” Lucy Morgan and Steve Bousquet, Lawmak-
ers Might Place Limits on Public Records, St. Petersburg 
Times, Oct. 17, 2001.
30 Executive Office of the Governor, Proclamation to 
the Honorable Members of the Florida Senate and House 
of Representatives, Oct. 25, 2001.
31 See Roberts Nov. 4 Op-Ed. See also Editorial, 
Budget Time, Again, St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 27, 2001. 
The two post-911 special sessions followed the 2001 regu-
lar session and were thus given letters to note the order. 
Special Session 2001 A was an organizational session that 
preceded the regular session. 
32 Jim Ash, Legislature’s Special Session Yields Few 
Anti-Terrorism Laws, The Palm Beach Post, Nov. 1, 2001 
[hereinafter Ash Nov. 1 Article].
33 Executive Office of the Governor, Proclamation 
to the Honorable Members of the Florida Senate and the 
House of Representatives, Nov. 6, 2001. Special Session 
2001 C was set to run from November 27 through Decem-
ber 6, 2001.
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SPECIAL SESSION 2001 B 
 As the Legislature prepared to meet in its first 
special session after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
State Senator Rod Smith, D-FL/Gainesville, “ex-
pressed concern about the need” for amendments 
to Florida’s public records law “in light of recent 
terrorist acts” and asked Attorney General Bob 
Butterworth to “examine existing statutory exemp-
tions relating to security and criminal investiga-
tions conducted by law enforcement agencies.”34 
Specifically, Senator Smith sought an opinion on 
whether “current statutes provide an exemption 
from disclosure for materials such as security sys-
tems plans or security needs assessments that are 
on file with a public agency.”35 
 At issue was the scope and breadth of § 
281.301, F.S., which provided an exemption for 
information relating to security systems plans for 
“property owned by or leased to the state or any of 
its political subdivisions,” as well as all meetings 
“that would reveal such systems or information.” 
The exemption, first enacted in 1987, was ex-
panded a few years later to also include “informa-
tion relating to the security systems for a privately 
owned or leased property, when such information 
is in the possession of any agency.”36 “Informa-
tion relating to the security systems” held by an 
agency specifically included 
all records, information, photographs, au-
dio and visual presentations, schematic 
diagrams, surveys, recommendations, or 
consultations or portions thereof relating 
directly to or revealing such systems or in-
formation.37
34 Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 01-75 (2001) at p. 1 [hereinaf-
ter AGO 01-75].
35 Id.
36 See Staff of Fla. H.R. Committee on Governmen-
tal Operations, Final Staff Analysis & Economic Impact 
Statement on HB 2513 (1990) at 9.
37 Fla. Stat. § 281.301, F.S. (2001)
 In noting that earlier opinions from the Attor-
ney General found that the scope of the security 
systems exemption also included “blueprints[] 
on file from private entities for crime prevention 
purposes” and security needs assessments held 
by a government agency, Attorney General But-
terworth opined that “[t]he comprehensive scope 
of the exemption makes it unnecessary…to create 
additional exemptions that would target this type 
of information.”38
 Senator Smith was also concerned with dis-
closure of active criminal investigative or intelli-
gence information, and asked the Attorney Gen-
eral whether a criminal justice agency would be 
required to provide access to public records gath-
ered as part of an active investigation.39 Referenc-
ing a long-established public record exemption for 
active criminal investigative and intelligence in-
formation,40 Attorney General Butterworth noted, 
“[i]t is well established in Florida that the exemp-
tion for active criminal intelligence and investi-
gative information does not exempt other public 
records from disclosure simply because they are 
transferred to a law enforcement agency.”41 How-
ever, the opinion continued, 
…the Public Records Act cannot be used 
to elicit exempt or confidential material. 
As one appellate court observed: The Pub-
lic Records Act “may not be used in such 
a way to obtain information that the legis-
lature has declared must be exempt from 
disclosure.” Thus, the exemption for active 
criminal investigative information may not 
be subverted by making a public records 
request for all public records gathered by a 
law enforcement agency in the course of its 
investigation; to permit such requests would 
negate the purpose of the exemption.42
38 AGO 01-75 at p. 3. (emphasis added)
39 Id. at p. 1.
40 See § 119.07(3)(b) (2001). Recodified as § 
119.071(2)(c)1 (2007).
41 AGO 01-75 at p. 4 (citation omitted).
42 Id. citing City of St. Petersburg v. Romine ex rel. 
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 The Attorney General concluded that a “law 
enforcement agency would not be required to re-
spond to a public records request which would di-
vulge the existence of an ongoing active criminal 
investigation or active criminal intelligence opera-
tion.”43 Yet despite the Attorney General’s opinion 
that existing law was sufficient to protect security-
related information and active criminal investiga-
tive information and that additional exemptions 
were unnecessary, during its first special session, 
Special Session 2001-B, the Florida legislature, 
at the urging of the state’s chief law enforcement 
officer, filed and considered a plethora of new ex-
emptions to the public records law. 
 And although all the proposed exemptions 
were filed in response to new security concerns 
raised by the terrorist attacks of 9/11-including 
legislation that would close access to the billing 
records for a law enforcement officer’s cellular 
telephone and a bill that would exempt the FAA 
(Federal Aviation Administration) aircraft regis-
tration numbers of aerial applicators-not one of the 
proposed exemptions passed, due in some mea-
sure to constitutional and public policy objections 
raised by the open government advocates, civil 
libertarians, and the media, but also to the extreme 
lack of cooperation between Florida’s legislative 
leaders.44 Put simply, the House Speaker and the 
Senate President did not get along. 
Dillinger, 719 So. 2d 19, 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Roberts Nov. 4 Op-Ed. See also Edito-
rial, Special Session Caution, St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 
23, 2001; Mary Ellen Klaus, Bills would Let Police Skirt 
Sunshine Law, Palm Beach Post, Oct. 23, 2001; Wire Ser-
vices, Key Senate Panel Goes Down Security Proposals, 
The Daytona Beach News-Journal, Oct. 23, 2001; Mark 
Silva, Florida Politics: Rash Rush to Secrecy, The Orlando 
Sentinel, Oct. 28, 2001; and Liz Balmaseda, Secret Meet-
ings? Not a Good Move, The Miami Herald, Oct. 29, 2001. 
Although Special Session 2001B ended in near complete 
failure, the Legislature did manage to pass a number of 
bills designed to foster patriotism – a bill requiring school 
children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance was approved, 
as was legislation allowing home owners to fly the Ameri-
can flag regardless of homeowner association rules. See 
Editorial, Cheap Political Trick, The Orlando Sentinel, 
 However, many of the exemptions considered 
were re-filed in the 2002 regular session and other 
subsequent sessions, and the Senate amended its 
rules to allow it to meet in secret and, in direct 
contravention to the state constitution, to deny ac-
cess of records relating to the secret meetings.
Special Session 2001 B: Legislative Proposals
CS/SB 58-B and HB 121-B, Hospital Emergency 
Management Plans 
 Originally filed as a shell bill,45 SB 58-B was 
amended and unanimously approved by the Sen-
ate Committee on Governmental Oversight and 
Productivity. 
Oct. 24, 2001; and Pamela Hasterok, Vantage Point: A Red, 
White and Blue Cover-Up, The Daytona Beach News-
Journal, Oct. 25, 2001. In casting the sole vote against the 
bill requiring recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, which 
is unconstitutional, Rep. Chris Smith, D-Fort Lauderdale, 
expressed his frustration: “In their extreme zealousness to 
show their extreme patriotism, they’ve got us violating the 
Constitution. If they suggested everyone has to tattoo a flag 
on their butt, everyone would have voted for that.” Edito-
rial, Legislative Follies, The Miami Herald, Oct. 25, 2001. 
In addition, the Legislature approved two new specialty 
license plates – United We Stand and American Red Cross 
– with proceeds to be used “to support airport security, 
poison control centers, and a federal reward program for 
terrorist snitches.” See Ash Nov. 1 Article.
45 Interestingly, all of the open government bills filed 
in the Senate during Special Session 2001 B were “shell” 
bills, and all had identical language: “It is the intent of the 
Legislature to create an exemption from public-records 
requirements in response to acts of terrorism.” Shell bills 
have become ubiquitous in the Florida Senate, due in large 
part to Senate rules, strict filing deadlines, and the single 
subject requirement under Art. I, sec. 24 of the Florida 
Constitution for any bill creating a exemption to either the 
public records law or sunshine law. A shell bill is, in effect, 
a place-holder, filed by the sponsor in a timely fashion and 
later amended by a strike-all amendment adding substance 
to the legislation. According to the First Amendment Foun-
dation, which tracks all open government legislation each 
session, there were 14 shell bills filed in the 2007 session, 
4 of which were later amended to create new open govern-
ment exemptions. See First Amendment Foundation, Final 
Report 2007 Legislative Session, May 5, 2007 (Report on 
file with the First Amendment Foundation, Tallahassee, 
FL). 
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 As amended, CS/SB 58-B would create a pub-
lic records exemption for portions of a compre-
hensive emergency-management plan which ad-
dress the response of a public or private hospital 
to an act of terrorism, including those portions ad-
dressing security systems or plans; vulnerability 
analyses; emergency evacuation transportation; 
sheltering arrangements; post-disaster activities 
and transportation; supplies, including drug cach-
es; staffing; emergency equipment; and individual 
identification of residents, transfer of records, and 
methods of responding to family inquiries. The bill 
also contained a provision that would exempt por-
tions of public meetings relating directly to or re-
vealing information regarding such plans. Finally, 
although the bill stipulated that the certification of 
the sufficiency of a hospital’s emergency response 
plan by the Governor would be a public record, 
the legislation did not require such certification. 
 According to the bill’s constitutionally - re-
quired statement of public necessity, the Legis-
lature determined that a hospital’s emergency re-
sponse plan “could be used to hamper or disable 
the response of a hospital to a terrorist attack,” in 
which case “an increase in the number of Florid-
ians subject to fatal injury would occur.” The Leg-
islature further found that 
[w]hile some skill would be required to 
use knowledge of plan components to dis-
able a hospital response to an act of ter-
rorism, there is ample existing evidence of 
the capabilities of terrorists to plot, plan, 
and coordinate complicated acts of ter-
ror. The hijacking and crashing of planes, 
the destruction of the World Trade Center, 
the attack on the Pentagon on September 
1, 2001, as well as the continued and pur-
poseful spread of anthrax in Washington, 
D.C., other states, and communities within 
this state, which has resulted in the death 
of at least one Floridian, provide evidence 
of such skill. 46
 HB 121-B, amended by the House Select 
Committee on Security to conform to its Senate 
companion, was unanimously approved by the 
committee, and passed out of the House the fol-
lowing day by a vote of 118/0, but died in the Sen-
ate without a hearing. The CS/SB 58-B died on 
the Senate Calendar. However, similar legislation 
was approved during the following session, Spe-
cial Session 2001 C.47
CS/SB 60-B and HB 123-B, Pharmaceutical Ma-
terials and Depositories 
 Also filed originally as a shell bill, SB 60-B 
was amended and unanimously approved by the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Oversight 
and Productivity.
 As amended, CS/SB 60-B would create a pub-
lic record exemption for the type or amount of 
pharmaceutical materials as well as the location 
of any pharmaceutical depository maintained in 
order to respond to an act of biochemical terror-
ism. Again, although the legislation stipulated that 
a certification of the sufficiency or amount of the 
pharmaceutical or the security of the depository 
would be public record, there was no requirement 
that such a certification be made nor any informa-
tion on what agency might be responsible for the 
certification.
 In justifying the exemption, the Legislature 
once again made reference to the possible use of 
such information “in planning acts of terrorism,” 
46 Fla. CS/SB 58-B (2001) at p. 3 – 4. Similar and 
sometimes near-identical language can be found in many 
of the security-related exemptions filed during Special Ses-
sion 2001 B and subsequent sessions. See, e.g., Fla. CS/SB 
60-B (2001) at p. 2 (proposed exemption for pharmaceuti-
cal cache information); Fla. HB 41-C (2001) at p. 3 (pro-
posed expansion of security systems plan exemption); Fla. 
SB 970 (2002) at p. 3 (proposed aerial applicators exemp-
tion); and Fla. CS/CS/SB 1362 (2003) (proposed exemp-
tion for building plans, blueprints, etc., of certain privately 
owned facilities).
47 See Fla. CS/SB 18-C, supra.
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stating that
[i]f terrorists were able to determine what 
types of pharmaceuticals are stored or 
maintained for response to terrorism, or 
the amount of pharmaceuticals stored, they 
could use this information to craft a ter-
rorist act to which the state may not be as 
well prepared to respond. This information 
could be used to increase the number of 
people injured or killed in a terrorist act.48
 HB 123-B was, again, amended to conform to 
its Senate companion, and approved unanimously 
by the House Select Committee on Security. The 
bill passed out of the House with a vote of 118/1 
and died in Senate Messages. The CS/SB 60-B 
died on the Senate Calendar, but similar legisla-
tion was approved during Special Session 2001 
C.49
CS/SB 62-B and HB 125-B, Security Systems 
Plans  
 Although the Attorney General had opined 
that the “comprehensive scope” of the exemp-
tion for security systems plans under § 281.301, 
F.S., made any amendment unnecessary,50 legis-
lation was filed during Special Session 2001 B 
that would slightly expand the exemption. Under 
the law in place at the time, all records, informa-
tion, photographs, audio and visual presentations, 
schematic diagrams, surveys, recommendations, 
or consultations revealing security systems were 
exempt, as was any meeting relating directly to 
such systems plans. The CS/SB 62-B would have 
expanded the exemption to include threat assess-
ments, threat response plans, emergency evacua-
tion plans, sheltering arrangements, and manuals 
for security personnel, emergency equipment, or 
for security training with its scope of protection.51
48 Fla. CS/SB 60-B (2001) at p. 2.
49 See Fla. CS/SB 20-C, supra.
50 AGO 01-75 at p. 3.
51 Fla. CS/SB 62-B.
 Like the other proposed exemptions filed in 
the Senate, SB 62-B was originally filed as a shell 
bill and later amended and unanimously approved 
by the Senate Committee on Governmental Over-
sight and Productivity; the public necessity lan-
guage in Section 2 of the bill was virtually identi-
cal to that in CS/SB 58-B.52
 A strike-all amendment to HB 125-B, approved 
unanimously by the House Select Committee on 
Security, conformed the House bill to its Senate 
companion with one significant difference: HB 
125-B moved the security systems exemption into 
chapter 119, F.S., the public records law, which 
would make it much easier to find.53 Although 
both the Senate and House bills subsequently died 
in the Senate, similar legislation was reintroduced 
and passed during Special Session 2001-C.54
CS/SB 64-B and HB127-B, Law Enforcement Of-
ficers/Cellular Telephone Numbers
 A shell bill, SB 64-B was amended by the Sen-
ate Committee on Governmental Oversight and 
Productivity to create a public record exemption 
for the cellular telephone number of a law enforce-
ment officer or former officer used in the course 
of his or her employment. Somewhat surprisingly, 
the sponsors of the legislation and its compan-
ion bill, HB 127-B, couched the necessity for the 
exemption under the rubric of security, claiming 
that access to a law enforcement officer’s cellular 
52 See Fla. CS/SB 62-B at p. 3.
53 There are well over 1,000 exemptions to Florida’s 
public records law and sunshine law, and only a handful 
of those exemptions are actually in the substantive chap-
ters. The rest, the vast majority, are scattered throughout 
the statutes and can be difficult to locate (for example, § 
281.301, F.S., was codified under title XIX, Safety and 
Security Services) , and the burden is on the custodial 
agency denying a public record request to provide the exact 
statutory citation authorizing the denial. See § 119.07(1)(c) 
and (d), F.S. (2007). Transferring the exemption to ch. 119, 
the Public Records Law, made practical sense. 
54 See Fla. CS/SB 16-C, supra. The CS/SB 62-B 
died on the Senate Calendar; HB 125-B passed the House 
by a vote 116/1 and died in Senate Messages.
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telephone number could compromise an on-going 
criminal investigation.55 The House version was 
broader than its Senate companion, including cel-
lular billing records within the scope of the ex-
emption.
 Although both bills were approved unani-
mously by their respective committees of refer-
ence, each died on the calendar. Similar legisla-
tion was filed in various subsequent sessions and 
failed to pass.56
CS/SB 66-B and HB 129-B, Law Enforcement 
Officers/Electronic Pager Numbers 
 Nearly identical to the proposed exemption 
for a law enforcement officer’s cellular tele-
phone number and containing the same question-
able public necessity language, CS/SB 66-B, as 
amended, would create a public record exemption 
for the electronic pager number of a law enforce-
ment officer or former officer used in the course 
of his or her employment. Its companion, HB 129-
B, would also exempt the related billing records. 
Again, each bill was unanimously approved in 
committee, but died on their respective calendars 
without consideration
CS/SB 68-B and HB 131-B, Automatic Delay/
Public Record Requests
 As controversial as it was unconstitutional,57 
55 See Fla. CS/SB 64-B at p. 2; see also Fla. HB 
127-B at p. 2.
56 See, e.g., Fla. HB 737 (2002) (cellular telephone 
numbers & billing records); HB 739 (2002) (digital pager 
numbers & billings records); HB 123 and SB 1666 (2003) 
(cellular telephone & digital pager numbers & related 
billing records); and SB 2370 (2004) (cellular telephone & 
digital pager numbers & related billing records).
57 See, e.g., Wire Services, Key Senate Panel Goes 
Down Security Proposals, The Daytona Beach News-
Journal, Oct. 23, 2001; Laura Zuckerman, Focus of Bills: 
Tighten Security, The Daytona Beach News-Journal, Oct. 
30, 2001 [hereinafter Zuckerman Oct. 30 Article]; Earl 
Maucker, Column: Security, Openness Require Delicate 
Balance, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, Nov. 25, 2001; and 
David Twiddy, Public Records Bill Looks Dead, Tallahas-
CS/68-B, as amended and approved by the Senate 
Governmental Oversight and Productivity Com-
mittee, would create a mechanism by which the 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) 
automatically delay for at least a week (with the 
exception of arrest records or records of first ap-
pearance) normally open to inspection and copy-
ing for the purpose of preventing or investigating 
acts of terrorism. The legislation required an agen-
cy to delay the inspection or copying of a public 
record for up to seven days if the FDLE executive 
director requested the delay and certified in writ-
ing (1) the specific record for which access was to 
be delayed; that (2) the record was necessary for 
investigation of a threat of a terrorist act; (3) the 
record was part of an active criminal investiga-
tion or was active criminal intelligence informa-
tion; (4) access would jeopardize the ability of law 
enforcement to prevent or reduce the threat of an 
act of terrorism; and (5) the specific time period 
during which access is to be delayed. 
 In addition, after an in-camera review of the 
requested records and upon a showing by substan-
tial competent evidence by the FDLE that (1) a 
viable threat of a terrorist act exists; (2) the public 
record at issue is active criminal intelligence or 
investigative information related to the threat; and 
(3) access would jeopardize the ability of law en-
forcement to prevent or reduce the threat, a court 
could extend the delay for an additional fourteen 
days, meaning, of course, that a request for public 
records could be delayed by the FDLE for as long 
as three weeks.58
 The House companion, HB 131-B, was similar 
except that it would allow FDLE to automatically 
close records for an initial period of only 48 hours, 
at which point FDLE would be required to seek a 
court order allowing an additional 14-day delay.59
 The constitutionally-required statement of 
see Democrat, Nov. 29, 2001 [hereinafter Twiddy Nov. 29 
Article].
58 See Fla. CS/SB 68-B (2001).
59 See Fla. CS/HB 131-B (2001).
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public necessity was identical in both bills, and 
bears recitation in its entirety:
The Legislature finds that delay in the 
ability to inspect or copy a public record 
provided by this act is a public necessity 
because of the great potential for harm to 
the public which exists in this era as a re-
sult of terrorism. An act of terrorism may 
come in an entirely unusual form and ter-
rorists may use unexpected and uncon-
ventional methods. The potential for acts 
of terror performed in unthinkable ways 
was made amply evident by the events of 
September 11, 2001. Individuals who re-
sided, worked, and attended flying school 
in this state commandeered planes, mur-
dered those on board who attempted to 
stop them, and then intentionally crashed 
those planes into the Pentagon and the 
World Trade Center, completely destroy-
ing the two main towers and surrounding 
structures. These acts of terror resulted in 
the deaths of approximately 6,000 persons. 
In addition, since that date, spores of an-
thrax have been purposefully distributed 
by persons yet unknown in Washington, 
D.C., other states, and communities within 
this state, in order to spread disease and 
cause death. As of this date, at least one 
Floridian has died because of anthrax, and 
other Floridians are being treated for the 
illness. Prior to these events, these meth-
ods of spreading destruction, death, and 
mayhem were unthinkable. The Legisla-
ture notes that, given the willingness of 
terrorists to die in the performance of acts 
of terror, it many not be able to foresee the 
manner or method in which an act of ter-
rorism might be performed or the public 
information that could be used to facilitate 
or plan it. The Legislature, therefore, can-
not foresee every public record that it must 
make confidential pursuant to its authority 
under s. 24(a), Art. I, of the State Constitu-
tion, in order to stop acts of terror. Given 
the capabilities of modern-day terrorists, 
as evidenced by the acts of September 11, 
2001, and the potential that even more 
serious acts of terrorism could be perpe-
trated, the Legislature explicitly finds that 
state law enforcement investigations of 
acts of terrorism are of the highest priority 
and that there may be instances, which are 
yet unknown and unidentifiable, when the 
ability to inspect or copy a public record 
could jeopardize such an investigation by 
making the subjects of such investigations 
aware that an investigation is active. If it is 
discovered that an act of terrorism is being 
investigated, the perpetrators may speed 
up the timetable for the performance of the 
activity, as well as flee, destroy evidence, 
or evade prosecution. As the danger posed 
to the public is so extreme, and as it may 
become imperative at times to temporarily 
delay access to specified public records in 
order to prevent the imminent commission 
of an act of terrorism, the Legislature finds 
that the procedures provided in this act to 
temporarily delay inspection or copying of 
a specific public records that are part of an 
investigation into a potential act of terror-
ism are reasonable and in the best interests 
of the safety of the public. As a result, the 
Legislature finds that there is a substan-
tial justification and public necessity for 
permitting the head of a law enforcement 
agency to request delay in the inspection 
or copying of public records under the 
limited circumstances and procedures set 
forth in this act.60
 The legislation was in direct conflict with the 
constitutional standard for creation of new exemp-
tions under Article I, section 24(c), of the Florida 
Constitution. Under the constitutional standard, 
any exemption to the right of access to govern-
ment records guaranteed under section 24(a) must 
60 Fla. CS/SB 68-B (2001) at pp. 3 – 5; and Fla. HB 
131-B at pp. 3 – 5.
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be narrowly-tailored. And in allowing the FDLE 
to determine which records would be exempt from 
public disclosure-even for a short period of time-
the legislation violated the constitutional provision 
stipulating that only the Legislature could create 
exceptions to the right of access.61 In addition, the 
public necessity statement appears to ignore the 
Attorney General’s opinion-requested by Senator 
Rod Smith, sponsor of CS/SB 68-B-in which the 
General opined that “a law enforcement agency 
would not be required to respond to a public re-
cords request which would divulge the existence 
of an ongoing active criminal investigation.”62
 The CS/SB 68-B was unanimously approved 
by the Senate Committee on Governmental Over-
sight and Productivity, but died on the Senate 
Calendar. After members of the House expressed 
concerns about the bill’s impact on Florida’s open 
government laws,63 HB 131-B was temporarily 
postponed and never made it out of committee. 
According to the bill’s sponsor, Representative 
Dan Gelber, D-FL/Miami Beach, there were sim-
ply too many concerns about the bill’s potential to 
violate the state constitution. “It’s very difficult to 
reconcile (HB 131-B) with the Florida Constitu-
tion.”64 Identical legislation was filed again in Spe-
cial Session 2001 C, but failed again to pass.65
CS/SB 70-B and HB 133-B, Law Enforcement 
Transmittal Letter
 The least controversial open government leg-
islation filed during the special session, CS/SB 
70-B, and its companion, HB 133-B, was an at-
tempt to clarify the law.66 As amended, the legisla-
tion would create a public records exemption for a 
61 See Fla. Const. Art 1, § 24(c).
62 AGO 01-75 at p. 4.
63 See Zuckerman Oct. 30 Article.
64 Twiddy Nov. 29 Article. Although Rep. Gelber 
was specifically referring to HB 53-C, filed during Special 
Session 2001-C, the bills were identical and thus gave rise 
to the same constitutional issues.
65 See Fla. SB 28-C; and HB 53-C, supra.
66 See AGO-01-75.
custodial agency’s response to a request for pub-
lic records from a law enforcement agency for re-
cords pursuant to an active criminal investigation. 
The bill required the law enforcement agency to 
notify the custodial agency when the investigation 
was complete or no longer active, at which point 
the transmittal letters would be subject to public 
disclosure.
 Both bills were approved unanimously by their 
committees of reference and CS/SB 70-B died on 
the Senate Calendar. The HB 133-B, which passed 
the House by a vote of 116/2, died in Senate Mes-
sages. Near identical legislation was filed and 
passed in Special Session 2001 C.67
CS/SB 72-B and CS/HB 115-B, Department of 
Agriculture/Proof of Identification 
 Originally filed as a shell bill and amended by 
the Senate Agriculture Committee, CS/SB 72-B 
contained various provisions that would codify 
an emergency rule adopted by the Department of 
Agriculture on September 27, 2001. The rule re-
quired aerial applicators-crop dusters-“to provide 
information demonstrating proper pesticide reg-
istration, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
licensure and aircraft registration. The emergency 
rules also require[d] the submission of daily flight 
plan information to authenticate operations if 
needed by law enforcement.”68 
 During the Senate bill’s only committee hear-
ing, a handwritten amendment sponsored by Sen. 
Kendrick Meek, D-FL/Miami, to require a writ-
ten request and two forms of personal identifica-
tion from any person requesting certain, specified 
records from the Department of Agriculture, was 
adopted. In addition, the Meek amendment autho-
rized the Department to give the written requests 
to any law enforcement agency for purposes of 
identify verification.69
67 See Fla. SB 22-C, supra.
68 Staff of Fla. Sen. Agriculture Committee Staff 
Analysis of SB 72-B (2001) at pp. 1 – 2.
69 See Fla. CS/SB 72-B, s. 6 at p. 4. (The Meek 
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 Interestingly, and perhaps a bit surprisingly, the 
House companion, HB 115-B, which was identical 
to CS/SB 72-B, was amended in the House Select 
Committee on Security to remove language iden-
tical to the Meek amendment. The amendment to 
HB 115-B removing the offensive language was 
offered by the bill’s sponsor, Representative Dud-
ley Goodlette, R-FL/Naples. The enrolled version 
of the House bill contained only those provisions 
that would regulate aerial applicators and the use 
of pesticides.70 
 After unanimous approval by the Senate Ag-
riculture Committee, CS/SB 72-B was placed on 
the Senate Calendar where it died. The CS/HB 
147-B passed the House unanimously and died in 
Senate Messages.
HB 147-B, Aerial Applicators
 Filed in response to the fear that terrorists 
might use aerial applicator aircraft for applica-
tion of biological or chemical agents,71 HB 147-
B would create a public record exemption for the 
names, addresses, and restricted-use license num-
bers of any person engaged in aerial application of 
pesticides, fertilizers, or seed, as well as the FAA 
aircraft registration number of any aircraft used 
for aerial application. The legislation seemed rath-
er impractical, frankly. Most, if not all of the in-
formation at issue is available from a wide variety 
Amendment is on file with the First Amendment Founda-
tion, Tallahassee, FL.) Specifically, the provision applied 
to requests for records or information under chapters 487 
(Florida Pesticide Law and Agricultural Worker Safety 
Act), 570 ( Department of Agricultural & Consumer 
Safety), 576 (Agricultural Fertilizers), and 578 (Florida 
Seed Law), of the Florida Statutes. As discussed previous-
ly, to require a written request and proof of identification as 
a condition to obtaining copies of public records is contrary 
to long-settled public policy in Florida, and to allow veri-
fication of the requestor’s identity by a law enforcement 
agency is particularly offensive to the state’s rich tradition 
of openness. See Introduction, pp. 1 – 4, infra.
70 See Fla. HB 115-B First Engrossed (2001). (The 
Goodlette amendment is on file with the First Amendment 
Foundation, Tallahassee, FL.)
71 See Fla. HB 147-B (2001) at pp. 2 – 4.
of other public and private sources. For example, 
crop dusters routinely advertise their services in 
local telephone books providing, obviously, their 
names and addresses. The FAA regulations require 
registration numbers to be painted on the fuselage 
of all registered aircraft, meaning such numbers 
are clearly visible from any highway near an air-
port or runway, and restricted-use license numbers 
and the aircraft registration numbers of all pilots 
and registered aircraft are available on the FAA’s 
website.72 Although introduced, HB 147-B did not 
receive a committee reference, and died, reference 
deferred. There was no Senate companion.
Senate Rule Change
 “[T]he biggest step … to block the public’s 
right to know in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist 
attacks”73 was a change to Senate rules, allowing 
the Senate President to close meetings to discuss 
“measures to prevent possible acts of espionage, 
sabotage, attack and other acts of terrorism.” As 
originally drafted, the rule amendment also closed 
all records “made or received during or in prepa-
ration for a closed meeting,” including all votes 
taken at the secret meeting.74 
 Article III, section 4(e) of the Florida Consti-
tution stipulates that all meetings of more than two 
legislators at which pending or proposed legisla-
tion is to be discussed must be reasonably opened 
72 Federal aircraft registration requirements can 
be found at http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_initia-
tives/oversight/iasa/model_aviation/media/PART04.doc, or 
through the FAA’s website, www.faa.gov.
73 Lucy Morgan and Steve Bousquet, Florida Senate 
to Vote on Meeting in Secret, St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 24, 
2001.
74 See Fla. Senate Journal, Oct. 25, 2001, at pp. 44 
– 45. The Florida House of Representatives had considered 
a similar rule amendment in September, 2001, but even-
tually abandoned the idea. See Joe Follick, Lawmakers 
Consider Closing Meetings on State Security, The Tampa 
Tribune, Sep. 27, 2001. See also Feeney Letter; and Letter 
from Representative Dan Gelber, Florida House of Rep-
resentatives, to Barbara Petersen, President, First Amend-
ment Foundation, Sep. 29, 2001. (Letters on file with the 
First Amendment Foundation, Tallahassee, FL.)
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to the public. The constitutional provision does 
allow, however, for closure of meetings in those 
limited occasions when security is an issue:
This section shall be implemented and de-
fined by the rules of each house, and such 
rules shall control admission to the floor of 
each legislative chamber and may, where 
reasonably necessary for security purposes 
or to protect a witness appearing before a 
committee, provide for the closure of com-
mittee meetings.75
 There were those who argued that the proposed 
rule allowing for closed meetings was unconsti-
tutional, asserting that closure was allowed only 
when the physical security of the chamber or wit-
ness was required.76 However, Article III, section 
4(e) mandates that each chamber “shall be the sole 
judge for the interpretation, implementation, and 
enforcement” of the constitutional right of access 
to legislative meetings, thus allowing little room 
for an effective argument on the constitutionality 
of the rule change to allow for secret meetings.
 The proposed rule amendment that would 
allow the Senate to deny access to records asso-
ciated with such meetings was a different story, 
though. Specifically, Article I, section 24, of the 
State Constitution grants a right to inspect or copy 
all legislative records, stipulating that “[t]he leg-
islature…may provide by general law for the ex-
emption of records” from the constitutional right 
of access.77 In other words, the Constitution spe-
cifically prohibited the Senate from creating an 
exemption for its records by rule.
 Criticism of the proposed rule change was 
swift and furious, and came from an unusual as-
75 Fla. Const. Art III, § 4(e).
76 See Letter from Barbara Petersen, President, First 
Amendment Foundation, to Senator Tom Lee, Chair, Sen-
ate Rules and Calendar Committee, The Florida Senate, 
Oct. 23, 2001. (Letter on file with the First Amendment 
Foundation, Tallahassee, FL.)
77 Fla. Const. Art I, § 24(c) (emphasis added).
sortment of disparate groups and organizations, 
including civil libertarians, open government ad-
vocates and-most surprisingly-the National Rifle 
Association.78 Even Governor Jeb Bush said he 
was “troubled” that Senators would meet in se-
cret and keep their votes shielded from the public. 
“This is an area we really need to be careful in 
how we proceed,” he said.79
 The most vocal and harshest critic, perhaps, 
was Senator Locke Burt, R-FL/Ormond Beach, 
one of only two Senators to vote against the pro-
posed rule change in committee. In addition to 
arguing there was no proof that closed meetings 
would improve public safety, Senator Burt said, 
“If I wanted to raise your taxes, take away your 
guns, or infringe on your civil liberties, I would 
do it in a secret meeting. It’s unnecessary, it’s 
bad public policy, it goes against our commit-
ment to open government and it ought to concern 
people.”80 The vast majority of senators, however, 
supported the proposal, claiming it was necessary 
in the wake of 9/11.81
 The move may also have been unprecedented 
in a security-conscious nation. According to Bren-
da Erickson, a senior research analyst with the 
National Conference of State Legislators, in the 
five or six weeks following the terrorist attacks, 
“twenty-six states created offices of homeland se-
78 See, e.g., Mark Silva, Senate Could Act in Secret, 
The Orlando Sentinel, Oct. 24, 2001; Editorial, Security, 
But Not Over Freedom, St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 24, 
2001; Editorial, Dangerous Territory, The Daytona Beach 
News-Journal, Oct. 24, 2001; Thomas B. Pfankuch, Secu-
rity Measures Too Much, Too Soon?, The Florida Times-
Union, Oct. 25, 2001; David Wasson, State Lawmakers 
OK Secret Senate Meetings, The Tampa Tribune, Oct. 26, 
2001; and Lesley Clark, Senators Approve Secret Commit-
tee Meetings, The Miami Herald, Oct. 26. 2001 [hereinafter 
Clark Oct. 26 Article].
79 See Laura Zuckerman, Official Touts Plan to Seal 
Records, The Daytona Beach News-Journal, Oct. 28, 2001 
[hereinafter Zuckerman Oct. 28 Article]. See also Steve 
Bousquet, Senate Favors Secret Meetings, St. Petersburg 
Times, Oct. 25, 2001,
80 See Zuckerman Oct. 28 Article.
81 See, e.g., Id.; and Clark Oct. 26 Article. 
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curity, special legislative security committees or 
appointed security chiefs. However, the Florida 
Senate likely leads the way in making substantial 
changes to its open meetings rules.”82
 The proposed rule amendment was heard by 
the Senate Rules and Calendar Committee on 
October 24th, and the committee voted 14-to-1 
to close meetings to discuss security measures, 
and 12-to-2 to keep all documents, including the 
votes of Senators, secret for as long as five years 
or more.83 
 The proposal went before the full Senate on 
October 25, 2001, which approved two changes to 
the records provision: First, the language specific 
to the votes and the substance of the votes was 
deleted, with the intent of making the Senators’ 
votes public record. Second, language was added 
to limit the duration of the records closure, speci-
fying that the records would be automatically sub-
ject to public disclosure thirty days after the closed 
meeting unless the Senate President extended the 
duration of the closure. No changes were made to 
the meetings provision.84 Incredibly, the Senators 
then approved an historical and unprecedented 
change to its rules by voice vote, “sparing them 
the burden of accountability.”85
82 See Jim Ash, Proposal Criticized as Attack on 
Sunshine, The Palm Beach Post, Oct. 25, 2001.
83 See Steve Bousquet, Senate Favors Secret Meet-
ings, St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 25, 2001. As approved by 
the Senate Rules and Calendar Committee, records would 
be closed for five years but subsequent Senate Presidents 
could continue to seal the records every five years after 
that. The committee also voted to “sunset” the rule in 2003 
unless, of course, future Senate presidents recommended 
its reenactment. “The last time I looked, terrorism didn’t 
have a calendar. I would never vote to do away with this 
provision. This is a safeguard,” said Senator Ron Silver, D-
North Miami Beach. In fact, the rule is still in effect today. 
See §§ 1.43(1)(a) and 1.444(11), Rules and Manual of the 
Fla. Senate 2006 – 2008 (as adopted Nov. 21, 2006).
84 See Fla. Senate Journal, Oct. 25, 2001, at pp. 44 
– 45. See also First Amendment Foundation, Alert: Rule 
Change is Adopted w/Amendments; Gov Expands the Call, 
Oct. 25, 2001. (FAF Alert on file with the First Amendment 
Foundation, Tallahassee, FL)
85 Editorial, Preserve Public Access, The Palm 
SPECIAL SESSION 2001 C
 After the flawed October special session that 
ended in partisan “hissy fits” and near failure, 
Governor Bush called the Legislature back to Tal-
lahassee in late November to consider, once again, 
security and budget issues.86 In bringing them 
back, however, the Governor warned legislators 
that he was interested only in security legislation 
that would support his efforts to create regional 
antiterrorist task forces and protect the state’s 
pharmaceutical stockpiles. “Let’s stay focused 
on the stuff that doesn’t require heavy lifting to 
pass,” Bush said.87 As a result of Governor Bush’s 
admonition, perhaps, and House Speaker Tom 
Feeney’s reluctance “to use Sept. 11 as an excuse 
to ram through numerous proposals that would . 
. . sharply curtail[] public access to government 
operations.”88 Only five of the proposed exemp-
tions considered during the first special session 
were re-filed during Special Session 2001 C. Four 
passed.89
Beach Post, Nov. 25, 2001.
86 Executive Office of the Governor, Proclamation 
to the Honorable Members of the Florida Senate and the 
House of Representatives, Nov. 6, 2001. See also Roberts 
Nov. 4 Op-Ed.
87 See Wire Services, House Panel Okays Security 
Bill, The St. Petersburg Times, Nov. 29, 2001; and Bob 
Mahlburg, Gov. Bush Wants Legislature to OK Basic 
Anti-Terrorism Bills, The Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 29, 2001 
[hereinafter Mahlburg Nov. 29 Article].
88 Orlando Sentinel Dec. 9 Editorial. See also Nancy 
Cook Lauer, Capitol Corner: House Action on Senate Bill 
Quite a Rarity, Tallahassee Democrat, Dec. 7, 2001.
89 However, all of the proposed exemptions consid-
ered during Special Session 2001 B, including those that 
passed in Special Session 2001-C, were filed for consid-
eration during the regular 2002 session. All failed. Those 
filed for reconsideration: SB 488 and HB 729, Hospital 
Emergency Management Plans, SB 490 and HB 733, Phar-
maceutical Materials, SB 492 and HB 741, Law Enforce-
ment Transmittal Letters, SB 494 FDLE/Automatic Delay, 
HB 731 and SB 970, Aerial Applicators, HB 737, Cellular 
Telephone Numbers & Billing Records, and HB 739, 
Digital Pager Numbers & Billing Records. In addition, 
four security-related shell bills were filed in the Senate: SB 
982, SB 984 and SB 986, Public Records/Preservation of 
Public Safety, and SB 1260, Public Records/Bioterrorism 
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 Although the second special session post-9/11 
was less chaotic and more focused than the pre-
ceding special session, it was not without con-
troversy: On the opening day of Special Session 
2001-C, the senate introduced twelve anti-terror-
ism bills outside the purview of the call, referred 
the bills to committee, and scheduled them for 
consideration. Less than three hours later, the Flor-
ida Senate Criminal Justice Committee hurriedly 
amended and/or approved eleven of the twelve 
bills - five of which created new exemptions to 
the public records law—and sent them to the floor 
for consideration by the full Senate the following 
day.90 Open government advocates, angered over 
the lack of proper notice by the senate committee, 
called the short notice “stunning and completely 
outrageous,” complaining “that the [s]enate in es-
sence shut out the public by giving short notice 
that a host of public records exemption bills would 
be heard on the first day of a special session called 
to resolve a $1.3 billion budget shortfall.”91
 Of the five bills approved by the Senate com-
mittee, only four were considered by the full Sen-
ate on December 3, 2001; the most controversial 
bill, which would allow the FDLE to delay access 
to public records, was allowed to languish on the 
senate special order calendar.92 The Florida House 
Threats. Three of the shell bills died in committee without 
consideration; the fourth, SB 982 was amended and its 
House companion, CS/HB 735 passed the Legislature. See 
First Amendment Foundation, Final Report 2002 Session, 
March 22, 2002. (Report on file with the First Amendment 
Foundation, Tallahassee, FL.)
90 See Mike Salinero, Open Record Laws in Florida 
Remain Untouched for Now, The Tampa Tribune, Nov. 29, 
2001.
91 Lesley Clark, Florida Takes a Step to Seal Public 
Records in Terror Cases, The Miami Herald, Nov. 28, 
2001.
92 The CS/SB 28-C, authorizing the FDLE to delay 
access to public records for as long as 21 days, was ap-
proved by the Senate Criminal Justice Committee by a 
vote of 5/1 (Sen. Locke Burt voting nay). See Fla. SB 28-C 
(2001). After the House made it clear that it would not 
consider the bill, CS/SB 28-C was allowed to die on the 
Senate’s special order calendar. See Thomas B Pfankuch, 
Lawmakers Ignite Anger Over Security, The Florida 
Select Committee on Security, in a rare show of 
legislative cooperation, then took up and approved 
the four Senate bills the following day. All four 
were passed by the House on December 5, 2001, 
and signed into law by Governor Bush less than a 
week later. Action was quick, certainly, but only 
those open government bills for which there was 
a general consensus successfully made it through 
the process.
Special Session 2001 C: Legislative Proposals
CS/SB 16-C Security Systems Plans 
 Senate Bill 16-C reenacted and slightly ex-
panded the exemption under § 281.301, F.S., for 
information relating to security systems and meet-
ings related to such information, moving the pub-
lic record exemption to § 119.07193, and the meet-
ings exemption to § 286.0113. Section 281.301, 
F.S., provided an exemption for all records, infor-
mation, photographs, audio and visual presenta-
tions, schematic diagrams, surveys, recommenda-
tions, or consultations revealing security systems 
are exempt, as are all meetings relating directly to 
or that would reveal such systems; SB 16-C ex-
panded-and clarified94 the exemption to include 
threat assessments, threat-response plans, emer-
gency-evacuation plans, sheltering arrangements, 
or manuals for security personnel, emergency 
equipment, or security training.
 After minor amendments were adopted, CS/
SB 16-C was unanimously approved by the Flor-
ida Senate Criminal Justice Committee, and sent 
to the senate floor where it was further amended 
to make the exemption retroactive; the bill passed 
by a vote of 38/0. Rather than take up the house 
companion bill, HB 41-C, which was similar but 
not identical, the Florida House Select Committee 
Times-Union, Nov. 29, 2001; Bob Mahlburg, New Front 
Opened on Terrorism, The Orlando Sentinel, Dec. 4, 2001, 
and Jackie Hallifax, Senate Squashes Effort to Seal Public 
Records, The Tampa Tribune, Dec. 4, 2001.
93 Recodified as § 119.071(3)(a) (2007).
94 See AGO 01-75 at p. 3.
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unanimously approved CS/SB 16-C, sending it for 
consideration by the House. The house passed CS/
SB 16-C by a vote of 115 to 3. Less than a week 
later, the CS/SB 16-C was signed into law by the 
Governor.95
 Originally scheduled for sunset review in 
2006,96 the security systems plans exemption was 
amended in 2003 to clarify that the security sys-
tems plans of a public or private entity held by 
an agency are exempt from public disclosure-the 
original language applied to those plans possessed 
by an agency. The bill, CS/SB 1182, also created 
an exception to the exemption, allowing disclo-
sure of the security systems plans to the property 
owner or lease holder.97 
 Both the public record exemption and meet-
ing exemption for security systems plans were 
reenacted in 2006 with minor, technical modifica-
tions.98
SB 18-C and HB 43-C, Hospital Emergency Man-
agement Plans
 Senate Bill 18-C, creating a public record ex-
emption for portions of a comprehensive emer-
gency-management plan which address the re-
sponse of a public or private hospital to an act of 
terrorism, including those portions addressing se-
95 Fla.Ch. No. 2001-161. 
96 Under Florida law, all newly-created exemp-
tions to the public records law and sunshine law must be 
reviewed and reenacted five years after original enactment 
or the exemption automatically “sunsets” – that is, expires. 
See § 119.15, F.S. (Open Government Sunset Review Act) 
(2007).
97 See Staff of Fla. Sen. Governmental Oversight and 
Productivity Committee, Analysis and Economic Impact 
Statement of SB 1182 (Mar. 27, 2003) at p. 3. CS/SB 1182 
was passed unanimously by both chambers and signed 
into law by the Governor. See Fla. Ch. No. 2003-16. 
Interestingly, SB 1182, as originally drafted, repealed the 
now-redundant exemption under § 281.301, but the repeal 
language was removed by the Senate Governmental Over-
sight and Productivity Committee. Thus, the redundant 
exemption still applies. See Fla. Stat. § 281.301 (2007).
98 See Fla. Ch. No. 2006-108 (HB 7023).
curity systems or plans, was virtually identical to 
legislation filed in the previous special session. It 
was amended in the senate Florida Criminal Jus-
tice Committee to make the exemption retroactive 
and was unanimously approved. An amendment 
offered on the Senate floor by Senator Rod Smith, 
D-FL/Gainesville, to stipulate that information 
addressing the sufficiency of a hospital’s response 
to an act of terrorism is not exempt from public 
disclosure, was adopted, and CS/SB 18-C passed 
out of the senate unanimously.
 The Florida House Select Committee then took 
up the Senate bill rather than HB 43-C, its com-
panion, and reported it favorably with a vote of 
11/0. CS/SB 18-C was passed by a vote of 116/2 
in the House and signed into law by the Gover-
nor.99 
 The exemption for hospital emergency-man-
agement plans was reenacted with modification in 
2006.100
SB 20-C and HB 45-C, Pharmaceutical Materials
 Amid growing concerns that the exemption for 
information identifying the types of pharmaceuti-
cal materials stockpiled by the state as part of its 
plan to defend against an act of terrorism was too 
restrictive in that it did not allow for public over-
sight,101 the legislation was significantly amended 
by the Florida Senate Criminal Justice Commit-
tee.
 As amended and approved by the committee, 
CS/SB 20-C allowed a public record exemption for 
information identifying or providing the location 
of the facility where pharmaceutical material was 
stored; any information as to the type or amount of 
pharmaceutical material in such storage facilities 
99 Fla. Ch. No. 2001-362. 
100 See Fla. Ch. No. 2006-109 (HB 7025).
101 See Bob Mahlburg, Senators Go for Secrecy, The 
Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 28, 2001, and Steve Bousquet, 
Senate Lets Public Records Bill Die, St. Petersburg Times, 
Dec. 4, 2001.
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would be subject to public disclosure. In addition, 
the bill specifically stated that the governor’s cer-
tification as to the sufficiency of the location, its 
contents, and capacities is public record. Finally, 
CS/SB 20-C was amended to allow disclosure of 
the exempt information to certain entities under 
specified circumstances.102 
 After unanimous passage in the Senate, CS/SB 
20-C passed out of the House by a vote of 116/2 
and was signed into law by Governor Bush.103 
The exemption was reenacted in 2006 with minor 
modification.104
SB 22-C and HB 47-C, Law Enforcement Trans-
mittal Letters
 Certainly, the least controversial bill consid-
ered during either special session, SB 22-C sim-
ply clarified existing law105 and allowed a public 
record exemption for requests of law enforcement 
agencies to inspect or copy public records in the 
custody of another agency. An amendment to 
make the exemption remedial in nature was adopt-
ed by the Florida Senate Criminal Justice Com-
mittee, which then unanimously approved the bill. 
The CS/SB 22-C passed the senate by a vote of 
37/1 and, after unanimous approval by the Florida 
House Select Committee on Security, the legisla-
tion passed the House by a vote of 117/2. Gover-
nor Bush signed the bill into law on December 10, 
2001.106
 The exemption was reenacted with minor, 
technical modification in 2007.107
102 See Fla. CS/SB 20-C (2001).
103 Fla. Ch. No. 2001-363. The House companion, 
HB 45-C, died on the House Calendar without consider-
ation.
104 See Ch. No. 2006-158 (HB 7033).
105 See AGO 01-75 at p. 4.
106 Fla. Ch. No. 2001-364 (2001).
107 See Fla. Ch. 2007-93 (CS/SB 816).
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS
2002
 In addition to the numerous exemptions origi-
nally filed during Special Session 2001-B,108 two 
additional open government exemptions related 
to security were considered by the legislature in 
2002, the first during the regular session and the 
second during Special Session 2002 E.
HB 735 and SB 982, Building Plans and Blue-
prints
 As originally filed, HB 735 simply duplicated 
the exemption for security systems plans enacted 
in Special Session 2001-C.109 A strike-all amend-
ment by the Florida House State Administration 
Committee, however, created a new public record 
exemption for building plans, blueprints, sche-
matic drawings, and diagrams depicting the in-
ternal layout and structural elements of buildings, 
arenas, stadiums, water treatment facilities, and 
other structures owned or operated by a govern-
ment agency. As amended, the bill allowed dis-
closure under certain, specified circumstances or 
upon court order and a showing of good cause.
 According to its constitutionally required 
statement of public necessity, the exemption was 
necessary to 
. . . [E]nsure public safety. Such exempt 
information is a vital component of public 
safety and if it were made publicly avail-
able, the ability of persons who desire to 
harm individuals located in or using those 
structures…would be increased. In addi-
tion, terrorists would have easy access to 
the exempt information and use the infor-
mation to inflict harm on the public. Al-
108 See fn. 89.
109 See Staff of H.R. State Administration Commit-
tee Analysis of HB 735 (Feb. 19, 2002) at p. 5. House Bill 
735 was originally filed as a proposed committee bill, PCB 
SEC 02-13, by the House Select Committee on Security.
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though skill would be required to use such 
information to further an act of terrorism, 
ample evidence exists of the capabilities 
of terrorists to conduct complicated acts of 
terrorism. The September 11, 2001, attack 
on the World Trade Center and the Pen-
tagon, as well as the intentional spread of 
anthrax in the country and state, provides 
evidence that such capabilities exist. These 
events also show the crippling effect that 
terrorist acts can have, not only on the lives 
of persons in a community affected by ter-
rorist acts but also on the economy of the 
community, the state, and the nation.110
 Relatively narrow in scope and without the 
controversy of open government exemptions pro-
posed in previous sessions,111 CS/HB 735 passed 
the House by a vote of 101/14.
 The Senate companion, SB 982, was a shell bill 
amended by the Florida Senate Select Committee 
on Security and Crisis Management, and although 
similar to its house companion, the senate bill, as 
amended, did not allow for the disclosure of the 
exempt information except by a showing of good 
cause and court order. The CS/SB 982 was tabled 
by the senate, however, which then substituted and 
passed CS/HB 735 by a vote of 33/4. The bill was 
subsequently signed into law by the Governor.112
 Reviewed and reenacted without modification 
in 2007,113 the exemption has just recently caused 
controversy-the Florida Department of Transpor-
tation refused to release state bridge inspection 
reports after the Minnesota bridge collapse on 
August 1, 2007, claiming the reports were exempt 
because they revealed the structural elements of 
110 Fla. CS/HB 735 (2001).
111 See Letter from Barbara Petersen, President, First 
Amendment Foundation, to Representative Fred Brummer, 
Florida House of Representatives, Feb. 14, 2002. (Letter 
on file with the First Amendment Foundation, Tallahassee, 
FL.)
112 Fla. Ch. No. 2002-67.
113 See fn. 93 and Fla. Ch. No. 2007-95 (SB 886).
the various bridges.114 Florida law, however, stipu-
lates that if a record contains exempt and non-ex-
empt information, that which is exempt must be 
redacted and access provided to the remainder.115 
Thus, the department could not lawfully deny ac-
cess to the bridge inspection reports simply be-
cause the reports contain information that is ex-
empt from disclosure. Although the issue has yet 
to be resolved as of the date of this paper, summa-
ries of the reports were ultimately released.116
HB 21-E and SB 24-E, Military Discharge Papers
 Certainly the oddest legislation filed under the 
cloak of security these two companion bills, as 
originally filed, would allow a public record ex-
emption for all identifying information contained 
in a U.S. military discharge record held by the 
clerk of court.
 Historically, the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) had advised those discharged from the 
military to record their separation documents with 
their local clerk of court where such documents 
would become part of the official records of the 
county.117 However, as clerks of court in Florida 
placed official records on the Internet,118 concern 
arose about the specter of identify theft and the 
possible illicit use of personal information con-
tained in military discharge records, and the DoD 
began advising individuals otherwise.119 In addi-
114 See, e.g., Jim Ash, Lawmaker Seeks Release of 
Bridge Inspection Reports, The Tallahassee Democrat, 
Aug. 17, 2007, and Paige St. John, Florida Bridge Inspec-
tion Reports to Go Public, The News-Press, Aug. 17, 2007 
[hereinafter St. John Aug. 17 Article]. 
115 Fla. Stat. § 119.07(1)(b) (2007).
116 See St. John Aug. 17 Article.
117 Staff of Fla. H.R. State Administration Committee 
Analysis of HB 21-E (Apr. 30, 2002) at p. 1 [hereinafter 
Staff Analysis of HB 21-E].
118 Section 28.2221, F.S., required clerks of court to 
make copies of all official records available on the county’s 
official website. Any military discharge document recorded 
with the clerk of court would be included in those official 
records required to be posted to the Internet.
119 Staff Analysis of HB 21-E. Personal information 
contained in a military discharge record includes names, 
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tion to justifying the proposed exemption for the 
purpose of thwarting identity theft, though, the 
public necessity statements in both bills took it a 
step further and incredibly attempted to justify the 
exemption in the name of security:
The legislature finds that exempting per-
sonal identifying information contained 
in military separation forms is a public 
necessity because the availability of that 
information in public records, especially 
when accessible on the Internet, facilitates 
the crime of identity theft and permits the 
identification of specific individuals who 
have served in the armed forces, which 
information may be of use in planning 
for terrorist acts…[G]iven the increased 
threat of terrorism in the United States 
and the large number of military person-
nel who retire in Florida, terrorists could 
use the information to identity and target 
former military personnel and use such 
information in planning terrorist acts. For 
example, terrorists may seek to avoid an 
area with a large concentration of former 
military personnel because those individu-
als may be armed and, given their military 
training, could threaten the success of a 
terrorist action. In the alternative, terror-
ists could seek to target a neighborhood 
with a large number of military retirees 
to seek revenge against persons who have 
been in the frontline of United States mili-
tary actions.120
 The legislation raised a number of serious 
constitutional issues, among them the question 
whether an exemption for information readily 
available from other public sources-in this specif-
ic case, military discharge records are subject to 
disclosure under the federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act-can be constitutionally justified as “nec-
social security numbers, dates of birth, homes of record, 
and next of kin. Id.
120 Fla. HB 21-E at pp. 1 – 3 and Fla. SB 24-E at pp. 
1 – 3 (emphasis added).
essary” to accomplish any valid purpose under 
Florida’s constitution.121
 Ultimately, both bills were amended, strip-
ping out the exemption language, and instead, in 
pertinent part, allowing a veteran or the veteran’s 
representative to request that his or her military 
discharge record be removed from the official re-
cords. The CS/HB 21-E was tabled, and its com-
panion, SB 24-E, was passed unanimously by both 
the Senate and the House as amended, and signed 
into law by the governor.122
2004
HB 317 and SB 410, Building Plans and Blue-
prints of Privately-Owned Structures
 Only one security-related open government 
exemption was considered during the 2004 leg-
islative session. It was an exemption that would 
extend the protection for building plans and blue-
prints, etc., would allow for government-owned 
structures to include building plans and blueprints 
of certain privately-owned facilities and structures 
held by an agency. Again, the concern was public 
safety and the breadth of Florida’s public records 
121 See Letters from Barbara Petersen, President, First 
Amendment Foundation, to Representative Jerry Paul, 
Florida House of Representatives, Apr. 30, 2002 (HB 21-E) 
and Senator Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida Senate, Apr. 30, 
2002 (SB 24-E) [hereinafter Military Discharge Record 
Letters]. (Letters on file with the First Amendment Founda-
tion, Tallahassee, FL.) In addition, the Legislature passed 
a bill during the 2002 regular session, HB 1679, which 
required the clerks of court to remove a military discharge 
record from the Internet if requested to do so by the subject 
of the record. See Fla. Ch. No. 2002-302. The FAF took the 
position that removing such records from the Internet upon 
request addressed the concerns of the military veterans 
without offending the public’s constitutional right of access 
– such records would be available pursuant to a public 
record request to the clerk of court even though no longer 
available on the Internet. See Military Discharge Record 
Letters.
122 Fla. Ch. No. 2002-391. Because the bill did not 
technically create a public record exemption, it is not sub-
ject to the Open Government Sunset Review Act.
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law—a blueprint of a privately-owned theme park, 
for example, provided to a government agency be-
comes subject to public disclosure under Florida 
law absent a specific statutory exemption.
 As filed, the two companion bills were virtu-
ally identical, each providing a public record ex-
emption for building plans, blueprints, schematic 
drawings, and diagrams which depict the internal 
layout or structural elements of an attractions and 
recreation facility, entertainment or resort com-
plex, industrial complex, retail and service de-
velopment, office development, or hotel or motel 
development, which were held by a government 
agency. Each of the different types of protected 
complexes and developments were specifically 
and carefully defined in the legislation. The leg-
islation also allowed for disclosure to other gov-
ernmental entities when necessary to the perfor-
mance of its duties and responsibilities, to the 
owner or owners of the structure in question, or 
upon court order and a showing of good cause.123 
Finally, each bill was amended in committee to 
stipulate that the proposed exemption did not ap-
ply to comprehensive plans or site plans submitted 
for approval under local land use regulations, thus 
allowing the public access to such plans prior to 
approval by local government.124
 There was little opposition to the proposed ex-
emption, and CS/HB 317 passed the House by a 
vote of 113/3. After tabling its own bill, the senate 
passed the house bill by a vote of 39/1, and it was 
signed into law by Governor Bush. The exemp-
tion is scheduled for open government sunset re-
view in 2009.125
123 See Fla. HB 317 and SB 410 (2004).
124 See Fla. CS/HB 317 and CS/SB 410.
125 Fla. Ch. No. 2004-9.
2005
SB 1416 and HB 1801, Meetings/Domestic Secu-
rity Oversight Council
 Although security-related legislation was filed 
during the 2005 regular session, there was only 
one new exemption proposed126-an exemption for 
the newly codified Domestic Security Oversight 
Council.127 
 Nearly identical, SB 1416 and HB 1801 would 
create a narrow exemption for portions of meet-
ings of the Domestic Security Oversight Council 
at which the council would hear and/or discuss 
active criminal investigative or intelligence in-
formation. The legislation contained a number of 
limitations: first, the council chair must announce 
at a public meeting the need to discuss such infor-
mation in connection with the performance of the 
council’s duties; second, the chair must declare, in 
writing, the specific reasons closure is necessary, 
and file the document-as a public record-with the 
official documents of the council; third, the entire 
closed meeting must be recorded; and fourth, at-
tendance at the closed meeting would be strictly 
126 During the 2005 session, the Legislature reenacted 
§ 311.13, F.S., providing an exemption for seaport security 
plans, pursuant to the Open Government Sunset Review 
Act and without modification. See Fla. SB 288 (2005). The 
bill passed both houses unanimously and was signed into 
law by Governor Bush. See Fla. Ch. No. 2005-53. Because 
the exemption was originally enacted in 2000 – prior to the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 – it was not included in this paper. 
In addition, one shell bill, SB 1226, expressing legislative 
intent to revise laws related to domestic security was filed; 
the bill was not considered and died in its first committee 
of reference. See Fla. SB 1226 (2005). 
127 See E-mail from Barbara Petersen, President, 
First Amendment Foundation, to Bill Garner, Staff At-
torney, Committee on Domestic Security, Florida House 
of Representatives, Mar. 10, 2005. (E-mail on file with the 
First Amendment Foundation, Tallahassee, FL.) According 
to Mr. Garner, the Domestic Security Oversight Council 
was designed to coordinate the work of the state’s regional 
domestic security task forces and state working groups in 
“defining domestic security and counter-terrorism fund-
ing recommendations that are made to the Governor and 
Legislature.” 
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limited. The legislation also contained an exemp-
tion for records generated during the closed meet-
ing, stipulating that such records would be subject 
to disclosure once the criminal investigation or 
intelligence information ceased to be active.
 Again, there was very little debate over the 
merits of the proposed exemption, and the only 
real issue was which version was preferable-the 
House or the Senate.128 After minor committee 
amendments, HB 1801 was passed unanimously 
out of the House. The Senate tabled its compan-
ion bill, substituted the House bill and passed it 
unanimously as well. The legislation was signed 
into law by Governor Bush.129
CONCLUSION
 After the panicked response of the Florida leg-
islature in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the 
discovery of anthrax in South Florida, it seemed 
entirely possible at the time that the legislature 
would do serious harm to the people’s constitu-
tional right of access to their government, roll-
ing back open government protections and public 
policy that had been in place for over a hundred 
years.
 But something happened between the first 
special session in October 2001 and the second in 
November—the entire legislative body appeared 
to take a deep collective breath and, with a fresh 
eye, considered which of the plethora of proposed 
new exemptions were truly necessary to protect 
the security of the state and the safety of its citi-
zens. As a result, only four new open government 
exemptions were created in the two special ses-
sions called by the governor to deal with security 
issues, and an equal number have been created in 
subsequent legislative sessions. All are arguably 
narrow and sufficiently specific so as to meet the 
constitutional standard. 
128 See Petersen/Garner E-mail.
129 Fla. Ch. No. 2005-211.
 Ultimately, it took the collective effort of the 
governor, the legislature and legislative staff, the 
media, civil libertarians, open government advo-
cates, and governmental watchdogs, to craft sen-
sible, prophylactic, and most significantly, con-
stitutional legislation meant to enhance the safety 
and security of the state and its citizens without 
eroding the vital and historic principals of access 
to government. 
SUMMARY OF SECURITY-RELATED 
OPEN GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION 
PASSED IN RESPONSE TO 9/11
2001
Section 119.071(3)(a), F.S., Security Systems 
Plans Records130
1. As used in this paragraph, the term “security 
system plan” includes all: 
Records, information, photographs, au-
dio and visual presentations, schematic 
diagrams, surveys, recommendations, or 
consultations or portions thereof relating 
directly to the physical security of the fa-
cility or revealing security systems; 
Threat assessments conducted by any 
agency or any private entity; 
Threat response plans; 
Emergency evacuation plans; 
Sheltering arrangements; or 
Manuals for security personnel, emergen-
cy equipment, or security training.
2. A security system plan or portion thereof for: 
Any property owned by or leased to the 
state or any of its political subdivisions; 
or 
Any privately owned or leased property 
held by an agency is confidential and ex-
empt from § 119.07(1) and § 24(a), art. I 
130 See Fla. CS/SB 16-C (Ch. No. 2001-361) (2001), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.
cfm?BI_Mode=ViewBillInfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu=1&
Year=2001C&billnum=16-C.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
a.
b.
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of the State Constitution. This exemption 
is remedial in nature, and it is the intent of 
the Legislature that this exemption apply 
to security system plans held by an agency 
before, on, or after the effective date of 
this paragraph. 
3. Information made confidential and exempt by 
this paragraph may be disclosed by the custo-
dian of public records to: 
The property owner or leaseholder; or 
Another state or federal agency to prevent, 
detect, guard against, respond to, investi-
gate, or manage the consequences of any 
attempted or actual act of terrorism, or to 
prosecute those persons who are respon-
sible for such attempts or acts. 
Section 286.0113(1), F.S., Security Systems 
Plans Meetings131
That portion of a meeting that would reveal a se-
curity system plan or portion thereof made confi-
dential and exempt by § 119.071(3)(a) is exempt 
from § 286.011 and § 24(b), art. I of the State 
Constitution. 
Section 395.1056, F.S., Hospital Emergency 
Management Plans132
(1)(a) Those portions of a comprehensive emer-
gency management plan that address the 
response of a public or private hospital to 
an act of terrorism as defined by § 775.30 
held by the agency, a state or local law en-
forcement agency, a county or municipal 
emergency management agency, the Ex-
ecutive Office of the Governor, the De-
partment of Health, or the Department of 
Community Affairs are confidential and 
131 Id.
132 See Fla. CS/SB 18-C (Ch. No. 2001-362) (2001), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.
cfm?BI_Mode=ViewBillInfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu=1&
Year=2001C&billnum=18.
a.
b.
exempt from § 119.07(1) and § 24(a), Art. 
I of the State Constitution. 
(b) Information made confidential and exempt 
by this subsection may be disclosed by a 
custodial agency to another state or federal 
agency to prevent, detect, guard against, 
respond to, investigate, or manage the 
consequences of any attempted or actual 
act of terrorism, or to prosecute those per-
sons who are responsible for such attempts 
or acts. 
(c) Portions of a comprehensive emergency 
management plan that address the re-
sponse of a public or private hospital to an 
act of terrorism include those portions ad-
dressing:
1. Security systems or plans; 
2. Vulnerability analyses; 
3. Emergency evacuation transportation; 
4. Sheltering arrangements; 
5. Post disaster activities, including provi-
sions for emergency power, communi-
cations, food, and water; 
6. Post disaster transportation; 
7. Supplies, including drug caches; 
8. Staffing; 
9. Emergency equipment; and 
10. Individual identification of residents, 
transfer of records, and methods of re-
sponding to family inquiries. 
(2) Those portions of a comprehensive emergency 
management plan that address the response 
of a public hospital to an act of terrorism as 
defined by § 775.30 held by that public hospi-
tal are exempt from § 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), 
art. I of the State Constitution. Portions of a 
comprehensive emergency management plan 
that address the response of a public hospital 
to an act of terrorism include those portions 
addressing: 
(a) Security systems or plans; 
(b) Vulnerability analyses; 
(c) Emergency evacuation transportation; 
(d) Sheltering arrangements; 
(e) Post disaster activities, including provi-
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sions for emergency power, communica-
tions, food, and water; 
(f) Post disaster transportation; 
(g) Supplies, including drug caches; 
(h) Staffing; 
(i) Emergency equipment; and 
(j) Individual identification of residents, trans-
fer of records, and methods of responding 
to family inquiries. 
(3) The public records exemptions provided by 
this section are remedial in nature, and it is 
the intent of the Legislature that the exemp-
tions apply to plans held by a custodial agency 
before, on, or after the effective date of this 
section. 
(4) That portion of a public meeting which would 
reveal information contained in a compre-
hensive emergency management plan that 
addresses the response of a hospital to an act 
of terrorism is exempt from § 286.011 and § 
24(b), Art. I of the State Constitution. 
(5) The certification by the governor, in coordina-
tion with the Department of Health, of the suf-
ficiency of a comprehensive emergency man-
agement plan that addresses the response of a 
hospital to an act of terrorism is not exempt.
Section 381.95, F.S., Pharmaceutical Materi-
als133
(1) Any information identifying or describing the 
name, location, pharmaceutical cache, con-
tents, capacity, equipment, physical features, 
or capabilities of individual medical facilities, 
storage facilities, or laboratories established, 
maintained, or regulated by the Department 
of Health as part of the state’s plan to de-
fend against an act of terrorism as defined 
in § 775.30 is exempt from § 119.07(1) and 
§ 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution. This 
exemption is remedial in nature, and it is the 
intent of the Legislature that this exemption 
133 See Fla. CS/SB 20-C (Ch. No. 2001-363) (2002), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?Mo
de=Bills&SubMenu=1&BI_Mode=ViewBillInfo&BillNum
=20&Year=2001C&Chamber=Senate.
apply to information held by the Department 
of Health before, on, or after the effective date 
of this section. 
(2) Information made exempt by this section may 
be disclosed by the custodial agency to anoth-
er state or federal agency in order to prevent, 
detect, guard against, respond to, investigate, 
or manage the consequences of any attempted 
or actual act of terrorism, or to prosecute those 
responsible for such attempts or acts. 
(3) The certification by the Governor of the suffi-
ciency of any location, pharmaceutical cache, 
contents, capacity, equipment, physical fea-
tures, or capabilities of individual medical 
facilities, storage facilities, or laboratories es-
tablished, maintained, or regulated by the De-
partment of Health as part of the state’s plan to 
defend against an act of terrorism is a public 
record. 
Section 119.071(2)(c)2., F.S., Law Enforcement 
Transmittal Letters134
2. A request made by a law enforcement agency 
to inspect or copy a public record that is in the 
custody of another agency and the custodian’s 
response to the request, and any information 
that would identify whether a law enforce-
ment agency has requested or received that 
public record are exempt from § 119.07(1) and 
§ 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution, during 
the period in which the information constitutes 
active criminal intelligence information or ac-
tive criminal investigative information. 
134 See Fla. CS/SB 22-C (Ch. No. 2001-364), avail-
able at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?Mode=
Bills&SubMenu=1&BI_Mode=ViewBillInfo&BillNum=2
2&Year=2001C&Chamber=Senate.
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2002
Section 119.071(3)(b), F.S., Building Plans & 
Blueprints Public Buildings135
1. Building plans, blueprints, schematic drawings, 
and diagrams, including draft, preliminary, and 
final formats, which depict the internal layout 
and structural elements of a building, arena, 
stadium, water treatment facility, or other 
structure owned or operated by an agency are 
exempt from § 119.07(1) and § 24(a), Art. I of 
the State Constitution. 
2. This exemption applies to building plans, blue-
prints, schematic drawings, and diagrams, in-
cluding draft, preliminary, and final formats, 
which depict the internal layout and structural 
elements of a building, arena, stadium, water 
treatment facility, or other structure owned or 
operated by an agency before, on, or after the 
effective date of this act. 
3. Information made exempt by this paragraph 
may be disclosed: 
To another governmental entity if disclo-
sure is necessary for the receiving entity to 
perform its duties and responsibilities; 
To a licensed architect, engineer, or con-
tractor who is performing work on or re-
lated to the building, arena, stadium, water 
treatment facility, or other structure owned 
or operated by an agency; or 
Upon a showing of good cause before a 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
4. The entities or persons receiving such informa-
tion shall maintain the exempt status of the in-
formation. 
135 See Fla. CS/HB 735 (Ch. No. 2002-67) (2002), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.
cfm?BI_Mode=ViewBillInfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu=1&
Year=2002&billnum=735.
a.
b.
c.
Section 295.186, F.S., Military Discharge Re-
cords136
Any veteran of the United States Armed Forces 
or his or her widow or widower, attorney, per-
sonal representative, executor, or court appointed 
guardian has the right to request that a county re-
corder remove from the official records any of the 
following forms recorded before, on, or after the 
effective date of this act, by or on behalf of the 
requesting veteran: DD-214; DD-215; WD AGO 
53; WD AGO 55; WD AGO 53-55; NAVMC 78-
PD; and NAVPERS 553. The request must specify 
the identification page number of the form to be 
removed. The request shall be made in person and 
with appropriate identification to allow determi-
nation of the identity of the requested. The county 
recorder has no duty to inquire beyond the request 
to verify the identity of the person requesting the 
removal. No fee shall be charged for the removal. 
When the request for removal is made, the county 
recorder shall provide a written notice to the re-
questing party that the removal of the document 
from the official records is permanent and no fur-
ther record of the document will exist in the of-
ficial records of the county. 
2004
Section 119.071(3)(c), F.S., Building Plans & 
Blueprints Private Facilities137
136 See Fla. SB 24-E (Ch. No. 2002-391) (2002), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.
cfm?BI_Mode=ViewBillInfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu=1&
Year=2002E&billnum=24.
137 See Fla. CS/HB 317 (Ch. No. 2004-9) (2004), 
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?BI_
Mode=ViewBillInfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu=1&Year=2
004&billnum=317. Although the sunset review language 
is not included in the statutory, a to § 119.071(3)(c) states: 
Note.--Section 2, ch. 2004-9, provides that “[s]ection 
[119.071(3)(c)], Florida Statutes, is subject to the Open 
Government Sunset Review Act of 1995, in accordance 
with§ 119.15, Florida Statutes, and shall stand repealed 
on October 2, 2009, unless reviewed and reenacted by the 
Legislature.”
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Building plans, blueprints, schematic drawings, 
and diagrams, including draft, preliminary, and 
final formats, which depict the internal layout 
or structural elements of an attractions and rec-
reation facility, entertainment or resort complex, 
industrial complex, retail and service develop-
ment, office development, or hotel or motel devel-
opment, which documents are held by an agency 
are exempt from § 119.07(1) and § 24(a), Art. I of 
the State Constitution. This exemption applies to 
any such documents held by an agency before, on, 
or after the effective date of this act. Information 
made exempt by this paragraph may be disclosed 
to another governmental entity if disclosure is 
necessary for the receiving entity to perform its 
duties and responsibilities; to the owner or owners 
of the structure in question or the owner’s legal 
representative; or upon a showing of good cause 
before a court of competent jurisdiction. As used 
in this paragraph, the term: 
1. “Attractions and recreation facility” means any 
sports, entertainment, amusement, or recre-
ation facility, including, but not limited to, a 
sports arena, stadium, racetrack, tourist attrac-
tion, amusement park, or pari-mutuel facility 
that: 
a. For single-performance facilities: 
(I) Provides single-performance facilities; 
or 
(II) Provides more than 10,000 permanent 
seats for spectators. 
b. For serial-performance facilities: 
(I) Provides parking spaces for more than 
1,000 motor vehicles; or 
(II) Provides more than 4,000 permanent 
seats for spectators. 
2. “Entertainment or resort complex” means a 
theme park comprised of at least 25 acres of 
land with permanent exhibitions and a variety 
of recreational activities, which has at least 1 
million visitors annually who pay admission 
fees thereto, together with any lodging, din-
ing, and recreational facilities located adjacent 
to, contiguous to, or in close proximity to the 
theme park, as long as the owners or opera-
tors of the theme park, or a parent or related 
company or subsidiary thereof, has an equity 
interest in the lodging, dining, or recreational 
facilities or is in privity therewith. Close prox-
imity includes an area within a 5-mile radius 
of the theme park complex. 
3. “Industrial complex” means any industrial, 
manufacturing, processing, distribution, ware-
housing, or wholesale facility or plant, as well 
as accessory uses and structures, under com-
mon ownership which: 
a. Provides onsite parking for more than 250 
motor vehicles; 
b. Encompasses 500,000 square feet or more 
of gross floor area; or 
c. Occupies a site of 100 acres or more, but 
excluding wholesale facilities or plants that 
primarily serve or deal onsite with the gen-
eral public. 
4. “Retail and service development” means any 
retail, service, or wholesale business establish-
ment or group of establishments which deals 
primarily with the general public onsite and is 
operated under one common property owner-
ship, development plan, or management that: 
a. Encompasses more than 400,000 square feet 
of gross floor area; or 
b. Provides parking spaces for more than 2,500 
motor vehicles. 
5. “Office development” means any office build-
ing or park operated under common owner-
ship, development plan, or management that 
encompasses 300,000 or more square feet of 
gross floor area. 
6. “Hotel or motel development” means any hotel 
or motel development that accommodates 350 
or more units. 
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This exemption does not apply to comprehen-
sive plans or site plans, or amendments there-
to, which are submitted for approval or which 
have been approved under local land develop-
ment regulations, local zoning regulations, or 
development-of-regional-impact review. 
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Section 943.0314, F.S., Domestic Security Over-
sight Council138
(1)(a) That portion of a meeting of the Domestic 
Security Oversight Council at which the 
council will hear or discuss active criminal 
investigative information or active crimi-
nal intelligence information as defined in 
§ 119.011 is exempt from § 286.011 and § 
24(b), Art. I of the State Constitution, if: 
1. The chair of the council announces at 
a public meeting that, in connection 
with the performance of the council’s 
duties, it is necessary that active crimi-
nal investigative information or active 
criminal intelligence information be 
discussed. 
2. The chair declares the specific reasons 
that it is necessary to close the meet-
ing, or portion thereof, in a document 
that is a public record and filed with 
the official records of the council. 
138 See Fla. HB 1801 (Ch. No. 2005-211), available at 
http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?BI_Mode=Vie
wBillInfo&Mode=Bills&SubMenu=1&Year=2005&billnu
m=1801.
3. The entire closed meeting is recorded. 
The recording must include the times 
of commencement and termination of 
the closed meeting or portion thereof, 
all discussion and proceedings, and 
the names of the persons present. No 
portion of the closed meeting shall be 
off the record. The recording shall be 
maintained by the council. 
(b) An audio or video recording of, and any 
minutes and notes generated during, a 
closed meeting of the council or closed 
portion of a meeting of the council are ex-
empt from § 119.07(1) and § 24(a), Art. I 
of the State Constitution until such time as 
the criminal investigative information or 
criminal intelligence information heard or 
discussed therein ceases to be active. Such 
audio or video recording and minutes and 
notes shall be retained pursuant to the re-
quirements of § 119.021. 
(2) Only members of the council, staff support-
ing the council’s functions, and other persons 
whose presence has been authorized by the 
chair of the council shall be allowed to attend 
the exempted portions of council meetings. 
The council shall ensure that any closure of its 
meetings as authorized by this section is lim-
ited so that the policy of this state in favor of 
public meetings is maintained. 
(3) This section is subject to the Open Government 
Sunset Review Act of 1995 in accordance with 
§ 119.15 and shall stand repealed on October 
2, 2010, unless reviewed and saved from re-
peal through reenactment by the Legislature.
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2.1 The Water Balance
by Thomas Collins
The Water Balance
The water balance is an accounting of the inputs 
and outputs of water.
—C. W. Thornthwaite (1899–1963)
The Water Balance analogy is not appropriate, but 
in a metaphorical sense, the balance between free-
dom of information and restricting public access 
to water utility information becomes meaningful 
after events of September 11, 2001. The original 
assumption of freedom of information in pub-
lic agencies is expressed by James Madison, “A 
popular government without popular information, 
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to 
a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both . . . a peo-
ple which mean to be their own governors must 
arm themselves with the power which knowledge 
gives” (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910). Conversely, a ter-
rorist group with the means of acquiring popular 
information can arm themselves with the power 
which knowledge gives and it is a prologue, not to 
a farce, but to a singular tragedy. This paper will 
briefly discuss the legal actions taken by stake-
holders in the critical infrastructure water utility 
after September 11, 2001 to protect Vulnerability 
Assessments (VA) and Emergency Response Plans 
(ERP) required by the Bioterrorism and Response 
Act, 2002. The paper will also analyze the current 
status of exemptions to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) regarding water related systems, 
where the current balance now lies, and how the 
States will continue toward more restrictions, not 
less, concerning the FOIA and potable water pro-
duction (USA Patriot Act, 2002). 
The Bioterrorism Act
 In 2002, Congress passed the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Re-
sponse Act (Public Law 107-188) known as the 
Bioterrorism Act. The Act required certain drink-
ing water systems to conduct vulnerability assess-
ments and update their Emergency Response Plans. 
The Act amended the Safe Drinking Water Act to 
require community water systems serving popula-
tions of greater than 3,300 persons to conduct an-
titerrorism water Vulnerability Assessments (VA) 
and develop a water system Emergency Response 
Plan (ERP), incorporating the findings of the VAs 
into the ERPs. As Shermer noted there are no man-
datory requirements for security upgrades in the 
Act (2006, p. 40). The Bioterrorism Act exempts 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) vulnerabil-
ity assessments from release through FOIA, and 
leaves the state FOIA laws to be amended through 
individual legislation (Altera, 2007). In Altera’s 
analysis in the Air Force Law Review, generally 
the federal laws do not supersede State FOIA laws 
(2007, p. 14). As a result, drinking water utilities 
will likely not be able to rely on the FOIA exemp-
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tion in the Bioterrorism Act for protecting access 
to all relevant water utility information at the state 
levels (Altera, 2007, p. 14 note 120, supra).
 Openness, not secrecy, had been the purview 
of the public regarding water information, and 
water information had been routinely disseminat-
ed, subject to FOIA rules, under the Community-
Right-to-Know-Act and the Safe Drinking Water 
Act. Prior to the passage of the Bioterrorism Act 
opinions varied regarding the historical use of the 
FOIA and the impact the Bioterrorism Act would 
have on the community’s right to know. The 
Houston Chronicle editorial warned of the pos-
sible dangers to the community right to know if 
the Bioterrorism Act became law (July 2002). The 
Denver Post contributed to the debate by offering 
as an explanation the restrictions in the Bioterror-
ism Act may be a shield for agencies to keep se-
cret and deny the release of routine information. 
“American lives can be negatively affected by a 
law that hides and limits information. Details re-
garding the safety of roads and bridges, railroads, 
food and drinking water could be hidden from the 
public” (Nov. 2002).
 Routine information had not been defined, 
but disregarding the notion that seldom does 
routine information negatively impact American 
lives when it concerns drinking water, and rare 
is the lack of information regarding the failure of 
bridges ex post facto, the Denver Post and Hous-
ton Chronicle editorials highlighted a debate that 
began prior to the passage of the Bioterrorism Act 
in 2002 and continues to the present. In the Nei-
mans Report (2004), Joseph Davis’ response to 
less FOIA information about energy infrastructure 
hazards echoed this need for more information, 
not less, in an era of terrorism. Dahl (2004) calls 
it the “Battle for Access” and understands the phi-
losophy of openness prior to September 11, 2001, 
dramatically changed, tilting the balance from 
openness to secrecy concerning environmental is-
sues. By May 2002, President Bush signed Execu-
tive Order #12958, delegating the administrator of 
the EPA “original classification authority.” Both 
Presidents Clinton and Bush greatly strengthened 
government officials’ powers to classify infor-
mation, but as Dahl points out, President Bush’s 
Executive Order #13292, which amended a 1995 
order by former president Bill Clinton, marked a 
new policy on classification of information. The 
Clinton Executive Order can be summarized as 
“when in doubt, don’t classify,” whereas the Bush 
Executive Order reversed this presumption to 
“when in doubt, classify” (Dahl, 2004). 
 By August 2002, eleven months after the trag-
edy of September 11, 2001, the Association of 
Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA) published 
State FOIA Laws: A Guide to Protecting Sensitive 
Water Security Information (AMWA, 2002). That 
publication provided information, background 
material and suggested language for model legis-
lation for water utilities to take to their respective 
legislatures for quick action; the primary concern 
being a greater vulnerability had been created by 
collecting the vulnerabilities for water utilities 
without the states offering commensurate protec-
tion through amendments to state laws. A compre-
hensive review of the current status of exemptions 
to the FOIA related to environmental documents 
has been undertaken by Altera (2007) in the Air 
Force Law Review. According to Altera, the Vul-
nerability Assessments are not subject to FOIA re-
quests, and they are specifically exempted through 
the SDWA, stating that “no community water sys-
tem shall be required under State or local law to 
provide a vulnerability assessment to any State, 
regional, or local governmental entity solely by 
reason of the requirement set forth in paragraph 
(2) that the system submit such assessment to the 
Administrator” (Aug. 2007). Her analysis of the 
FOIA concluded that individual requests for infor-
mation would be decided on a case by case basis. 
 By September, 2003, the AMWA published 
another set of guidelines for water utilities, this 
time offering legislative language and the current 
status of state laws regarding the water utility in-
dustry and FOIA. In State Laws Protecting Water 
Security Information, AMWA published excerpts 
of the state statues enacted in 2002 and 2003 to 
protect information that could be used to disrupt a 
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drinking water system. The report showed twenty-
seven states passed legislation exempting certain 
security information, however, only ten states had 
language in the exemptions that specifically cov-
ered the release of information on water systems 
(Sept. 2003). Conflicting analysis by the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) showed 
forty-six states appeared to have legislation ex-
empting from public disclosure water security 
system information (Protecting Water System Se-
curity Information, NCSL, 2003). Figure 1 dis-
plays the states that have legislation exempting 
vulnerability assessments, including the District 
of Columbia; although the NCSL report showed 
thirty-six states having specific exemptions, the 
wording of the statutes are not consistent, and the 
report relied on the language in the statutes refer-
ring to the vulnerability assessments that are not 
considered to be public record (NCLS, p.2, 2003). 
Ten additional states provide for FOIA exemption 
if federal or state laws require protection of infor-
mation. Those states are: Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin.
Figure 1
States/Jurisdictions	That	Hae	Vulnerability	
Assessment	Exemptions
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District	of	Columbia
Florida
Georgia	
Idaho	
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Neada
New	Hampshire
New	Jersey
New	Mexico
North	Carolina
North	Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode	Island
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Washington
West	Virginia
Wyoming
Source:	Protecting Water System Security 
Information,	National	Conference	of	State	
Legislatures,	Atkins,	C.,	Morandi,	L.,	200.
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 As reported in State Open Government Law 
and Practice in a Post-9/11 World, by 2007, forty-
five states and the District of Columbia now have 
exemptions or restrictions on public information 
laws relating to the specific category of Critical 
Infrastructure (Aug. 2007). This is an indication 
that more specific restrictions are being developed 
for water utilities throughout the country.
Figure 2
States/Jurisdictions	That	Hae	Vulnerability	
Assessment	Exemptions	Relating	to	Critical	
Infrastructures
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District	of	Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Neada
New	Hampshire
New	Jersey
New	Mexico
New	York
North	Carolina
North	Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylania
Rhode	Island
South	Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West	Virginia
Wyoming
Source:	State Open Government and Prac-
tice in a Post-9/11 World,	Editors:	Dalglish,	
L.A.,	Cochran,	L.A.,	Winegar,	N.,	200.
 Additionally, State Open Government and 
Practice in a Post-9/11 World, reported twenty-
two states with specific references to water util-
ity systems, water distribution lines, dams, or 
water related functions in their State exemption 
laws compared to exemption laws in 2003. Fig-
ure 3 lists the twenty-two states that have included 
specific references to water utility systems, water 
distribution lines, dams, or water related functions 
being exempted from FOIA laws at the state level. 
The finding indicates restrictions specifically tar-
geting water systems in critical infrastructure are 
being implemented and will continue throughout 
the country as awareness is raised among state po-
litical leaders and water stakeholders.
Figure 3
States/Jurisdictions	That	Hae	Exemptions	
Specific	to	Water	Relating	to	Critical	
Infrastructures	(200).
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Michigan
Neada
North	Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
West	Virginia
Wyoming
Source:	State Open Government and Prac-
tice in a Post-9/11 World,	Editors:	Dalglish,	
L.A.,	Cochran,	L.A.,	Winegar,	N.,	200.
 In Texas this is most readily discerned through 
the two Attorney’s General opinions over four and 
a half years of rulings on open records requests. 
In years 2003 to 2007 there have been 14 Open 
Records requests for information on water related 
utilities, and two different Attorneys General have, 
in all of the opinions, ruled in favor of the utilities 
seeking to protect sensitive information (Depart-
ment of State Health Services, Office of General 
counsel, May 15, 2007). 
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The Allegorical Balancing Act: Does It 
Matter?
James Madison’s world view: Open disclosure 
of information makes water utility actions trans-
parent and is good for public health and safety; 
this hypothesis is based upon the assumption that 
agencies need prodding to produce information 
for general public consumption, and that agency 
heads, knowing such legislative prods exists will 
act in their own best interests, or the people who 
govern will replace them; openness serves the 
public health and safety, and carried to the logical 
end, national security. 
Implicit . . . in current debates in the Unit-
ed States is the polarization of those in-
terested in protecting the nation and those 
assumed to be against such societal protec-
tion because they value individual liberties 
more. Yet, a summary of the arguments for 
access…is that this is what national secu-
rity is all about. An informed citizenry is 
the bulwark of open government, not an 
inconvenience to be tolerated or a gad-
fly to be shooed away when government 
has more important matters to attend to 
(Strenz, 2004).
Applying C. W. Thornthwaite’s Water Balance 
allegory, assume in a pre-September 11, 2001, 
world all public information regarding water utili-
ties is readily available and the educated citizenry 
obtain it by using their respective state FOIA laws 
-- a balance between the public’s right to know 
and public health and safety therefore exists. The 
FOIA model, ala Strenz, is in place and operat-
ing. Assume also the regulated U.S. water indus-
try sets a high standard for water quality emulated 
around the world.
America’s high quality of public water 
supplies has traditionally been a source of 
local and national pride. Travelers drink 
water from the tap wherever they may be, 
with no question of its safety. Conformance 
to federally mandated drinking water qual-
ity standards has virtually eliminated the 
occurrence of waterborne diseases in this 
country; such diseases are not the serious 
problems that they are elsewhere in the 
world (Pontius, F. W., and Clark, S. W., p. 
4, 1999).
The water industry in the United States consis-
tently produces a standard of potable water that 
can be used with confidence among the citizenry 
traveling between the fifty states. In other coun-
tries water utilities use the United States model for 
water filtration, purity and quality as a benchmark 
for measurable achievement. 
 Yet, infrastructure neglected is infrastructure in 
danger of collapse, and as a self-inflicted wound, 
is capable of causing as much or more damage as 
a terrorist attack. As Shermer writes:
From a relative risk standpoint, debating 
the likelihood and consequences of terror-
ist threats to drinking water infrastructure 
may seem like a misguided exercise. The 
risk terrorism poses to drinking water safe-
ty almost indisputably pales in comparison 
to the threats drinking water supplies face 
everyday from pollution, overuse, and 
lack of adequate funding for infrastructure 
maintenance. The unfortunate truth is that 
plenty of bad stuff gets into our drinking 
water already. 
Thousands of illnesses and hundreds of 
deaths occur each year, not as the result of 
terrorist efforts, but because of commonly-
found waterborne contaminants (2006, p. 
30). 
This is a serious indictment, yet in 1993 a citizen 
requesting information concerning the Milwau-
kee Water Utility could make the requests for the 
Utility’s water filtration system and it would be 
granted. The Milwaukee Water Utility possessed a 
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good record for water quality and was not in vio-
lation of the federal drinking water regulations in 
place at the time. All is right with the FOIA world 
and balance is achieved -- requests for informa-
tion as inputs equal release of information as out-
puts. However:
Despite this generally good record, water 
utilities using conventional treatment are 
not immune from waterborne-disease out-
breaks . . . The most notable occurrence 
is the 1993 outbreak in Milwaukee, Wis-
consin, where over 400,000 people were 
sickened with severe gastrointestinal upset 
due to cryptosporidiosis. Over 4,000 peo-
ple were hospitalized, and, tragically, it is 
estimated that between 50 and 100 people 
died as a result of this illness . . . Of par-
ticular interest to water utility profession-
als is the fact that at no time during the 
Milwaukee outbreak did the utility violate 
any of the federal drinking water regula-
tions in place at that time (Pontius, F. W., 
and Clark, S. W., p.4, emphasis added).
This seems to run counter to the argument that 
openness serves the public interests, protects pub-
lic health and safety, and further, national security. 
At the time of the deaths of the 100 individuals the 
FOIA and Community Right to Know Act, and the 
Safe Drinking Water Act were in place. The Mil-
waukee cryptosporidium incident should not have 
occurred, yet it did even though safeguards and 
information sharing were in place. 
 An event of the magnitude of the Milwaukee 
poisonings raises citizen alarm, destroys confi-
dence, endangers fears, and is costly. The costs for 
replacing the Milwaukee water system exceeded 
$100 million (Blair, 2003). The medical costs 
of the Milwaukee illness exceeded $67 million 
(Blair, 1993). Yet incidents of cryptosporidium 
illnesses stemming from a water utilities’ inability 
to properly filtrate and monitor regularly occur; as 
late as 2005 even after the release of all available 
information on the causes of the Milwaukee inci-
dent people are sickened from cryptosporidium in 
drinking water systems (Utility Week, 2006).
 The impact of the cryptosporidium tragedy 
resulted in amendments to the Safe Drinking Wa-
ter Act regarding the monitoring and treatment 
of water to protect public health and safety and 
have now been promulgated in the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations (Ternus, M., Sept. 1995). Those 
interested (other than people responsible for the 
treatment of drinking water who faithfully seek 
compliance) can search the electronic Code of 
Federal Regulations and read that utilities serving 
a population less than 10,000 will not start moni-
toring their source water for cryptosporidium un-
til April 1, 2010 (Rules and Regulations, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 753-786 (Jan. 5, 2006)).
 A reader will also discover that cryptosporidi-
um treatment requires filtration, as disinfection is 
non-effective and is resistant to traditional water 
utility treatments such as chlorine, hypochlorite, 
iodophors, formaldehyde, and pro-longed treat-
ment of ammonia and saline of less than 18 hours 
(MSDS for cryptosporidium, Public Health Agen-
cy of Canada). The information provided meets 
the criteria for “in the public domain” as defined 
by the Department of Homeland Security, Sep-
tember 1, 2006:
In response, in section 29.2(d), DHS has 
defined “in the public domain’’ in part as 
information lawfully, properly and regu-
larly disclosed generally or broadly to the 
public. This definition draws in part on 
section 214(c) of the CII Act (6 U.S.C. 
133(c)), which stipulates that nothing in 
section 214 constrains the collection of 
critical infrastructure information includ-
ing any information lawfully and prop-
erly disclosed generally or broadly to the 
public (Rules & Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 
52,261-52,277 (Sept. 1, 2006)).
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What is the lesson to be learned from the allegory 
of balancing the public right-to-know with the 
public health and safety? Water utility information 
is more restricted, as reported in the CRS Report 
for Congress, and are classified as FOIA exemp-
tion 3 prohibiting the disclosure of information 
and authorizing withholding under FOIA subsec-
tion (b) (3), but in the post-9/11 world information 
is still available, perhaps too much information, 
when motive, intent and knowledge come togeth-
er (Stevens & Tatelman, Sept. 27, 2006). 
 A citizens’ motive and intent differs from a ter-
rorists’ and yet in the post-9/11 world both groups, 
the citizen group and the terrorist group, can op-
erate under the assumption a public agency acts 
in the agency’s best interest and seeks compliance 
of the law, providing information upon request 
and following the requirements under the Code of 
Federal Regulations. The lesson is this: the FOIA 
laws become another terrorist’s tool because the 
motive and intent of the terrorist is there, what 
they may lack is the knowledge. 
 This is where the balance tilts away from open-
ness and transparency of government and tilts to-
ward legislative remedies to protect the public. It 
does not suggest a permanent change in the shift 
in the balance, therefore the analogy of a scale, the 
counter-balance ever shifting, is appropriate. This 
is affirmed through the report State Open Govern-
ment Law and Practice in a Post-9/11 World (Aug. 
2007). As mentioned earlier: in Part 1, “Critical 
Infrastructures,” forty-five states now have ex-
emptions to FOIA regarding disclosure of infor-
mation relating to building/architectural plans, 
vulnerability assessments, energy/public utilities 
information, mass transit and telecommunications 
systems (Dalglish, L.A., Cochran, L.A., Winegar, 
N., 2007). Currently, a total of twenty-two states 
enacted laws specifically exempting water sys-
tems from disclosure of information.
Conclusion
Publication of regulatory procedures and impor-
tant information related to water utility systems 
still exists in the public domain. It is difficult to 
imagine water operators efficiently functioning 
without these “public domain” websites. As of 
2007, twenty-two state exemption statutes specifi-
cally referenced water utility systems, water dis-
tribution lines, dams, or water related functions in 
their State exemption laws compared to ten states 
possessing similar restrictions in 2003. Water util-
ity operators and security managers in states with-
out FOIA legislative exemptions for water system 
information restrictions may begin to restrict in-
formation from public disclosure, as they press 
their State legislators for similar exemptions. As 
water security professionals become more knowl-
edgeable regarding the use, limitations, restric-
tions, exemptions and exclusions in the Freedom 
of Information Act and the use of existing current 
state laws to protect critical infrastructure system 
design and information, one can expect more laws 
to seek protection for utilities from public expo-
sure. One should also expect to see more state At-
torney General opinions exempting water utilities 
from releasing information. 
 Based on the anecdotal evidence, it is expected 
the trend toward more secrecy and restrictions on 
water utility information will continue. As dem-
onstrated by the Milwaukee incident, and the con-
tinuation of water contamination incidents, open-
ness and sharing of information is not a guarantee 
of total public health and safety. As more public 
awareness of exemptions and security practices 
becomes common knowledge it is expected that 
further restrictions will be placed on water util-
ity information once thought of as a community’s 
right to know. 
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2.2 State Laws Regarding Information 
About Critical Infrastructure
 by James W. Conrad, Jr.1 
Introduction
The six years since 9/11 have seen extraordinary 
change across virtually every field of substantive 
law. Legislatures and courts have been continu-
ously busy rewriting preexisting law, from airline 
security to electronic surveillance to tort liabil-
ity, as well as crafting law in entirely new fields 
such as chemical facility security and anti-ter-
1 Principal, Conrad Law & Policy Counsel, Wash-
ington, D.C.; J.D., George Washington University Law 
School; B.A., Haverford College.
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rorism technology. Many of these changes have 
been extremely controversial, pitting fundamental 
constitutional rights like the privacy rights of air 
travelers and the due process rights of people like 
Jose Padilla against the specter of death and de-
struction on par with, and potentially worse than, 
that fateful day.
And yet, at the same time these legal battles have 
played out across front pages and TV screens, 
equal or more sweeping changes prompted by 
9/11 have also proceeded almost unnoticed. A 
prime example is the legislation addressed by this 
paper—state enactments limiting the disclosure 
of information regarding the security of critical 
public or private infrastructure. A precise count 
of such laws would depend on how the category 
was defined, and even then would still be ham-
pered by the difficulty of dealing with borderline 
cases. Easily 75% of the 50 states, however, have 
passed some sort of statute since 9/11 protecting 
information about security vulnerabilities, coun-
termeasures or response plans associated with in-
frastructure. In its compilation of changes to state 
public information laws since that date,2 the Re-
porters Committee for Freedom for the Press lists 
only eight states as not having some such law.
Even more remarkably, these statutes seem to be 
almost all sui generis—that is, they give every ap-
pearance of having been bottoms-up, spontaneous 
initiatives, rather than instances of a uniform or 
model statute that was developed by some interest 
group or institute and then systematically pushed 
through state legislatures. The strongest evidence 
for this theory of origin is the remarkable diver-
sity of these laws. They differ on at least a dozen 
2 Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 
State Open Government Law and Practice in a Post-
9/11 World – Changes in State Public Information 
Laws in the United States Since the War on Ter-
rorism (Jeffrey Addicott, Lucy Dalglish, Loren Cochran, 
& Nathan Winegar eds., Lawyers & Judges 2007). This 
paper generally limits itself to the authorities discussed in 
that compilation. While I have conducted some additional 
research for the paper, I have not attempted to assess the 
compilation’s completeness or to independently replicate it.
different parameters (e.g., breadth of coverage, 
standard for nondisclosure), and on many of those 
parameters they adopt up to a half-dozen different 
approaches.
This paper takes a largely descriptive approach, 
listing the most important parameters and illus-
trating the diversity of approaches taken by differ-
ent laws. Where I am aware that a court or other 
decision-maker has adjudicated a statute, I discuss 
that precedent. (However, it seems from both the 
Reporters Committee document and my own ex-
perience that the application of these statutes has 
very rarely been evaluated by tribunals.) At times, 
I offer editorial opinions regarding the wisdom 
or danger of particular approaches. While these 
statutes may not trample directly on any constitu-
tional protections, they do impinge on the public’s 
right to know, which has achieved a sort of quasi-
constitutional status. 
To establish a standard of comparison, the paper 
begins by describing how federal law governs the 
disclosure of information regarding the security 
of infrastructure. The paper then identifies a set 
of significant parameters and discusses how the 
laws identified in the Reporters Committee docu-
ment vary across those parameters. At the end, I 
offer some concluding thoughts. In a nutshell, my 
conclusion is that the relatively low level of public 
controversy associated with these statutes is prob-
ably appropriate—it does not appear that they 
have, in fact, inspired a qualitatively new level of 
state government secrecy.
As the reader reviews the paper, he or she should 
bear in mind the basic ways that security-related 
information could become public, i.e., through 
disclosure by:
The relevant sovereign;
A subordinate governmental instrumental-
ity; or
A private entity;
either:
Voluntarily;
•
•
•
•
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In response to a request under the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) (in the case of 
the federal government) or comparable 
open records laws (in the case of state or 
local governments); or
Pursuant to judicial process.
I. Federal Law Applicable to Information 
about the Security of Critical Infrastructure
There are potentially multiple ways for the fed-
eral government to avoid having to disclose in-
formation about the security of infrastructure, in-
cluding one—classification on national security 
grounds—that only the federal government can 
exercise.3 Aside from classification, however, in 
the great majority of cases, two authorities are 
likely to be the basis on which the federal gov-
ernment might refuse to disclose infrastructure 
security information, or seek to prevent others 
from doing so. These two authorities also serve as 
a useful yardstick by which to judge state enact-
ments directed toward the same end.
 A. Sensitive Security Information (SSI)
Both the Department of Transportation (DOT) and 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA, 
part of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)) have statutory authority to issue regula-
tions, “[n]otwithstanding [FOIA],” that “prohibit[] 
disclosure of information obtained or developed 
in ensuring security” (DOT) or “in carrying out 
security” (TSA) under regulatory programs they 
administer, if the relevant agency finds that “dis-
closing the information would . . . be detrimental 
to transportation safety” (DOT) or “transportation 
security” (TSA).4 The two agencies have jointly 
issued rules implementing this authority.5 These 
rules largely address aviation security (regulated 
3 This general topic is the subject of my article, 
James Conrad, Protecting Private Security-Related In-
formation from Disclosure by Government Agencies, 57 
Admin. L. Rev. 715 (2005).
4 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(s)(1), 40119(b)(1).
5 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 (TSA) and 1520 (DOT).
•
•
by TSA) and maritime security (regulated by the 
Coast Guard), but a few of the rules are written 
so generally that they apply in any transportation 
setting.
The rules identify over a dozen ‘categorical inclu-
sions;’ i.e., if information falls into one of these 
categories, it is automatically SSI. These include 
“vulnerability assessments,” “threat information,” 
“security programs and contingency plans,” “se-
curity inspection or investigative information,” 
“security measures,” and “critical aviation or mar-
itime infrastructure asset information.”6 The two 
agencies can also conclude that other information 
meets the statutory definition.7 
The SSI rules allow DOT and TSA to make SSI 
available to the relevant players in the aviation 
and maritime security context—i.e., “covered 
persons”—who by rule or agency decision have 
a “need to know” that SSI.8 Those persons are in 
turn authorized to give SSI to others meeting the 
same description. Like the procedures for classi-
fied information, the SSI rules are legally bind-
ing on private persons who possess SSI, includ-
ing those who generate the information in the first 
place. Violations of the SSI rules by governmental 
or private actors are “grounds for a civil penalty 
and other enforcement or corrective action” by the 
relevant agency.9
The SSI rules (and the statutory authority underly-
ing them) thus prevent government personnel from 
voluntarily disclosing SSI outside of regulatory 
channels, and provide TSA and DOT with a basis 
for denying FOIA requests for such information. 
Because the federal government has concluded 
that the SSI rules preempt state law, they have the 
same effect on state and local governments.10 And 
6 Id. §§ 15.5(b), 1520.5(b).
7 Id. §§ 15.5(b)(16), 1520.5(b)(16).
8 Id. §§ 15.7, 15.11, 1520.7, 1520.11.
9 Id. §§ 15.17, 1520.17.
10 See e.g., 68 Fed. Reg. 60469 (Oct. 22, 2003) (TSA 
and Coast Guard agree that SSI rules preempt conflicting 
state disclosure laws).
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for the reasons just discussed, they prevent private 
persons from disclosing SSI without approval.
While the statutes and rules do not speak directly 
to judicial process, DOT and TSA have taken the 
position that the rules apply to litigants just like 
any other persons, and TSA has invoked SSI au-
thorities as the basis for refusing to provide SSI 
to persons in litigation with the government,11 and 
for intervening to prevent others from releasing 
SSI in litigation.12 
The aggressiveness with which the federal gov-
ernment has asserted its SSI authorities has led to 
repeated Congressional criticism, culminating last 
fall in appropriations legislation that provides a 
means for litigants to obtain SSI under standards 
somewhat like those that apply to attorney work 
product.13
 B. Protected Critical Infrastructure
 Information
Part of the Homeland Security Act enacted in 
2002, the Critical Infrastructure Information Act 
(CIIA)14 attempts to encourage unregulated criti-
cal infrastructure sectors to voluntarily share se-
curity-related information with DHS by providing 
that information with an unprecedented type of 
protection. Under this law and rules issued under 
it by DHS, “critical infrastructure information”15 
that is “voluntarily”16 submitted to the “Protected 
Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program 
11 See e.g., Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 
1133 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006).
12 See, e.g., In re Sept. 11 Litigation, 431 F. Supp. 2d 
405, 407-411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
13 See Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 525(d).
14 6 U.S.C. §§ 131-34.
15 “Critical infrastructure information” basically 
means information not customarily in the public domain 
regarding threats, vulnerabilities and related problems or 
solutions affecting critical infrastructure or the physical or 
cyber resources that support it. Id. § 131(3).
16 “Voluntarily” means not in response to DHS’s 
exercise of its power “to compel access to or submission of 
the information.” Id. § 131(7)(A).
Office” at DHS is exempt from disclosure under 
FOIA.17 Criminal penalties are established for 
federal employees who “knowingly” release the 
information.18 In addition, among other things:
The information is also exempt from dis-
closure under any state or local ‘FOIA’ or 
“sunshine” laws;19 and
If submitted in “good faith,” the submitted 
information cannot itself be used “direct-
ly” in any governmental civil enforcement 
action, or in any private civil lawsuit, in 
federal or state court.20
DHS can share the information within the fed-
eral government and with state and local govern-
ments—and contractors working for them—but 
all of these entities can only use it for purposes 
of:
Infrastructure protection; or
Investigating or prosecuting crimes.21
The PCII program does not allow would-be sub-
mitters to “launder” or otherwise conceal in-
formation currently required to be made public. 
Regulated entities must continue to report to the 
federal government any information that they are 
required to report under any other law, and fed-
eral, state and local agencies continue to have all 
their existing powers under other laws to obtain 
records and other information that regulated enti-
ties are required to make available to them.22
Unlike the SSI regime, the PCII program is not 
self-implementing—it applies only if information 
is submitted to DHS and DHS “validates” it as fit-
ting the definition of PCII.23 Also unlike the SSI 
regime, the PCII program imposes no obligations 
on nonfederal persons generating (or otherwise in 
possession of) PCII—they can freely release it, al-
though it is then no longer protected.
17 Id. § 133(a)(1)(A).
18 Id. § 133(f).
19 Id. § 133(a)(1)(E)(i).
20 Id. § 133(a)(1)(C).
21 Id. § 133(a)(1)(E)(iii).
22 Id. §§ 133(c), (d); 6 C.F.R. § 29.8.
23 6 C.F.R. §§ 29.5, 29.6.
•
•
•
•
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I am unaware of a case in which litigants have at-
tempted to obtain PCII from the federal govern-
ment or a private entity, but in its PCII rules, DHS 
has taken the position that PCII is not discover-
able or admissible in litigation other than criminal 
prosecutions.24
Finally, on a related point, the Homeland Secu-
rity Act also empowered the Secretary of Home-
land Security to issue exemptions from the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act, and he has done 
so for meetings of a new entity called the Critical 
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Committee, 
facilitating the exchange of critical infrastructure 
information between the federal government and 
private infrastructure owners and operators.25
The PCII program has also had its critics in the 
right-to-know community26 and Congress, but 
legislation to commission a critical GAO study of 
the program was recently dropped from the Sen-
ate version of pending FOIA amendment legisla-
tion.27
II. State Statutes
As noted earlier, the multitude of state laws regard-
ing information about the security of critical infra-
structure differs across about a dozen parameters:
 A. Whose information is covered?
Under most of the statutes, it does not matter who 
generated the information in question. Many are 
24 Id. §§ 29.8(f)(1)(A), (i); 71 Fed. Reg. 52264-65.
25 See 6 U.S.C. § 871; 71 Fed. Reg. 14930 (Mar. 24, 
2006).
26 See, e.g., Rena Steinzor, Democracies Die Behind 
Closed Doors: The Homeland Security Act and Corporate 
Accountability, 12 Kansas J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 641, 643 
(2003).
27 The GAO study would have been commissioned 
by Section 12 of the OPEN Government Act of 2007, S. 
849 and H.R. 1326, as introduced on March 13 and March 
5, 2007, respectively. However, that section is absent in S. 
849 as passed by the Senate on August 3, 2007.
more limited, however. For example, the Arizona 
statute addresses risk assessments performed “by 
or on behalf of a federal agency regarding critical 
energy, water or telecommunications infrastruc-
ture.”28 The California statute covers only docu-
ments prepared “by or for a state or local agen-
cy.”29 Such a narrow focus seems unwise, or at 
least likely to require later amendment to add as-
sessments conducted by others or voluntarily. The 
Arizona law could also be superfluous, at least 
in the case of information that constitutes SSI or 
PCII.30
 B. Breadth of coverage.
The fundamental premise of the Reporters Com-
mittee compilation is that the statutes it has com-
piled in the “Critical Infrastructure” category ad-
dress security-related information about critical 
infrastructure. Many do cover the category gener-
ally. Others are limited to specific sectors or activ-
ities. For example, the Arkansas law covered only 
computer or telecommunications infrastructure 
and public water systems.31
Some statutes, however, sweep quite a bit more 
broadly. Perhaps the most dramatically sweeping 
coverage is the Alabama statute, which covers 
“records relating to, or having an impact upon, the 
security or safety of persons, structures, facilities, 
or other infrastructures, including without limita-
tion information concerning critical infrastructure. 
. . the public disclosure of which could reasonably 
be expected to be detrimental to the public safety 
or welfare, and records the disclosure of which 
would otherwise be detrimental to the best inter-
ests of the public.”32 An exemption that covers any 
information about the “security . . . of persons” 
pretty well exempts all security-related informa-
tion—which may be appropriate, so long as the 
28 Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 39-126 (emphasis added).
29 Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(aa) (emphasis added).
30 See text accompanying notes 10 and 19, supra.
31 Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105. According to the 
compilation, the law sunset in July 2007.
32 Ala. Code § 36-12-40.
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standard for nondisclosure is not too low (which I 
think is a problem here; see Part II.E below)—but 
it is important that such legislation be fairly adver-
tised for what it is, which is a lot more than just 
critical infrastructure.
The Alabama statute and many others are also no-
table in that their coverage turns on risks not just 
to “security,” but also “safety.”33 Again, this may 
be appropriate if the standard for nondisclosure 
is not too law, but the scope of coverage is enor-
mous, which understandably can raise concerns 
about the potential for excessive secrecy.
 C. Is the statute limited to terrorism
 concerns? 
Since 9/11 was the paradigmatic terrorist attack 
against the United States, it is only natural that 
about half of the statutes covered in the Report-
ers Committee compilation use words like “ter-
rorist attack”34 or “act of terrorism”35 in defining 
their scope. Others use more oblique words like 
“security,”36 which at least is limited to the con-
cept of illegal entry or attack. But several statutes 
refer simply (or additionally) to “criminal acts.”37 
This seems unnecessarily broad, and could result 
in a wide range of information being kept secret, 
potentially more to avoid governmental embar-
rassment than to prevent terrorist attacks. For ex-
ample, the vulnerability of a state health insurance 
program to fraud is likely to be a subject of public 
interest and not of great relevance to terrorists.
 D. Types of documents covered
Some of the statutes compiled by the Reporters 
Committee refer to a laundry list of common se-
33 Id; see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-210(a)(19); 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 7(n) (among others).
34 See, e.g., Ind. Code § 5-14-3-4(b)(19).
35 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 395.1056(1)(a).
36 See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 192.502(32).
37 E.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(aa), Ga. Code 
Ann. § 50-18-72(a)(15)(A); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-
712.05(8).
curity-related documents like vulnerability as-
sessments and security plans, either preceding 
or following a catch-all descriptive clause.38 This 
seems sensible, so long as the standard for nondis-
closure (see Part II.E below) is not too low—the 
types of documents that can pose security risks if 
disclosed are so varied that any specific enumera-
tion is bound to be under inclusive. Yet a number 
of statutes are limited to such enumerations,39 and 
some of them are not very long; for example, the 
Wisconsin statute protects only “plan or specifica-
tions for state buildings.”40
Several of the statutes employ various limiting ad-
jectives like “specific and unique” 41 or “special-
ized details”42 to limit the kinds of documents pro-
tected. While the precise meaning of such words 
in a given case may be obscure, at least they give 
some indication of legislative intent to limit with-
holding. This kind of limitation seems to have been 
effective in the case of one of the Texas statutes. 
The Texas Attorney General rejected a municipal 
water authority’s attempt to withhold a report re-
vealing management problems associated with its 
software system, holding that the authority had 
“not identified which portions of the quality con-
trol audit consist of technical details of particular 
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to an act 
of terrorism.”43
 E. Standard for nondisclosure
The statutes compiled by the Reporters Committee 
vary widely in how demanding their standards for 
nondisclosure are. Some statutes include a num-
ber of limiting adjectives and adverbs that would 
seem to give disclosure proponents some amount 
38 E.g., Ala. Code § 36-12-40; Ga. Code Ann. § 
50-18-72(a)(15)(A); Idaho Code § 9-340B (4)(b); Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-106.
39 E.g., W. Va. Code § 29B-1-5(a).
40 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.36(9).
41 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 10002(g)(16)a.5.A. 
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-204(2)(a)(VIII).
43 Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. OR2007-10996, 2007 WL 
2462472 (Aug. 23, 2007) (italicized words are from Tex. 
Gov’t Code Ann. § 418.181).
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of comfort about the reality or degree of harm that 
they can justify withholding. For example, the 
Alaska law only allows withholding of records 
where disclosure “could reasonably be expected 
to endanger the life or physical safety of an indi-
vidual or to present a real and substantial risk to 
the public health and welfare.”44 The Illinois stat-
ute is even more demanding, requiring disclosure 
to “constitute a clear and present danger to the 
health or safety of the community”45—rather than 
“an individual” or “any person”—which seems 
appropriate given the types of mass casualty at-
tacks that homeland security law generally is de-
signed to prevent. 
At the other extreme, as noted in above, the Ala-
bama statute allows the state to withhold “records 
. . . the public disclosure of which could reason-
ably be expected to be detrimental to the public 
safety or welfare [or] would otherwise be detri-
mental to the best interests of the public.”46 This 
standard seems unjustifiably low, as by definition 
the italicized language would only apply to re-
cords that cannot reasonably be expected to jeop-
ardize public safety or welfare. What other risks 
are being averted here? The standard created by 
the italicized language certainly evinces a pater-
nalistic type of discretion of a sort that legislatures 
generally have not dared to give bureaucrats in re-
cent decades.
On the other hand, concerns about undue secrecy 
arising from a very general threshold for with-
holding should be mitigated to some extent by 
a recognition that the same generality that could 
support over withholding can also be consistent 
44 Alaska Stat. § 40.25.120(a)(10)(C) (empha-
sis added). The first half of that clause is taken verbatim 
from the law enforcement sensitive exemption of FOIA, 5 
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F).
45 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 140/7(1)(ll) (emphasis 
added).
46 Ala. Code § 36-12-40 (emphasis added).
with a strong bias for release. For example, the 
Connecticut statute on its face sets up a relative-
ly low threshold: whether “there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that disclosure may result in 
a safety risk, including the risk of harm to any 
person…..”47 A town opposed the release of GIS 
(geographical information systems) data about it 
(aerial photography, primarily) with testimony by 
the chief of police that the photographs could aid 
professional criminals by revealing security mea-
sures that homeowners had put in place.48 While 
such a statement could conceivably meet the 
statutory standard, the state supreme court unani-
mously concluded “[s]uch generalized claims of a 
possible safety risk…did not…establish a nexus 
between [the police chief’s] opinion and the con-
clusion that the release of the data would pose a 
safety risk.”49 
Beyond risks of harm, some state statutes also 
track federal law in allowing withholding where 
disclosure:
“could reasonably be expected to interfere 
with implementation or enforcement of the 
security plan, program or procedures”50 
(somewhat comparable to the “law en-
forcement sensitive” exemption to FOIA’s 
disclosure mandate51); or
“would disclose confidential guidelines for 
investigations or enforcement [that] could 
reasonably be expected to risk circumven-
tion of the law”52 (effectively the same as 
the “risk of circumvention” or “high 2” 
interpretation of the FOIA exemption re-
garding “internal personnel rules and prac-
tices of an agency”).53
47 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-210(b)(19).
48 Director, Dep’t of Info. Tech. v. FOI Comm’n; 
274 Conn. 179, 874 A.2d 785 (2005). 
49 274 Conn. at 193, 874 A.2d at 794. 
50 Alaska Stat. § 40.25.120(a)(10)(A).
51 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A).
52 Alaska Stat. § 40.25.120(a)(10)(B).
53 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2); see Conrad, supra note 3, 
57 Admin. L. Rev. at 733-34.
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 F. Does a central state agency make final
 decisions about withholding information? 
I noted at the outset that there appear to be very 
few judicial or administrative decisions interpret-
ing the statutes compiled by the Reporters Com-
mittee, which is initially surprising given the num-
ber of such statutes and the degree of controversy, 
at least at the federal level, associated with the 
government withholding of information on secu-
rity grounds. The chief exception to this general-
ization is Texas, where the state Attorney General 
issues informal opinions roughly twice a month 
interpreting three related statutes concerning in-
formation about emergency response providers, 
risk or vulnerability assessments, and critical in-
frastructure.54 Otherwise, it appears that the only 
state high court to address one of these statutes is 
the Connecticut Supreme Court.55 It may not be 
accidental that this activity has occurred in two 
states whose freedom of information law empow-
ers a central state agency to make final adminis-
trative decisions regarding withholding of infor-
mation. In Connecticut, a person whose request 
for information has been denied may appeal that 
denial to the state Freedom of Information Com-
mission,56 and in such an appeal the burden of 
persuasion is on the denying agency to show that 
its decision to withhold was correct.57 In Texas, 
the state or local agency seeking withhold infor-
mation must ask the state Attorney General to 
decide whether that decision is correct.58 It seems 
entirely plausible that a state agency tasked with 
interpreting a statute with a bias toward disclosure 
is likely to reach decisions to release information 
much more readily than an agency that has other 
missions, missions that such agency may feel are 
undercut or frustrated by the obligation to release 
information. 
54 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 418.176, .177 & .181.
55 See note 48, supra.
56 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-206(b)(1).
57 Director, Dep’t of Info. Tech, supra note 48; 274 
Conn. at 187, 874 A.2d at 791.
58 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.301(a).
 G. Is nondisclosure discretionary or
 mandatory?
One thing that private sources of security-related 
information have made abundantly clear is that 
they are very unlikely to share such information 
with governmental entities if there is any uncer-
tainty about whether it will be protected.59 That 
is why such sources prefer laws and rules that are 
written in terms like “shall not be disclosed” rath-
er than ambiguous phrases like “is exempt from 
disclosure” (which could mean exempt from man-
datory disclosure, but still disclosable at the gov-
ernment’s discretion), or worse yet language that 
expressly makes disclosure discretionary.60 The 
Virginia and District of Columbia statutes suffer 
from this flaw, and probably have not promoted 
much submission to those governments.61 
 H. Does a private submitter of information
 get notice of a request for that informa-
tion?
 
Under FOIA, an executive order ensures that, 
whenever an agency receives a request for pri-
vate information that the submitter has claimed to 
be confidential business information, the agency 
must notify the submitter and give it an oppor-
tunity to object to disclosure and explain why.62 
Some state critical infrastructure statutes have 
expressly included a similar notice requirement,63 
which should encourage voluntary submittals by 
private entities. It also should aid states in making 
59 Homeland Security Advisory Council Private Sec-
tor Information Sharing Task Force, Homeland Security 
Information Sharing Between the Government and 
the Private Sector at15-16, 24-27 (Aug. 2005).
60 See Conrad, supra note 3, 57 Admin. L. Rev. at 
723 n. 18 and accompanying text.
61 See Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3705.2 (“The following 
records are excluded from the provisions of this chapter but 
may be disclosed by the custodian in his discretion, except 
where such disclosure is prohibited by law.”); DC Code 
Ann. § 2-534(a) (“The following matters may be exempt 
from disclosure…..”).
62 E.O. 12600, 52 Fed. Reg. 23781 (June 25, 1987).
63 Ala. Code § 36-12-40.
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disclosure decisions, particularly if submitters are 
not required to substantiate requests for protection 
at the time of submittal.
 I. Does a private source of the information
 need to request coverage?
In Part II.F, I discussed statutes that require a state 
or local agency seeking to withhold information 
to obtain the approval, initially or on appeal, of 
another state agency. A different issue arises in the 
case where the information in question was sub-
mitted by a private entity: is the private entity’s 
information automatically protected, or does the 
entity have to invoke the law’s protection? As 
with the PCII program (or the FOIA exclusion 
regarding confidential business information64), 
the Virginia statute appears to apply only to pri-
vately submitted information where the submit-
ter invokes its protections.65 Even then, however, 
the Virginia statute says the information “may” be 
withheld from disclosure,66 which does not inspire 
confidence. 
 J. Does the law allow some degree of
 protected information sharing?
As noted in the discussion of the federal PCII and 
SSI regimes, enhancing security generally requires 
the relevant federal, state, local and private actors 
to be able to share sensitive information with each 
other without thereby being required to release it 
to anyone. In this spirit, the Maine statute specifi-
cally provides that information otherwise prohib-
ited from disclosure under it may be shared with 
“municipal officials or board members under con-
ditions that protect the information from further 
disclosure.”67 The Florida statute is similar.68 
The Washington statute specifically exempts from 
disclosure “records not subject to disclosure un-
64 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
65 Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3705.2 (4).
66 Id.
67 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 402.3.L.
68 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 119.071(3)(c).
der federal law that are shared by federal or in-
ternational agencies, and information prepared 
from national security briefings provided to state 
or local government officials related to domestic 
preparedness for acts of terrorism.”69 To the ex-
tent such records are covered by the PCII program 
or constitute SSI (which respectively override 
state and local open records laws expressly and 
impliedly), such an exemption would be unneces-
sary. But it is a helpful contribution to the cause 
of intergovernmental information sharing, some-
thing that (i) is necessary for effective protection 
and (ii) does not occur adequately, in the view of 
most state and local officials.
The Tennessee statute presents a good example of 
bad information sharing language, preserving the 
right of access to protected information “by other 
governmental agencies performing official func-
tions” (so far so good), but then allowing “any 
governmental agency [to] allow[] public access to 
the records during the course of an official func-
tion.”70 Perhaps the fire marshal should be able to 
inspect security plans to see if physical security 
measures might obstruct egress from the facility 
in the event of a fire, but he or she should not be 
given blanket authority to make such information 
public in the process.
 K. Is there a judicial escape clause?
The Florida statute is somewhat unusual in ex-
pressly providing that “a court of competent ju-
risdiction” may order disclosure of a protected 
document “upon a showing of good cause.” While 
this sort of judicial escape clause is probably a 
good idea (and might well be invented by a court 
in any event), the statute could be clearer (i) about 
what would constitute good cause (e.g., when the 
public interest in disclosure outweighs the risks to 
the public caused thereby), and (ii) that disclosure 
could be under terms that would limit further dis-
closure.
69 Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.420(1)(b).
70 Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(21)(D).
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 L. Does the law preserve existing
 requirements regarding public availability
 of information?
As noted above, the federal PCII rules are clear 
that they do not allow facilities to get disclosure 
protection for information that other law requires 
to be reported or made available to federal agen-
cies. Oddly, given the degree of attention this issue 
has attracted whenever Congress has debated the 
issue, most of the statutes in the Reporters Com-
mittee compilation do not address it. The Dela-
ware and Ohio laws are exceptions.71 
 M. Does the statute create an exemption
 from open meetings laws?
A few of the statutes in the Reporters Committee 
compilation appear to be exemptions from open 
meetings laws, not open records laws.72
III. Concluding Thoughts
Virtually all of the state statutes contained in the 
Reporters Committee compilation were enacted 
in 2002 or, to a diminishing extent, the next two 
years, and so almost all have now been in place 
for three to five years. Over this period, it appears 
that very rarely has a frustrated requestor sought 
review of a state’s denial of that person’s request 
for information. Rather, it seems that private citi-
zens, journalists and others have not needed the 
sort of information that these laws protect in order 
to do their jobs or go about their lives. This has 
happened, moreover, even though most of these 
laws do not contain clauses expressly assuring the 
continued availability of information previously 
required to be reported or made available to the 
government. In sum, the harms that might have 
been predicted to follow from these statutes ap-
pear not to have materialized.
71 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 10002(g)(16)a 2; 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3750.22(B)(2) (not exempting 
private owner/operators from providing information to the 
public when required by any other federal or state law).
72 E.g., 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2140.202(c).
Moreover, the laws do serve a valuable purpose. 
Since 9/11, public and private entities have em-
barked on an ambitious program of assessing their 
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and developing 
security and response plans to prevent or respond 
to such an attack. While some of these locations 
may not be likely to top any terrorists’ target lists, 
many others could experience (or cause) substan-
tial adverse consequences if attacked. Presumably 
most Americans would agree that, at some level 
of specificity and at some threshold for nondis-
closure, this information should be protected from 
public release.
Most states have already enacted such legislation, 
though it has sunset in several cases. Other states 
may yet address this issue, and the sunset states 
may wish to enact new legislation. Finally, some 
states might want reconsider or optimize the leg-
islation they have already enacted. Based on my 
review of the statutes contained in the Reporters 
Committee compilation, I would venture that a 
model law would:
Protect infrastructure security information 
regardless of whether it was prepared by 
federal, state, local or private entities.
Protect information about any type of crit-
ical infrastructure, rather than specific cat-
egories such as water treatment systems.
Protect specific information the public re-
lease of which would be reasonably likely 
to pose real risks to the community from 
acts of terrorism, not just criminal activity.
Provide an administrative appeal to some 
central state agency of decisions by other 
state or local agencies to withhold infor-
mation under the law.
Provide that withholding of information 
protected by the statute is mandatory and 
that violations are subject to sanctions.
•
•
•
•
•
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Provide prior notice to private entities of 
an initial decision to disclose information 
they have submitted.
Not require private submitters to request 
protection of information they submit.
Allow state and local agencies in pos-
session of protected information to share 
it with other federal, state, local and pri-
vate entities where warranted to enhance 
security or preparedness, with provisions 
for continued protection, without thereby 
waiving the protections of the law.
Address the standards and conditions un-
der which courts may allow disclosure of 
the information to others.
Provide that information currently re-
quired to be reported or made available 
to a government agency remain subject to 
such requirements.
Not contain a sunset clause.
2.3 Exempting Critical Infrastructure 
Information: More Harm Than Good
by Harry Hammitt
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 
government scrambled to reduce potential vul-
nerabilities to protect against such future attacks. 
Responding more from fear than from measured 
deliberation on how best to solve these problems, 
the Bush administration trotted out a litany of 
shop-worn programs and expanded powers that, 
cobbled together in a matter of weeks, was passed 
by Congress as the Patriot Act. One aspect of the 
debate that began to receive attention from both 
executive agencies and Congress was the extent 
to which publicly available information might be 
used by terrorists to plan and execute future at-
tacks. Many agencies, most notably the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, began to scrub their 
•
•
•
•
•
•
websites of information that only weeks before 
had been considered useful and beneficial to the 
general public and the constituencies served by 
various agencies. In no time at all, public informa-
tion, which had long been considered a vital part 
of our democratic society, became instead a sus-
pect commodity to be withheld from all those who 
did not have a crucial need to know. While a good 
deal of the information removed from websites 
immediately after September 11 has since been 
restored, government information policy remains 
stuck in a post-9/11 world in which the right to 
know has been rolled back and the need to know 
is the default position.
 Perhaps one of the most wrong-headed initia-
tives from an information policy perspective has 
been the Critical Infrastructure Information Act, 
part of the Homeland Security Act creating the 
Department of Homeland Security, which pro-
vided a blanket exemption from disclosure under 
the Freedom of Information Act for critical infra-
structure information provided to the Department. 
As with much of the flurry of legislation passed 
in the immediate wake of September 11, the cre-
ation of the Department of Homeland Security 
seemed like a good way of effectively rearranging 
government’s ability to protect against terrorist 
threats and to respond to them if one were to occur 
again. But, as is often the case with hastily crafted 
legislation, many provisions were poorly thought 
out and were subject to little or no congressional 
debate before passage. The Critical Infrastructure 
Information Act was one such instance.
 The debate over critical infrastructure informa-
tion predates the terrorist attacks of September 11. 
In 1999, Congress held several hearings and leg-
islation was introduced after the EPA announced 
that it intended, as part of its public disclosure 
obligations under amendments to the Clean Air 
Act, to post on the Internet what are known as 
worst-case scenario reports—assessments of po-
tential environmental damage that could occur if 
a catastrophic event took place at a manufactur-
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ing facility that stored chemicals or other hazard-
ous materials. Such reports were required to help 
facilitate emergency response planning and to al-
low people to assess the risks such facilities posed 
for the community. After the EPA announced that 
it would make these reports available on the In-
ternet, the chemical manufacturing industry pro-
tested and was able to convince the FBI that such 
widespread dissemination would allow terrorists 
to assess the vulnerabilities of such plants and 
maximize the potential damage from an attack. As 
a result of the hearings, Congress commissioned a 
two-year study of the problem. However, there is 
no apparent evidence that such a study ever actu-
ally took place and worst-case scenarios have in 
recent years been available in hard copy at various 
locations in the pertinent communities, but are not 
available to a wider audience and are not available 
at all in electronic form.
 The worst-case scenarios controversy dove-
tailed with a related concern then being brought 
up in Congress—the possibility that computers 
would fail to properly recognize the date change 
when the calendar moved from 1999 to 2000, 
potentially causing massive equipment failures. 
An important part of assessing the potential for 
such trouble was to encourage the private sector 
to share its concerns about vulnerabilities with the 
government. To encourage such information-shar-
ing, Congress passed Y2K legislation that prohib-
ited disclosure of any such voluntarily-submitted 
information under FOIA and also excused the 
private sector from any potential liability if their 
products did fail as a result of the date change.
 The issue of protecting critical infrastructure 
information more generally was still being dis-
cussed when the Bush administration took office 
and some form of legislation might well have been 
passed in the next year or two. But the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 tied the issue more closely to 
terrorism. Instead of being an issue about protect-
ing confidential business information, it was now 
rolled into the push to protect the nation from fu-
ture terrorist attacks. As part of the Homeland Se-
curity Act of 2002, the House of Representatives 
passed a provision allowing the Department of 
Homeland Security to protect voluntarily-submit-
ted critical infrastructure information. In the Sen-
ate, public interest groups helped craft a provision 
that, while allowing such voluntary submissions, 
would allow outside challenges, based on the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Critical Mass v. NRC,73 as to 
whether or not specific submissions did indeed 
qualify as critical infrastructure information. The 
amendment, offered by Sen. Robert Bennett (R-
UT), Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Sen. Carl 
Levin (D-MI) was adopted by the Senate but was 
dropped in conference, leaving the House provi-
sion as the final version.
 In its final version, the Critical Infrastructure 
Information Act74 allows the Department of Home-
land Security to receive voluntarily submitted in-
formation relating to critical infrastructure from 
the public, owners and operators of critical infra-
structure, and state and local governmental entities 
in confidence while limiting public disclosure of 
that sensitive information under both the FOIA and 
any other federal or state laws. These provisions 
qualify as an Exemption 375 statute under FOIA, a 
catch-all exemption allowing other statutory provi-
sions providing for non-disclosure of information 
to be applied through FOIA. It is important to note 
that the initial policy debate over the provision as 
it worked its way through Congress was whether 
an Exemption 3 statute, which allows agencies to 
withhold records whose disclosure is prohibited or 
restricted by a provision in another statute as long 
as that statute either provides no discretion on the 
part of the agency or identifies specific types of in-
formation to be withheld, was required or whether 
other existing exemptions, particularly Exemption 
73 Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 
871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Critical Mass].
74 Codified as Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. 
L. 108-275, tit. II, subtitle B, § 211, 116, Stat. 2135, 2150 
(Nov. 25, 2002) (6 U.S.C. § 131-134).
75 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)
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276—which protects information the disclosure 
of which could result in circumvention of law or 
regulation—, Exemption 477—which protects con-
fidential business information submitted to gov-
ernment agencies—, or Exemption 578—which 
protects information that is privileged in litiga-
tion—were adequate to provide protection. While 
neither proponents nor opponents of the provision 
were able to show to a certainty that existing ex-
emptions would or would not protect the bulk of 
critical infrastructure information, it was clear that 
a specific tailored Exemption 3 provision would 
provide blanket protection—the preferred position 
of government and industry—while the combina-
tion of existing exemptions might allow a court to 
reject protection for certain types of information 
that did not seem to meet the threshold of being 
critical infrastructure information. 
 Critics of the provision were even willing to 
accept the analytical basis for determining what 
constituted a voluntary submission contained in 
the D.C. Circuit’s Critical Mass decision. Under 
the Critical Mass test, information voluntarily 
submitted to government which is of a type that 
is not customarily disclosed by the submitter is 
presumed to be confidential. But information 
that is required to be submitted or whose submis-
sion the agency has statutory authority to require, 
will be analyzed under the earlier National Parks 
test,79 which requires the agency or the submitter 
to show that disclosure will likely cause substan-
tial competitive harm. From the beginning of the 
debate over critical infrastructure information, the 
position of industry had been that it was unwill-
ing to trust its critical infrastructure information to 
renegade judges.
 Senator Leahy has continued to push for 
changes in the Critical Infrastructure Information 
Act that would restore the balancing test that he, 
76 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)
77 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
78 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)
79 National Parks & Conservation Association v. 
Morton, 498 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Bennett and Levin sponsored in the Senate. He in-
troduced the Restore FOIA Act in March 2003 to 
amend section 204 of the Homeland Security Act. 
In introducing the legislation, he observed that the 
bill “would correct the problems in the HSA in sev-
eral ways. First, it limits the FOIA exemption to 
relevant ‘records’ submitted by the private sector, 
such that only those that actually pertain to critical 
infrastructure safety are protected. ‘Records’ is the 
standard category referred to in FOIA. This corrects 
the effective free pass given to industry by the HSA 
for any information it labels ‘critical infrastructure.’ 
Second, unlike the HSA, the Restore FOIA bill al-
lows for government oversight, including the abil-
ity to use and share the records within and between 
agencies. It does not limit the use of such informa-
tion by the government, except to prohibit public 
disclosure where such information is appropriately 
exempted under FOIA.” Another provision, Leahy 
explained, “allows local authorities to apply their 
own sunshine laws. The Restore FOIA bill does 
not preempt any state or local disclosure laws for 
information obtained outside the Department of 
Homeland Security. Likewise, it does not restrict 
the use of such information by state agencies.”80 
Leahy also offered an implicit criticism of the way 
in which the original bill had been handled by the 
congressional Republicans. He noted that the Re-
store FOIA Act was “identical to language I negoti-
ated with Senators Levin and Bennett last summer 
when the HSA was debated by the Governmental 
Affairs Committee. Senator Bennett stated in the 
Committee’s July 25, 2003 mark up that the ad-
ministration had endorsed the compromise. He also 
said that industry groups had reported to him that 
the compromise language would make it possible 
for them to share information with the government 
without fear of the information being released to 
competitors or to other agencies that might acci-
dentally reveal it. The Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee reported out the compromise language that 
day. Unfortunately, much more restrictive House 
language was eventually signed into law.”81 
80 Cong. Record, Mar. 12, 2003, p. S3632.
81 Id.
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 Leahy’s bill did not move during that ses-
sion of Congress. However, he reintroduced the 
bill in the next session of Congress on March 15, 
2005.82 Further, Leahy included auditing require-
ments for the critical infrastructure information 
provisions in the OPEN Government Act of 2007 
(S.R. 849), which were also included in the House 
version (H.R. 1309). These provisions would re-
quire the Government Accountability Office to 
report annually for three consecutive years on 
the “number of persons in the private sector, and 
the number of State and local agencies, that vol-
untarily furnished records to the Department [of 
Homeland Security] under this section, the num-
ber of requests for access to records granted or 
denied under this section. . .[and] an examination 
of whether the nondisclosure of such information 
had led to the increased protection of critical infra-
structure.”83 Resolving a hold placed on the OPEN 
Government Act by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), acting 
on behalf of the Justice Department, Leahy agreed 
to some changes, including dropping the reporting 
requirements, which had become the target of a 
separate last-minute hold by none other than Sen. 
Bennett. The amended bill has since been passed 
by the Senate. Regardless of the lack of success of 
Leahy’s attempt to revise the critical infrastructure 
information provisions of the Homeland Security 
Act, his continued commitment to such changes 
reflects a strong attitude in the FOIA community 
that the current provisions are inappropriate.
 The Department of Homeland Security issued 
proposed regulations concerning the voluntary 
submission of critical infrastructure information 
in 2003,84 published an interim rule in 200485 and 
issued a final rule in August 2006.86 The original 
proposal suggested that critical infrastructure in-
formation could be submitted to other agencies 
and could then be passed along to Homeland Se-
82 Cong. Record, Mar. 15, 2005, p. S2735. 
83 S.R. 849, § 12, Accessibility of Critical Infrastruc-
ture Information, (a)(1),(2) and (4).
84 68 Fed. Reg. 18523 (Apr. 15, 2003).
85 69 Fed. Reg. 8074 (Feb. 20, 2004).
86 71 Fed. Reg. 52261 (Sept. 1, 2006).
curity. The statutory language appears to contem-
plate that such submissions can only be made to 
the Department of Homeland Security and public 
interest groups were concerned that allowing other 
agencies to collect the submissions expanded the 
provision’s reach.87 In the final rule, DHS modi-
fied its original position by allowing other agen-
cies to accept and submit critical infrastructure 
information to the Program Manager’s Office at 
DHS, but that only that office would have the au-
thority to validate information as protected critical 
infrastructure information.88 
 The DHS definition of what constitutes a vol-
untary submission is so scant as to be non-exis-
tent. The final regulations say only that whether 
the submission was voluntary or involuntary will 
be determined at the time the request for protected 
status is reviewed. What this means in practice is 
further explicated in the regulation’s discussion of 
when information might lose protected status. The 
interim rule provided that protected status could 
be lost if the Program Manager determined that 
“the information was customarily in the public do-
main, is publicly available through legal means, 
or is required to be submitted to DHS by Federal 
law or regulation.” In the final rule, two of these 
criteria were deleted. DHS dropped the status for 
information that was publicly available through 
legal means, explaining that “the CII Act does not 
provide for a change in status on this ground.”89 
The criterion for loss of protection if “required to 
be submitted to DHS by Federal law or regulation” 
was also deleted. The rule explained that the “def-
inition of ‘voluntary or voluntarily’ refers express-
ly to the time of submittal and is thus retrospec-
tive only. This does not, of course, prevent DHS 
from using current or future authority to mandate 
submission of any information.”90 In essence, the 
existing test seems to be one based on “I’ll know it 
87 DHS Proposal on CII Attracts Comments on Both 
Sides of Issue, Access Reports, v. 29, n. 17, Sept. 10, 
2003.
88 71 Fed. Reg. 52263 (2006).
89 Ibid., 52265
90 Id.
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when I see it,” rather than any objective standard. 
Although the voluntary submission standard from 
Critical Mass is not terribly requester-friendly, at 
least there is some substantive guidance as to what 
constitutes a voluntary submission. Under that test, 
which refers predominantly to submissions made 
pursuant to a government contract, most submis-
sions a company provides to bid on a contract are 
deemed mandatory because they are required to 
successfully bid on the contract.
 An article in SecurityFocus91 looked at how the 
submission process has worked so far and noted 
that at least the information technology industry 
is still wary of the program and has yet to submit 
any information. Although the information is pro-
tected from public disclosure, industries are more 
concerned about its potential wide dissemination 
within government. Sean Moulton, a policy ana-
lyst at the public interest group OMB Watch, ex-
plained to SecurityFocus the concerns of the public 
interest community. He indicated that industry had 
been given more protection than public interest 
groups thought was warranted, yet industry was 
still uncomfortable submitting such information. 
He pointed out that “I really find it troubling that 
it’s industry driving the process and not the gov-
ernment driving the process, when it’s the public 
who has a stake in this. It’s the public who will 
be harmed if these infrastructures are attacked.”92 
What the government hoped was an ironclad pro-
tection to encourage businesses to share informa-
tion about vulnerabilities with the government has 
so far turned out to be a pyrrhic victory at best. It 
is not the disclosure of the information to the pub-
lic that scares business as much as it is the sharing 
of such information within government itself. 
The Card Memo
It is important to understand the immediate evo-
lution of information policy after September 11. 
91 Poulsen, Kevin, U.S. Info-Sharing Initiative 
Called a Flop, SecurityFocus, Feb. 11, 2005.
92 Ibid.
Perhaps the most dramatic enunciation of where 
the Bush administration was headed was a White 
House memo that came to be known as the Card 
Memo. In March 2002, then White House Chief 
of Staff Andrew Card sent a memo93 to all agen-
cies concerning the need to safeguard sensitive 
but unclassified information pertaining to home-
land security. Because such undefined informa-
tion did not qualify for classification on national 
security grounds, Card attached two short memos 
from Laura Kimberly, Acting Director of the In-
formation Security Oversight Office,94 and Rich-
ard Huff and Daniel Metcalfe, Co-Directors of the 
Justice Department’s Office of Information and 
Privacy,95 explaining possible FOIA exemptions 
that could be used to withhold such information. 
Primary among them was Exemption 2, which al-
lows an agency to withhold records “related solely 
to the internal personnel rules and practices of an 
agency.” Over the years, courts have stretched 
these words so they now allow an agency to with-
hold records where disclosure could lead to cir-
cumvention of a law or regulation. The Justice 
Department memo reminded agencies to consider 
using Exemption 2 for such sensitive but unclas-
sified information on the untried theory that dis-
closure would allow a requester to circumvent a 
law or regulation. Although it said little about the 
scope of the problem, the Card memo was the first 
White House policy directive concerning the need 
to protect sensitive unclassified information and 
was certainly a primary factor in moving the de-
velopment of such policies forward.
93 Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President 
and Chief of Staff, Memorandum for the Heads of Execu-
tive Departments and Agencies, Subject: Action to Safe-
guard Information Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion & Other Sensitive Documents Related to Homeland 
Security (Mar. 19, 2002) [hereinafter Card memo].
94 Laura S. Kimberly, Acting Director of the In-
formation Security Oversight Office, Memorandum for 
Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002).
95 Richard Huff & Daniel Metcalfe, Co-Directors, 
Office of Information and Privacy, Department of Justice, 
Memorandum for Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 
2002).
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Other Information Protection Measures: Sen-
sitive Security Information
Sensitive security information is one of the few 
such categories with a statutory basis. In Novem-
ber 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Trans-
portation Security Act, creating the Transportation 
Security Administration. That statute defines sen-
sitive security information as information describ-
ing air carrier screening procedures, airport or air 
carrier security programs, maritime transportation 
security procedures, or other related transportation 
security matters. It prohibits the disclosure of such 
information if the TSA Administrator determines 
disclosure would “be detrimental to the safety of 
passengers in transportation.”96 The Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 expanded this to cover infor-
mation that “would be detrimental to the security 
of transportation.” A May 2004 Federal Register 
notice set out 16 categories of information from 
traditional security plans to security directives and 
included “other information” that TSA at its dis-
cretion determined should be withheld. This statu-
tory authority is structured so that it qualifies as an 
Exemption 3 statute under FOIA.
 These sensitive security information provi-
sions have been involved in a number of incidents 
that have received national press coverage, in-
cluding the refusal of TSA staff to allow former 
Rep. Helen Chenoweth-Hage to board a flight be-
cause she refused to submit to a pat-down search 
and asked for the legal authority to conduct such a 
search, a request that was denied. Other high-pro-
file incidents involved a lawsuit by activist John 
Gilmore, after TSA again refused to disclose its 
authority for demanding personal identification 
before boarding a flight; Gilmore’s suit was ul-
timately dismissed for lack of standing.97 A law-
suit was also filed by the ACLU of Northern Cali-
fornia on behalf of several people who were told 
they were on the “No Fly List,” but were denied 
96 49 U.S.C. § 114(s)(1) and 49 U.S.C. § 
40119(b)(1).
97 Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 
2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct 929 (2007).
any information concerning why they were put on 
such a list. Although the judge hearing the lawsuit 
initially told TSA that it had failed to substantiate 
its claims, he ultimately ruled that the information 
was exempt under FOIA.
Critical Energy Infrastructure Information 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has 
created its own category of sensitive information, 
known as critical energy infrastructure informa-
tion, and has faced its own specific problems 
which it has had to finesse. The Commission over-
sees the energy industry and holds a number of 
administrative proceedings involving companies 
and utilities in that area. As a part of these hear-
ings, the Commission requires submission of tech-
nical information, including infrastructure infor-
mation. Generally, most of this information would 
be public when used in a proceeding. However, 
after September 11, FERC moved more aggres-
sively than virtually any other agency to remove 
critical energy infrastructure information from the 
public domain. The agency’s regulations define 
CEII as information that is exempt from FOIA and 
submitted to the agency by private parties about 
proposed or existing critical infrastructure that re-
lates to the production, generation, transportation, 
transmission or distribution of energy and which 
“could be useful to a person planning an attack on 
critical infrastructure.”98 
 The most glaring problem with FERC’s policy 
is that it is based on the assumption that this in-
formation is exempt from disclosure under FOIA. 
However, FERC’s claims are based not on any 
court-accepted interpretation of FOIA, but on 
the Justice Department’s suggested potpourri of 
possible exemptions. These include Exemption 
2, which protects information the disclosure of 
which could allow someone to circumvent a law 
or regulation, Exemption 7(E), which allows a 
law enforcement agency to withhold information 
98 18 C.F.R. § 388.113(c) (68 Fed. Reg. 9857, 9870 
(March 3, 2003)).
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that would reveal investigative methods and tech-
niques, and Exemption 7(F), which allows a law 
enforcement agency to withhold information the 
disclosure of which could endanger the physical 
safety of an individual. The agency also suggested 
that the information could be withheld under Ex-
emption 4, which protects confidential business in-
formation, because a terrorist attack would clearly 
cause a company economic harm. The other prob-
lem is that FERC wanted to continue to share this 
information during its proceedings, requiring it to 
create a non-FOIA process of disclosure to those 
parties with a “need to know,” which required par-
ties to sign a non-disclosure agreement. It is dif-
ficult to see how information that was previously 
public could become non-public based solely on 
agency regulations.
Case Law
There is surprisingly little case law on this subject 
and so far there are only two state cases that direct-
ly deal with aspects of protected CII and what that 
status might mean for disclosure of the informa-
tion. In a case in New Jersey where a plaintiff had 
been denied access to a topographic map in digital 
form maintained by the Brick Township Munici-
pal Utilities Authority, the appellate court agreed 
with the state’s Government Records Council that 
the topographic map was exempt from disclosure 
under the Open Public Records Act because it had 
been submitted to DHS and been validated as pro-
tected critical infrastructure information. The court 
noted that “BUTMA’s GIS topographical mapping 
data in digital format comes within the definition 
of ‘government record’ in [the OPRA]. However, 
the same information has been found by the DHS 
to be protected from disclosure by the [Critical In-
frastructure Information Act].” The court contin-
ued: “BTMUA submitted the electronic GIS data 
to DHS, obtained confirmation that the data had 
been received and was presumed protected and 
finally was informed that the data was validated 
as PCII. Clearly, information validated as ‘PCII 
shall be treated as exempt from disclosure under 
the Freedom of Information Act and any State or 
local law requiring disclosure of records or infor-
mation.’”99 
 In the second case, the California First Amend-
ment Coalition brought suit against Santa Clara 
County after it was denied access to the county’s 
GIS basemap in digital form. While the litiga-
tion involved several separate exemptions under 
the California Public Records Act, one claim the 
county made was that the information was exempt 
because it was protected as critical infrastructure 
information under the CIIA. Rejecting that claim, 
the trial court indicated that: 
[T]he court has considered whether County 
can cloak the entirety of the GIS basemap 
with the broad brush protection of CII/PCII 
simply by depositing it with the federal or 
state [Office of Homeland Security]. The 
action taken by County may well be legiti-
mate with regard to some of the informa-
tion in the GIS basemap, i.e. water lines 
for delivery of water from Hetch Hetchy, 
but do not appear to be valid for informa-
tion that is public record and which have 
nothing to do with critical infrastructure. 
For example, information about the as-
sessed value of a single family home in 
San Jose has nothing to do with critical 
infrastructure, but because it is contained 
in the GIS basemap, is it thereby cloaked 
with the protection of CII/PCII simply by 
submission to the OHS? It appears County 
has belatedly focused on the information 
pertaining to ‘water lines’ and used that 
as its primary, if not sole, basis for obtain-
ing the CII/PCII designation without any 
concession that the GIS basemap consists 
of any other publicly available informa-
tion. County’s argument runs counter to 
its earlier argument that CFAC has alter-
native means of obtaining the same infor-
99 Tombs v. Brick township Municipal Utilities Au-
thority, WL 3511459 (N.J. Super. A.D.) (Dec. 7, 2006).
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mation contained in the GIS basemap – if 
CFAC can obtain, for instance, property 
assessment data from the assessor’s office, 
County is hard pressed to argue that this 
same information is now exempt because 
it has been submitted as CII.
Saying that the county bore the burden of proving 
that the information was CII, the court observed 
that “[c]ounty has not make the initial effort to es-
tablish that all information contained in the GIS 
basemap is CII. Having failed to meet its initial 
burden, County’s assertion of this particular ex-
emption fails.”100
 The analysis contained in these two cases does 
not provide much to go on. In the New Jersey 
case, the court seems to have taken the position 
that once DHS designates information as PCII, it 
is categorically exempt, while the California court 
believed that the county was required to show in 
the first instance that all the information was eligi-
ble for PCII designation, at least where there were 
serious doubts as to whether some of the informa-
tion could be CII since it was already public.
The Impact on Disclosure of Such Categories 
of Information 
These ill-defined categories—be they “sensitive 
but unclassified,” “sensitive security information,” 
or some form of “critical infrastructure informa-
tion”—almost always do more harm than good. 
They are a solution to a problem that may not even 
exist and are based on an antithetical proposition 
in our democracy—that, when in doubt, always 
favor secrecy over openness. That is not to say 
that some government information should not 
remain secret; we can all agree that some infor-
mation, such as troop movements in time of war, 
for instance, should be kept secret. But when our 
government fosters the attitude that there are vast 
100 California First Amendment Coalition v. County 
of Santa Clara, No. 1-06-CV-072630, California Superior 
Court, County of Santa Clara, May 18, 2007.
undefined categories of information that must be, 
at a minimum, safeguarded by agencies, it does 
a grave disservice to the ideal of an open demo-
cratic society. It is paternalistic for government to 
assume that people cannot assess and use such in-
formation responsibly.
 Government officials say these designations, 
like “sensitive but unclassified,” or “for your eyes 
only,” have no legal status and cannot be used to 
deny access under FOIA. While this is true on a 
technical level, it is hard to believe that when agen-
cy personnel are faced with a document with such 
a designation they are not going to think twice be-
fore agreeing to disclose such a document. In oth-
er words, such a designation sets off red flags that 
suggest the record merits withholding. The prob-
lem with the Justice Department’s memo attached 
to the Card memo is that it outlines a strategy for 
withholding information that perhaps should have 
been released. When a record says “sensitive, but 
unclassified,” the first step for agency personnel is 
likely to try to figure out which FOIA exemption 
can be applied.
 For years, most outside observers have com-
plained that too much information is classified. 
The annual reports of the Information Security 
Oversight Office consistently show that the num-
ber of classification determinations, whether at 
the original or derivative level, continue to go up 
every year. But the national security classifica-
tion scheme provides several potential remedies 
for forcing the disclosure of classified informa-
tion. These include a mandatory declassification 
review, most often in conjunction with an FOIA 
request, or a review by the Interagency Security 
Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP). Review by 
ISCAP, created by Executive Order 12958 issued 
by President Clinton, has resulted in further dis-
closure of previously classified information in a 
significant majority of cases. However, the num-
ber of cases heard by the panel is relatively small 
and resort to it is not a practical option for many 
requesters.
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 When it comes to critical infrastructure in-
formation, however, the CIIA has adopted such 
a broad test that it allows information to be com-
pletely exempt from public disclosure regardless of 
its content if the submitter can get DHS to validate 
it as protected critical infrastructure information. 
There is no nod to any public interest or responsi-
ble alternative uses of the information. Information 
that has been public previously can now become 
completely non-public merely because DHS de-
cides that its designation as protected critical infra-
structure information is desirable. The CIIA is an 
extension of secrecy policies that have existed for 
years in the U.S. judicial system, allowing litigants 
to seal or protect records that may have substantial 
significance to public safety or public policy. The 
idea that secrecy is the best remedy betrays demo-
cratic principles and narrows the ability to use in-
formation to such an extent that much of its utility 
is completely lost. A policy like the CIIA is based 
on the premise that government can enlist the co-
operation of information holders by providing con-
fidentiality. But this system seems to have largely 
backfired in the area of critical infrastructure infor-
mation because business is more fearful of govern-
ment than it is of public disclosure. In other words, 
the carrot provided to encourage submission is 
not nearly large enough and is not even aimed at 
the actual problem. Beyond that, the over-arching 
policy underlying government access to critical in-
frastructure information is undercut by the CIIA. 
If there is indeed a need for government to know 
about the vulnerabilities of the critical infrastruc-
ture so that it can prepare for a potential terrorist 
threat, then government needs to mandate disclo-
sure of such information, not make it voluntary in 
a system that doesn’t provide sufficient rewards 
in the first place. By taking that tact, the federal 
government has gotten the worst of both worlds. It 
has ensured that critical infrastructure information 
is not available to the public while failing to secure 
its availability to the government at the same time.
 The protection of critical infrastructure infor-
mation is premised on the idea that by protecting 
such information from would-be terrorists we take 
steps to protect ourselves from such terrorism. But 
unless we could keep all information about any 
vulnerable man-made or natural potential target 
from anyone and everyone, which is clearly im-
possible and not even contemplated, there is suf-
ficient information for a would-be terrorist to con-
clude that breaching a dam or blowing up a major 
bridge would probably have catastrophic con-
sequences. Further, because the policy assumes 
the continued vulnerability of the infrastructure, 
its blanket exemption for public access prevents 
informed public discussion and political debate 
concerning how best to remedy existing vulner-
abilities. If a bridge is unsafe or an urban chemical 
plant is a significant environmental hazard, such 
problems are more likely to be remedied if pub-
lic and political pressure is brought to bear. With-
holding any debate on such issues is tantamount to 
ensuring that such vulnerabilities are accepted as 
the status quo rather than being subject to a rem-
edy.
 When it comes to these undefined categories 
of information there are no remedies short of liti-
gation, probably under FOIA. While the govern-
ment’s collection of recommended exemptions 
has not been thoroughly tested, at least two U.S. 
district court judges have accepted some combina-
tion of these claims.101 Further, the expanded def-
erence shown by the D.C. Circuit in litigation102 
over disclosure of the identities of individuals who 
were detained in the immediate aftermath of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, suggests that courts would likely 
be sympathetic to the government’s arguments 
when it came to withholding information based 
on concerns about possible terrorist use. There is 
no administrative appeal aside from that available 
under FOIA. This means, realistically, that there 
are fewer checks against the improper denial of 
101 See Living Rivers, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 
No. 2:02-CV-644TC (D. Utah, Mar. 25, 2003); Coastal De-
livery Corp. v. Customs Service, No. 02-3838 WMB (C.D. 
Cal., Mar. 14, 2003).
102 Center for National Security Studies v. DOJ, 331 
F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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such undefined categories of information than ex-
ist for classified national security information.
 Further, remedies to challenge the designation 
of such information must be made available. Re-
questers must not be forced to go to court as their 
only alternative. Instead, a process akin to manda-
tory declassification review should be instituted. 
Along these same lines, time limits for protection 
should be considered and implemented. Sensitive 
information may well be sensitive for a period of 
time and lose its sensitivity thereafter. Once infor-
mation is no longer sensitive it should be made 
publicly available. 
 The obsession with protecting such information 
because under some scenario it might be of use to 
a terrorist, fails to consider the value of the infor-
mation itself. Vulnerabilities in our infrastructure 
should not be broadcast to potential enemies, but 
should not be hidden under a basket either. A good 
analogy for fostering greater public disclosure is 
how open source software code works in the com-
puter world. When such code is openly available, 
individuals tinker with it in an effort to improve it 
or to expand its utility. When such programs are 
closed, they stagnate rather than expand. Bridges 
or roads or manufacturing facilities that are vul-
nerable will not be fixed because their vulnerabili-
ties are hidden. They are much more likely to be 
fixed, and thus become less useful as an end goal 
for terrorists, because individuals and groups put 
pressure on government or business to fix them. 
We need to be less fixated on the potential harmful 
use of information and more cognizant of the way 
in which we can use that information to achieve 
a result that makes us both safer from potential 
attack and safer because vulnerabilities have been 
addressed. As a nation we cannot very well ad-
dress vulnerabilities when we do not know they 
exist.
 These undefined categories of information 
stifle the availability and use of information. They 
expand the universe of information agencies are 
likely to withhold from the public solely because 
of their designation. They also restrict the avail-
ability of information within government and par-
ticularly between levels of government. One of 
the lessons of the 9/11 Commission’s report is that 
information is most useful when it is available. 
Various bureaucratic gate-keeping regimes that 
slow or halt the flow of information, or worse still, 
hide its existence, are detrimental to our available 
knowledge base and, ultimately, do us more harm 
than good.
2.4 Protecting Sensitive Information: 
Critical Infrastructure Protection at the 
Local Level
by Maeve Dion
Abstract
Given the upsurge in the use of security ratio-
nales as justifications for non-release decisions 
regarding freedom of information requests related 
to critical infrastructure, some people are asking 
whether we should have a common definition for 
such assessments. This article discusses the back-
ground to this debate and ultimately concludes 
that (a) in the current circumstances of both vague 
and complex federal guidelines, and (b) with the 
necessity of analyzing these issues from a state 
and local perspective, such a common-language 
policy may not be very useful. 
Background of Critical Infrastructure
Protection
This conference focuses on the time period after 
September 11, 2001, but it should be noted that 
the concept of critical infrastructure protection 
(CIP), although perhaps not labeled as such, has a 
long history and did not develop only in response 
to what we may now call terrorist incidents. Al-
though CIP reflects a fear of foreign enemies at-
tacking domestic assets, CIP also incorporates 
threats from native saboteurs and from nature (un-
der current terminology, this is an “all hazards” 
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approach). While the depth and breadth of CIP 
history varies depending on the industry sector, 
a few examples can demonstrate the pre-1990s 
awareness of CIP: 
In the World War One and World War Two 
eras, the United States instituted civil de-
fense programs, which related directly to 
the fear of domestic invasion by our re-
spective nation-state enemies.103 
In the 1960s, the Defense Electric Power 
Administration recognized that public ac-
cess to information about power systems 
(specifically, maps of the power grids) 
could endanger the industry and every-
thing reliant on it. This awareness in part 
arose because of various threats and inci-
dents of sabotage, such as when domes-
tic political protestors disabled electricity 
transmission lines in Colorado.104 
By the 1980s, the Department of Energy 
was issuing terrorist threat advisories to 
the electricity industry; the Department 
of Justice was assembling a critical asset 
database and a communications/coordina-
tion system in conjunction with the private 
owners and operators; and the Department 
of Defense for the first time stated that its 
highest priority was the assurance of en-
ergy supply to its essential facilities.105 
In 1986, the National Security Council 
directed FEMA “to identify the extent to 
which various critical infrastructure ele-
ments (e.g., the computerized banking sys-
tem, power grids, and communication net-
works) were vulnerable to terrorism and 
propose near and long term solutions.”106 
103 See Kathi Ann Brown, Critical Path: A Brief 
History of Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United 
States, 7-8 & 22-23 (2006) (discussing efforts of the 
Council of National Defense and the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration).
104 Id. at 51, 60.
105 Id. at 58.
106 Id. at 71 n.iv (quoting a 1989 Secret Service report 
by Charles Lane to the U.S. Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs).
•
•
•
•
After a 1989 California earthquake, gas 
companies were hindered in restoring gas 
service because the phone company shut 
off phone services that were needed for the 
gas companies’ restoration activities.107 
This incident showed not only the prob-
lems of interdependencies, but also high-
lighted the need—within both the private 
and public sectors—for awareness of such 
interdependent systems and functions. 
Two evolutions furthered the recognition of the 
importance of CIP: the increasing government re-
liance on private sector suppliers, and the develop-
ment of computers and the information age. While 
the early age of CIP focused primarily on prevent-
ing a physical attack through conventional means, 
CIP now incorporates a spectrum of threats, in-
cluding attacks that target, or are accomplished 
via, complex cyber systems. 
The first major policy document on CIP, and the 
vulnerabilities enhanced by the information age, 
was the 1997 report of the President’s Commis-
sion on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PC-
CIP).108 Since then, there have been numerous CIP 
offices established (and renamed and reformed) at 
the federal, state, and local levels of government, 
as well as within research institutions; and there 
have been various laws and regulations relating 
to CIP. It should also be recognized that much of 
CIP may not be labeled as “critical infrastructure 
protection”—just as “Homeland Security” incor-
porates numerous legacy agencies and historical 
concepts and policies, so does CIP. Thus, a 2006 
search of the term “critical infrastructure” in on-
line Westlaw and Lexis legal databases (state and 
federal cases, no date limitations), resulted in only 
42 cases109 . . . and only three of these cases used 
107 Id. at 110.
108 Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s 
Infrastructures, Report of the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (1997).
109 The most recent searches were conducted on 
November 6, 2006. The searches resulted in 43 and 45 
opinions respectively; however some cases had several 
•
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the phrase “critical infrastructure” (CI) in the man-
ner used in this paper. 
Thirty-one of the cases used the phrase in refer-
ence to physical infrastructure improvements (e.g., 
the building of roads).110 Two cases mentioned 
damage to CI as a statutory factor for increasing 
sentencing,111 and six cases merely mentioned CI 
as part of a governmental office title (e.g., Public 
Safety and Critical Infrastructure Division),112 or 
to identify critical equipment or facilities,113 and in 
these cases, CIP was unrelated to the disputes. Of 
the three CIP-relevant cases, one case sustained 
the constitutionality of random searches in the 
New York subway system;114 one case held that 
the District of Columbia’s attempt to regulate the 
rail transportation of hazardous materials through 
D.C. was preempted by federal law;115 and one 
case exempted U.S. Bureau of Reclamation maps 
from disclosure under the federal Freedom of In-
formation Act because release of the maps could 
increase the risk of terrorist attacks.116
It should be noted, however, that numerous cases 
have addressed aspects of CIP without explicitly 
referencing “critical infrastructure” (both pre- and 
post- September 11, 2001). Some of the compo-
nents of CI are protected by government regula-
tions or criminal laws specific to an industry or 
act, rather than general CIP; for example, although 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act117 does not 
specifically mention “critical infrastructure” or 
opinions.
110 E.g., Banner v. U.S., 303 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2004), aff’d, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 23828 (D.C. Cir. 
2005).
111 E.g., U.S. v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 
2006).
112 E.g., Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Network, Inc. v. FCC, 397 
F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
113 E.g., Former Employees of I.B.M. v. Sec’y of 
Labor, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006).
114 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).
115 CSX Transp. v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 
2005).
116 Living Rivers v. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. 
Supp. 2d 1313 (D. Utah 2003).
117 Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
municipal radio systems, that was the law used to 
convict an individual who intentionally disrupted 
a city’s emergency response radio communica-
tions system—a system that would definitely be 
considered a component of CI.118 [Note that Con-
gress has recently enacted a few industry-specific 
CIP laws, which resulted from concerns that the 
respective industries and regulators had not been 
moving quickly enough to institute adequate pro-
tection measures under the more amorphous CIP 
definitions and legislation discussed below.119] 
What Infrastructure is Critical?
This question of what constitutes CI is often the 
crux of many debates relating to freedom of infor-
mation (FOI) non-disclosure decisions based on 
CIP concerns. Formal governmental definitions of 
CI can be traced back to the 1996 PCCIP Execu-
tive Order, which defined infrastructure as “[t]he 
framework of interdependent networks and sys-
tems comprising identifiable industries, institu-
tions (including people and procedures), and dis-
tribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow 
of products and services essential to the defense 
and economic security of the United States, the 
smooth functioning of government at all levels, 
and society as a whole.”120 This Executive Order 
specifically recognized that some infrastructures 
were critical: “certain national infrastructures are 
so vital that their incapacity or destruction would 
have a debilitating impact on the defense or eco-
nomic security of the United States.”121
A few years later, Congress responded to the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by passing vari-
ous new laws, including the Critical Infrastruc-
118 U.S. v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2005).
119 For example, the 2005 Energy Act contained pro-
visions mandating electric reliability standards, 16 U.S.C. § 
824o, and in October of 2006, Congress required increased 
CIP in chemical facilities, Department of Homeland Secu-
rity Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 550 
(2006).
120 Exec. Order No. 13010, 60 Fed. Reg. 37347 (July 
17, 1996).
121 Id.
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tures Protection Act, in which Congress explicitly 
found that “[p]rivate business, government, and 
the national security apparatus increasingly de-
pend on an interdependent network of critical 
physical and information infrastructures, includ-
ing telecommunications, energy, financial servic-
es, water, and transportation sectors.”122 Congress 
defined “critical infrastructure” as “systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combina-
tion of those matters.”123
These definitions are quite broad, and are not fur-
ther defined in any piece of legislation (although 
individual agency regulations may provide more 
specific guidance within their jurisdictions).124 
Congress increased the complexity of CI defi-
nitions in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
where it differentiated “critical infrastructure” 
from “key resources,” which was defined as “pub-
licly or privately controlled resources essential to 
the minimal operations of the economy and gov-
ernment.”125 Within the realm of national U.S. in-
frastructure, this is the guidance for determining 
which should be considered critical, and therefore 
which should receive the focus of federal CIP ef-
forts and information protection. 
Many states have passed their own laws to protect 
CI and related sensitive information. For example, 
122 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1016(b)(2) (2001) (prior to 
2006 reauthorization) (the Critical Infrastructures Pro-
tection Act of 2001 was also enacted as part of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001).
123 Id. at § 1016(e).
124 E.g., 49 C.F.R. § 1520 et seq. (Transportation Se-
curity Administration regulations regarding the Protection 
of Sensitive Security Information).
125 Homeland Security Act of 2002 §§ 2(9), 
2(15)(A)(i), 6 U.S.C §§ 101(10), 101(15)(A)(i) (as amend-
ed); see also John Moteff and Paul Parfomak, Critical In-
frastructure and Key Assets: Definition and Identification, 
p. 7 (Oct. 1, 2004) (CRS Report for Congress Order Code 
RL32631).
in 2003 Virginia enacted a law that added critical 
infrastructure and vulnerability assessments to an 
exemption in the state FOI act. The current exemp-
tion (resulting from the 2003 law and amendments 
in intervening years) permits the withholding of: 
Plans and information to prevent or re-
spond to terrorist activity, the disclosure of 
which would jeopardize the safety of any 
person, including (i) critical infrastructure 
sector or structural components; (ii) vul-
nerability assessments, operational, proce-
dural, transportation, and tactical planning 
or training manuals, and staff meeting 
minutes or other records; and (iii) engi-
neering or architectural records, or records 
containing information derived from such 
records, to the extent such records reveal 
the location or operation of security equip-
ment and systems, elevators, ventilation, 
fire protection, emergency, electrical, tele-
communications or utility equipment and 
systems of any public building, structure 
or information storage facility, or tele-
communications or utility equipment or 
systems. The same categories of records 
of any governmental or nongovernmental 
person or entity submitted to a public body 
for the purpose of antiterrorism response 
planning may be withheld from disclosure 
if such person or entity in writing (a) in-
vokes the protections of this subdivision, 
(b) identifies with specificity the records 
or portions thereof for which protection is 
sought, and (c) states with reasonable par-
ticularity why the protection of such re-
cords from public disclosure is necessary 
to meet the objective of antiterrorism plan-
ning or protection. Such statement shall be 
a public record and shall be disclosed upon 
request. Nothing in this subdivision shall 
be construed to prohibit the disclosure of 
records relating to the structural or envi-
ronmental soundness of any building, nor 
shall it prevent the disclosure of informa-
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tion relating to any building in connection 
with an inquiry into the performance of 
that building after it has been subjected 
to fire, explosion, natural disaster or other 
catastrophic event.126
As demonstrated by these examples of Virginia 
state law and the federal experience, the term 
“critical infrastructure”—all that CI may, or may 
not, encompass—is highly relevant (and greatly 
debated) in the FOI context. In addition to laws 
like this Virginia state FOI exemption (and other 
states’ similar laws with descriptive rather than cat-
egorical/classification exemptions), information 
may be withheld from public disclosure because 
the information is deemed Critical Infrastructure 
Information (CII), Sensitive Security Information 
(SSI), or Homeland Security Information (HSI).127 
Also, in addition to the more traditional classifica-
tions of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential, in-
formation may be labeled For Official Use Only 
(FOUO) or Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU), and 
may thus be prohibited from certain transfers or 
disclosures. And to further complicate the issue, 
these terms can have different definitions not only 
among federal agencies, but also within different 
state and local governments. When it comes to ap-
plying these labels and categories and descriptive 
state non-disclosure laws on a case-by-case basis 
in the context of FOI requests, the crux of the se-
curity-versus-openness debate is truly a matter of 
perspective. 
The Problem of Perspective
When a government entity decides to withhold 
information—whether under a CI exemption in a 
FOI law, or under a law protecting CII or HSI in-
126 Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.2-3705.2(4) (updated July 2, 
2007).
127 For an overview of the protection of private sector 
information in the context of the Federal FOIA, SSI and 
other federal CII protection laws, see James W. Conrad, 
Protecting Private Security-Related Information from Dis-
closure by Government Agencies, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 715 
(2005).
formation—that entity does so on a case-by-case 
basis, on its own determination regarding both the 
criticality of the infrastructure and the sensitivity 
of the information being requested. These deter-
minations may vary greatly among government 
bodies, depending on each entity’s perspective of 
what is “critical” to that locality or to that specific 
government. 
For example, what is critical to a city may not be 
critical to the nation, to a region, or even to the 
respective state. A city government may thus be 
concerned about protecting systems or assets that 
are “so vital to the United States city that the in-
capacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, na-
tional local economic security, national local pub-
lic health or safety.” Security and public health 
and safety are inherent responsibilities of govern-
ment; determinations of the criticality of the infra-
structures within a jurisdiction depend on the risk 
calculations regarding the likelihood of the threat 
and the weight of the responsibility (how great is 
the potential damage, based upon the level of vul-
nerability and the type and quantity of damage). 
If the disclosure of certain information could in-
crease either the likelihood of harm or the conse-
quential damage, the government may decide that 
one of its responsibilities is to restrict access to 
that information.128
If the information is general public knowledge, 
then obviously most FOI laws and non-release 
exemptions will not apply. However, if informa-
tion is public, but not necessarily readily avail-
able, the government may still choose to withhold 
the information if it deems that greater access to 
the information may increase either the amount of 
damage or the likelihood of harm. Here, one gov-
ernment concern is that, while there may be some 
risk in maintaining the information in the public 
domain, that risk is limited if it is not widely or 
easily accessible by those who may want to use 
128 E.g., Living Rivers, Inc. v. United States Bureau of 
Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d (D. Utah 2003).
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the information to cause harm.129 For example, a 
municipality may choose to withhold full access 
to geographic information systems (GIS) that map 
utility systems and access points . . . even though 
anyone could walk through the town and note the 
location of utility manholes.130
The local government’s thoughts may somewhat 
follow these lines: (a) if saboteurs wanted to target 
a U.S. municipality via its utility systems, the bad 
guys are more likely to pick a town that allows for 
easy access to its utility information; (b) if sabo-
teurs still wanted to target our municipality, even 
without such easy information access, the necessi-
ty of the bad guys tromping through the streets of 
the town with a laptop (or notebook and pencil), 
jotting down all the utility info they can see, pro-
vides a greater likelihood of detection and preven-
tion, or at least a chance for prosecution after an 
attack if the saboteurs were photographed by any 
surveillance cameras in the town. 
It should be noted that there are two other issues 
of perspective that a government entity may face 
when deciding to release information under a 
FOI request: (1) when the requested information, 
129 This concern regarding easier access to and trans-
fer of information in digital format (e.g., via the Internet, 
with computer mapping tools, etc.) was recognized before 
the 2001 terrorist attacks; a 1999 federal law restricted 
electronic release of off-site consequence analyses by 
chemical companies. However, to maintain traditional con-
cepts of public access to government information, and to 
retain the incentive for the chemical companies to reduce 
the likelihood of chemical accidents (via informational 
openness and potential public pressure), print-outs of the 
consequence analyses were made available at federal read-
ing rooms throughout the U.S. See also David Zocchetti, 
Public Disclosure of Information by Emergency Services 
Agencies: A Post-September 11 Paradigm Shift, A Legal 
Guide to Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
for State and Local Governments, p. 3 (Ernest B. Abbott 
& Otto J. Hetzel eds., 2005); and Conrad, supra note 25, 
at .740 (briefly discussing FERC’s “non-Internet public” 
information category, which includes public information 
that is not included in FERC’s online records information 
system).
130 See, e.g., Security Officials Seek to Block Some 
Online Maps (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 8, 2007).
standing alone, may not be a security threat, but 
paired with other information, may be deemed a 
CI threat (i.e., aggregated information); and (2) 
when the requested information is does not endan-
ger infrastructure within the government entity’s 
jurisdiction, but may imperil another jurisdiction’s 
CI. Thus, in regard to CIP-related FOI requests, 
non-disclosure determinations are highly complex 
and may include decisions as to: 
what is critical to this jurisdiction; 
what is the likelihood of harm if the infor-
mation is disclosed; 
does this non-sensitive information be-
come more sensitive when paired with 
other information; 
what is critical to interconnected and inter-
dependent systems and jurisdictions, and 
does the release of this information endan-
ger those other constituencies; and 
do any or all of these concerns outweigh 
our traditional policies of open govern-
ment? 
Further, a state or local government would also 
have to determine whether the respective CI at 
issue falls under any federal information-protec-
tion laws and regulations, so that even if the state 
would permit its release, the federal government 
mandates non-disclosure. 
Conclusions
These concerns, and the example of the municipal 
utility mapping above, may be deemed far-fetched 
by some people. However, it is the government 
that has the responsibility of public safety and se-
curity, and the government that has a duty to ful-
fill FOI requirements that relate to its jurisdiction. 
Therefore it is from that perspective that non-dis-
closure decisions are being made. As one analyst 
stated, 
[f]or many years, we have assumed that we 
could protect people, save lives, reduce in-
•
•
•
•
•
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juries, and minimize the impacts to proper-
ty and the environment by disclosing infor-
mation . . . This disclosure has been based 
on two premises: That more information 
in people’s hands will encourage them to 
take protective measures (strap down their 
water heaters, move to a safer neighbor-
hood, lobby their planning agencies, etc.), 
and provide them with a tool to hold their 
government accountable to addressing the 
disaster risks around them. With terrorism, 
however, we may have encountered a risk 
under which more information in more 
people’s hands may cost more in decreased 
levels of safety, because our assessments, 
plans, and many other types of records can 
be used against us.131
As more time passes without CI attacks or increas-
es in threats, local governments may reach differ-
ent conclusions when balancing security versus 
openness. Non-disclosure decisions under FOI 
laws are challengeable; following these adminis-
trative procedures, courts may find that, although 
the government should be granted deference in its 
security and safety determinations, withholding of 
some information is no long reasonable—either 
because the threat environment has changed, or 
because the subject is not really a matter “critical 
infrastructure,” “sensitive security,” or other secu-
rity information protection category. 
For the skeptical, it should be noted that not all 
courts are overly deferential to arbitrary govern-
mental use of security and CIP rationales in re-
lation to FOI requests/exclusions. For example, 
the Supreme Court of Virginia recently rejected 
a municipal airport authority’s claim that “fed-
eral airport-security laws and regulations preempt 
the provisions of the [Virginia FOI] Act requiring 
specific, timely responses and mandate protection 
of SSI.”132 In that case, the airport authority had 
131 Zocchetti, supra note 27, at 8.
132 Fenter v. Norfolk Airport Authority, 649 S.E.2d 
704, 709 (Va. Sept. 14, 2007).
failed to follow the state FOI procedures, as it was 
waiting for legal advice from the federal Trans-
portation Security Administration regarding the 
petitioner’s FOI request.133 The court agreed with 
the petitioner’s claim that although “airport secu-
rity is an extremely serious matter since the events 
of 9/11,” the airport authority still had to either 
prove that all requested documents were protect-
ed SSI, or else produce the non-SSI documents, 
and that these actions had to be accomplished in 
a timely manner in accordance with the state FOI 
procedures.134 Holding that the airport authority 
had violated the state FOI law, the court reversed 
the lower court’s judgment and granted costs and 
attorney’s fees to the petitioner.135
It has only been six years since the 2001 terror-
ist attacks, and since Congress first defined “criti-
cal infrastructure” from a federal perspective. In 
the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, 
state and local governments had to respond to an 
upsurge of security and safety fears. In the inter-
vening years, we have all had to wrangle with the 
concepts of homeland security and critical infra-
structure protection. 
As one of the PCCIP Commissioners said, “when 
it comes to critical infrastructure protection the 
national security pyramid is inverted. . . . The 
pyramid is stood on its head. The federal govern-
ment is the least knowledgeable about the inner 
workings of critical infrastructures, the banking 
system, electrical power grids, telecommunica-
tions networks in an age of convergence.”136 What 
this Commissioner meant was that the CI owners 
and operators (mostly the private sector) are more 
knowledgeable than the federal government in re-
spect to protection of their infrastructures.137
133 Id. at 706-08.
134 Id. at 709.
135 Id.
136 David Keyes, Commissioner, President’s Com-
mission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, quoted in 
Brown, supra note 1, at 114-16.
137 Id.
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However, it is equally true that state and local 
governments are more knowledgeable than the 
federal government when it comes to determining, 
for example, (a) whether a specific infrastructure 
is critical to a region, state, or municipality; and 
(b) whether the disclosure of certain information 
impacts that critical infrastructure. Thus, even if 
arguments for a common CI definition and CIP ex-
emption were successful, this article demonstrates 
that application of such definitions and exemp-
tions may still result in varying disclosure deci-
sions, based upon the perspectives of the govern-
mental bodies receiving the FOI request. We have 
a history of using the states as experimental labo-
ratories, where new procedures or laws or policies 
can be tried out, amended, and refined; very often 
this approach helps us find the best practices. Per-
haps this approach will also prove true in relation 
to protecting sensitive CI information. If so, rather 
than calling for a federally-led common CI defini-
tion and CIP exemption, we might instead begin 
a survey of the best practices among state and lo-
cal FOI-responding offices. If we also look at how 
these entities make their criticality and risk deter-
minations, not only might such a study be useful 
for other state and local governments, it might 
also help us refine our federal practice of protect-
ing CII, SSI, HSI, etc. 
2.5 Protecting Sensitive Information: A 
Private Sector Perspective
by Maeve Dion
Abstract
“For many years, we have assumed that 
we could protect people, save lives, reduce 
injuries, and minimize the impacts to prop-
erty and the environment by disclosing in-
formation…This disclosure has been based 
on two premises: That more information 
in people’s hands will encourage them to 
take protective measures (strap down their 
water heaters, move to a safer neighbor-
hood, lobby their planning agencies, etc.), 
and provide them with a tool to hold their 
government accountable to addressing the 
disaster risks around them. With terrorism, 
however, we may have encountered a risk 
under which more information in more 
people’s hands may cost more in decreased 
levels of safety, because our assessments, 
plans, and many other types of records can 
be used against us.”138
This paper provides a brief background on critical 
infrastructure protection, and discusses the protec-
tion of sensitive critical infrastructure information 
from a private sector perspective. 
Background of Critical Infrastructure
Protection
This conference focuses on the time period after 
September 11, 2001, but it should be noted that 
the concept of critical infrastructure protection 
(CIP), although perhaps not labeled as such, has a 
long history and did not develop only in response 
to what we may now call terrorist incidents. Al-
though CIP reflects a fear of foreign enemies at-
tacking domestic assets, CIP also incorporates 
threats from native saboteurs and from nature (un-
der current terminology, this is an “all hazards” 
approach). While the depth and breadth of CIP 
history varies depending on the industry sector, 
a few examples can demonstrate the pre-1990s 
awareness of CIP: 
In the World War One and World War Two 
eras, the United States instituted civil de-
fense programs, which related directly to 
the fear of domestic invasion by our re-
spective nation-state enemies.139 
138 David Zocchetti, Public Disclosure of Informa-
tion by Emergency Services Agencies: A Post-September 11 
Paradigm Shift, A Legal Guide to Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management for State and Local Governments, 
8 (Ernest B. Abbott & Otto J. Hetzel, eds., 2005).
139 See Kathi Ann Brown, Critical Path: A Brief 
History of Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United 
States, 7-8 & 22-23 (2006) (discussing efforts of the 
•
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In the 1960s, the Defense Electric Power 
Administration recognized that public ac-
cess to information about power systems 
(specifically, maps of the power grids) 
could endanger the industry and every-
thing reliant on it. This awareness in part 
arose because of various threats and inci-
dents of sabotage, such as when domes-
tic political protestors disabled electricity 
transmission lines in Colorado.140 
By the 1980s, the Department of Energy 
was issuing terrorist threat advisories to 
the electricity industry; the Department 
of Justice was assembling a critical asset 
database and a communications/coordina-
tion system in conjunction with the private 
owners and operators; and the Department 
of Defense, for the first time, stated that its 
highest priority was the assurance of en-
ergy supply to its essential facilities.141 
In 1986, the National Security Council 
directed FEMA “to identify the extent to 
which various critical infrastructure ele-
ments (e.g., the computerized banking sys-
tem, power grids, and communication net-
works) were vulnerable to terrorism and 
propose near and long term solutions.”142 
After a 1989 California earthquake, gas 
companies were hindered in restoring gas 
service because the phone company shut 
off phone services that were needed for the 
gas companies’ restoration activities.143 
This incident showed not only the prob-
lems of interdependencies, but also high-
lighted the need—within both the private 
and public sectors—for awareness of such 
interdependent systems and functions. 
Council of National Defense and the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration).
140 Id. at 51, 60.
141 Id. at 58.
142 Id. at 71 n.iv (quoting a 1989 Secret Service report 
by Charles Lane to the U.S. Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs).
143 Id. at 110.
•
•
•
•
Two evolutions furthered the recognition of the 
importance of CIP: the increasing government re-
liance on private sector suppliers, and the develop-
ment of computers and the information age. While 
the early age of CIP focused primarily on prevent-
ing a physical attack through conventional means, 
CIP now incorporates a spectrum of threats, in-
cluding attacks that target, or are accomplished 
via, complex cyber systems. 
The first major policy document on CIP, and the 
vulnerabilities enhanced by the information age, 
was the 1997 report of the President’s Commis-
sion on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PC-
CIP).144 The Executive Order with established the 
PCCIP defined infrastructure as “[t]he framework 
of interdependent networks and systems compris-
ing identifiable industries, institutions (including 
people and procedures), and distribution capabili-
ties that provide a reliable flow of products and 
services essential to the defense and economic se-
curity of the United States, the smooth function-
ing of government at all levels, and society as a 
whole.”145 This Executive Order specifically rec-
ognized that some infrastructures were critical: 
“certain national infrastructures are so vital that 
their incapacity or destruction would have a debil-
itating impact on the defense or economic security 
of the United States.”146
Since the PCCIP, there have been numerous CIP 
offices established (and renamed and reformed) at 
the federal, state, and local levels of government, 
as well as within research institutions; and there 
have been various laws and regulations relating to 
CIP. In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive No. 
63 (PDD-63) identified principles for protecting 
the U.S. from cascading disruptions as a result of 
interdependent critical infrastructure, and guard-
ing against attacks on our information technol-
144 Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s 
Infrastructures, Report of the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (1997).
145 Exec. Order No. 13010, 60 Fed. Reg. 37347 (July 
17, 1996).
146 Id.
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ogy.147 PDD-63 also called for a National Infra-
structure Assurance Plan, but such a plan was not 
created for another eight years. 
A few years later, Congress responded to the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by passing vari-
ous new laws, including the Critical Infrastruc-
tures Protection Act, in which Congress explicitly 
found that “[p]rivate business, government, and 
the national security apparatus increasingly de-
pend on an interdependent network of critical 
physical and information infrastructures, includ-
ing telecommunications, energy, financial servic-
es, water, and transportation sectors.”148 Congress 
defined “critical infrastructure” (CI) as “systems 
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to 
the United States that the incapacity or destruc-
tion of such systems and assets would have a de-
bilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of those matters.”149
These definitions are quite broad, and are not fur-
ther defined in any piece of legislation (although 
individual agency regulations may provide more 
specific guidance within their jurisdictions150). 
The Congress increased the complexity of CI 
definitions in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
where it differentiated “critical infrastructure” 
from “key resources,” which it defined as “pub-
licly or privately controlled resources essential to 
the minimal operations of the economy and gov-
ernment.”151
147 Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63. May 22, 
1998.
148 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1016(b)(2) (2001) (prior to 
2006 reauthorization) (the Critical Infrastructures Pro-
tection Act of 2001 was also enacted as part of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001).
149 Id. at § 1016(e).
150 E.g., 49 C.F.R. § 1520 et seq. (Transportation Se-
curity Administration regulations regarding the Protection 
of Sensitive Security Information).
151 Homeland Security Act of 2002 §§ 2(9), 
2(15)(A)(i), 6 U.S.C §§ 101(10), 101(15)(A)(i) (as amend-
ed); see also John Moteff and Paul Parfomak, Critical In-
frastructure and Key Assets: Definition and Identification, 
Protecting Sensitive Information
The government traditionally controls certain as-
pects of CIP, such as those related to national de-
fense, law enforcement, and foreign intelligence 
and affairs. However, the majority of U.S. infra-
structure is owned or operated by the private sec-
tor. In the words of one of the PCCIP Commis-
sioners, 
when it comes to critical infrastructure 
protection the national security pyramid 
is inverted….The pyramid is stood on its 
head. The federal government is the least 
knowledgeable about the inner workings 
of critical infrastructures, the banking sys-
tem, electrical power grids, telecommuni-
cations networks in an age of convergence. 
The owners and operators of the business 
are the best informed, the most knowl-
edgeable and the most capable of dealing 
with emergencies . . . So this inversion of 
the national security pyramid is one that, 
in my mind, very much argued against 
attempting to impose from the unknowl-
edgeable government sector onto the very 
knowledgeable and capable private sector 
what [CIP] criteria should be put in place. I 
think the majority of [the PCCIP Commis-
sioners] agreed that the government didn’t 
know enough about what it was doing to 
be entrusted with legislating that sort of 
response.”152
Thus, the PCCIP recommended that the govern-
ment institute programs to garner information 
from the CI owners and operators. Following this 
recommendation, and in order to effectuate CIP 
under the mandates of the Homeland Security 
Act, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has created numerous different programs for “in-
7 (Oct. 1, 2004) (CRS Report for Congress Order Code 
RL32631).
152 David Keyes, Commissioner, President’s Com-
mission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, quoted in 
Brown, supra note 2, at 114-16.
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formation sharing” and “public-private partner-
ships.” On one hand, DHS was attempting to get 
a lot of CI information from the private sector; on 
the other hand, the private sector wanted certain 
pieces of intelligence information in order to de-
termine national security risks to their own infra-
structures. 
The information sharing programs have had a 
mixed result for various reasons—of course, the 
government was wary of sharing intelligence in-
formation, but the private sector, too, was con-
cerned with the detrimental effects that may ac-
company increased private sector information 
collating and transfer to the government. Private 
companies may face economic and competition 
harms if they share vulnerability information. As 
one PCCIP Advisory Group Member stated, “it’s 
an act against nature for a company to sit down 
with its competitors and share its vulnerabilities 
and to share information which is going to give 
its competitors competitive advantages.”153 Com-
panies also want to limit costly regulation, and are 
thus unlikely to give the government any more 
information than necessary. Further, once propri-
etary commercial information is in the hands of 
government, it may be accessible through freedom 
of information (FOI) laws, which could not only 
hinder the private companies’ competitiveness, 
but could expose CI vulnerabilities to malfeasors, 
thus heightening risks of sabotage. 
Some of the security concerns and information 
sharing problems may be addressed by laws that 
restrict the use of and access to sensitive infor-
mation—for example, FOI exemptions, the fed-
eral Protected Critical Infrastructure Information 
(PCII) Program, and the new Critical Infrastruc-
ture Partnership Advisory Council, which DHS 
established as a committee exempt from the 
public access/notice requirements of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act.154 Information may be 
153 Brown, supra note 2, at 155 (quoting Jamie Gore-
lick, Co-Chair of the PCCIP Advisory Committee).
154 See Brett Callahan, whitepaper, Listening to the 
Eighty-Five Percent: the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
withheld from public disclosure because the infor-
mation is deemed Critical Infrastructure Informa-
tion (CII), Sensitive Security Information (SSI), or 
Homeland Security Information (HSI).155 Also, in 
addition to the more traditional classifications of 
Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential, information 
may be labeled For Official Use Only (FOUO) or 
Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU), and may thus 
be prohibited from certain transfers or disclosures. 
And to further complicate the issue, these terms 
can have different definitions not only among fed-
eral agencies, but also within different state and 
local governments. 
The multitude of classifications, and the varying 
definitions for similar terms, can cause confusion 
regarding a government office’s responsibility 
as to disclosure decisions. As stated in a January 
2007 report by a Department of Defense (DoD) 
federal advisory committee, 
[a] particularly thorny issue is the lack of 
guidance from DHS. DHS currently re-
lies on the classification guidance of other 
agencies (DoD and [the Department of En-
ergy], in particular). In addition, the “sensi-
tive but unclassified” category of informa-
tion for DHS requires careful review and 
implementation of the proposed Sensitive 
Homeland Security Information since it 
will be the official interface to state, local, 
tribal, and some private sector entities. . . . 
Certainly the issue of how much informa-
tion the Federal Government really needs 
for homeland security, how to protect that 
information, and how to share it appropri-
and Communication Between the Private Sector and the 
Department of Homeland Security (2005), available at 
http://cipp.gmu.edu/archive/FACA.pdf.
155 For an overview of the protection of private sector 
information in the context of the Federal FOIA, SSI and 
other federal CII protection laws, see James W. Conrad, 
Protecting Private Security-Related Information from Dis-
closure by Government Agencies, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 715 
(2005).
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ately, were all open questions at the time 
this Task Force concluded.”156
In addition to the quantity and variety of classifi-
cations, when it comes to applying classification 
labels and informational categories on a case-by-
case basis in the context of FOI requests, the crux 
of the security-versus-openness debate is truly a 
matter of perspective. When a government entity 
decides to withhold information—whether under 
a CI exemption in a FOI law, or under a law pro-
tecting CII or HSI information—that entity does 
so on a case-by-case basis, on its own determina-
tion regarding both the criticality of the infrastruc-
ture and the sensitivity of the information being 
requested. 
These determinations may vary greatly among 
government bodies, depending on each entity’s 
perspective of what is “critical” to that locality or 
to that specific government. For example, what is 
critical to a city may not be critical to the nation, 
to a region, or even to the respective state. A city 
government may thus be concerned about protect-
ing systems or assets that are “so vital to the Unit-
ed States city that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national local economic secu-
rity, national local public health or safety.” 
These are the kinds of decisions that are not only 
necessary to preserve the balance of security and 
openness in government, but such determinations 
are also needed to inform the private-sector busi-
nesses that own and operate our critical infra-
structure. One of the important needs in business 
is clarity of expectations; some degree of predict-
ability is necessary for internal corporate decision-
making. For example, a business needs to be able 
to anticipate what may be considered a public re-
cord/document for FOI purposes; what will likely 
be covered in a FOI exemption; and, if there is an 
156 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force 
on Critical Homeland Infrastructure Protection, p. 25, 
United States Department of Defense (January 2007).
exemption for voluntarily-shared CI information, 
what is the meaning of “voluntarily” in that con-
text. A business should know which government 
entities hold sensitive information relating to that 
business; whether those entities operate under FOI 
rules; and how those entities apply the FOI rules 
to this kind of information. 
It may be thought that if a CI-related business 
only interacts with a limited number of govern-
ment jurisdictions, then the tasks of learning and 
maintaining current answers to these questions 
is relatively manageable. However, the business 
may have regional or nationwide (or internation-
al) interactions. The business may be deemed a 
critical infrastructure by another company or sys-
tem that is dependent on the business, and the de-
pendant company or system may be located in an 
entirely separate jurisdiction. The business may 
be deemed “critical” infrastructure by some gov-
ernmental bodies and not others; or the criticality 
of the business’s assets or services may be fluid 
(criticality depending upon circumstances). In 
these situations, it is harder to achieve clarity of 
expectations. 
Thus, in relation to CIP and FOI issues, some of 
the challenges we are currently faced with include 
(a) rather vague federal guidelines; (b) a multitude 
of classifications and definitions among agencies 
and offices; (c) the necessity of analyzing critical-
ity not only from a federal perspective, but also 
from state and local perspectives; (d) the com-
plications of interdependencies (e.g., when sev-
eral governmental bodies may hold information 
which may only be protected as CI information 
by one jurisdiction); and (e) the business need for 
predictability in decisions of nondisclosure and 
information transfer. In the U.S., we have a his-
tory of using the states as experimental labora-
tories, where new procedures or laws or policies 
can be tried out, amended, and refined; very of-
ten this approach helps us find the best practices. 
Perhaps this approach will also prove true in rela-
tion to protecting sensitive CI information. It may 
9	 Selected	Essays	on	State	Open	Goernment	Law	and	Practice	in	a	Post-9/11	World
therefore be useful to survey the best CIP-related 
practices among state and local FOI-responding 
offices. If we look not only at the outcomes but 
also at how these entities make their criticality and 
risk determinations, not only might such a study 
be useful for other state and local governments, 
it might also help private sector CI owners/opera-
tors to make more reliable business decisions re-
garding expectations of governmental protection 
of sensitive CI information.
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3.1 Informing the Public: Overbroad 
Secrecy in Public Health
by Rick Blum1
Coordinator, Sunshine in Government Initiative2
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Commu-
nity and the U.S. Government labored to prevent 
attacks by Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist net-
work against the United States, but largely with-
out the benefit of an alert, mobilized and commit-
ted American public.
—Congressional Joint Inquiry into 9/113
Introduction
Democracy lives on openness. But openness is 
more than a value. It is a tool for strengthening se-
1 The author may be contacted by phone at (703) 
807-2100, via mail at 1101 Wilson Blvd, Suite 1100, Ar-
lington, VA 22209 or via email at rblum@sunshineingov-
ernment.org.
2 Affiliation for identification purposes only. All 
views expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily represent the views of the Sunshine in 
Government Initiative or its member organizations. The 
author retains fully responsibility for the contents.
3 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report 
of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 
11, 2001, , S. Rep. No. 107-351 & H. Rep. No. 107-792, 
Dec. 2002 (July 24, 2003), p. xix.
curity and advancing science, technology and hu-
man knowledge. Secrecy also is an effective, and 
at times necessary, tool for the government to use 
in advancing other interests such as individual pri-
vacy, commercial interests, and national security. 
This paper examines the secrecy statutes passed in 
the states since the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, and concludes these statutes as written 
do not incorporate safeguards helping to ensure 
secrecy is the exception, not the rule. This paper 
suggests criteria for creating openness-based se-
crecy laws that create appropriate and necessary 
limits on secrecy. Put another way, the laws de-
veloped since 9/11 by the states do not define ad-
equately the boundary beyond which secrecy is no 
longer an appropriate technique for government 
to use when working to advance such interests as 
public health, public safety and national security. 
Openness and Secrecy Since 9/11
A factor complicating the debate about openness 
and secrecy in government is that many observers 
frame this question as a balance between security 
and openness.4 This balance test is a straw man 
4 See, for example, Charles M. Vest, Response 
and Responsibility: Balancing Security and Openness in 
Research and Education, available at http://web.mit.edu/
president/communications/rpt01-02.pdf (last viewed 
November 2, 2007); Balancing Scientific Openness and 
National Security Controls at the Nation’s Nuclear Weap-
ons Laboratories, Committee on Balancing Scientific 
Openness and National Security, National Academic of 
Sciences, Institutes of Medicine, National Academy Press 
(Washington, DC) (1999).
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for at least two reasons. First, security, just like 
freedom, is an end in and of itself. Secrecy and 
openness are tools our government uses to achieve 
societal goals of freedom and security. By mix-
ing a means (openness) with an objective (secu-
rity) we are comparing two things that cannot be 
compared. Second, discussing a balance between 
security and openness assumes that the relation-
ship is zero-sum, that one is the antithesis of the 
other. The framing of the policy discussion in this 
way therefore pushes into irrelevancy the practi-
cal ways that openness contributes to the national 
security, public safety and public health. 
At the same time, the debate about secrecy and 
openness has tremendous salience and resonance 
since 9/11. Scientific researchers have faced the 
post-9/11 tension between information sharing 
and secrecy. In 2004, the National Science Advi-
sory Board for Biosecurity was established to 
provide advice, guidance, and leadership 
regarding biosecurity oversight of dual-
use research, defined as biological research 
with legitimate scientific purpose that may 
be misused to pose a biologic threat to 
public health and/or national security.5
In 2005, two researchers sought to publish a pa-
per in a respected scientific journal demonstrat-
ing how easily a terrorist could contaminate the 
nation’s milk supply and advocating additional re-
search and early, cost-effective testing to mitigate 
the threat.6 The Department of Health and Human 
Services intervened and requested the article not 
be published.7 After a brief review, the editors de-
cided to publish the paper. 
5 Charter of the National Science Advisory Board 
for Biosecurity, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Mar. 4, 2004.
6 Lawrence M. Wein, & Yifan Liu, Analyzing a Bio-
terror Attack on the Food Supply: The Case of Botulinum 
Toxin in Milk, PNAS 102:28, July 12, 2005, p. 9984-9989.
7 Feds: Science Paper a Terrorist’s Road Map, 
CNN, June 5, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/
US/06/06/milk.terror/index.html (last viewed 6/7/2005).
In difficult areas of dual-use scientific research, 
in which a technology or scientific breakthrough 
can help us and be used against us, is it possible 
to better define and articulate the line between se-
crecy and the free flow of information? Recently, 
the National Academies has encouraged more ac-
tive communication on the relationship between 
national security and biological research.8 Or, is 
this a disagreement based on fundamental philo-
sophical difference in views on how our govern-
ment and society handles information? Answers 
to these questions will have profound impact on 
our strategies for protecting public health, nation-
al security, scientific research and openness in our 
democracy. 
Secrecy Proposals at the Federal Level Are 
Overbroad
From experience reading proposals floated in Con-
gress and examining the collection of state laws 
compiled for this conference, this much is clear: 
legislation passed in the states and in Congress re-
flects decision makers’ ambivalence about when 
secrecy is the best strategy and when disclosure is 
preferable to maximize public health and safety. 
At the very least, lawmakers have trouble clearly 
writing the difference into law. 
At the federal level, Congress continues to write 
new exemptions into federal law that go beyond 
the existing exemptions written into the federal 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).9 The federal 
FOIA law already has nine exemptions allowing 
federal agencies to withhold documents, includ-
ing protections for classified information, trade 
secrets and individual privacy.10 In addition, in 
8 Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Re-
port Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science 
and Security Communities, Committee on a New Govern-
ment-University Partnership for Science and Security, 
National Research Council, 2007.
9 5 U.S.C. § 552.
10 See 5 U.S.C. § 552; “Freedom of Information Act 
Guide,” U.S. Department of Justice, Mar. 2007, available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_guide07.htm (last viewed 
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2006, federal agencies cited 149 separate laws on 
the books that put information held by the federal 
government beyond FOIA’s reach.11 
Today, attempting to exempt information from 
the federal FOIA is routine. Earlier this fall, the 
Sunshine in Government Initiative (SGI) identi-
fied at least 27 bills in the U.S. Congress this year 
that proposed exempting certain information from 
FOIA. For two consecutive years, the Department 
of Defense proposed exempting certain infor-
mation concerning weapons of mass destruction 
from FOIA’s long reach. This may sound like a 
reasonable approach, given the threat of terrorism 
and the possibility of mass civilian casualties if 
such a weapon were used. The problem, however, 
has been in the broad construction of the propos-
al. The Defense Department proposed exempting 
information from public disclosure any informa-
tion “concerning” weapons of mass destruction. 
As SGI noted at the time, this scope is so broad 
it could include information about vulnerabilities, 
accidents and safety problems at chemical plants 
and other challenges to the safety and health of a 
community’s residents.12 
This is but one experience that raises fundamental 
questions about laws that allow the government 
to withhold information from the public. How do 
we maximize the openness in our society while 
recognizing the government’s legitimate need to 
keep secrets? How do we better identify when se-
crecy is the most effective tools for security? Con-
versely, how do we identify when openness best 
serves the interests of the public? 
Sept. 26, 2007).
11 Summary of Annual FOIA Reports for Fiscal 
Year 2006, FOIA Post, U.S. Department of Justice, Sept. 
14, 2007, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/
2007foiapost11.htm (last viewed Sept. 26, 2007).
12 Hazardous Secrecy Proposal Re-emerges, Sun-
shine in Government Initiative, May 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.sunshineingovernment.org/foia/SGI%20on%20
WMD%20proposal.pdf (last viewed Sept. 26, 2007).
Principles for Legislating Secrecy as an 
Exception
Working in collaboration with the Coalition of 
Journalists for Open Government, the Sunshine 
in Government Initiative developed criteria for 
assessing whether secrecy laws are adequately 
bounded. They have been adapted for use in the 
context of both federal and state laws. These prin-
ciples can serve as a checklist for evaluating new 
proposals to withhold documents held by the gov-
ernment and, more importantly, infusing those rare 
secrets with necessary limitations. To adequately 
limit the impact of secrecy on the ability of the 
public to stay informed of government’s activi-
ties, any new exemptions to public records laws 
should: 
1. Avoid duplication. Those who propose 
new secrecy laws should provide a clear 
statement of public purpose and expla-
nation as to why existing laws are not 
adequate. Anyone who would propose 
changes to law might discover upon close 
examination of existing law that the con-
cerns are not founded and that existing law 
is adequate. A careful analysis and under-
standing of what can be withheld from the 
public under existing law would likely cut 
down on policy debates about duplicative 
new proposals, allowing all participants 
more time to focus on the more difficult, 
complex situations. 
2. Be surgical. Laws should be narrowly 
drafted so as not to exceed the specific 
non-disclosure needs compelling the ex-
emption. Where broad disclosure is vital to 
advancing public understanding, any nec-
essary exceptions to disclosure should be 
narrowly drafted. In areas where free flows 
of information advance public health, any 
sensitive information that must be with-
held must be clearly identified to allow the 
maximum benefit from disclosure while 
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protecting information the disclosure of 
which may do harm. Information useful 
in mounting biological, radiological and 
chemical attacks on the U.S. population 
can also be useful in spurring medical ad-
vances against disease and illness, so that 
information to be protected should be nar-
rowly described. 
3. Be accountable. Laws should provide for 
public reporting that measures the efficacy 
of the exemption in achieving its stated 
goals and that offers alternative and equiv-
alent means of public oversight. Use of se-
crecy as a tool should be better monitored 
for at least two reasons. First, when a law 
is enacted giving the government power to 
collect information from the private sec-
tor and keep it confidential, the public de-
serves to know whether this closed system 
is achieving the practical objectives for 
which secrecy is granted. 
Second, better oversight will strengthen 
public trust in government by helping en-
sure government officials are not invoking 
secrecy solely to avoid revealing embar-
rassing or inconvenient truths. 
Is the federal government better able to 
protect critical infrastructure because it can 
keep information secret when companies 
volunteer it? Are readers better protected 
from accidents or possible attacks on a 
chemical plant in exchange for remaining 
ignorant of the problems, possible protec-
tive measures, and ways to fix them? 
These are not theoretical questions, nor 
do they call for values-based answers. 
Rather, for the presumption of openness to 
have meaning, secrecy should be accept-
able only when traded for identifiable and 
wherever possible measurable benefits to 
the public. 
4. Include sunsets. Laws should establish 
a time limit after which the exemption 
expires and requires affirmative action 
to renew. Also establish a built-in sunset 
provision for the entire statute or for that 
section of statute which establishes the b3 
exemption. Were it to develop a vaccine 
against anthrax, the government may seek 
to withhold details about specific ways to 
disarm that vaccine. If such secrecy were 
granted, it would be in the face of an acute 
threat for a limited amount of time until 
the known threat is eliminated or the dis-
arming technique is known. Such secrecy 
should be publicly reviewed (preferably 
by a party with no interest in the relevant 
government activity) to assess whether 
continued secrecy is warranted. Affirma-
tive action should be required for the gov-
ernment to continue its withholding. 
5. Protect whistleblowing. Laws should 
make clear that the non-disclosure provi-
sions, along with any penalties established 
to enforce them, are not intended to inhibit 
whistleblowing. Non-disclosure agree-
ments should not protect wrongdoing such 
as waste, fraud and abuse or illegal activi-
ties. 
6. Allow public review. Any legislation pro-
posing exemptions to public records, pub-
lic meetings or other open government laws 
should be publicly identified and reviewed 
for their impact on openness.13 Congress 
could refer all bills (or their relevant sec-
tions) that contain a FOIA exemption to 
the House and Senate committees with 
jurisdiction over the FOIA for review by 
staff with experience with FOIA laws. Just 
as they summarize privacy or budgetary 
13 Because it is a matter of the legislative process 
which would not be readily apparent from an analysis of 
the legislative text of statutes passed since 9/11, this ele-
ment was not included in the analysis of the state statutes 
that follows.
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impacts of bills approved in committee, 
the House and Senate could adopt rules 
requiring committees to conduct openness 
impact statements. State legislatures could 
adopt similar approaches. 
7. Balance incentives. Laws should impose 
no penalties for release of information 
greater than those provided by law for im-
proper withholding of information. Pen-
alties, both perceived and actual, for im-
properly disclosing sensitive information 
far outweigh the penalties associated with 
improperly withholding documents. Leg-
islators should develop additional tools to 
create consequences—both positive and 
negative—for improperly withholding 
documents from the public. 
A Brief Note on Methodology
For this analysis, we used a content analysis of 
the legislative language itself to evaluate whether 
each bill text met the seven criteria. 
Caveats. The author of this study did not review 
other material, such as news coverage, legislative 
history or outside analyses. An inherent limitation 
of primarily examining bill texts is this analysis 
did not identify earlier drafts of the legislation, 
amendments and other modifications made dur-
ing the legislative process, additional views on the 
bills, or the motivations of those political actors 
(i.e., legislators, state officials, interest groups) in-
volved in the policy debate. This additional knowl-
edge could affect the analyst’s ability to predict 
the impact of the legislation on the public’s avail-
ability of information about public health issues. 
It should also be noted that relevant qualifiers 
affecting the breadth of the secrecy required or 
allowed in each law passed since 9/11 may not 
appear in the provision of law but may exist else-
where in the statute. A withholding statute may be 
part of a broader statute subject to a sunset date. 
New statutes requiring or permitting agencies to 
withhold documents may also suffer unintended 
consequences. To the extent that statutes asserting 
that information should be protected could be per-
ceived to conflict with whistleblower protections 
elsewhere in the law, new laws preventing disclo-
sures should include a statement reaffirming the 
rights of whistleblowers already in law. 
Analysis: Applying the Principles
To evaluate whether secrecy provisions are bound-
ed so as to preserve the presumption of openness, 
thirty-one statutes were examined from the re-
search compiled for this conference. Several stat-
utes that appeared to provide for withholding were 
excluded because the extent of the withholding 
could not be determined from the provided text. 
As the table in Appendix A shows, the principles 
outlined above did a relative poor job of differen-
tiating one statute—or one state’s performance—
from another. State legislatures shielded categories 
of information based on subject matter or type of 
document without providing wholesale discretion 
to withhold documents. Beyond that, however, 
these strategies for limiting information—creat-
ing time limits, creating statutory requirements 
for review accompanying new secrecy provisions, 
clarifying how secrecy provisions relate to other 
requirements such as whistleblower protections—
were clearly and absent from state secrecy statutes 
enacted in recent years. 
Topics/need statement. Of the selected statutes, 
all clearly defined a topic or subject area. None 
provided blanket discretion for a state agency to 
withhold records. Many laws, however, left to 
agency judgment whether disclosure would as-
sist terrorist attacks without providing criteria or 
a method for calculating the risk. 
Most of the public health statutes focused on 
protecting physical infrastructure necessary to 
maintain human life—buildings, water supply 
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systems, energy infrastructure. Surprisingly few 
statutes dealt with the most interesting of public 
health questions: how information about new sci-
entific discoveries is handled. Here the possible 
approaches—secrecy or sharing—are the starkest 
and the pitfalls the greatest. At what point is se-
crecy about the workings of a new vaccine—or 
the vaccine’s own vulnerabilities—justified to 
protect this country’s ability to protect public 
health? Once granted, how is secrecy reviewed 
and overturned once knowledge has been shared 
broadly and its secrecy no longer relevant? And 
who decides? Experts with sufficient knowledge 
of and independence from the government activ-
ity? Those people in government who also have 
a keen professional interest in the success of the 
program? Or legislators, who may address these 
questions on an ad hoc basis writing new laws, 
often the least discriminating of policy tools? 
Narrow construction. Comparing the laws au-
thorizing the withholding of information from the 
public, three interesting lessons are yielded. First, 
states broadly were concerned with withholding 
information out of a concern that it may be useful 
to terrorists, such as critical infrastructure emer-
gency response; providing protections. Second, 
state laws reflected a concern after 9/11 that those 
protections be sufficiently broad to provide clear 
protections. Only a few states affirmatively noted 
types of related information that should remain 
public. Third, states responded to the threats made 
real by 9/11 by requiring new reports and infor-
mation to be shared within government and put-
ting that information largely beyond the public’s 
grasp. 
Critical infrastructure. The language in most stat-
utes gave broad coverage to specific types of infor-
mation. Many state legislatures since 9/11 wrote 
laws keeping from disclosure an information the 
government holds about safety problems or vulner-
abilities with complex systems supporting energy 
transmission, water supply, food distribution and 
transportation network. Protecting such networks 
has become such a policy imperative since 9/11 
that a new term describing them has entered the 
policy lexicon—“critical infrastructure.” North 
Dakota defined the term broadly to include any 
system whose destruction would have a “debili-
tating impact” on the economy, security or public 
health or safety of the state. The state government 
in North Dakota can withhold plans for protecting 
critical infrastructure throughout the state, includ-
ing government as well as non-government. 
Emergency response. Many state laws passed 
since 9/11 reflected concern about what would be 
known either to terrorists or the public generally 
about government plans to respond to terrorist at-
tacks. West Virginia exempted from disclosure re-
cords “assembled, prepared or maintained” about 
government activities before, during or after a ter-
rorist attack. Other states did the same. Nevada 
can avoid public inspection of its comprehensive 
response plan, although officials may decide to 
disclose information during an emergency. Mary-
land arguably established the most limits on the 
state government’s ability to withhold its terror-
ism response plans. Government officials can 
deny requests to review emergency response doc-
uments if disclosure would assist terrorist attacks 
or endanger public health. Government buildings 
are exempt from such withholding, and the statute 
clearly states that routine inspections are public 
and details about buildings involved in fires or 
other catastrophic events are public. In Missouri, 
officials must find that disclosure will impair its 
ability to protect public health and safety, and that 
the public interest in withholding outweighs the 
benefits of disclosure. 
Protecting new information collections. In many 
cases, state governments wanted to collect infor-
mation and had to promise in new laws that the 
public would not see it. In New York, compa-
nies that produce and deliver energy must report 
on their security efforts to the State. The reports 
are largely public but certain documents can be 
kept confidential. Oklahoma went further, broadly 
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barring seven state agencies that regulate energy 
production, including the state’s environmental 
protection agency, from releasing environmental 
and safety threats existing in the energy industry’s 
infrastructure. Utah protects disclosures of vulner-
abilities in the food supply. 
Several states were concerned about the condition 
of the public health system. Ohio now requires 
trauma centers to report on their preparedness to 
a public health council. Even the council’s guide-
lines for reporting are confidential, although a 
summary is public. In Nevada, hotels and resorts 
must develop comprehensive response plans, but 
those are not public. 
Sunsets. The statutes, with rare exceptions, also 
share a failure to establish a time limit for the se-
crecy. Such time limits can come in at least two 
forms: sunsets on the authority to withhold and 
secrecy expiration dates. 
Sunsets on the authority to withhold 
Legislatures can sunset the authority to withhold 
documents. Legislatures can at a future date renew 
or extend that authority, hopefully after assessing 
whether the secrecy has created any public ben-
efit. However, without a provision to automatical-
ly sunset the government’s authority to withhold 
information, legislators are unlikely to review or 
reverse new laws granting the power to withhold. 
State legislatures were unlikely to limit the time 
information could be withheld. In Arkansas, the 
state legislature allowed the state to broadly keep 
secret virtually any information about vulnerabili-
ties or safety problems of water systems if disclo-
sure might jeopardize or compromise efforts to 
protect the water system. 
Secrecy expiration dates 
In addition, the time limits can apply to the with-
holding of specific information. For example, in 
the federal government when a government offi-
cial creates a document that needs to be classified, 
the official designates when the information can 
be declassified. This analysis could not find any 
state law that used this limitation. 
Other Measures: Whistleblowers & Penalties. 
The statutes universally did not include whistle-
blower statements or address penalties for im-
proper disclosing or withholding. 
The Benefits of Openness: A Research Agenda
In the late 1990s, the Environmental Protection 
Agency dipped its toes into the waters of assess-
ing the benefits of openness. The federal agency 
had been discussing its plans, mandated by the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, to compile 
industry-written emergency response plans based 
on estimates of the impact in surrounding com-
munities of worst-case scenarios at thousands of 
chemical plants around the U.S. The EPA planned 
to make these available on the Internet in search-
able form and distribute CD-ROMs with the data-
base available to anyone who requested it. Some 
representatives of plant operators argued that pub-
lic availability would substantially increase risks 
of terrorist attacks. The debate elevated. Congress 
got involved and within days of this data being 
available to the public, Congress exempted this 
information from the federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act for one year while EPA and the Justice 
Department conduct separate assessments of the 
benefits and risks, respectively, of public disclo-
sure.14 
That EPA benefits assessment consisted of case 
studies and anecdotes and concluded that there 
were, in fact, benefits to public disclosure, espe-
cially as it related to public safety. This 149-page 
document is perhaps the most ambitious effort to 
pull together wide-ranging case examples of the 
practical public health benefits of disclosure of 
government held information.15
14 Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and 
Fuels Regulatory Relief Act, Pub. L. 106-40 (enacted Aug. 
5, 1999).
15 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Assess-
ment of the Incentives Created by the Public Disclosure of 
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Moving one step in this direction, the Sunshine 
in Government Initiative (SGI), the coalition of 
media groups for whom I work, has catalogued 
approximately 250 stories of value to the pub-
lic—mostly from media outlets but including ad-
vocacy groups and researchers—that relied upon 
access to documents under the federal FOIA.16 
We have catalogued these stories and summarized 
their contribution to the public’s understanding 
of issues from veterans’ benefits to education and 
made this collection available online at our web-
site, www.sunshineingovernment.org. Our objec-
tive is to provide a resource for anyone who wants 
to know or demonstrate how FOIA is used by the 
news media or anyone else to inform the public 
and the practical benefits of our open government 
laws. 
SGI’s The FOIA Files is only a first step. Unfortu-
nately, we do not yet have a collection of similar 
stories and their impact that relied on state open-
ness laws. We hope in the future someone will 
collect that information. And in focusing on the 
Freedom of Information Act, this database does 
not address how society benefits in practical ways 
from government agencies proactively posting in-
formation on websites and making databases of 
information available to the public. So this is a 
limited but, we hope, significant step to helping 
the public and decision makers see the practical as 
well as philosophical value of openness. 
3.2 Model Citizenship in the Management 
of Public Health Emergencies – The Role of 
Open Government
by Monica Schoch-Spana, PhD
Off-site Consequence Analysis Information for Reduction 
in the Risk of Accidental Releases, Apr. 18, 2000; See also, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Assessment of the Increased 
Risk of Terrorism or other Criminal Activity Associated 
with Posting Off-site Consequence Analysis Information on 
the Internet, Apr. 18, 2000.
16 The FOIA Files is available through the website 
of the Sunshine in Government Initiative at http://www.
sunshineingovernment.org.
Abstract
Improvements in the nation’s ability to handle 
both emergent and familiar health threats depend 
upon deliberate planning for the smart flow of 
information among officials and with the public. 
The new field of public health preparedness has 
been predisposed towards a “closed” system in 
which political leaders and their health, safety, 
and security advisors—at all levels of govern-
ment—have defined the direction of health emer-
gency management policies and plans without suf-
ficient input from the populations that they seek 
to protect. Under these conditions, the citizen role 
in helping remedy health disasters has been very 
circumscribed, leaving undeveloped any broad 
understanding of, or institutionalized mechanisms 
for tapping the valuable contributions of citizens 
and civil society throughout the complete disaster 
cycle. To help remedy this deficit, this paper de-
scribes and illustrates a continuum of public-spir-
ited contributions that civic groups and individu-
als can make to health emergency management, 
and it calls for a model program that would estab-
lish and sustain “community engagement” as the 
national standard for state and local health emer-
gency planning.
Introduction
This paper reviews factors that have predisposed 
the emerging field of “public health preparedness” 
towards a closed system in which political leaders 
and their health, safety, and security advisors—at 
all levels of government—have defined the direc-
tion of health emergency management policies 
and plans without sufficient input from the pop-
ulations that they seek to protect.17 Under these 
conditions, the citizen role in helping remedy ex-
treme health events has been very circumscribed, 
leaving undeveloped any broad understanding of, 
or institutionalized mechanisms for, tapping the 
17 This paper re-examines, in terms of an “open 
government” framework, earlier concepts, arguments, and 
recommendations developed by the author and associates 
elsewhere (e.g., 23, 52, 54-56, 69).
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valuable contributions of citizens and civil society 
during the complete disaster cycle. 
To help remedy this deficit, the paper describes 
and illustrates a continuum of public-spirited con-
tributions that civic groups and individuals can 
make to comprehensive health emergency man-
agement, and it calls for a model program that 
would establish and sustain “community engage-
ment” as the national standard for state and local 
health emergency planning. The civic infrastruc-
ture—the public’s collective wisdom and abil-
ity to solve problems; voluntary associations that 
arise from shared interests or a public good, and 
that meet on-line or face-to-face; and non-profits 
that protect the well-being of various groups—is 
essential to managing a mass health emergency. 
Community engagement is the practical means by 
which officials can access that dynamic whole.
 
Before turning to how leaders, in and out of gov-
ernment, may wish to redefine citizens’ role in 
health emergency management, the paper pro-
vides a quick overview of other public health de-
bates in relation to information-sharing policies 
and practices after the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax 
letter deaths of 2001. This review is meant to alert 
the reader interested in “open government” to the 
large biodefense universe, illustrating the range of 
transparency debates and discussions within. This 
survey and the larger argument to follow show 
that future improvements to the nation’s ability 
to handle emergent and familiar health threats re-
quire deliberate designs for the smart flow of in-
formation among officials and with the public.
Public Health Impacts of Biodefense Informa-
tion Sharing Policies
Various authorities during the 1990s expressed 
mounting concern about re-/emerging infectious 
diseases, terrorists’ interest in mass casualties, and 
the increased availability of unconventional arms 
such as biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons 
(32, 62). Events in the fall of 2001 consummated 
their worst fears about dangers facing the country 
in a world no longer defined in terms of a nuclear 
stand-off with the Soviet Union. A trickle of feder-
al investments prior to 9/11 burst into an immense 
funding stream and plethora of initiatives to pro-
tect civilians against biological attacks—over $34 
billion in FY2001-2007 (20). Two top priorities are 
improving the biomedical research infrastructure 
to produce vaccines, antibiotics, and diagnostics 
against potential threats and enhancing the ability 
of the medical and public infrastructure to contain 
the effects of a bioattack and help survivors.
Many government transparency issues have arisen 
in the pursuit of these objectives (e.g., 24, 26, 31, 
67). The select cases below involve potential ad-
verse health effects in connection with how infor-
mation is generated, collected, analyzed, verified, 
communicated, and acted upon. They also repre-
sent the 3 traditions in open government depicted 
by Fung et. al. (2007). Preparedness spending 
presents a classic right-to-know situation in which 
transparency can help rule out the arbitrary use of 
government funds and confirm their intended out-
come as genuinely protecting the public’s health. 
Safety data and their use in regulating the growing 
numbers of biodefense research labs illustrate an 
opportunity for “targeted transparency” in which 
public access to technical data helps remedy a spe-
cific risk or public service failure. Community en-
gagement in emergency planning, addressed later, 
is part of a third generation in transparency policy 
in which the public collaborates with officials in 
producing the very knowledge that can reduce risk 
and enhance safety.
Fiscal Accountability and Public Health Pre-
paredness
Diverse analysts have noted that systematic un-
derstanding is lacking about the effects of the re-
cent, immense federal investments in basic public 
health infrastructure (e.g. 27, 30, 31, 39, 52, 67). 
Federal spending on state and local preparedness 
began at moderate levels in 1999 ($40M) and 2000 
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($50M), but then jumped 20 fold after the 9/11 
and anthrax letter attacks of 2001 and has contin-
ued at this magnitude ever since (70). Beginning 
in FY 2001 and including estimates for FY2007 
and FY2008, the federal government will have 
spent roughly $9.1 billion dollars on agreements 
with state and local health agencies and hospitals 
to improve public health capabilities and bioter-
rorism preparedness (20). 
Two nagging questions dominate discussions 
about these expenditures: Have they, as intended, 
improved public health preparedness within state 
and municipal jurisdictions, and the nation as a 
whole? Have they unintentionally reduced locali-
ties’ focus upon more familiar population health 
needs such as water quality, routine immuniza-
tion, and maternal and child health? (27, 31, 52, 
61) Among factors fueling these uncertainties is a 
lack of agreement among health agencies and pro-
fessionals about the best way to measure, verify, 
and communicate to federal funders and the public 
about improvements in preparedness capabilities 
and outstanding vulnerabilities (27, 31, 39, 67). 
Another major cause for ambiguity is the absence 
of any objective mechanism to track how states 
allocate and account for federal preparedness dol-
lars (27, 31, 52, 67). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some health 
agencies were unable to secure additional quali-
fied personnel and resorted to transferring staff 
from other divisions to fill the new preparedness 
positions (27, 31). Reasons given for this include 
hiring “freezes,” desire to retain staff who had lost 
other grants, lack of competitive salaries to attract 
good candidates, and limited faith in the constancy 
of federal support for the new job slots (27). The 
appearance that many localities have supplanted 
public health budget cuts with federal biodefense 
monies led Congress to require in the Pandemic 
and All Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006, that 
states provide a portion of matching funds for pre-
paredness programs and also undergo an indepen-
dent audit. 
Biosafety Concerns with the Rapid Growth in 
Biodefense Laboratories
The number of laboratories and investigators re-
searching risky biological agents has grown ex-
ponentially since the 2001 anthrax letter deaths, 
eliciting concerns among industry observers and 
host communities about potential harm to work-
ers, the public, and U.S. reputation abroad (26, 
28, 44, 50). Having identified biological weapons 
and use by terrorists as possible security threats, 
the federal government has invested heavily in the 
research, development, production, and procure-
ment of “medical countermeasures” such as vac-
cines, antibiotics, and diagnostic tools for biologi-
cal agents of greatest concern such as smallpox, 
anthrax, plague, and ebola. From FY2001 through 
FY2007, almost $17B in federal funds have spent 
(or appropriated) for bioweapons-related research 
and development, and approximately 10% of this 
amount has been reserved for the construction of 
new high containment research facilities (44).
The burgeoning infrastructure dedicated to infec-
tious diseases research has raised questions about 
the very scale of the effort, especially given the 
rapid increase in lab space where the most conta-
gious of lethal agents are handled (BSL-4, BSL-3). 
Before the terrorist attacks of 2001, only 5 BSL-
4 laboratories, which handle the most dangerous 
agents, were in operation; now they number 15, 
including at least one in the design stage (50), 
and even more are anticipated (26). The BSL-3 
lab total is less certain, because no single federal 
agency has the responsibility to track the growth 
now occurring across federal, state, academic, and 
private sectors (50). One DHS and HHS estimate 
from 2005 puts the number of BSL-3 labs in the 
U.S. at over 600 (26). 
Some observers have noted the absence of a ratio-
nal strategy for the vast expansion; this omission 
along with a lack of transparency about lab poli-
cies and research directions may undermine inter-
national confidence in U.S. commitments to global 
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biosecurity and the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion (28, 44). Many researchers and technicians 
filling the new facilities are novices in high con-
tainment research, and the influx will likely strain 
the current system of biosafety training, according 
to industry experts (26). Moreover, no objective 
and transparent mechanism for the tracking and 
analyzing of accident reports and near misses ex-
ists to improve safety practice and performance; 
certain government rules impede labs from shar-
ing lessons learned with one another (26, 28, 44). 
The dramatic scale-up in high containment re-
search, analysts note, increases the chances for 
biosafety errors and for criminal access to con-
trolled pathogens (26, 28, 44). Public protests 
have arisen in many locales where new contain-
ment research is planned, due in part to highly 
publicized laboratory mistakes such as tularemia 
infections in lab workers at Boston University and 
the discovery that Texas A&M University failed 
to report lab-acquired infections to the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (26). Biosafety 
oversight and regulation has yet to keep pace with 
the tremendous growth in research with danger-
ous pathogens, and processes for keeping host 
communities informed about siting decisions and 
operations are poorly developed (26, 28, 44).
Pursuit of increased safety in the context of bioat-
tacks and other health emergencies may inadver-
tently compromise the public’s health, although it 
does not have to. Potential effects include a reduc-
tion in routine public health services or insufficient 
development in health agencies and hospitals’ 
ability to handle extreme health events—the re-
sult of unknown outcomes and expenditures. Oth-
ers are unacceptable biosafety incidents or harms 
to U.S. international standing—possible costs of 
intensified scientific understanding of pathogens 
and potential countermeasures. The next sections 
consider a third question about “net” health gains 
with the institutionalization of biodefense: Do 
local health emergency systems have all the rel-
evant information and public support necessary to 
achieve intended goals? In each of these 3 cas-
es—budgets, labs, and local planning—intelligent 
open government can help overcome uncertainties 
concerning societal investments in biosecurity and 
inform future policy developments. 
 
Public Health Emergency Management as a 
“Closed” System
Health authorities and the public they hope to 
protect may have contended with epidemics and 
mass casualty disasters before, but the field of 
public health preparedness—as a self-conscious 
collection of concepts, practices, and organiza-
tional forms—is still very young. Certain aspects 
of recent history have predisposed the discipline 
towards a closed form of governance. That is, a 
societal enterprise with limited input from broader 
publics, those outside the circles of political and 
technical authorities now deciding courses for 
action in the context of emergent health threats. 
Factors contributing to this trend are assumptions 
about how the public behaves in disasters and 
epidemics, the impact of federal programming on 
state policy and practice, and a broader shift to-
ward enhanced secrecy as a function of national 
security concerns about terrorists. 
The ‘Panicky Public’ as Foil to Professional 
Planners & Responders
Prior to 2001 when catastrophic terrorism and 
biological incidents were serious but postulated 
dangers, U.S. officials frequently conceived pub-
lic reactions to a biological event as part and par-
cel of the crisis: the “worried well” who would 
pour into hospitals and hinder health care work-
ers’ ability to treat “real” victims. The perpetra-
tor, the pathogen, and the public were all forces 
that seemed to demand containment by authorities 
(56). Playing one-dimensional roles in hypotheti-
cal scenarios and tabletop exercises, members of 
the public usually surfaced as mass casualties or 
hysteria-driven mobs that would self-evacuate af-
fected areas or resort to violence to gain access to 
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scarce, potentially life saving antibiotics and vac-
cines (57). 
Such typecasting arguably was seen as necessary 
to prepare planners and responders for the “worst 
case,” and to devise contingency plans for manag-
ing the public so that the professionals could per-
form their respective missions. In contrast, exten-
sive social research into disasters, terrorist attacks, 
and even epidemics of novel disease, reveals that 
people rarely fall apart and put themselves first 
(11, 13, 23, 35, 41, 48, 59). This finding contra-
dicts what people tend to say on surveys that ask 
them how they think they will behave when disas-
ter hits (63). Panic is the exception and ordinary 
people emerge as innovative problem-solvers who 
are responsive to the needs of others around them. 
The overriding notion of the “problem public” to 
be managed precludes careful consideration of, 
and planning for ways to solicit the cooperation 
of affected populations. Emphasis instead is on 
crowd control, not enhancing people’s ability to 
cope with a public health emergency. 
Civil Defense, Emergency Management, and 
Community Partnerships
The notion of the public in the context of a biolog-
ical attack as, at best, getting in the way of the pro-
fessionals, and at worst, constituting a secondary 
disaster, is in keeping with much of the thinking 
within the history of North American civil defense 
and emergency management as quasi-military ac-
tivities. Disaster planning, by and large has been 
seen as something done for, not with the commu-
nity (38, 43, 73). The organizational emphasis, 
instead, has been on a chain of command among 
authorized personnel and on centralized decision-
making and communications (17, 73). 
Certain events have chipped away at this model of 
insular authority. The 1984 Bhopal tragedy helped 
spur a series of right-to-know laws and regula-
tions that enabled local people to learn more about 
the chemical hazards in their communities and im-
prove plans for responding to a major chemical 
accident (7, 22, 38, 40, 51). The Local Emergen-
cy Planning Committees (LEPCs), mandated by 
SARA Title III, consciously called for a diverse 
set of stakeholders to sit at the planning table in-
cluding public safety officers, planners, health 
care providers, environmental specialists, indus-
try representatives, school representatives, jour-
nalists, and environmental and community action 
groups (7, 38, 40). 
In the 1990s, facing an escalation in the economic 
and social costs due to natural disasters, FEMA 
began a national effort to shift the focus of state 
and local jurisdictions toward pre-disaster activi-
ties that could reduce risks and cut the costs of 
post-disaster recovery (4, 66, 71). Among the new 
programs stressing hazard mitigation was “Project 
Impact,” whose core objectives included reaching 
constituencies outside the traditional emergency 
management profession and building up new part-
nerships among local government agencies, non-
profit organizations, and private businesses (4, 
71). Both the LEPCs and Project Impact (prior to 
being defunded in 2000) have had mixed success 
at involving local civic groups, and in particular, 
those who represent vulnerable or marginalized 
populations (38, 40, 71). Yet, overall these grass-
roots initiatives do signal a more inclusive, trans-
parent approach to emergency management. 
Terrorism, National Security, & Renewed Em-
phasis on Secrecy
Whereas disaster-related events in the 1980s and 
1990s helped advance the turn toward community 
right-to-know and partnerships for comprehen-
sive disaster management, government responses 
to the 9/11 attacks have provoked a different set of 
trends, as a number of disaster, public health, and 
legal scholars have noted in greater detail else-
where (6, 7, 10, 25, 29, 54, 66, 72, 73). 
Concerns about future terrorist attacks threats 
spurred many federal agencies to remove publicly 
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accessible information that revealed potential vul-
nerabilities within the U.S. critical infrastructure 
(6, 7, 10, 25, 54). The perceived tension between 
environmental health and national security ob-
jectives continues with different levels of gov-
ernment trying to find the right balance between 
legitimate security concerns and a community’s 
right to know (6, 10, 54). The reasoning in the case 
of chemical facility data, for example, is that the 
same information that alerts the public to potential 
toxic releases within their communities may also 
provide terrorists an advantage in selecting and at-
tacking targets (10, 54).
Prior to 9/11, disaster management was the pur-
view of a new class of professional emergency 
managers who—driven by events in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s—had come to embrace a model of 
integrated emergency management (29, 66, 73). 
Elements of this conceptual framework included 
an “all-hazards” perspective that seeks to create 
flexible institutions that can deal with the most 
frequent, geographically specific hazards in a 
community and also be able to address a range of 
unforeseen extreme events (66). Integrated emer-
gency also incorporates the classic four phase di-
saster cycle that sees the protective interventions 
of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recov-
ery as part of a single, iterative process (66). 
In contrast, the rising field of homeland security, 
due to its counter-terrorist priorities, has come to 
be populated by law enforcement and military-
trained professionals whose organizational culture 
incorporates the top down, command-and-control 
approach characterizing an earlier generation of 
civil defense (29, 66, 73)—the one from which 
emergency managers had been turning away to 
embrace a model of shared responsibility among 
community partners (38). Homeland security also 
has a core posture of readiness to act swiftly when 
a terrorist attack occurs. The focus on picking up 
the pieces after the fact, however, has eclipsed the 
longer term perspective necessary for both pre-
disaster loss reduction activities and post-disaster 
reconstruction and recovery (66). Moreover, the 
value placed on countering terrorism has over-
shadowed an “all hazards” mindset. Some ana-
lysts attribute this shift as a partial contributor to 
the failed governmental response to Hurricane 
Katrina (66).
Federal Investments in Preparedness & the Turn 
to ‘Risk Communication’
As noted earlier, public health preparedness was a 
field inclined, in the early imaginations of planners 
and responders, to see the public as either passive 
victims or active rioters (55-57). Once the 9/11 
attacks occurred, the field continued to evolve in 
the context of a larger political and organizational 
milieu stressing limits to public information as a 
function of national security—the USA Freedom 
Corps and ready.gov notwithstanding as develop-
ments to involve the public in homeland security. 
Some public health and civil rights advocates also 
worried about the new collaborations necessarily 
emerging between law enforcement and public 
health practitioners (3, 24, 34, 61). A biological at-
tack would trigger two very different kinds of crit-
ical investigations: one to identify and neutralize 
the attacker; the other to identify victims, contain 
the disease, and provide medical care. How secu-
rity and health officers might effectively work to-
gether to achieve their respective aims was uncer-
tain. Would counter-terrorism aims overshadow 
those of protecting the public’s health? (24, 61) 
Would confidential health data be put to use by 
law enforcement, and if so, what did that mean for 
public privacy and the public trust that health pro-
fessionals need to do their work? (24, 34) Would 
people avoid seeking medical attention if they felt 
their personal health information might somehow 
be used against them? (3, 24, 34)
The new patterns of information sharing practices 
in the aftermath of 9/11 provoked these and other 
questions among health professionals who now 
had to contemplate the prospect of biological at-
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tacks in addition to more familiar health threats. 
The complex realities of the 9/11 attacks and an-
thrax mail crises did refine, however, many au-
thorities’ understanding of the public not simply 
as a problem to be managed, but a constituency to 
be served: anxious people understandably in need 
of good information about what the danger was 
and what to do about it. Communications failures 
on the part of authorities spurred recognition of 
how public outreach is part of managing the ef-
fects of a bioattack. Missteps included public of-
ficials’ underestimation of the significance of the 
first anthrax death and an over-reassurance of 
the public, public health authorities’ lack of clear 
medical “next steps” in the midst of an urgent 
population health matter, and the perceived un-
equal treatment of exposed Capitol Hill and postal 
workforces (23, 49, 64). 
Following the anthrax crisis, U.S. federal health 
authorities thus identified “risk communication 
and health information dissemination” as 1 of 7 
priority areas in their guidance and financial sup-
port to upgrade the ability of state and local health 
departments to respond to bioterrorism (discussed 
above). Critical reflection on responses to the 2001 
attacks also spurred the release of many helpful 
analyses and guidebooks for officials regarding 
successful communications with the media and 
the larger public (8, 19, 69). Prevailing approaches 
among decision-makers and professional respond-
ers toward the public have now shifted in great 
measure from an earlier emphasis on containing 
disorder to communicating information to citizens 
in a public health emergency. The communication 
model is reminiscent, however, of command-and-
control organizational forms where warning mes-
sages are seen to emanate from a center outward. 
Citizens are expected to remain alert to uncertain 
and evolving events, awaiting instructions about 
what to do from officials who are adept at risk 
communication (55). 
The People’s Role in the Life Cycle of a Major 
Health Emergency
In the context of a closed preparedness system, the 
perceived citizen role in health emergency man-
agement is very circumscribed. Individualized ac-
tivity has been the object of official interest and 
intervention, more so than collective endeavors. 
Household readiness is the concept most preva-
lent in popular culture (if not in practice), fol-
lowed by volunteering and direct problem-solving 
by nonprofits. Notably absent are structured and 
sustained opportunities for public deliberation and 
input about preparedness policy, implementation, 
and outcomes.
Self-Reliance, Personal Stockpiles, and Ready 
Households
U.S. residents are on the receiving end of much 
thoughtful advice about individual and household 
preparedness for a variety of hazards (2, 14, 16, 
68). In this self-reliant approach, members of the 
public ready themselves by preparing contingency 
plans for their families, including a strategy to keep 
each other informed of personal location and well-
being. Officials also consider it prudent for mem-
bers of the public to stockpile enough food, water, 
and other essentials to be self-sufficient until help 
arrives or the crisis resolves—72 hours being the 
general rule of thumb. Another recommended act 
of self-sufficiency is becoming familiar with the 
special challenges posed by unconventional ter-
rorist attacks that involve chemical, radiological, 
nuclear or biological agents. 
Reasonable arguments support the notion of a pub-
lic equipped to make do on its own. Self-study of 
unconventional attacks may reduce the shock val-
ue of otherwise novel and insidious hazards such 
as radiological, chemical and biological weap-
ons. Family plans for emergencies target a prac-
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tical and meaningful solution to one of the most 
emotionally wrenching qualities of an extreme 
event—worry and uncertainty about the welfare 
of loved ones. Compiling an emergency kit that 
includes flashlight, radio, fresh batteries, non-
perishable foods, maintenance medications, and 
other “basics” is a do-able, human-scaled project 
that—depending upon the circumstances—can 
have real material value, and also brings intan-
gibles like personal safety and security into being. 
Lastly, from the perspective of disaster response 
professionals, every self-sufficient individual and 
household lightens the burden of having to protect 
an entire population, focusing limited resources 
on the most needy. 
Family communication plans, emergency kits, 
and self-study of threat agents are sensible pre-
paredness activities, but with notable limitations. 
Capable institutions and professionals—includ-
ing those that make up the health care and public 
health systems—are still necessary to handle the 
needs of large numbers of people. In a bioattack, it 
certainly helps for private citizens to be informed 
and alert to specific symptoms, but if doctors and 
health authorities do not know the next best steps 
or have not jointly planned community-wide con-
tingency plans, a community’s well-being may 
still be in jeopardy.
Volunteering during the Response & Recovery
The extent to which citizens have acted on this 
advice, however, is not what disaster planners and 
educators would hope (37). Some Americans have 
moved beyond disaster preparedness, however, as 
a private act like stockpiling to a public good by 
volunteering their time in a variety of national and 
local programs. Government sponsored programs 
include the Citizens Corps and its constituent 
volunteer programs such as the Medical Reserve 
Corps and the Community Emergency Response 
Teams (58). Non-governmental programs include 
the Red Cross and Voluntary Organizations Active 
in Disaster (a collection of social service organi-
zations who have agreed to perform their respec-
tive missions as needed in disaster settings). 
Community-oriented groups are also acting on be-
half of the public good for disasters. The National 
Organization on Disability, the American Asso-
ciation for Retired Persons, and the Red Cross re-
cently joined the DHS in preparing brochures that 
provide seniors and disabled persons preparedness 
tips directly relevant to their circumstances (1). 
Collaborating Agencies Responding to Disasters 
(CARD) emerged in the aftermath of the Loma 
Prieta earthquake and the Oakland Hills firestorm 
as the publicly-minded mechanism to train, unite, 
and coordinate Alameda County service providers 
as a safety net for people with little or no ability 
to address their own preparedness, response and 
recovery needs such as seniors, children, the dis-
abled, the homeless, non-English speakers, and 
low income families (12).
“Disaster-conscious” households and non-profits 
are significant achievements in terms of civic en-
gagement in a pressing public policy issue. But 
important gaps remain. First, notions of citizen 
and community preparedness play an important 
rhetorical role in homeland security. Yet, their 
symbolic significance is not matched by a com-
mensurate level of public funding, judging from 
a proxy index such as the inconsistent and dimin-
ishing Citizen Corps budget (58). Secondly, the 
prevailing emphasis on household stockpiling and 
individual public service represents only one im-
portant point along a much broader continuum of 
“civic preparedness”—that is, the total of private 
and public measures that citizens can adopt to 
mitigate the communitywide problems of disas-
ters and epidemics.
Civic Duties beyond Individual Public Service in 
the Disaster
Defining the citizen role in a health emergency 
strictly in terms of ready households and emer-
gency volunteers—both absolutely essential civic 
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goods—may inadvertently make it easier for peo-
ple to rescind on another kind of public-spirited 
obligation: paying closer attention to the politics 
of disaster. By “politics of disaster,” what is meant 
is the relative value placed on health emergency 
management amidst other societal problems and 
policy solutions, as well as the difficult tradeoffs 
that can arise in relation to specific policies to mit-
igate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
extreme events (cf. 46). 
Complex reasons explain the lack of opportunities 
and demands for this collective, public-minded as-
pect of civic preparedness. Elected officials may 
be reticent to hold public conversations about the 
psychologically wrenching aspects of large-scale 
and/or long-duration tragedies, and emergency 
response and health professionals may hesitate 
to articulate out loud the limits to their profes-
sional tools and institutions to protect entire pop-
ulations. Often eager to volunteer, Americans are 
in comparison less practiced with democracy’s 
“pluralistic” and “agonistic” sides (9). Civic en-
gagement scholars note that U.S. has a history 
of vigorous participation in voluntary associa-
tions where members mix with similar others for 
a common pursuit (47, 60); far less frequent are 
exchanges on community matters among people 
with diverse backgrounds and opinions (15, 18, 
33, 65). 
Whatever the cause for this neglected aspect of 
civic preparedness, the situation is no longer sus-
tainable. The Gulf Coast tragedies painfully called 
into question the collective resolve and capacity 
of Americans, in and out of government, to care 
adequately for one another in catastrophic circum-
stances (66). Community engagement, as the next 
section describes, is one intervention that leaders 
can take to help evolve all points along the civic 
preparedness continuum.
Sustainability of Citizen-Aided Remedies for a 
Public Health Emergency
The civic infrastructure—the public’s collective 
wisdom and ability to solve problems; voluntary 
associations that arise from shared interests or 
a public good, and that meet on-line or face-to-
face; and non-profits that protect the well-being of 
various groups—is essential to managing a mass 
health emergency and other large-scale disasters, 
yet policy and practice rarely articulate well with 
this critical resource. Community engagement, a 
complement to mass communications and ad hoc 
consultation, is the practical means by which of-
ficials can access that dynamic whole. Public par-
ticipation methods are under-utilized despite indi-
cators from research and practical experience that 
these tactics, in contrast to mass communications, 
may help leaders tackle some of the more intrac-
table problems posed by extreme events (53, 59).
How to Tap into the Civic Infrastructure’s Talent 
at Managing Emergencies
The civic infrastructure—rather than the lone 
citizen, individual household, or undifferentiated 
masses—provides a very specific target for lead-
ers to incorporate into health disaster policy-mak-
ing and implementation (59; see Figure 1). In the 
pre-event period, it can help set policy priorities, 
inform value-laden policy decisions, and function 
as a “multi-frequency” communications network 
that can reach dispersed and diverse populations; 
during the crisis and recovery periods, it can sup-
port responders, tackle unforeseen problems, and 
identify priorities for rebuilding. 
Leaders have a range of techniques through which 
to mobilize elements of the civic infrastructure 
in (and for) disasters (53). Operating in a “com-
munication” mode, an official or agency conveys 
information to members of the public in one-way 
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fashion, often with the intent of educating and 
informing the populace. Public feedback is not 
required or specifically sought out. Alternately, 
leaders may assume a “consultation” posture, 
soliciting opinions through surveys, polls, focus 
groups, and advisory panels. The public’s opin-
ions, criticisms, and constructive advice comprise 
only one factor among others for a policy maker’s 
consideration. In contrast, “engagement,” the third 
approach, constitutes a two-way flow of informa-
tion between authorities and citizens, where dia-
logue helps foster a more nuanced understanding 
of a complex issue, and where the goal is to work 
together to conceive and implement a policy solu-
tion. 
In this latter modality, leaders expressly seek out 
the counsel of citizens and consciously share deci-
sion-making power, to more or less degrees, de-
pending upon the context. Citizens, in turn, draw 
upon and exercise collective power through open 
deliberations and/or having their interests repre-
sented by local opinion leaders working alongside 
authorities. Ideally, these conversations help them 
to glean views of a problem that reach beyond 
their immediate circumstances and to learn how to 
make appropriate demands upon government (that 
is, act as a public) and what government may need 
from them to meet those requests (45). This last 
and most robust form of public involvement has 
yet to be incorporated into public health prepared-
ness. It is nonetheless very promising in terms of 
developing socially acceptable plans to distribute 
scarce life-saving medical resources and to care 
for large numbers when the formal health care 
system is overwhelmed or incapacitated (58-59). 
 
“Civic Preparedness” Continuum for Public 
Health Emergencies
The citizen role in health emergency management, 
as largely conceived today, suffers from a complex 
myopia: the stress upon private citizens acting 
alone rather than civic groups like faith commu-
nities, neighborhood associations, trade organiza-
tions, and social clubs pulling together; the weight 
given to improving individuals’ emergency stock-
piles and coping skills at the expense of develop-
ing more public-minded contributions throughout 
the disaster cycle; and lastly, the valorization of 
volunteers’ physical contributions during the cri-
sis while their mental and moral problem-solving 
abilities remain untapped in the planning periods 
long before and after an event. These deficits in 
public health preparedness are all the more appar-
ent when one looks at the rich history of citizen-
aided remedies for epidemics and disasters (13, 
23, 35, 38, 41, 51, 57, 58). 
In the case of polio in the mid-20th century, U.S. 
citizens had their own analog to ready.gov and 
pandemic.gov suggestions for individuals to make 
a kit and have a plan: don’t get over-tired, wash 
your hands, don’t catch a chill, allow your chil-
dren to play with friends but not strangers. Outside 
the realm of monitored individual behavior, how-
ever, regular people made sweeping contributions 
to the prevention and treatment of this dreaded, 
highly visual disease that crippled children in the 
post-war period—a time when infectious disease 
was thought to have been conquered by miracles 
like penicillin (41). The March of Dimes facilitat-
ed this social crusade, turning philanthropy on its 
head by seeking small donations from millions of 
Americans rather than large contributions from a 
few wealthy individuals and inspiring civic groups 
to take up roles in mass vaccination (41). 
Local chapters organized “mothers’ marches on 
polio” to raise funds through door-to-door neigh-
borhood canvassing, and these donations helped 
support research and development for both the 
Salk and Sabin polio vaccines (41). People do-
nated their time and money to help carry out the 
clinical trial of the Salk vaccine in 2 million chil-
dren, the positive results of which were received 
“as if a war had ended” (41). Civic groups, such 
as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, also volun-
teered with health departments in a mass vacci-
nation program known as “Sabin on Sunday,” a 
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campaign that reached 80–90% of the target popu-
lation, a critical step to eliminating polio in the 
U.S. (58) Today, voluntary groups such as Rotary 
International are the engine for National Immuni-
zation Days around the globe, vaccinating against 
polio; on a single day, volunteers in Brazil vac-
cinated nearly all children under five years old 
against polio (58).
Such dramatic civic contributions to public health 
are not limited to a time in the U.S. when volun-
tary organizations flourished or to simple matters 
of campaign fundraising and volunteering. Into the 
perceived void of leadership by health authorities 
at the start of the HIV/AIDS epidemic stepped a 
number of community groups that both advocated 
and self-organized (when slow to emerge through 
formal institutions) health education and care 
delivery systems for patients suffering from the 
disease as well as it social stigma (5, 35). Com-
munity-based organizations fought for social poli-
cies that would prevent the spread of the epidemic 
and protect the rights of the infected. Grassroots 
organizers also played a key role in shaping gov-
ernment regulation of, and research into promis-
ing drug therapies, and they worked toward fair 
consumer pricing. Today, as a requirement of the 
1990 Ryan White Care Act, people personally af-
fected by HIV/AIDS sit alongside government 
leaders, health officials, and heads of community-
based groups to help set local spending priorities 
for federal funds—whether primary medical care, 
case management services, or volunteer labor 
power (59). 
The citizen role in reducing the scourge of HIV/
AIDS is hardly limited to safe sex behaviors or to 
keeping one’s children safe from chills or over-ex-
ertion in the case of polio, however critical these 
contributions may be the health of the individual 
and society. A genuine account of civic prepared-
ness must span from the realm of individual pro-
tective behaviors, to the group actions of formal 
and informal volunteer networks, to the public de-
liberation of health emergency management poli-
cies and their implementation. Until now, the most 
“public” of public involvement efforts in health 
emergency management has occurred only on a 
small-scale experimental basis (36, 75). The U.S., 
thus, requires a concerted effort to institutionalize 
community engagement as the national standard 
for state and local health emergency planning.
National Initiative on Community Engagement 
for Public Health Preparedness
Current U.S. health emergency policies—at all 
levels of government—do not adequately reflect 
the civic infrastructure’s proven contributions in 
disasters and epidemics. Nor have policymakers 
realized the even greater potential of consciously 
standing up, collaborating with, and regenerating 
trained networks of disaster-conscious constitu-
ents. The citizen role in emergencies may play an 
important rhetorical function in present political 
discussions, but this is not matched by a commen-
surate level of public funding. Two indices men-
tioned earlier are Citizens Corps’ negligible oper-
ating budget in DHS, and the priority placed on 
mass risk communication capabilities in the HHS/
CDC preparedness grants to state and local health 
agencies, rather than the more resource dependent 
approaches of community engagement. 
Moreover, civic contributions in the manage-
ment of health emergencies have been narrowly 
construed as private acts of stockpiling and ready 
households, not the more open, group actions of 
informing public health preparedness plans, gaug-
ing their outcomes, and making refinements. The 
structures for amassing the collective good of vol-
untarism are presently weak, and those for apply-
ing a community’s judgment are non-existent. A 
conscious, deliberate, and well-funded effort will 
be necessary to reverse this trend. Some recent de-
velopments, however, represent opportunities for 
positive change.
The bipartisan-supported Pandemic and All-Haz-
ards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) was signed into 
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law in December of 2006. This Act singled out 
“risk communication and public preparedness” 
as “essential public health security capabilities” 
(Sec. 103). It also made emergency preparedness 
awards to state and local health agencies via co-
operative agreements with HHS/CDC contingent 
upon an explicit mechanism, such as an advisory 
committee, “to obtain public comment and input” 
on preparedness and response plans and their ap-
plication (Sec. 201). If implemented well, PAHPA 
presents a ripe opportunity to advance local health 
emergency preparedness systems that collaborate 
with civic groups and incorporate citizen input, 
thus helping obtain what some have called a true 
“culture of preparedness.”
Congress, when making appropriations for PAH-
PA, should fund public preparedness at a level 
commensurate with its status as “essential public 
health security capabilities.” Specifically, Con-
gress should authorize sufficient funds to support 
state/local health agencies in hiring the fulltime 
staff necessary for community engagement, to vi-
talize the Citizens Corps in more localities, and to 
support local community-based groups in devis-
ing emergency plans that pool resources and tap 
social networks. HHS and DHS—in their joint ef-
forts to expand the Lessons Learned Information 
System as required by PAHPA—should facilitate 
the collection, analysis, and sharing of best prac-
tices related to civic engagement, volunteer mobi-
lization, and other forms of public involvement in 
disaster and health emergency management.
Mayors, governors, and county executives can 
provide the political support and visibility neces-
sary to institutionalize preparedness partnerships 
between civic groups and health and safety offi-
cials. Key actions include providing financial and 
programmatic support for a fulltime qualified co-
ordinator within the health department (or emer-
gency management office) with experience in 
community engagement, and assessing their own 
administration’s means to engage local opinion 
leaders and citizens at-large (e.g., advisory boards, 
neighborhood liaison offices, health education and 
outreach staff) and how these might be tapped for 
health emergency objectives. Community engage-
ment should be part of present pandemic flu pre-
paredness efforts, with special attention to devis-
ing socially fair and acceptable plans to distribute 
scarce life-saving medical resources, care for sick 
people when hospitals become overburdened, and 
provide a safety net for people who have chronic 
illness and other special needs. 
Heads of community-based groups need not wait 
to be invited to the health emergency planning 
table. They can contact their political representa-
tives, as well as local health officers and emer-
gency managers, to offer advice on a community 
engagement structure. At the same time, they can 
work with officials immediately to obtain advice 
on their own continuity planning, ascertain pre-
event protocols for volunteer integration, and dis-
cuss how the group might mobilize its own net-
work as part of a pre-event education campaign 
and/or crisis and recovery support system.
Conclusion
Deliberate planning for the smart flow of mean-
ingful information among officials and with the 
public proves requisite for improving the nation’s 
ability to handle both emergent and familiar health 
threats. The call for citizens’ active engagement 
in the formulation and implementation of health 
policy for major emergencies represents only one 
of many open government challenges within the 
larger biodefense context. Greater transparency in 
preparedness goals and budgets, robust biosafety 
systems for laboratories, and clarification of the 
rationale for major biomedical investments can 
also help assure that protections against biological 
attacks and other extreme health events produce 
their intended results, without unacceptable costs 
to the public’s health and other core U.S. values 
and objectives. 
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3.3 The Texas Public Information Act and 
Bioresearch: Application and Implications
by Joseph R. Larsen
 Legislation is always an exercise in the art of 
the possible. There are usually many competing 
interests, often irreconcilable interests, to balance 
and a paucity of empirical evidence about how 
much information should be released. In addition, 
even if legislators had objective information re-
garding application of the underlying principles 
at issue, the actual result of the legislation is of-
ten quite wide of the mark. With any legislative 
framework, the law of unintended consequences 
looms large, and the actual result depends in large 
part upon the procedural and litigation realities 
which underlie the application of the law. Finally, 
the integrity of any system depends in large part 
on the integrity of its components. In the context 
of open government laws, this integrity depends at 
least in part on honesty in fact of the governmen-
tal bodies involved.
 The interface between the Texas Public Infor-
mation Act, with its emphasis on the right of the 
citizens to know what their governmental institu-
tions are doing, and doing with their money, and 
public institutions involved in bioresearch, with 
their own competing interests of security, intellec-
tual property, and intellectual freedom, is a fruit-
ful microcosm to review as it sheds light on many 
of the larger issues often unexamined regarding 
how an open society is to provide for its own se-
curity. This paper will provide a brief study of 
the actual application of several statutes meant to 
govern release of information in the possession of 
public institutions funded in large part by public 
money, and also to discuss the particular instance 
of one Texas institution, Texas A&M, to properly 
report a reportable occurrence and, in response to 
a request to information, to acknowledge the exis-
tence of responsive information. 
The Texas Public Information Act
This statutory framework, modeled generally af-
ter the federal Freedom of Information Act, was 
passed in 1973 as the Open Records Act in the 
wake of the “Sharpstown” banking scandal which 
implicated several sitting legislators. It was re-
named the Public Information Act (“PIA”) in 
1995 when it was rewritten to require release of 
information in the hands of private entities kept on 
behalf of governmental bodies and to better define 
access to electronic information. See generally, 
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001 et seq.
 The PIA mandates that all information kept by 
or on behalf of governmental bodies is public un-
less it falls within an exception to the PIA. How-
ever, there are a number of statutory exceptions to 
the PIA, and the number grows with each legisla-
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Figure 1
Civic Infrastructure Capacities to Remedy Disasters and Epidemics59
Multi-frequency communications network to reach dispersed and diverse populations
“Lie”	since	June	‘0,	Flu	Wiki	(www.fluwikie.com)	is	a	irtual	non-profit	that	helps	local	commu-
nities	prepare	for	and	perhaps	cope	with	a	possible	flu	pandemic	by	tapping	the	skills,	knowledge,	
and	desire	to	learn	of	its	dierse	users	and	core	moderator	group.	
Salon	Voices,	an	innoatie	non-profit	in	Washington	(DC),	engages	the	hair	salon	culture	of	the	
African-American	community	and	equips	cosmetologists	with	information	and	internet	connec-
tions	to	educate	customers	on	HIV/AIDS,	reproductie	health,	and	parenting.	
Social circuitry to energize trust between authorities and communities at-large
CARD	-	Collaborating	Agencies	Responding	to	Disasters	(Alameda	County,	CA)	emerged	after	the	
Loma	Prieta	earthquake	to	train	and	unite	serice	proiders	as	a	safety	net	for	people	with	limited	
ability	to	address	their	own	disaster-related	needs—seniors,	children,	the	disabled,	the	homeless,	
non-English	speakers,	and	low	income	families.	CARD	has	subsequently	deeloped	an	alternatie	
curriculum,	deoid	of	fear-based	messages,	emphasizing	community	building,	leadership	cultia-
tion,	and	economic	deelopment	strategies.
St.	Philip	of	Jesus	Parish	and	the	Uniersity	of	the	Incarnate	Word	in	San	Antonio	(TX)	team	up	
nursing	faculty	and	students	with	promotoras de salud	(lay	community	health	workers)	to	reach	
a	near-by,	wary	and	under-sered	Hispanic	population	through	health	programs	held	at	the	church	
hall,	neighborhood	barbeques,	and	subsidized	housing	for	the	elderly.	
Collective wisdom to set policy priorities and inform values-laden health policy decisions 
In	200,	the	Public	Engagement	Project	on	Community	Control	Measures	for	Pandemic	Influenza	
held	public	deliberations	–	inoling	national	stakeholder	and	regionally	dierse	citizens	at-large	
–	about	which	non-pharmaceutical	measures	should	be	implemented	early	on	to	slow	flu’s	spread,	
and	about	ways	to	mitigate	the	aderse	economic	and	social	effects	of	these	interentions.
As	a	requirement	of	the	1990	Ryan	White	Care	Act,	people	personally	affected	by	HIV/AIDS	sit	
alongside	goernment	leaders,	public	health	officials,	and	heads	of	community-based	organiza-
tions	to	help	set	local	spending	priorities	for	federal	funds—whether	primary	medical	care,	case	
management	serices,	olunteer	labor	power,	etc.	
Local knowledge to improve feasibility, reliability, and acceptability of disaster plans
Residents	of	Grand	Bayou	(LA),	a	Cajun	and	Natie	American	ocean-farming	community,	hae	
partnered	with	state	and	local	goernment,	business,	the	faith	community,	and	uniersity-based	
experts	to	tackle	mounting	coastal	dangers;	one	such	effort	is	hazard	mapping	that	incorporates	
indigenous	knowledge	about	historic	enironmental	transformations.	
During	the	19	smallpox	outbreak,	NYC	health	officials	accinated	>.mil	people	in		weeks	
(>mil	alone	 in	 the	 first	2	weeks)	using	priate	physicians	and	olunteers	 from	 the	Red	Cross,	
teachers’	groups,	women’s	clubs,	and	ciil	defense	groups;	this	partnership	helped	staff	free	clinics	
in	12	hospitals,		police	precincts,	and	eery	public	and	parochial	school.
Operational support for professional responders during crisis and recovery periods
The	Harris	County	(TX)	Citizens	Corps	helped	manage	0,000	olunteers	in	setting	up	a	“mini-
city”	at	the	Houston	Astrodome	to	host	,000	Katrina	eacuees	in	200.
In	the	190s,	the	Junior	Chamber	of	Commerce	in	cooperation	with	health	departments	launched	
“Sabin	on	Sunday,”	a	mass	accination	program	that	reached	0–90%	of	the	target	population—a	
critical	step	in	eliminating	polio	in	the	U.S.
•
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Self-organized, innovative solutions when unforeseen needs arise
After	the	emergency	serices	leadership	eacuated	the	area,	a	Plaquemines	employee	took	charge	
by	phoning	around	 the	 south	parish	 to	 locate	people	 stranded	by	 the	Hurricane	Katrina	 storm	
surge	and	to	commandeer	boats,	keys,	and	gasoline	for	a	search-and-rescue	“Cajun	Nay.”
Responding	to	calls	from	the	American	Council	of	Education	and	the	Association	of	American	Uni-
ersities,	more	than	1,000	U.S.	colleges	took	in	>1,00	students	displaced	from	the		Louisiana	
colleges	closed	by	Hurricane	Katrina—with	offers	of	reduced	or	free	tuition.
Rooted-ness in place that personalizes communitywide recovery and amasses resilience
Some	Katrina-weary	New	Orleans	residents	were	tentatie	about	rebuilding	due	to	demolition,	
debris	remoal,	and	reconstruction	challenges;	neighbors’	exchanges	of	labor,	expertise,	tools	and	
equipment,	shelter,	and	childcare	hae	made	rebuilding	a	physical	possibility	and	coneyed	social	
commitments	to	the	future	of	their	communities.
Greater	Seattle	 (WA)	residents,	businesses,	and	emergency	managers	collaborated	on	“Disaster	
Saturday,”	a	preparedness	and	surial	training	on	earthquakes	for	the	public.	By	the	time	the	.	
Nisqually	earthquake	hit	in	2001,	1,000	people	had	taken	the	training,	and	at	least	00	of	them	
had	retrofitted	their	homes,	none	of	which	were	damaged	in	the	quake.
Tax revenue base and in-kind contributions that help mitigate extreme event losses 
In	a	multi-day	blitz,	29,000	Berkeley	households	receied	disaster	readiness	door	hangers	in	200;	
Disaster	Resistant	Berkeley	(a	former	Project	Impact	recipient)	funded	the	campaign	from	a	special	
preparedness	city	tax	and	used	student	olunteers	from	the	Uniersity	of	California.
“McReady	OK!”—a	priate-public	 collaboration	 in	 the	 heart	 of	Tornado	Alley—has	made	 free	
spring	storm	surial	information	aailable	in	eery	McDonald’s	restaurant	in	Oklahoma,	reaching	
upwards	of	10,000	customers	a	day	for	an	entire	month	each	year	since	200.
•
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•
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tive session. The first of these exceptions requires 
a governmental body to withhold all information 
considered “confidential by law.” This exception 
brings in a plethora of confidentiality statutes, in-
cluding the two statutes examined by this paper, 
as well common law constructs such as trade se-
crets and right to privacy.
 The Texas PIA is unique among state freedom 
of information laws in that the state attorney gen-
eral (“A.G.”) serves as essentially an ombudsman 
regarding each request. A governmental body, if 
it seeks to withhold information, is required to 
seek an attorney general ruling within ten working 
days. The attorney general issues a ruling within 
45 working days of the governmental body’s re-
quest. As a result, Texas has A.G. rulings on spe-
cific legislation that shed some light on the actual 
application of some statutes that may not, for rea-
sons of time and/or resources, have resulted in a 
reported court decision. A governmental body that 
feels the attorney general has ruled in error may 
contest the ruling by filing a lawsuit against the 
Attorney General. The actual procedural and evi-
dentiary issues involved in taking such a case to 
trial will also be reviewed.
A Typical Request
This first part of this paper will focus on some of 
the information sought by a typical request, two 
of the statutes raised by the governmental body 
to withhold the requested information, and Texas 
Attorney General Letter Ruling, OR2007-00489, 
which opined on the assertions made by the gov-
ernmental body. Finally, I will look at how these 
same issues would be dealt with at the next lev-
el—litigation. This examination will be useful 
as a check on our expectations as to what sort of 
confidentiality is possible and advisable given the 
various and conflicting goals of the governmental 
bodies and the realities of our legal system. It is 
hoped that his study will be a fresh perspective 
on the implications of the legislative schemes we 
have enacted for reasons often at cross-purposes 
with each other, and for future proposed legisla-
tion.
 The attorney general summarized the informa-
tion sought by the requester, a well-known watch-
dog group, as follows:
[T]en categories of information concerning 
the UTMB Institutional Biosafety Commit-
tee; notifications of use involving biosafety 
considerations; records of occupational ex-
posures and/or laboratory-acquired infec-
tions; Dr. Stanley Lemon’s participation on 
the National Science Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity; meetings of the New England 
biodefense regional center of excellence; 
correspondence with the Southwest Foun-
dation for Biomedical Research and with 
Dr. Rick Lyons; research contracts with 
other institutions; and other matters.
Much of the information responsive to this request 
consists of approved and unapproved applications 
for grants for specific bioresearch proposals. With 
regard to this specific information, the exceptions 
raised by the governmental body fall into two cat-
egories: (1) intellectual property; and (2) security. 
1. Intellectual Property
The increasing privatization of the public sphere 
can be seen not only in the increasing use of pri-
vate vendors to perform governmental services, 
from maintaining government databases to pro-
viding military support, but also by the morphing 
of governmental bodies themselves into for profit 
actors. The latter is due in part, to the simple fact 
that the amount of dedicated public funds is sim-
ply insufficient to maintain public research in-
stitutions. Public bodies are increasingly seen as 
competing in the private sector for available re-
sources, and competing with the private sector to 
profit from intellectual property. Indeed, research 
institutions are increasingly being asked to live off 
what they kill, so to speak, and are encouraged to 
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obtain patent protection for research results with 
potential commercial application. 
 In connection with this, in 1985 the Texas leg-
islature passed the statute now codified at Tex. 
Educ. Code § 51.914:
In order to protect the actual or potential 
value, the following information shall be 
confidential and shall not be subject to dis-
closure under [the Act], or otherwise:
(1) all information relating to a product, 
device, or process, the application or use 
of such a product, device, or process, and 
all technological and scientific information 
(including computer programs) developed 
in whole or in part at a state institution of 
higher education, regardless of whether 
patentable or capable of being registered 
under copyright or trademark laws, that 
have a potential for being sold, traded, or 
licensed for a fee; [or]
(2) any information relating to a product, 
device, or process, the application or use 
of such product, device, or process, and 
any technological and scientific informa-
tion (including computer programs) that 
is the proprietary information of a person, 
partnership, corporation, or federal agency 
that has been disclosed to an institution of 
higher education solely for the purposes 
of a written research contract or grant that 
contains a provision prohibiting the insti-
tution of higher education from disclosing 
such proprietary information to third per-
sons or parties[.]
In connection with the government body’s request 
to withhold information under this exception, the 
A.G. generally concurred, holding:
This office has stated that in considering 
whether requested information has “a po-
tential for being sold, traded, or licensed 
for a fee,” we will rely on a university’s 
assertion that the information has this po-
tential. Section 51.94 is applicable only to 
information “developed in whole or in part 
at a state institution of higher education.” 
Tex. Educ. Code § 51.914(1).
This letter ruling reflects the fact that the attor-
ney general is not empowered to make findings 
of fact. Of course, at the level of review by the at-
torney general, this clearly puts the governmental 
body in the driver’s seat with regard to claims of 
intellectual property. This singular limitation ren-
ders almost ineffective the mandate that the PIA 
is to be liberally interpreted to favor release of 
information, and its corollary that confidentiality 
statutes are to be narrowly construed.
 However, moving this issue into a court of law 
brings its own set of difficulties. Whether or not 
particular “information” has the “potential” for be-
ing “sold, traded, or licensed for a fee” will almost 
certainly have to be proven by expert testimony. 
Expert testimony is subject to exacting standards 
in order to be deemed helpful to the trier of fact. 
See E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 
S.W.2d 549, 556-57 (Tex. 1995). Further, an ex-
pert must usually express that a certain matter 
is “reasonably” probable, that is, more probable 
than not. Finally, the expert will have to articulate 
the factual basis underlying his or her conclusion. 
See, e.g., Lyondell Petrochem Co. v. Fluor Daniel, 
Inc., 888 S.W.2d 547, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied.).
 It is hard to square the language of this statute, 
expressed in “potentialities,” and the burden of 
proof that requires a governmental body to show it 
is more probable than not that particular informa-
tion falls within an asserted exception. As a matter 
of statutory construction, how is a court to “nar-
rowly read” a confidentiality statute that requires 
proof of “potential” for being sold or licensed?” 
To take a more concrete example, evidence of how 
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much money a start up business was expected to 
make is often rejected by a court as speculative 
unless there is some solid historical information 
from which one can make a projection.
 Intellectual property often comes up in the con-
text of a public information act request. However, 
these claims are usually defended by third parties 
who have provided information to a governmental 
body as part of a bid or package for approval to 
do business. Procedurally, the governmental body 
advises the third party of the request, and it is the 
third party’s obligation to establish the claims be-
fore the attorney general, or prove them in court. 
If the claim is that the information is a trade secret, 
the third party must make its case on the tradition-
al common law factors: (1) the extent to which the 
information is known by employees and others in-
volved in the company’s business; (2) the extent 
to which it is know by employees and others in-
volved in the business; (3) the extent of measures 
taken to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) 
the value of the information to the company and its 
competitors; (5) the amount of money or effort ex-
pended in developing the information; and (6) the 
ease or difficulty with which the information could 
be properly acquired or duplicated by others. See 
Tex. Gov’t Code § 110(a); Hyde v. Huffines, 314 
S.W.2d 763, 776 (Tex. 1958). Alternatively, a third 
party may demonstrate “based on specific factual 
evidence that disclosure would cause substantial 
competitive harm to the person from whom it was 
obtained.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 110(b); Tex. Att’y 
Gen. Op. ORD No. 659 at 2 (1990).
 That an institution of higher education is 
granted far more sweeping protection for its intel-
lectual property than third parties who share in-
formation with the government is not only incon-
sistent, but there is obviously a tension in the very 
idea of a publicly owned institution having intel-
lectual property rights, and free access to publicly 
financed research is not only consistent with the 
public policy rationale for such research, but the 
obverse, roping off the public and/or competing 
institutions from this information runs against the 
increasingly outmoded concept of open scientific 
debate. Further, the current paradigm has the un-
intended consequence of choking off the flow of 
information to these institutions from countries 
and organizations that fear that information freely 
given will become the property of the institution, 
foreclosing or limiting the power to use it freely or 
at all in the future.
 In this regard, as pointed out in an Op-Ed piece 
by Michael Crichton published on February 13 of 
this year in the New York Times entitled “Patent-
ing Life,” when SARS was spreading across the 
globe, “medical researchers hesitated to study 
it—because of patent concerns. There is no clear-
er indication that gene patents block innovation, 
inhibit research and put us all at risk.” The same is 
surely true when researcher or doctor will refuse 
to provide information to a research institute be-
cause of concerns the information freely granted 
will later become available only upon execution 
of a license.
2. Security
Perhaps it is not surprising that much of the very 
information that this and similarly situated gov-
ernmental bodies seek to withhold on the basis of 
its potential commercial value is also claimed as 
information that should be withheld from release 
because it could be useful to terrorists. While fil-
ing an application for patent protection for infor-
mation is at odds with making sure it doesn’t “fall 
into the hands of the bad guys,” research institu-
tions will nevertheless claim both exceptions for 
the same information. With regard to bioresearch 
(and other “dual purpose research”), the specific 
statutes involved and the attorney general’s hold-
ing on the issues presented are as follows:
 Section 418.178, as added to chapter 
418 of the Government Code as part of the 
Texas Homeland Security Act, provides as 
follows:
12	 Selected	Essays	on	State	Open	Goernment	Law	and	Practice	in	a	Post-9/11	World
(a) In this section, “explosive weapon” has 
the meaning assigned by Section 46.01, 
Penal Code.
(b) Information is confidential if it is infor-
mation collected, assembled, or maintained 
by or for a governmental entity and:
(1) Is more than likely to assist in the 
construction or assembly of an explo-
sive weapon or a chemical, biologi-
cal, radiological, or nuclear weapon of 
mass destruction; or
(2) Indicates the specific location of:
(A) A chemical, biological agent, 
toxin, or radioactive material that 
is more than likely to be used in the 
construction or assembly of such a 
weapon; or
(B) Unpublished information re-
lating to a potential vaccine or to 
a device that detects biological 
agents or toxins.
Tex. Gov’t Code § 418.178. The fact 
that information may generally relate to 
biological toxins does not make the infor-
mation per se confidential under section 
418.178. See Open Records Decision No. 
649 at 3 (1996) (language of confidential-
ity provision controls scope of its protec-
tion). As with any confidentiality statute, 
a governmental body asserting section 
418.178 must adequately explain how the 
responsive records fall within the scope 
of that provision. See Tex. Gov’t Code 
§ 552.301(e)(1)(A) (governmental body 
must explain how claimed exception to 
disclosure applies).
UTMB asserts that section 418.178 is 
applicable to information encompassed 
by items 4, 8, and 9 of the request. You 
contend that some of the information in 
question reveals the location of biologi-
cal agents or toxins that have potential for 
use in terrorist plots and thus is protected 
by section 418.178(b)(2)(B). You also ar-
gue that section 418.178(b)(2)(B) encom-
passes responsive information that relates 
to antidote research for exposure to certain 
bio-toxins. SFBR contends that the names 
of biological agents and/or toxins and of 
employees conducting research concern-
ing potential vaccines are protected by 
section 418.178(b)(2). We note that section 
418.178 is applicable only to (1) informa-
tion that is more than likely to assist in the 
construction or assembly of an explosive 
weapon or weapon of mass destruction 
and (2) information indicating the specific 
location of certain materials that are poten-
tially useful in constructing or assembling 
such a weapon or of unpublished informa-
tion relating to a potential vaccine or a de-
vice that detects biological agents or toxins. 
We have marked information revealing the 
location of toxins that is confidential under 
section 418.178 of the Government Code 
and must therefore be withheld under sec-
tion 552.101. As neither UTMB nor SFBR 
has explained how or why section 418.178 
encompasses any of the remaining infor-
mation at issue, UTMB may not withhold 
any other information on that basis.
 Again, at the level of review of the Texas At-
torney General, facts asserted by the governmental 
body are accepted as true. Despite this, and per-
haps because this statute is written more consis-
tent with the governmental body’s burden of proof 
that information be “more than likely to assist in 
the construction or assembly of a . . . biological . . . 
weapon of mass destruction,” the attorney general 
found the governmental body had “not explained” 
how much of the claimed information fell with the 
asserted exception.
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 Because in this, and many instances, the gov-
ernmental body challenged the AG’s ruling in 
court, it is useful to review how this issue might 
be dealt with before a court of law. Again, whether 
information could “more than likely” assist in con-
struction of WMD is an opinion which will have 
to be given by an expert (possibly the same expert 
could testify that the information has commercial 
application), subject to the same limitations and 
constraints discussed above.
 The scale of such a trial is large indeed, as 
this request and similar ones from other watchdog 
groups and media typically involve many applica-
tions and reports and thousands of pages. Because 
the matters at issue are claimed to be secret, dis-
covery must be done pursuant to a protective order 
and some pleadings filed under seal and reviewed 
in camera, that is, by the court in chambers.
 The daunting prospect of a many-week trial 
for release of public information that looks a lot 
like a trial for misappropriation of trade secrets 
gives pause as to the efficacy of these laws. But 
even aside from that, there are several assump-
tions underlying laws, like this, whose purpose is 
to keep information from “failing into the hands 
of the bad guys.” The first is that you can actually 
prevent the bad guys from gaining access to the 
information by limiting public access to the infor-
mation; the second is that the information would 
be more useful to the bad guys to attack us than it 
would be to the public to insure our defense.
 There is a dearth of research on the issue, but 
a law review article by Peter Swire at least gives 
a framework with which to get past the rhetoric 
that is normally offered as analysis. See Swire, A 
Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competi-
tive Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, 
and Government Systems, 42 Houston L. Rev. 133 
(2006). Swire points out similarities between re-
vealing software code to prevent breaches of se-
curity, as is done with LINUX software, and re-
leasing information related to military or national 
security, again to prevent breaches of security. 
While there is clearly information to which the 
public should not have access, for example tacti-
cal plans that would use the element of surprise, 
as often as not this information is broadcast by 
the government itself, such as our battle plans in 
the Iraq theatre of war, for purposes of political 
persuasion. The recent stunning premature dis-
closure, by the Bush Administration, of an Osama 
Bin Laden video that had been provided to them 
by SITE Intelligence Group is another instance 
of the disconnect between the rhetoric regarding 
withholding information for national security and 
the reality of getting information out to influence 
public opinion. On the other hand, information 
that could help address security problems through 
greater public awareness and public pressure is of-
ten withheld.
There is No Responsive Information
The natural human tendency is to attempt to cover 
over mistakes and to consolidate power through 
operating without oversight. Where funding is in-
volved, the temptation to conceal, falsify, or sim-
ply fail to keep records can be overwhelming. 
 Some readers of this paper may ask why a re-
quester needs to see all this information in the first 
place. I have already discussed some of the pub-
lic policy arguments, both for security and gover-
nance, as to why open access is always preferable. 
Aside from this, requesters have good reason to be 
suspicious of claims of governmental bodies that 
information responsive to a request does not exist. 
Often, the only way the watchdog learns of the 
existence of information is through reference to it 
in another document. Thus, requesters often cast a 
wide net.
 The widely reported, though not by the gov-
ernmental body, incident involving exposure to 
and infection by the brucella bacteria at Texas 
A&M is a case in point, but it is hardly unique. 
See, e.g., More than 100 incidents reported at 
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labs handling deadly germs, Austin American-
Statesman, Oct. 2, 2007.
 While the specifics of the exposure, diagnosis, 
request for information, initial denial of that there 
was any responsive information, eventual release, 
and subsequent events, including the CDC cease 
and desist letter and site visits, may be accessed 
at the website of The Sunshine Project, it is worth 
recounting in summary form here.
 The Sunshine Project filed its Texas Public In-
formation Act request on October 24, 2006 with 
Texas A&M for (among other items) “All records 
on possible or actual occupational exposures and/
or laboratory-acquired infections with risk group 
2 (RG2) or higher agents at TAMU, from 1 Janu-
ary 2000 through the present.”
 Texas A&M requested a ruling from the attor-
ney general along the lines of the procedure out-
lined above, asserting (principally) Tex. Gov’t 
Code § 418.178 as an exception. This resulted in 
Attorney General Letter Ruling OR2007-01189 in 
which the attorney general again observed that the 
fact that “information may generally relate to bio-
logical toxins does not make the information per 
se confidential” and that only specific locations 
may be withheld under this statute. The attorney 
general ruled that the remaining information must 
be released. 
 Texas A&M had not timely requested the rul-
ing, and OR2007-01189 was not issued until Janu-
ary 31, 2007. Further, when Texas A&M finally 
released responsive documents, it produced only 
one page that it claimed was the entirety of its 
records on all exposures over a period of nearly 
7 years. Texas A&M took the position that it had 
released all the documents that had been located 
and were responsive to the request. However, the 
single document that was released identified an 
occupational exposure to brucella, with the neces-
sary implication that additional documents were 
required by law to have been generated, in partic-
ular, an APHIS/CDC Form 3. And, of course, the 
existence of only a single piece of paper as a result 
of such an exposure was simply not credible. Only 
as a result of continual pressure and escalation by 
the requester did Texas A&M finally release ad-
ditional information in its possession, and finally 
inform CDC of the incident.
 An incident at Texas A&M involving exposure 
to Q Fever, and a dearth of information regarding 
the incident has come to light since the brucella 
incident. Yet, Texas A&M has produced no ac-
cident reports, lab paperwork, lessons learned, or 
modified operating procedures, for either the Q 
Fever or the Brucella accident.
 These institutional shortfalls have consequenc-
es potentially as deadly as those which could result 
if a terrorist group were to obtain truly sensitive 
information regarding the programs at issue, or 
somehow breach the physical security of the in-
stitution. Further, it appears that watchdog groups 
and public interest are more reliable in enforcing 
compliance and safe practices that governmental 
oversight. To underscore this, three years ago, 
President Bush ordered the Homeland Security 
Department to consolidate biological threats un-
covered by agencies such as Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention into a central early warn-
ing system (the “National Bio-Surveillance Inte-
gration System”). However, the Inspector General 
found that the system has failed to provide “consis-
tent leadership and staff support to ensure success-
ful execution” of the program. See, U.S. biological 
detection program falling short, report says, Aus-
tin American-Statesman, Aug. 11, 2007.
Conclusion
The principal purpose of this paper is to show the 
difficulty in drafting legislation with the purpose 
of preventing release of information in the stated 
interest of security, and the even greater difficulty 
in applying the legislation to the facts of a given 
case, particularly where the information is volumi-
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nous. On the other hand, information that should 
clearly be maintained and released, and which we 
should hope is not overly voluminous, that involv-
ing accidental exposures or other such incidents, 
is being withheld using broad statutes never meant 
to reach this information, or is simply claimed not 
to exist. In part, institutions are relying upon the 
general talisman of terrorist threats and homeland 
security to justify not releasing information re-
garding dual use technology to the public at large, 
and watchdog requesters in particular, even while 
the vigorously pursue commercial applications for 
the information at issue.
 This suggests that the proper legislative ap-
proach should be, instead of a focus on what a gov-
ernmental body may withhold, to set a baseline for 
what is expressly public and can never be withheld 
under any exception to the Public Information Act. 
 This baseline should include mandatory re-
porting of all significant accidents and near-ac-
cidents with the details of each incident, includ-
ing the name of the lab and the agent involved. It 
should also include the following:
1) Common and scientific name(s) and descrip-
tions (including structures and sequences) of spe-
cies and strains.
2) Name(s) and descriptions (including origin, 
structures and sequences) of nucleic acids.
3) Name(s) and descriptions (including origin, 
structures and sequences) of genetic vectors.
4) Name(s) and descriptions of research reagents.
5) Name(s) of Principal Investigator(s) and 
collaborator(s).
6) Individual name(s), institution name(s), city, 
and country of any individual or entity that pro-
vides biological materials to governmental body.
7) Individual name(s), institution name(s), city, and 
country of any individual or entity to which gov-
ernmental body provides any biological materials.
8) Biosafety level and risk group information.
9) Make, model, size, type, or other descriptions 
of lab equipment.
10) The name(s) of any human or veterinary (can-
didate) therapeutics or vaccines.
11) The species and breed of any laboratory animal.
12) Information on the production method(s) and 
quantity(ies) of biological agents held or produced 
by governmental body.
With regard to grant applications:
1) Any portion of the grant abstract and other sum-
mary information.
2) Financial data.
3) The proposed grant term (length of time, start 
and end dates, etc).
4) Bibliographical information.
5) Descriptions of the problem being addressed.
6) Descriptions of past research.
7) Descriptions of research not conducted at gov-
ernmental body.
8) Descriptions of the goals of research.
9) Biographical sketches (resumes) except for 
home addresses, home phone numbers, and social 
security numbers.
Not only would setting a baseline along these lines 
make unnecessary much of the intensive and waste-
ful struggle between watchdog groups and govern-
mental bodies with regard to release of information, 
but it would make clear to the institutions involved 
that lack of transparency is not an option.
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4.1 Beyond Practical Obscurity: Building 
Sound Privacy, Security and Open 
Government Policy in the Age of the 
Internet
by Ari Schwartz1
Abstract
The concept of “practical obscurity”—in which 
sensitive documents are theoretically attainable, 
but in practice remain of reach to ordinary citi-
zens—served a purpose for over a decade, but has 
become increasingly unworkable as a matter of 
policy in the Internet age. Like the boy with his fin-
ger in the dyke, governments that attempt to keep 
publicly accessible data from reaching the Internet 
are fighting a losing battle. When possible, gov-
ernments should take detailed inventories—not 
only of the information that they currently make 
available—but also of all the information that they 
collect from citizens. From those inventories they 
should make reasonable determinations about the 
potential harms of associated with releasing cer-
tain types of information. When a potential for 
harm is identified, the first choice should be to 
review the purpose of collecting that piece of in-
1 Ari Schwartz is Deputy Director at the Center for De-
mocracy and Technology in Washington, DC. http://www.
cdt.org.
formation and stop collecting it if possible. If the 
collection of that potentially harmful information 
is deemed important for a legitimate government 
function, then governments should establish ad-
equate safeguards for the sensitive data. Where no 
practical solution exists, governments will have to 
explore placing use limitations on the distribution 
of certain documents despite the fact that such 
limitations are difficult to legislate and enforce 
without incurring unintended consequences.
I. Introduction
 In the pivotal 1989 case Department of Jus-
tice v. Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the 
Press, the U.S. Supreme Court introduced the idea 
of “practical obscurity” into the policy lexicon.2 
 The case centered on a reporter who had 
submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request for information on the owners of a com-
pany that had received politically suspect defense 
contracts from the FBI. The Bureau complied with 
much of the request but would not provide one 
of the owner’s rap sheets because it would have 
violated the privacy exemption to FOIA. A lower 
court upheld the FBI’s decision. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals then overturned the decision suggesting 
that a FOIA requester could compile these same 
records from individual government agencies.3
2 See Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee of 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
3 Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press v. US 
Dept. of Justice, 816 F.2d 730, 740 (1987).
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 In a clearly worded decision, Justice John 
Paul Stevens wrote for a unanimous court that 
ruled in favor of the government’s position that 
“practical obscurity” limits access to documents 
spread around the country in a way not possible 
with a single rap sheet:
[P]lainly there is a vast difference between 
the public records that might be found af-
ter a diligent search of courthouse files, 
county archives, and local police stations 
throughout the country and a computer-
ized summary located in a single clearing-
house of information.4
Providing direct access to the same information 
in a different format changes the impact of mak-
ing records public. Therefore, governments may 
establish different policies that make information 
accessible, but not too accessible, after they weigh 
the potential downsides of broader access. On the 
other hand, it is important to note that the court did 
not suggest that all documents containing privacy-
sensitive information should be held in practical 
obscurity, but rather maintained that “[t]he priva-
cy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity 
of rap-sheet information will always be high.”5 
 In summary, the “practical obscurity” of gov-
ernment document protects the privacy of indi-
viduals to the extent that it requires major, incon-
venient effort on the part of an information seeker 
to gather very private details about an individual 
held by the government.
 Observers have noted that the concept of 
practical obscurity has been an important policy 
concept used regularly not only in FOIA privacy 
exemption decisions, but also in other policy de-
terminations.6 In fact, the precedent set by the Re-
4 489 U.S. at 764.
5 489 U.S. at 762.
6 See Charles N. Davis, PhD, Electronic Access to In-
formation and the Privacy Paradox: Rethinking ‘Practical 
Obscurity,’ A Paper Presented to TPRC: The 29th Annual 
Conference on Information Communication and Internet 
porters Committee case has had an influence even 
beyond its impact on privacy, such as providing 
access to the risks from chemical plant or sensi-
tive geographic information system (GIS) data. 
For example, in 1999 Congress passed a law that 
stopped the U.S. Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (EPA) from publishing certain data on the EPA 
web site or providing them in electronic form to 
FOIA requesters. This data in question - risk man-
agement plans (RMPs) for chemical companies 
collected under the Clean Air Act that included 
the so-called “worst case scenario” information 
about chemical plant disasters -- was limited out 
of fear that posting it online would allow terrorists 
easy access to the data.7 Instead, Congress created 
a forced, practical obscurity of the RMPs by al-
lowing public access only to a limited number of 
the actual reports through the federal depository 
library systems computers.8
 While government policies rendering sensitive 
data practically obscure have increased, the futil-
ity of such policies has also become increasingly 
clear.9 The cost of taking disparate sources of in-
formation (electronic or paper) and converting 
them into an electronic format that can be made 
available over the Internet has plummeted in re-
cent years. Companies and organizations are now 
gathering information that was previously practi-
Policy, Oct. 27-29, 2001, TPRC-2001-096 citing 60 lower 
court decision on practical obscurity and FOIA; Arminda 
Bradford Bepko, Public Availability or Practical Obscurity: 
The Debate Over Public Access to Court Records on the 
Internet, 49 N.Y. Law School Law Review, p. 967 discuss-
ing the application of practical obscurity to federal and state 
court policy. 
7 Center for Democracy and Technology, Congress Hur-
ries to Limit Public Right to Know, CDT Policy Post Vol. 5, 
No.9, May 20, 1999, available at http://www.cdt.org/publi-
cations/pp_5.9.html. 
8 Linda-Jo Schierow, Accident Prevention under the 
Clean Air Act Section 112(r): Risk Management Planning 
by Propane Users and Internet Access to Worst-Case Ac-
cident Scenarios, CRS RL30228, June 10, 1999, available 
at http://www.opencrs.com/document/RL30228/.
9 The probable futility of such policies has been raised in 
theory for years. See supra Davis, TPRC 2001-096 and CDT 
Policy Post Vol. 5, No 9.
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cally obscure and making it easily accessible to 
the public on the Internet. 
II. Three Examples of the Increasing Futility of 
Practical Obscurity
 There are many examples of government in-
formation that was once practically obscure, but 
has since been made widely available by non-gov-
ernmental actors. Some of these were originally 
obscured as part of specific policy decisions to 
try to obscure non-classified and non-confidential 
data. Other data have been obscured, not through 
active policymaking or law, but by the fact that 
most of the records are in paper or legacy data-
bases not readily available to the broader public. I 
will focus on three of these cases.
A. Chemical Risk Management Plans 
 As discussed above, when the U.S. Congress 
passed a law to limit access to chemical plant risk 
management plans, it decreed that access to this 
public information should be provided to the pub-
lic only through the federal depository libraries. 
This decision was made in part because it was 
clear from the Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right-to-Know Act of 1986 that the Toxic Re-
lease Inventory Information, of which the RMPs 
are a part, was collected with publication in mind, 
so that local officials and even the media could ex-
amine the risk of local plants and create emergency 
plans.10 Several environmental and right-to-know 
advocacy groups, led by OMB Watch, believed 
that the government’s decision was made more in 
deference to the desires of the chemical industry 
than out of any sort of balanced policy-making 
process. These groups decided to systematically 
gather RMP summaries from the depository librar-
ies and use them to create their own database.11 
Today, anyone can get access to these plans on the 
Web despite Congress’ attempt to obscure them. 
10 See Title III of PL 99-499. 
11 OMB Watch, “Access to Government Information Post 
9/11” Feb. 1, 2007, available at http://www.ombwatch.org/
article/articleview/213/1/1.
B. CRS Reports 
 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is 
a division of the Library of Congress that taxpay-
ers pay $100 million a year to support. CRS serves 
as a kind of think tank for Congress providing 
unbiased, nonpartisan research on the key issues 
facing the country.12 As part of its duties, CRS at-
tempts to address questions that will be of inter-
est to a wide range of members of Congress and 
their staff. These reports are then made available 
on an internal Web site available only to Capitol 
Hill offices.13 Because these reports are non-clas-
sified and non-confidential, Members of Congress 
are free to distribute them to their constituents in 
paper or electronic form. In this case, the policy 
of practical obscurity appears to be intended to 
protect the unique relationship that CRS has with 
Congress. However, some private companies 
have found a means to collect all of the reports as 
they are posted and sell them for as much as $20 
a piece on the Internet, so the reports are being 
made available to those that can afford them.14 Ac-
cess advocates, including Members of Congress,15 
12 See http://www.opencrs.com/about.php.
13 Http://www.crs.gov redirects a user off of Capitol Hill 
to a the CRS Employment Opportunities Page, but sends a 
user with a Capitol Hill assigned Internet Protocol address 
to the CRS website.
14 LexisNexis provides CRS reports as part of its Congres-
sional service package at http://www.lexisnexis.com/help/
cu/CU.htm#TP/CRS_Reports.htm, or back reports in bulk 
at different prices http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/
catalog/2006intl_pdfs/UPA_Collections_CongressionalRe-
searchService.pdf; Penny Hill Press Sells individual reports 
as its main business model at http://www.pennyhill.com/;
Roll Call’s Gallery Watch also resells Penny Hill’s reports at 
http://www.gallerywatch.com/m_news-press.htm.
3) CQ sells access to CRS reports as the lead item in their 
“Top Docs” Product at http://www.cq.com/corp/show.
do?page=products_cqtopdocs.
15 “All of these reports are ‘public’ for only those who can 
afford to hire a lawyer or lobbyists, or who can afford to 
physically travel to Washington to visit the Office of Public 
Records. That is not very ‘public,’ and does almost nothing 
for the average citizen in Vermont or the rest of this coun-
try who does not have easy access to Washington.” Senator 
Patrick Leahy (D-VT), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/
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have long asserted that Congress should make 
these documents available to the public directly 
and have been especially outraged to see them be-
ing sold.16 
 Several public interest groups and libraries17 
have created collections of reports in their respec-
tive issue areas and, in 2005, the Center for Democ-
racy and Technology (CDT) created the OpenCRS 
web site18 to tie these different collections together 
and make them widely available. OpenCRS has 
taken advantage of the decentralized nature of the 
Internet by establishing a single interface that al-
lows citizens to easily peruse and download reports 
from a large and growing network of available 
CRS collections. The site also encourages users 
to grow the database, by uploading copies of any 
new CRS reports they happen to obtain on their 
own. While OpenCRS does not have every non-
classified and non-confidential CRS report, the 
site and the sale of all of the reports has generally 
rendered the policy of practical obscurity useless 
since anyone with means can obtain the reports.19 
C. Court Records
 The openness of judicial proceedings has al-
ways been a fundamental principle of the court 
systems in the United States. However, the courts 
are facing some unexpected consequences of that 
openness as they become increasingly reliant upon 
the Internet. With caseloads growing each year, 
press/200302/021103a.html.
16 In a 1998 report, CDT and OMB Watch placed CRS 
reports as the number one “most wanted” set of government 
documents, available at http://www.cdt.org/righttoknow/
10mostwanted/.
17 These groups include National Council for Science and 
the Environment, Federation of American Scientists, Thur-
good Marshall Law Library/University of Maryland School 
of Law, National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism, and Center for Democracy & Technology.
18 http://www.opencrs.com.
19 According to Jill Brett, from the Library of Congress, 
“If [the CDT] can get the reports and put them up, we can’t 
stop them.” Brian Faler, Hard-to-Get Policy Briefings For 
Congress Are Now Online: Technology Group Opens Access 
to Research Reports, Wash. Post, June 28, 2005, at p. A-13.
the Internet has become a valuable tool for court 
officials in terms of managing cases in an efficient 
and timely manner and streamlining document 
processing. At the same time, courts are using 
the Internet to give the public electronic access to 
court records, making judicial proceedings more 
transparent and making access more equitable,20 
but also making widely available personally iden-
tifiable and sometimes sensitive information that 
used to be practically obscure.21 
 For several years, advocates have suggested 
that increased posting with no changes to current 
policy could lead to identity theft using those re-
cords.22 Recently, those predictions have proven 
to be prescient. In one harrowing case, a metham-
phetamine addict seeking to commit identity theft 
was found using local divorce records “listing 
the parties’ names, addresses and bank account 
numbers, along with scans of their signatures. . 
. . all he needed to print checks in his victims’ 
names.”23 
20 Companies such as ChoicePoint, LexisNexis and West 
Publishing have been charging for access to digitized court 
records for years.
21 See Center for Democracy and Technology, A Quiet 
Revolution in the Courts: Electronic Access to States Court 
Records—A CDT Survey of State Activity and Comments on 
Privacy, Cost and Accountability Issues, Aug. 2002, avail-
able at http://www.cdt.org/publications/020821courtrecords.
shtml.
22 For example, “[T]he crime of identity theft will be fu-
eled by easy access to personal identifiers and other personal 
information via electronic public records,” Beth Givens, Di-
rector, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Public Records on the 
Internet: The Privacy Dilemma, Computers Freedom and 
Privacy Conference, Apr. 2002. Available at http://www.
cfp2002.org/proceedings/proceedings/givens.pdf.
23 John Leland & Tom Zeller, Technology and Easy Credit 
Give Identity Thieves An Edge, N.Y. Times, May 30, 2006, 
at A1. Prior to this case, most experts cited the FTC and 
GAO reporting on identity theft showing that 61.7% of iden-
tity theft victims simply did not know who the thief was and 
those that did knew the thief, see Government Accountabil-
ity Office, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to Be 
Growing, Mar. 2002, GAO-02-363, available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d02363.pdf (suggesting that the threat 
from public records was theoretical).
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 Several committees and groups have been 
formed by state and federal have made attempts to 
provide guidance on the privacy issues raised by 
placing previously practically obscure documents 
directly online.24 These guidance documents have 
been helpful in setting broad policy but, as seen 
in the Arizona case, have not solved the problem 
completely. 
III. Overview of Broad Access Policy Alterna-
tives in the Internet Age
Looking over existing laws, legislation and dis-
cussions in the areas of information policy, one 
can identify five groupings of policies:25
1) Open Access—In this approach, govern-
ments provide the broadest access to pub-
lic records by placing them on the Internet, 
unmodified from their current paper or 
electronic format. This maximizes access 
but does not address privacy and security 
issues. 
2) No Access—Under this policy, government 
does not place any public records that may 
be potentially sensitive online. Officials 
could comb through information that is al-
24 Several states have also had their own advisory com-
mittees. I was a member of the Maryland Committee on 
Access to Court Records in 2001 (see http://www.courts.
state.md.us/access/index.html, conclusions and other infor-
mation) and other states have had similar groups including 
Washington and New York. See Martha Wade Steketee & 
Alan Carlson, Developing CCJ/COSCA Guidelines for Pub-
lic Access to Court Records: A National Project to Assist 
State Courts, Nat’l Center for State Courts & the Justice 
Management Institute, Oct. 2003, available at http://www.
ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_PriPub_Guideline-
sPublicAccessPub.pdf. 
25 See Sol Bermann’s instructive paper, Privacy and Ac-
cess to Public Records in the Digital Age, Center for In-
terdisciplinary Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series No. 62, Law and Policy Studies Working Paper Series 
No. 40, Apr. 2006, focus suggests four of these same policy 
options. I have reordered them and added “Use limitations,” 
but we come to similar conclusions on the problem and po-
tential solutions.
ready available both in paper and online 
and prevent access. This minimizes ac-
cess, but maximizes privacy. 
3) Enhancing Practical Obscurity—This 
update to the old system is a planned ver-
sion of the practical obscurity defined by 
the court. Government creates a bifurcated 
records system that would limit online ac-
cess to certain private or sensitive informa-
tion, but leave the complete paper or elec-
tronic record available for public review 
at the record holder’s office. This is often 
held up as a middle ground approach. 
4) Use limitations—A very common ap-
proach is to provide broad access for cer-
tain pre-defined purposes set forth in law 
or policy, and to restrict access for all other 
purposes.
5) Review and Redact—Under this policy, 
governments review the collection polic-
es for public record-keeping and modify 
them to protect individual privacy or secu-
rity interests. 
III. Reaching a Balanced Policy
None of the above policy choices is perfect. Pub-
lic information varies widely, as do the situational 
dynamics associated with specific data sets. There 
are several factors that come into play in making 
determinations about what may be the best policy 
for a particular situation, government agency or 
data set. These considerations include but are not 
limited to: the type of data and its potential benefit 
in being made widely available versus its potential 
harm; the resources of the agency posting the data; 
and historical use and access to the data. With 
these potential considerations in mind, policymak-
ers can think through the options in Section II.
 To begin with, we should remove the first two 
approaches (open access and no access) from con-
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sideration simply because they suggest an easy 
answer to a difficult problem. Proponents of each 
extreme suggest that one basic tenet of American 
society—government and corporate accountabil-
ity, efficiency and openness; security and/or pri-
vacy must trump the other. Pollsters usually like 
to take what are really four concerns (government 
accountability, privacy, security, and government 
efficiency) and offer only two binary options: you 
can either have privacy or security; or you can ei-
ther have security or efficiency.26 Yet, when given 
multiple options, poll results clearly suggest that 
Americans do not want to sacrifice one of these 
tenets over another.27 In fact, they expect govern-
ment to be able to find a way to protect privacy 
and security in a way that does not detract from 
government accountability or efficiency. As such, 
striking this proper balance should be the goal of 
any policy designed to address these difficult pol-
icy challenges.
 The next approach, enhancing practical obscu-
rity, seems reasonable in its framing. Proponents 
simply want to modernize the current system. The 
major difference is that, whereas the Supreme 
Court treated practical obscurity as a kind of 
happy accident, using—or purposely not using—
technology to help obscure information raises en-
tirely different issues. In brief, the problem with 
this policy, as we have seen with the Chemical 
Plant Risk Model Plans and CRS Reports, is that 
in an age of inexpensive storage of information,28 
26 For example, in May 2006, ABC News and the Wash-
ington Post conducted a poll asking for a binary choice, 
“What do you think is more important right now -- for the 
federal government to investigate possible terrorist threats, 
even if that intrudes on personal privacy; or for the federal 
government not to intrude on personal privacy, even if that 
limits its ability to investigate possible terrorist threats?” 
Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/poli-
tics/polls/postpoll_nsa_051206.htm.
27 The Council for Excellence in Government, “The New 
e-Government Equation: Ease, Engagement, Privacy and 
Protection,” Apr. 2003. Available at http://www.excelgov.
org/admin/FormManager/filesuploading/egovpoll2003.pdf.
28 See Ari Schwartz et.al., Storing Our Lives Online: Ex-
panded Email Storage Raises Complex Policy Issues, 1 IS-
JLP 597, Summer 2005, for other examples of the policy 
inexpensive imaging equipment, powerful optical 
character recognition software, and increasingly 
powerful database software it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to keep public documents practi-
cally obscure. In fact, there is a clear policy advan-
tage to the government in posting public materials 
online themselves, because they can generally 
control the context in which they are made avail-
able.
 The fourth option—use limitations—has be-
come more common to enhance privacy protec-
tions by limiting the use of information usually by 
placing strong restrictions and then creating ex-
ceptions for particular uses. For example, in 1994, 
the U.S. Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act (DPPA).29 The DPPA prevents state 
governments from selling driver and identity card 
information without the consent of the individual. 
Yet, the statute has many exemptions including:
For use in the normal course of business 
by a legitimate business or its agents, em-
ployees, or contractors, but only to verify 
the accuracy of personal information sub-
mitted by the individual to the business or 
its agents, employees, or contractors.30
In other words, businesses can obtain driver in-
formation for the broad purpose of fraud preven-
tion. Exceptions have caused states such as North 
Carolina to pass even stronger laws that require 
the written consent of the individual for some in-
formation.31 The key to this policy is that it re-
stricts subsequent use and onward transfer of the 
information. Whereas enhanced practical obscu-
rity policies simply place limitations on the origi-
nal use of information, use limitations allow the 
flexibility to limit future uses as well.
impact of cheap storage.
29 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
30 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)3.
31 North Carolina has detailed information about the pro-
gram, including consent forms, on their website available at 
http://www.ncdot.org/dmv/other_services/recordsstatistics/
copyDrivingRec.html.
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 Some states have attempted to combine a use 
limitation policy with an enhanced practical obscu-
rity policy. For example, data brokers that provide 
access to voter registration information cannot 
provide Pennsylvania or South Dakota informa-
tion over the Internet and cannot even take orders 
for Arizona voter lists online.32 It seems clear that 
the states in these cases are attempting to limit the 
wide distribution of the material and allow most 
other uses. Unfortunately, they appear only to be 
creating a speed bump since data brokers are still 
selling this information in paper format that can 
be scanned and easily put into databases.
 The major problem with use limitation laws is 
that they are in clear conflict with the fundamental 
openness tenet that government should not be able 
to control how non-classified government infor-
mation is used. Also, if not crafted carefully, such 
policies can be so vague as to be easily abused33 
and can also run afoul of the principles of free ex-
pression.34 Policymakers must consider all current 
32 The data broker company, Aristotle, explains on its 
web site, “Use of and access to voter list data is restricted 
in some jurisdictions. For information, contact an Aristotle 
representative. AZ voter data is not available on the Internet. 
Orders for PA & SD voter data may be placed; however, the 
data will be delivered separately as it is not available for 
download over the Internet. Searching for individual voters 
is not available, and voter names and addresses are not visi-
ble during your searches.” Available at http://www.aristotle.
com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&I
temid=64
33 My favorite example of the abuse of a privacy excep-
tion was when the National Zoo declared a privacy exemp-
tion to the Freedom of Information Act when a reporter 
sought the medical records of the Zoo’s Pandas. James V. 
Grimaldi, National Zoo Cites Privacy Concerns in Its Refus-
al to Release Animal’s Medical Records, Wash. Post, May 6, 
2002, p. E12. Aside from the fact that the privacy of animals 
has not been upheld by any court, the Zoo itself provides a 
service called “PandaCam” where web users can watch the 
panda’s activities at all times. Available at http://national-
zoo.si.edu/Animals/GiantPandas/default.cfm.
34 These are complicated issues; especially when discuss-
ing the role of government in limiting use of information 
collected by government. For an interesting debate of the 
general issue of privacy and speech, see Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy, 52 Stan. L. 
and potential uses in order to create policies that 
are neither so restrictive that legitimate uses are 
ignored, nor so lenient that the policy may as well 
not exist. Therefore, crafting a balanced use limita-
tion policy will always be a complicated endeavor 
fraught with potential unintended consequences.
 The final policy alternative, review and redact, 
allows for broad access to a base set of informa-
tion but attempts to safeguard privacy and security 
by limiting access to the most concerning pieces 
of data. This approach has become more common. 
In some recent examples: 
The federal government has encouraged 
agencies to stop using Social Security 
Numbers in public records as identifiers to 
protect individuals from potential identity 
theft.35 
Federal bankruptcy courts have begun re-
dacting bank account and social security 
information when publishing court docu-
ments.36 
Agencies that provide satellite-mapping 
data have blurred images only over sensi-
tive buildings, such as embassies or mili-
tary bases.37
Rev. 1049 (2000); and Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. 
Information Privacy, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1559 (2000).
35 OMB released a “plan to eliminate unnecessary use of 
Social Security Numbers” as part of a memo in July 2007, 
OMB Memo 07-19, available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-19.pdf. Technically 
speaking, non-congressionally approved uses of the social 
security number were outlawed by the Privacy Act of 1974, 
5 U.S.C. § 552a.
36 There have been several projects on this issue had sev-
eral projects including a set of guidance that came from a 
detailed U.S. Treasury Report, Financial Privacy in Bank-
ruptcy: A Case Study on Privacy In Public and Judicial Re-
cords, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/re-
ports/bankrstudy.pdf.
37 Other governments have taken a more extreme ap-
proach of no access or strong use limitations to mapping 
data. Most recently see Dan Charles, “Security Officials 
Seek to Block Some Online Maps,” National Public Radio, 
Oct. 10, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=15091682.
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This approach clearly has the potential for the 
greatest balance between openness and competing 
values because it allows for a tailored approach. 
However, putting a review and redact policy in 
place is not nearly as easy as other policy ap-
proaches. Finding the right balance of what infor-
mation should be included and what should be re-
dacted can be complicated and contentious. Also, 
once a redact policy has been determined, locating 
all of the records that need to be redacted can be 
resource intensive even with the use of technology 
to help. 
IV. Conclusions
Practical obscurity is now merely a remnant of an 
accidental policy that worked prior to the digital 
age. Unfortunately, there are no easy, one-size-
fits-all policy answers to address the fundamental 
conflicts in making potentially sensitive govern-
ment information widely available in a networked 
world. In fact, the two kinds of policies most likely 
to achieve a workable balance for competing pol-
icy aims are also the most difficult to implement. 
Achieving the best resolution takes a broad un-
derstanding of all competing needs and may also 
require substantial resources and skilled govern-
mental facilitation to be properly implemented.
 Policymakers faced with this challenge should 
begin by examining a possible review and redact 
approach. This will mean beginning a public con-
sultation with all interested parties to examine the 
extent of the concerns with particular data sets. 
Policymakers must then determine whether such 
information can be placed online as a whole or 
only after it is scrubbed of specific pieces of in-
formation. Next, a technical discussion is needed 
to examine the potential difficulties associated 
with redacting a portion of a specific data set. 
For example, it is easy to say that Social Security 
Numbers and Bank Account information should 
be removed from court records, but, assuming that 
these numbers are embedded in court filings and 
not in a database, finding these identifiers can be 
a difficult task. Once the scope of the project is 
determined, a final public consultation should be 
held to ensure that the process has addressed con-
cerns.
 If such a process is simply not possible, then 
the more difficult but possibly less resource-inten-
sive task of placing use limitations on certain data 
sets should be examined. As mentioned above, the 
goal should be to achieve a balanced policy that 
is not so restrictive that it stops legitimate use of 
government information, but is still strong enough 
to mitigate potential security and privacy vulner-
abilities. 
 Finally, it is important to note that consider-
ations of what should be available online should 
not only focus on what is currently public. Poli-
cymakers that are examining the issue of what 
government information should and should not be 
available online should take a broader view and 
examine all information held, not just that which 
has been made public in the past. Without a regu-
lar examination of what can be made available and 
how it should be made available, the public may 
be missing out on potentially valuable informa-
tion and the government will rightfully be seen as 
merely trying to obscure information rather than 
embrace openness. 
4.2 Homeland Security v. Homeland 
Defense: Gaps Galore
by Jody R. Westby38
Introduction
Since the formation of the President’s Commission 
on Critical Infrastructure Protection in 1996, sig-
38 Jody R. Westby is CEO of Global Cyber Risk LLC in 
Washington, D.C. and serves as Adjunct Distinguished Fel-
low to Carnegie Mellon CyLab. She chairs the American 
Bar Association’s Privacy & Computer Crime Committee 
(Section of Science & Technology Law) and is a member of 
the World Federation of Scientists’ Permanent Monitoring 
Panel on Information Security. She represents the ABA on 
the National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists. 
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nificant work has been undertaken by U.S. agencies 
and departments and state and local governments 
with respect to the protection of critical infrastruc-
ture (CI) and public-private sector coordination in 
the event of a cyber attack. The associated legal 
and policy issues have also been reviewed and ac-
tions have been taken to ensure an appropriate le-
gal framework is in place to support Homeland Se-
curity response measures.39 Little has been done, 
however, with respect to (a) public-private sector 
response coordination in a cyber warfare context, 
and (b) the development of domestic and interna-
tional legal and policy frameworks to support such 
responses. Thus, there are significant preparedness 
gaps between the Homeland Security capabilities 
exercised by infrastructure owners and local, state, 
and federal responders and the Homeland Defense 
capabilities required from the U.S. military and 
39 See e.g., Adequacy of Criminal Law and Procedure 
(Cyber): A Legal Foundations Study, President’s Commis-
sion on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997, available at 
http://chnm.gmu.edu/cipdigitalarchive/object.php?id=184; 
Approaches to Cyber Intrusion Response: A Legal Founda-
tions Study, 1997, President’s Commission on Critical In-
frastructure Protection, 1997, available at http://chnm.gmu.
edu/cipdigitalarchive/object.php?id=190; Federal Gov-
ernment Model Performance: A Legal Foundations Study, 
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion, 1997, available at http://chnm.gmu.edu/cipdigitalar-
chive/object.php?id=189; Legal Authorities Database: A 
Legal Foundations Study, President’s Commission on Criti-
cal Infrastructure Protection, 1997, available at http://chnm.
gmu.edu/cipdigitalarchive/object.php?id=181; Legal Foun-
dations, Studies and Conclusions: A Legal Foundations 
Study, President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, 1997, available at http://chnm.gmu.edu/cipdigi-
talarchive/object.php?id=167; Legal Impediments to Infor-
mation Sharing: A Legal Foundations Study, President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997, 
available at http://chnm.gmu.edu/cipdigitalarchive/object.
php?id=188; Liability and Insurance: Infrastructure As-
surance, President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, 1997, available at http://chnm.gmu.edu/cipdigi-
talarchive/object.php?id=168; Major Federal Legislation: 
A Legal Foundations Study, President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997, available at http://
chnm.gmu.edu/cipdigitalarchive/object.php?id=179; Ethan 
B. Kapstein, Regulating the Internet, President’s Commis-
sion on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997, available at 
http://chnm.gmu.edu/cipdigitalarchive/object.php?id=170.
other nation states. It is precisely these Homeland 
Defense gaps that leave America most vulnerable. 
In the post-9/11 world, responses to major cyber 
attacks will require (a) enormous interaction and 
cooperation between the public and private sec-
tors, (b) clear legal authority for actions taken by 
the U.S. military and any collective assistance from 
other nation states, and (c) authorization from pri-
vate sector boards of directors and senior manage-
ment regarding the use of private sector networks 
in offensive and defensive actions.
Definitions and context are important when dis-
cussing Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, 
and critical infrastructure protection, and when 
analyzing the legal instruments that govern po-
tential responses by nation states to cyber attacks. 
For purposes of this paper, “Homeland Security” 
is defined as “[a] concerted national effort to pre-
vent terrorist attacks within the United States, 
reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks 
that do occur.”40 “Homeland Defense” is defined 
as “[t]he protection of United States territory, 
sovereignty, domestic population and critical in-
frastructure through deterrence of and defense 
against direct attacks as well as the management 
of the consequences of such attacks.”41 Section 2 
of the U.S. Homeland Security Act defines “criti-
cal infrastructure” as having the same meaning as 
that used in the USA PATRIOT Act:
[T]he term “critical infrastructure” means 
systems and assets, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the . . . [nation] that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems 
and assets would have a debilitating im-
pact on security, national economic secu-
rity, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of those matters.42 
40 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of 
Homeland Security, July 2002 at 2, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf. 
41 General Military Training – Homeland Defense, avail-
able at https://www.cnet.navy.mil/cnet/gmt/gmt03/1_5.pdf. 
42 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. Law 107-296, 
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The Threat
The threat of cyber warfare is not new. In fact, 
the U.S. Government has exercised cyber war-
fare tactics probably more than any other nation. 
Two excellent examples of U.S. cyberwar tactics 
are Operation Desert Storm and a successful CIA 
plot to disrupt Soviet pipelines. In 1982, President 
Reagan approved a plan to transfer software used 
to run pipeline pumps, turbines, and valves to 
the Soviet Union that had embedded features de-
signed to cause pump speeds and valve settings to 
malfunction. “The result was the most monumen-
tal non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from 
space,” noted former Air Force Secretary Thomas 
C. Reed in his book, At the Abyss: An Insider’s 
History of the Cold War.”43 The attack caused 
enormous economic and psychological impact to 
the Soviet Union and is credited with helping to 
end the Cold War.44 The U.S. deployed cyber war-
fare tactics again when it invaded Iraq in 1991. 
Phase I of Operation Desert Storm was a strategic 
air campaign that would “attack Iraq’s strategic air 
defenses; aircraft/airfields; …command and con-
trol systems; … telecommunications facilities; and 
key elements of the national infrastructure, such as 
critical … electric grids….”45 The U.S. also used 
its extensive communication and satellite systems 
to support its Desert Storm activities.46
Section 2, available at http://whitehouse.gov/deptofhome-
land/bill. The USA PATRIOT Act is an acronym for the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropri-
ate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
of 2001.
43 David E. Hoffman, “CIA slipped bugs to Soviets,” 
Washington Post, Feb. 27, 2004, available at http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/4394002. 
44 Id.
45 Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Cam-
paign, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Letter Re-
port, GAO/NSIAD-97-134, June 12, 1997 at Appendix V, 
available at http://www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad97134/app_
05.htm. 
46 Jon Trux, “Desert Storm: A space-age war,” NewScien-
tist, July 27, 1991, available at 
h t t p : / / w w w . n e w s c i e n t i s t . c o m / a r t i c l e /
mg13117794.900-deser t -s torm-a-spaceage-war--
one-year-ago-next-week-iraqinvaded-kuwait-pro-
The U.S. is not alone in developing cyber warfare 
tactics and strategies. As early as 1996, U.S. Gov-
ernment officials estimated that more than 120 
countries either had or were developing computer 
attack capabilities that could enable them to take 
over the Department of Defense’s (DoD) informa-
tion systems and “seriously degrade the nation’s 
ability to deploy and sustain military forces.”47 
Considering that today over one billion online us-
ers48 and 233 countries are connected to the Inter-
net,49 the number of countries with such capabili-
ties is likely higher. 
China has long been considered one of the more 
aggressive countries focusing on cyber warfare 
capabilities, but speculation in this area was clari-
fied when Xinhua published the full text of Chi-
na’s National Defense in 2006. In this document, 
China declared its goal of “building information-
ized armed forces and being capable of winning 
informationized wars by the mid-21st century.”50 
The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission (USCC) noted in its 2006 annual re-
port to Congress that:
Chinese military strategists write openly 
about exploiting the vulnerabilities cre-
ated by the U.S. military’s reliance on 
advanced technologies and an extensive 
C4ISR infrastructure it uses to conduct 
operations. China’s approach to exploit-
voking-a-war-with-the-us-and-its-allies-but-withoutanarmada-
of-snooping-satellites-iraqs-battle-was-lost-almost-before-
it-began.html.
47 Information Security: Computer Attacks at Depart-
ment of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, United States Gov’t. 
Accountability Office, GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996, 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/gao/aim96084.htm. 
48 “Internet Usage Statistics – The Big Picture: World 
Internet Users and Population Stats,” Internet World Stats, 
available at http://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (herein-
after “Internet Usage Statistics”).
49 “Internet World Stats: Usage and Populations Statis-
tics,” available at http://www.internetworldstats.com/.
50 “China’s National Defense in 2006,” Xinhua, Dec, 
29, 2006 at 5, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-
lish/2006-12/29/content_5547029.htm. 
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ing the technological vulnerabilities of 
adversaries extends beyond destroying or 
crippling military targets. Chinese mili-
tary writings refer to attacking key civil-
ian targets such as financial systems….
According to the Department of Defense, 
the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] 
cyber-warfare strategy has evolved from 
defending its own computer networks to 
attacking the networks of its adversaries 
and limiting their ability to obtain and pro-
cess information….Such attacks would be 
intended to disable defense systems that 
facilitate command and control and intel-
ligence communication and the delivery of 
precision weapons, primary instruments 
for the conduct of modern U.S. warfare.51
The USCC’s 2007 report to Congress expanded on 
its earlier warnings by noting that a Chinese cyber 
attack might go beyond government systems and 
target U.S. financial, economic, energy, and com-
munications infrastructure.52 
In June 2007, Pentagon computer networks were 
allegedly hacked by the Chinese military in what 
has been called “the most successful cyber attack 
on the U.S. defense department,”53 shutting down 
parts of the Pentagon’s systems for more than a 
week.54 Chinese hackers have also been blamed 
for attacks that compromised German government 
systems and cyber espionage incidents against the 
51 2006 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, Nov. 2006 at 137, avail-
able at http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2006/06_an-
nual_report_contents.php. C4ISR is an acronym for Com-
mand, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.
52 2007 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission, June 1, 2007 at 8, avail-
able at http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/annual_re-
port_full_07.pdf. 
53 Demetri Sevastopulo, “China ‘hacked’ into Pentagon 
defence system,” Financial Times, Sept. 6, 2007 at 1.
54 Demetri Sevastopulo, “Real security fear over virtual 
invasions,” Financial Times, Sept. 4, 2007 at 2.
United Kingdom’s (UK) government systems.55 
The Director-General of the UK’s counter-intel-
ligence and security agency, MI5, recently posted 
a confidential letter to 300 CEOs and security of-
ficers on the website of the Centre for the Protec-
tion of National Infrastructure, warning them that 
their infrastructure was being targeted by “Chi-
nese state organizations” and that the attacks were 
designed to defeat security best practices.56
Cyber threats do not emanate solely from nation 
states, however. Government officials have repeat-
edly warned that terrorists or other rogue actors 
have the capability to attack critical infrastructure 
and cause catastrophic consequences. Analysis of 
the use of the Internet and information and commu-
nication technologies (ICTs) by terrorists confirms 
their interest in and ability to use these technologies 
for asymmetric attacks. For example, after Septem-
ber 11, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) discovered that online users, whose activity 
was routed through switches in Saudi Arabia, Paki-
stan, and Indonesia, were exploring the digital sys-
tems of emergency telephone, electrical generation 
and transmission, water storage and distribution, 
nuclear power plants, and gas facilities.57 Comput-
ers seized in Pakistan in July 2005 contained ma-
terial from “casings” of key financial institutions 
located in New York, Washington, D.C., and New-
ark, New Jersey, prompting Homeland Security 
alerts to these organizations and locales.58 
55 “China’s cyber-spies spread their net,” Financial Times, 
Sept. 4, 2007 at 12; Andrew Ward and Demetri Sevastopulo, 
“US concedes danger of cyber-attack,” Financial Times, 
Sept. 6, 2007 at 3.
56 Rhys Blakely, “MI5 alert on China’s cyberspace spy 
threat,” Times Online, Dec. 1, 2007, available at http://busi-
ness.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/tech-
nology/article2980250.ece. 
57 Jody R. Westby, “Countering Terrorism with Cyber 
Security,” Jurimetrics, Vol. 47, No. 3, Spring 2007 at 297, 
306-307, available at http://lawlib.wlu.edu/CLJC/index.
aspx?mainid=163&issuedate=2007-09-12&homepage=no 
(hereinafter “Westby”) (citing Barton Gellman, “Cyber-At-
tacks by Al Qaeda Feared,” Washington Post, June 26, 2002, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/
A50765-2002Jun26). 
58 Westby at 306-307 (citing “Al-Qaeda surveillance 
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The Need for Response Coordination
Cyber response capabilities must be closely coor-
dinated because, at the time of a cyber attack, it is 
not possible to immediately determine whether the 
attacker is a script kiddie, an insider, a rogue actor 
(organized crime, terrorist organization, or radi-
cal), or a nation state. Therefore, the “response ba-
ton” may have to be passed from the private sector 
to law enforcement to the military with swift, ef-
ficient coordination and certainty regarding legal 
authority for actions taken. 
It is imperative that cyber response capabilities be 
analyzed from the perspective of cyber warfare 
and/or attacks from terrorists, including public-
private sector coordination and the information 
sharing that will be required to shift from local 
responders to military involvement. Unlike tradi-
tional defense categories (i.e., land, air, and sea), 
the military capabilities required to respond to an 
attack on U.S. infrastructure will necessarily in-
volve infrastructure owned and operated by the 
private sector. Indeed, 85 percent of CI in the U.S. 
is owned by the private sector.59 What is more, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) is critically depen-
dent upon these infrastructures, both domestically 
and globally, to support its operations. A 1995 re-
search report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that 
“over 95 percent of the worldwide telecommuni-
cations needs of the Department of Defense (DoD) 
are satisfied by commercial telecommunications 
carriers.”60 Thus, the very networks that support 
techniques detailed,” USA Today, Dec. 29, 2004, available 
at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-12-29-
terror-surveillance_x.htm). 
59 Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinat-
ing Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sec-
tors’ Characteristics, Government Accountability Office, 
GAO-07-39, Oct. 2006 at 1, available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d0739.pdf. 
60 Science Applications International Corp., Information 
Warfare: Legal, Regulatory, Policy and Organizational Con-
siderations for Assurance, A Research Report for the: Chief, 
Information Warfare Division (J6K), Command, Control, 
Communications and Computer Systems Directorate, Joint 
Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. July 4, 1995 at 1-1, 
DoD operations and network-centric warfare ca-
pabilities – including defensive and offensive cy-
ber capabilities – are not under the direct control 
of DoD and require private sector involvement for 
offensive and defensive capabilities. 
The military has long embraced the concept of 
information operations and has developed exten-
sive materials in the area of cyber warfare.61 In 
2005, the Joint Functional Component Command 
for Network Warfare (JFCCNW) was established 
to “facilitate cooperative engagement with other 
national entities in computer network defense and 
offensive information warfare.”62 The JFCCNW 
is headed by the director of the National Security 
Agency (NSA), presently Lt. General Keith B. Al-
exander, but it is a component of the United States 
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which coor-
dinates offensive computer network operations 
for DoD.63 The establishment of the JFCCNW is 
a critical step toward creating a formal cyber de-
fense category and response capability.
Since its establishment, however, the JFCCNW 
has done little to reach out to the private sector 
to plan their involvement – and the use of their 
networks – in the cyberwar offensive and defen-
sive actions. The deployment of military weapons 
is traditionally under the complete control of the 
U.S. President as Commander and Chief of the 
Armed Forces and the Department of Defense. 
available at http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=A
DA316285&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
61 See, e.g., Cyberspace & Information Operations Study 
Center, Air University, U.S. Air Force, available at http://
www.au.af.mil/info-ops/; Naval Information Warfare Activ-
ity, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/navsecgru/
niwa/; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Con-
cept for Information Operations, Aug. 1, 1995, available at 
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-69.htm. 
62 Statement of Gen. James E. Cartwright, Commander, 
United States Strategic Command, Before the Strategic 
Forces Subcommittee on Space Policy, Mar. 16, 2005 at 
12, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/
congress/2005_h/050316-cartwright.pdf. 
63 Joint Functional Component Command for Network 
Warfare, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_
Functional_Component_Command_for_Network_Warfare. 
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Perhaps the notion that a cyber defense category 
and response capability involves private sector 
participation is foreign to military planning, but 
there is an urgent need for the JFCCNW to engage 
the private sector in offensive planning and the 
development of coordinated response capabilities 
in the event of cyber warfare. 
The establishment of a cyber defense category and 
cyber response capability within DoD can only be 
effective – and considered within our correlation 
of forces – if it includes the coordination and co-
operation of the private sector that owns and oper-
ates the very networks at risk and which would be 
used to launch an attack or counter-attack. 
Quite simply, effective cyber actions require open 
channels of communication between the military 
and critical infrastructure owners, with scenarios 
and interactions well thought-out and rehearsed. 
These actions are a giant step beyond the Home-
land Security efforts voluntarily undertaken by 
U.S. companies on an industry-sector basis to de-
velop CI plans and establish information sharing 
and analysis centers (ISACs). This work has been 
undertaken in concert with a Government depart-
ment or agency as the industry sector’s public 
sector counterpart, as designated by Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive No. 7 (HSPD-7). 
HSPD-7 instructs each Government Sector-Spe-
cific Agency to “collaborate with … the private 
sector, including key persons and entities in their 
infrastructure sector.”64 HSPD-7 designates DoD 
as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA)65 for the de-
fense industrial base (DIB). 
64 Homeland Security Presidential Directive / HSPD-7, 
“Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection, Dec. 17, 2003 at 4, available at http://www.fas.
org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-7.html. 
65 Defense Industrial Base Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National In-
frastructure Protection Plan, U.S. Department of Defense, 
May 2007 at 5, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/as-
sets/DIB_SSP_5_21_07.pdf (hereinafter “DIB Plan”).
HSPD-7 is implemented in DoD through Depart-
ment of Defense Directive 3020.40 (DD 3020.40), 
which incorporates the collaboration requirement 
in the Directive’s Purpose. DD3020.40 defines 
Defense Critical Infrastructure as “DoD and non-
DoD networked assets essential to project, support, 
and sustain military forces and operations world-
wide.”66 DD3020.40 defines the Defense Industrial 
Base (DIB) Defense Sector as “[t]he Department 
of Defense, the U.S. Government, and private sec-
tor worldwide industrial complex with capabili-
ties to perform research and development, design, 
produce, and maintain military weapon systems, 
subsystems, components, or parts to meet military 
requirements.”67 Notably, this definition excludes 
the private sector entities that DoD would have to 
rely upon for cyber warfare offensive and defen-
sive actions. In fact, the Defense Industrial Base 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-
Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastruc-
ture Protection Plan specifically notes that:
The DIB does not include commercial 
infrastructure that provides, for example, 
power, communications, transportation, 
and other utilities that DoD warfighters 
and support organizations use to meet their 
respective operational needs. Those com-
mercial infrastructures are addressed by 
the other SSAs and through dependency 
analysis.68
To date, DoD’s interactions with the private sector 
have largely been limited to working with defense 
industrial base companies to secure their informa-
tion technology systems to protect information 
regarding U.S. weapons systems and DoD data. 
Efforts to work more broadly with the private sec-
tor on defining roles and responsibilities in cyber 
warfare offensive and defensive situations have 
66 Department of Defense Directive, “Defense Critical In-
frastructure Program (DCIP)”, No. 3020.40, Aug. 19, 2005 
at 2, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3020_
40.pdf. 
67 Id. at 11.
68 DIB at 5 (emphasis added).
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not occurred, yet somehow DoD conveys the mes-
sage that the U.S. is prepared for such actions. 
General Cartwright, former commander of 
STRATCOM, aroused attention in his March 21, 
2007 testimony before the House Armed Services 
Subcommittee by declaring that the best defense 
to cyber attacks against U.S. military, civilian, and 
commercial networks was a good offense:
[If] we apply the principle of warfare to 
the cyber domain, as we do to sea, air and 
land, we realize the defense of the nation 
is better served by capabilities enabling us 
to take the fight to our adversaries, when 
necessary, to deter actions detrimental to 
our interests.69
The General’s comments are unhinged from the 
reality of private sector ownership of the criti-
cal infrastructure that must be used to launch an 
offensive attack and DoD’s lack of interactions 
with the private sector on planning such attacks. 
Indeed, with the exception of historic interactions 
with the communications sector through the Na-
tional Communications Coordinating Center and 
the National Security Telecommunications Advi-
sory Committee, DoD and the JFCCNW has not 
reached out to private sector entities to plan and 
coordinate cyber offensive and defensive actions. 
Likewise, although CI owners have developed 
sector-specific plans for CI protection, they have 
not (a) adequately examined their role in respond-
ing to cyber warfare attacks on their infrastructure, 
(b) analyzed the legal considerations and risks 
that may be involved, and (c) developed response 
plans that involve coordination with the U.S. mili-
tary and the involvement of their own personnel. 
In addition, neither the Government nor CI owners 
have adequately examined the interdependencies 
in critical infrastructure to begin developing re-
sponse plans that support more than their own CI. 
69 Bob Brewin, “Cybersecurity defense requires a good 
offense,” FCW.com, Mar. 22, 2007, available at http://www.
fcw.com/online/news/98016-1.html.
This gap between Homeland Security and Home-
land Defense preparedness planning must be ad-
dressed immediately if the U.S. is to keep pace with 
the cyber warfare activities of other nation states 
and rogue actors and effectively execute offensive 
attacks and manage defensive response capabili-
ties. The recent attacks on government and private 
sector networks in Estonia demonstrate the rapid 
pace at which a cyber attack can escalate to a na-
tional security issue, involve other nation states, 
and raise the issue of collective defense. The Es-
tonian attacks may also represent a situation in 
which rogue actors are aligned with a nation state 
in conducting and concealing such attacks, though 
this has not been proven. Serious cyber attacks, 
such as those directed at Estonia, cannot be coun-
tered by any private sector company; government 
assistance is necessary. These situations rapidly 
escalate beyond the capabilities of law enforce-
ment, CERTs, and ISACs and military and cyber 
warfare expertise is required.
The attacks against Estonian government and pri-
vate sector systems began April 26, 2007 and con-
tinued for several weeks. They involved hacking, 
web defacement, and sustained denial of service 
attacks that were amplified by the use of a large 
network of bots.70 The attacks began after Esto-
nian officials took down a popular bronze statue 
of a World War II Soviet soldier. They started with 
a flood of spam messages that eventually shut 
down the Estonian Parliament’s email system. In 
another attack, hackers broke into the web site of 
the Reform Party and posted a phony letter from 
Estonia’s prime minister apologizing for remov-
ing the statue. The attacks quickly escalated into 
what Estonia’s defense minister called “a national 
security situation,” seriously impacting govern-
ment web sites and systems and shutting down 
70 Bots are software robots that are planted in a computer 
by a hacker without the knowledge of the owner. They can 
be linked together into networks (called botnets) control-
ling millions of computers and can be activated remotely to 
perform automatic tasks, such as sending large packets of 
information. See generally, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In-
ternet_bot. 
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newspaper and financial networks.71 The Esto-
nian government was forced to close large parts 
of the country’s network to outside traffic as it at-
tempted to gain control of the situation. Estonia 
blames the attacks on Russia and claims that it has 
tracked some communications to an Internet ad-
dress belonging to a Kremlin official.72 Notably, 
Russia refused to cooperate in the investigation 
of the attacks even though it strongly denied any 
responsibility for them.73 “They won’t even pick 
up the phone,” complained Rein Lang, Estonia’s 
minister of justice regarding Russia’s refusal to 
help end the attacks or investigate evidence that 
Russian state employees were behind them.”74
The head of Estonia’s Computer Emergency Re-
sponse Team (CERT) initially summoned security 
experts from Estonia’s Internet service providers 
(ISPs), financial institutions, government agen-
cies, and police and called on contacts in other 
countries to help track and block suspicious In-
ternet addresses and traffic. Before the attacks 
ended, computer security experts from the U.S., 
Israel, the European Union (EU), and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were as-
sisting Estonia—and learning its lessons.75 Traffic 
involved in the attacks was traced to countries as 
diverse as the U.S., China, Vietnam, Egypt, and 
Peru.76 In a Joint Motion for a Resolution of the 
European Parliament, Estonia called on the Eu-
ropean Commission and the Member States of 
the EU “to assist in the analyses of the cyber-at-
71 Mark Landler and John Markoff, “Digital Fears Emerge 
After Data Siege in Estonia,” The New York Times, May 29, 
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/
technology/29estonia.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref
=slogin (hereinafter “Landler and Markoff”). 
72 Id.
73 David J. Smith, “Cyber-war!” 24 Saati, Tblisi, Sept. 25, 
2007, available at http://www.potomacinstitute.org/media/
mediaclips/2007/Smith_24Hours_092507.pdf. 
74 Peter Finn, “Cyber Assaults on Estonia Typify a New 
Battle Tactic,” Washington Post, May 19, 2007 at 1, avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/05/18/AR2007051802122.html (hereinafter 
“Finn”). 
75 Landler and Markoff.
76 Finn at A14.
tacks on Estonian websites and to present a study 
on how such attacks and threats can be addressed 
at the EU level. . . .”77 Linton Wells II, then the 
principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for DoD networks and information integration, 
commented that “[t]his [the Estonian attacks] may 
well turn out to be a watershed in terms of wide-
spread awareness of the vulnerability of modern 
society.”78 
Theory falls way to reality in the chaos that fol-
lows such crises: neither NATO nor the countries 
that came to the assistance of Estonia had clear 
legal authority to engage in defensive measures 
to aid Estonia. The Estonian attacks highlight 
the need to revise the doctrines and documents 
that traditionally support diplomatic, policy, and 
military decisions so they can accommodate cy-
ber situations. The political and economic shifts 
caused by the Internet and globalization introduce 
geo-cyber considerations that impact more funda-
mental approaches to national security based on 
geo-political79 interests and spheres of influence.
Geo-Cyber Considerations
On the heels of World War II, America was faced 
with a new kind of enemy: the Cold War, social-
ism, and threats of nuclear strikes. The Air Force 
became concerned about its ability to maintain 
command and control operations following a 
nuclear attack, and they commissioned RAND to 
77 Joint Motion for a Resolution, European Parliament, May 
23, 2007 at 4, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+MOTION+P6-RC-
2007-0205+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
78 Landler and Markoff.
79 Geopolitics is defined as “(1) The study of the relation-
ship among politics and geography, demography, and eco-
nomics, especially with respect to the foreign policy of a 
nation, (2)(a) A governmental policy employing geopolitics, 
(b) A Nazi doctrine holding that the geographic, economic, 
and political needs of Germany justified its invasion and sei-
zure of other lands, (3) A combination of geographic and po-
litical factors relating to or influencing a nation or region.” 
American Heritage Dictionary, 2000, available at http://dic-
tionary.reference.com/search?r=2&q=geopolitical.
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do a study on a survivable military network that 
could provide “minimum essential communica-
tions.”80 The RAND work (1962-1965) conclud-
ed with a report by Paul Baran describing how a 
packet switched computer network could provide 
this capability.81 The rest is history. In 1971, the 
ARPANET, as the Internet was first called, had 
23 hosts connecting government research centers 
and universities across the nation. In 1995, NSF 
turned access to the Internet backbone over to four 
commercial companies, and, by 1996, there were 
nearly 10 million hosts online and the Internet 
spanned the globe. Within three decades, the In-
ternet grew “from a Cold War concept for control-
ling the tattered remains of a post-nuclear society 
to the Information Superhighway.”82 
Today, there are no U.S. Government controls or 
geographical boundaries on the Internet. Policies 
are determined by the Internet Society (ISOC) 
and other international bodies.83 Since the NSF 
unleashed the Internet in 1995, it has experienced 
explosive growth, increasing from 50 million us-
ers in 1996 to around 1.2 billion today,84 served by 
around 490 million hosts around the globe.85 The 
negative repercussions to the Internet boom – vi-
ruses, worms, trojan horses, bots, network attacks, 
intrusions, web defacements, economic espio-
nage, and interceptions of data are commonplace 
– also originate from all over the world, creating 
new threats and more closely linking national and 
economic security.
80 Dave Krisula, “The History of the Internet,” Aug. 2001, 
available at http://www.davesite.com/webstation/net-his-
tory.shtml (hereinafter “Krisula”); “A Brief History of the 
Net,” Fortune, Oct. 9, 2000 at 34; Stewart Brand, “Founding 
Father,” Wired, Mar. 2001 at 148 (hereinafter “Brand”).
81 Brand at 145-153; Krisula. 
82 “Life on the Internet: Net Timeline,” PBS, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/internet/timeline/timeline-txt.html; see 
also Krisula. 
83 See e.g., http://www.isoc.org/isoc/; http://www.wia.org/
ISOC/.; http://www.iab.org/iab/. 
84 Internet Usage Statistics.
85 Internet Systems Consortium, “ISC Domain Survey: 
Number of Internet Hosts,” available at http://www.isc.org/
index.pl?/ops/ds/host-count-history.php. 
History repeats itself. Today, America once again 
faces new threats, and our ability to maintain our 
C4ISR capabilities against attacks from terrorists 
and nation states has become a national priority. 
September 11 changed our concept of national se-
curity, stood our military strategy on its head, and 
heightened our sensitivity to vulnerabilities in our 
critical infrastructure. We are faced with unprec-
edented asymmetrical challenges to our national 
and economic security. Although geo-political 
considerations still must be afforded great weight, 
threats to our critical infrastructure must be evalu-
ated in a policy paradigm that is based on main-
taining geo-cyber security and stability. 
The author defines “geo-cyber” as the relationship 
between the Internet and the geography, demog-
raphy, economy, and politics of a nation and its 
foreign policy. “Geo-cyber security” is defined as 
the ability to protect the infrastructure, systems, 
and information of a nation from intrusion, at-
tack, espionage, sabotage, unauthorized access or 
disclosure, or other forms of negative or criminal 
activity that could undermine its national and eco-
nomic security. “Geo-cyber stability” is defined as 
the ability to utilize the Internet for economic, po-
litical, and demographic benefit and to influence 
the policies, laws and regulations governing the 
Internet, while minimizing the risks and threats to 
economic and national security. 86
Today, it is no longer a question of our maintain-
ing “essential minimum communications;” it is a 
question of how we can maintain geo-cyber secu-
rity so our critical infrastructure cannot be used 
as a weapon against us and how we can engage 
multilaterally to ensure geo-cyber stability. The 
irony is that the brainchild of the Cold War era 
now presents one of the most daunting challenges 
to Homeland Defense—one which we are ill-pre-
pared to meet. Not only is there no planned co-
86 Jody R. Westby, “A Shift in Geo-Cyber Stability and 
Security,” Paper presented at ANSER Institute of Homeland 
Security Conference, “Homeland Security 2005: Charting 
the Path Ahead,” College Park, MD, May 6-7, 2002 at 2-3.
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ordination for offensive and defensive cyber at-
tacks, the legal framework to support such actions 
is murky at best.
Legal Issues
Numerous legal and policy questions arise in the 
context of cyber warfare. Consider how the U.S. 
might launch an offensive attack on China through 
communications infrastructure. DoD systems are 
not connected to China, so any attack would nec-
essarily involve private sector networks. Who on 
the public and private sector sides would have au-
thority to approve military use of private sector 
networks? What international cooperation would 
be required? Would the attack have to traverse 
more than one provider’s network? Would al-
lowing the use of the private network for military 
purposes interfere with the fiduciary duty owed to 
the company’s shareholders by the board of direc-
tors and officers to protect company assets and its 
market value? Who is responsible for damage that 
could occur to the private sector network as a con-
sequence of the attack or as the result of a counter-
attack? Can the U.S. Government order a private 
sector company to let it take over its network for 
national security interests? What third party liabil-
ity may arise as a result of such an attack? 
Experts who have analyzed legal issues associated 
with cyber responses have noted that in kind cyber 
responses or active defense responses to cyber at-
tacks could result in violations of domestic laws 
or, if the act is deemed to be a “use of force,” it 
could violate the customary rules of war.87 Other 
issues arise in the context of assistance from other 
countries, including multilateral assistance. The 
Estonian government quickly brought the cyber 
attacks on their systems to the EU and NATO, 
raising numerous questions regarding internation-
al law and prompting predictions that the attacks 
“will likely shape a debate inside many govern-
87 Thomas C. Wingfield, James B. Michael, Duminda 
Wijesekera, “Optimizing Lawful Responses to Cyber Intru-
sions,” available at http://www.dodccrp.org/events/10th_IC-
CRTS/CD/papers/290.pdf. 
ments over how such attacks should be considered 
in the context of international law and what sort 
of response is appropriate.”88 “It was a concerted, 
well-organized attack, and that’s why Estonia has 
taken it so seriously and so have we,” noted Rob-
ert Pszczel, a NATO spokesman.89
Estonia’s defense minister, Jaak Aaviksoo, pin-
pointed the gaps in the NATO treaty with respect 
to cyber attacks by stating:
At present, NATO does not define cyber-at-
tacks as a clear military action. This means 
that the provisions of Article V of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, or, in other words collec-
tive self-defence, will not automatically 
be extended to the attacked country. Not a 
single NATO defense minister would de-
fine a cyber-attack as a clear military ac-
tion at present. However, this matter needs 
to be resolved in the near future.”90
International cooperation is almost always needed 
in tracking and tracing cyber communications sim-
ply due to the interconnected nature of the Inter-
net and the manner in which the Internet Protocol 
breaks a communication into packets and routes 
them across many networks before reassembling 
them at their destination point. Therefore, the co-
operative efforts of nation states may also be nec-
essary in defending against cyber attacks.
The two principal legal instruments that would 
govern multinational action in a cyber warfare 
situation are the NATO treaty and the United Na-
tions (UN) Charter. Each document is more than 
50 years old and their provisions do not accom-
modate cyber scenarios.
88 Christopher Rhoades, “Estonia Gauges Best Response 
to Cyber Attack,” The Wall Street journal, May 18, 2007 at 
A6.
89 Finn.
90 Ian Traynor, “Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar 
to disable Estonia,” The Guardian, May 17, 2007, available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,2081438,00.
html.
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UN Charter
The United Nations defines aggression as “the use 
of armed force by a State against a sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, or political independence of 
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations….”91
The UN Charter has five articles that require scru-
tiny in the cyber warfare context: Article 2, para-
graph 4, and Articles 41, 42, 51, and 99:
Article 2
4. All Members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.92
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what 
measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect 
to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply 
such measures. These may include com-
plete or partial interruption of econom-
ic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations.93
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that 
measures provided for in Article 41 would 
91 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 
(XXIX), Dec. 14, 1974, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.
edu/3314.htm; see also Jeffrey F. Addicott, Terrorism Law: 
Materials, Cases, Comments, Lawyers & Judges Publishing 
Co., Inc., 4th ed., 2007 at 28 (hereinafter “Addicott”).
92 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Purposes 
and Principles, Article 2, para. 4, available at http://www.
un.org/aboutun/charter/ (hereinafter UN Charter) (emphasis 
added).
93 UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 41 (emphasis added).
be inadequate or have proved to be inad-
equate, it may take such action by air, 
sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of 
the Members of the United Nations.94
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack oc-
curs against a Member of the United Na-
tions, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Measures taken 
by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self-defense shall be immediately re-
ported to the Security Council….95
Article 99
The Secretary-General may bring to the 
attention of the Security Council any mat-
ter which in his opinion may threaten the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security.96 
In analyzing these provisions, one first has to ask 
whether a cyber attack constitutes the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of another nation, as proscribed by Ar-
ticle 2. Although some cyber attacks that have the 
force to destroy communication networks (such as 
the Desert Storm attacks) might be deemed to harm 
the territorial integrity of a country, the general 
view is that they would not. Such attacks might 
well impact the political independence of a nation; 
however, if its government systems are shut down, 
web sites are defaced, and electronic government 
services are impaired. Would economic impact re-
sulting from a cyber attack be considered the use 
94 UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42 (emphasis added).
95 UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51 (emphasis added).
96 UN Charter, Chapter XV, Article 99 (emphasis added).
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of force against territorial integrity? Perhaps. The 
CIA plot to sell the Soviet Union bogus software 
that blew up its pipelines and wreaked significant 
economic harm to the country allegedly impacted 
the Soviet Union’s territorial integrity by attribut-
ing to its downfall. It is a stretch, however, to fit 
cyber attacks within the meaning of Article 2. 
Article 51 indicates that nothing shall block a na-
tion or group of nations from engaging in collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack occurs, rais-
ing the question of whether a cyber attack could 
be deemed to be an “armed attack.” Even if the 
attack came from a branch of the armed forces, 
Article 41 cuts against this interpretation because 
it discusses actions that may be taken that are 
not involving the use of armed force. It specifi-
cally includes the complete or partial interruption 
of communications, which could encompass a cy-
ber attack. Article 42 discusses actions that may 
be taken by air, sea, or land forces, including 
blockades and “other operations.” Cyber capa-
bilities are well developed within the traditional 
air, land, and sea branches of the U.S. and foreign 
militaries. Could cyber military action by the Air 
Force, for example, that blocked traffic from a 
specific country or countries be considered an air 
attack or a blockade? Article 99 allows the Sec-
retary-General to bring matters before the Secu-
rity Council if threaten international peace and 
security. Would a cyber attack qualify as such a 
threat? If so, the Security Council could authorize 
actions by Member nations to block communica-
tions from one or more countries or to counter-at-
tack under Article 42. 
In sum, none of the UN Charter provisions neatly 
accommodate cyber attacks and provide clear le-
gal authority for these types of events. The best 
course of action would be to amend the Charter to 
make it specifically address the geo-cyber secu-
rity issues associated with cyber attacks and cyber 
warfare. It is also important that amendments to 
the UN Charter include the recognition that cy-
ber defense categories and response capabilities 
constitute a legitimate branch of military forces 
alongside air, land, and sea. Chapter XVIII of the 
Charter governs amendments.
NATO Treaty
The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO Treaty) uses 
similar language as that in the UN Charter and is 
equally ambiguous regarding cyber attacks. In fact, 
Article 1 of the NATO Treaty requires the parties 
to “refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations.”97 Tra-
ditionally, the term “act of war” “refers to the use 
of aggressive force against a sovereign State by 
another State in violation of the United Nations 
Charter and customary international law.”98 How-
ever, following the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) invoked its collective defense clause, Ar-
ticle V, even though the attack came from a terror-
ist organization instead of a country.99
The five relevant provisions of the NATO treaty 
in the context of cyber attacks and cyber warfare 
are:
Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, sepa-
rately and jointly, by means of continu-
ous and effective self-help and mutual 
aid, will maintain and develop their in-
dividual and collective capacity to resist 
armed attack.100
Article 4
The Parties will consult together when-
ever, in the opinion of any of them, the 
97 The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 1, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, Apr. 4, 1949, available at http://www.
nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm (hereinafter “NATO Trea-
ty”).
98 Addicott at 23.
99 Addicott at 23.
100 NATO Treaty, Article 3 (emphasis added). 
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territorial integrity, political indepen-
dence or security of any of the Parties is 
threatened.101 
Article 5
The Parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe 
or North America shall be considered an 
attack against them all and consequently 
they agree that, if such an armed attack oc-
curs, each of them, in exercise of the right 
of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, will assist the Party 
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore 
and maintain the security of the North At-
lantic area.102
Article 6(1)
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed 
attack on one or more of the Parties is 
deemed to include an armed attack:
On the territory of any Parties….;
On the forces, vessels, or aircraft of 
any of the Parties….103
Article 12
After the Treaty has been in force for ten 
years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties 
shall, if any of them so requests, consult 
together for the purpose of reviewing the 
Treaty, having regard for the factors then 
affecting peace and security in the North 
Atlantic area, including the development 
of universal as well as regional arrange-
ments under the Charter of the United Na-
tions for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.104
101 NATO Treaty, Article 4 (emphasis added).
102 NATO Treaty, Article 5 (emphasis added).
103 NATO Treaty, Article 6(1) (emphasis added).
104 NATO Treaty, Article 12 (emphasis added).
•
•
A review of the NATO Treaty leaves geo-cyber 
issues as unsettled as the UN Charter. Article 3 
of the Treaty refers to self-help and mutual assis-
tance, but only in the context of an “armed at-
tack.” Since the NATO Treaty is intended to be 
consistent with the UN Charter, it is unlikely that 
a cyber attack would be deemed to be an armed 
attack absent special circumstances, such as an 
attack using an electromagnetic pulse generation 
techniques.105 The same issues with respect to ter-
ritorial integrity and political independence 
arise under Article 4 of the Treaty as with Article 
2 of the UN Charter. The addition of the words 
“or security” in Article 4, however, may open 
the door for consultation among NATO member 
states. Cyber attacks certainly raise national and 
economic security concerns since defense and 
financial networks are so dependent upon com-
puter systems and connected networking capabili-
ties. The central provision of the NATO Treaty is 
Article 5, calling for collective assistance in the 
event of an “armed attack” upon any Party to 
the Treaty. As the Estonian defense minister point-
ed out, NATO at this point would most likely not 
consider a cyber attack an armed attack for pur-
poses of invoking an Article 5 collective response. 
This conclusion is further supported by Article 
6(1) and its reference to territory, forces, vessels, 
or aircraft of any of the Parties. Article 12 does 
not authorize action but it does offer an avenue for 
reviewing the NATO Treaty in the context of cy-
ber attacks and geo-cyber security and to include 
universal approaches and regional arrangements 
for responding to cyber events. 
Upon examination of cyber attacks and the existing 
legal framework, the World Federation of Scien-
tists’ Permanent Monitoring Panel on Information 
Security supported the following conclusion in its 
report to the Secretary-General of the UN and the 
World Summit on the Information Society: 
105 Carlo Kopp, “The Electromagnetic Bomb: A Weapon of 
Electrical Mass Destruction,” available at http://www.glo-
balsecurity.org/military/library/report/1996/apjemp.htm. 
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As electronic information networks expand 
and military and industrial infrastructures 
become more dependent on them, cyber-
attacks are bound to increase in frequency 
and magnitude. Interpretations of the UN 
Charter and of the laws of armed conflict 
will have to evolve accordingly in order to 
accommodate the novel definitions of the 
use of force that such attacks imply….
In terms of the laws of armed conflict, the 
potentially dangerous consequences of an 
unnecessary response, a disproportional 
response or a mistakenly targeted response 
argue for keeping a human being in the de-
cision loop. 
Beyond these preliminary conclusions, 
there is far more work to be done on both 
the international, technical, and legal 
fronts. Nations that choose to employ in-
formation operations, or that expect to be 
targeted by them, should facilitate track-
ing, attribution, and transnational enforce-
ment through multilateral treaties and, 
more broadly, by clarifying international 
customary law regarding the use of force 
and self-defence in the context of the UN 
Charter and the laws of armed conflict.106
The need to update the legal instruments govern-
ing the actions of nation states with respect to cy-
ber warfare and attack capabilities has never been 
more urgent. The rule of law is already in a precar-
ious state due to the disruptions caused by terrorist 
activities. The ominous threat of cyber attacks by 
nation states and rogue actors can no longer be 
106 Toward a Universal Order: Managing Threats From 
Cybercrime to Cyberwar. Report and Recommendations, 
World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel 
on Inforrmation Security, Nov. 19, 2003, World Summit on 
the Information Society, Document No. WSIS-03/GENE-
VA/CONTR/6-E, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/
itu-s/md/03/wsis/c/S03-WSIS-C-0006!!PDF-E.pdf (citing 
Grove, Goodman, and Lukasik at 100, available at http://
survival.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/42/3/89).
ignored. The UN Charter and NATO Treaty are 
antiquated and do not accommodate the electronic 
capabilities of the 21st century. Governments, the 
private sector, and multinational organizations 
must begin an international dialogue in this area 
to accommodate new military capabilities, collec-
tive action, and geo-cyber considerations. 
Conclusion
There are gaps galore in our ability to counter cy-
ber attacks and protect our critical infrastructure. 
There are gaps in ownership of weapons (i.e., the 
CI networks are owned by the private sector but 
would need to be deployed by the military in a 
cyber warfare situation). There are gaps in the 
response coordination that would be required to 
execute such attacks or defend the networks and 
gaps in defining responsibilities for command and 
control. There are gaps in the legal frameworks 
that would support such offensive, defensive, or 
collective cyber warfare actions. There are gaps 
in the prevailing policy mindset that would likely 
preclude effective decision-making: 20th century 
principals are not wholly adequate in the 21st cy-
ber century. 
The Internet has connected the globe and intro-
duced new ways to harm national and economic 
security interests. It has also changed the tradi-
tional roles of the public and private sectors re-
garding national defense and public safety. Hard 
lines between law enforcement and military re-
sponsibilities are more blurred in the cyber con-
text. An incident may look like an inside event at 
the outset but, upon investigation, require law en-
forcement assistance and, within short order, end 
up being a cyber attack by a nation state in concert 
with rogue actors. 
The course ahead is clear. Military leaders must 
engage the private sector and develop offensive 
and defensive cyber response plans. CI owners 
must begin analyzing cyber warfare scenarios 
and mapping out response plans that will involve 
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military engagement and possibly coordination 
with other CI sectors. Legal experts, policy mak-
ers, and diplomats must work together to bring 
the legal instruments that underpin international 
peace and security into the electronic age. The ur-
gency of the situation can hardly be overstated: 
without such action, we will face legal uncertainty 
and chaos when managing cyber attacks that are 
of such a nature that they can jeopardize public 
safety, national and economic security, global sta-
bility, and international peace. This is a risk we 
cannot afford to take.
4.3 Control System Cyber Security and 
Potential Legal Ramifications
by Joe Weiss, PE, CISM
Abstract
Industrial control systems such as Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), plant 
Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and Program-
mable Logic Controllers (PLC) are used to moni-
tor and control all types of industrial processes 
including production and distribution of electric-
ity, water, oil, gas, chemicals, etc. These systems 
were designed with strict functional requirements 
such as reliability, availability, and time response. 
Originally, these systems were utilized in isolated 
applications. With the advent of networking and 
Internet technologies these systems are now being 
interconnected and remotely addressed. Utilizing 
these new networking technologies has resulted in 
significant productivity gains, but at the expense 
of making these systems vulnerable to cyber intru-
sions. Developing a business case to protect these 
systems is difficult as there has been extreme reti-
cence to publicly identify control system cyber 
security intrusions, whether they are intentional 
or unintentional. Control system cyber security 
incidents have occurred in all industries through-
out the world. The impacts range from trivial, to 
significant equipment and environmental dam-
age. This paper provides a technical background 
of what makes control systems different than IT 
systems, examples of control system impacts, rec-
ommendations for what can be done today to bet-
ter secure these systems and issues that can affect 
legal and law enforcement proceedings.
1.0 What Makes Control Systems Different
Control systems comprise SCADA systems, Plant 
DCSs, PLCs, Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), In-
telligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), intelligent field 
devices and drives, smart meters, etc. SCADA, 
DCS, and PLCs consist of operator interfaces that 
are generally Windows, UNIX, or LINUX-based 
and field devices utilizing proprietary Real Time 
Operating Systems (RTOSs). Industrial control 
systems utilize operator interfaces that are similar 
to traditional IT business systems but the control-
lers and field devices are fundamentally different 
than traditional IT systems. For traditional business 
systems, the paradigm of CIA – Confidentiality, 
Integrity, and Availability defines the technologies 
needed to secure the systems. As confidentiality 
is most important, cryptography is critical. For 
control systems, the paradigm is the opposite and 
availability and message integrity are most impor-
tant. This leads to potentially different technologi-
cal and policy solutions. Control systems were de-
signed for functionality and reliability/availability 
rather than cyber security. Specifically, control 
systems have design characteristics that differenti-
ate them from traditional IT environments.
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Attribute Office IT Control Systems
System	Life	Cycle -	years 1-2	years
Confidentiality High Low
Message	Integrity Low-moderate Very	High
Aailability Low-Moderate Very	High
Time	Criticality Delays	tolerated Critical
Security	skills/awareness Good Usually	poor
Patching Frequent Slow	or	impossible
Software	changes Frequent,	formal,	and	documented
Rare,	informal,	not	always	
coordinated
Automated	tools Widely	used Limited,	used	with	care
Communication	protocols IP DNP,	ICCP,	Modbus
Communications Telco,	wi-fi Telco,	radio,	satellite,	power	line	carrier,	wi-fi
Computing	resources High Very	limited
Bandwidth High Limited
Security	standards ISO-199 ISA	SP99,	etc
Administration Centralized Localized
Operating	systems COTS	(Windows) COTS	for	HMI,	proprietary	real	time	for	field	deices
Security	impacts Business Business,	equipment,	personnel	safety,	and	enironment
Forensics Often	aailable Almost	non-existant
Table 1
Typical Differences Between Office IT and Control Systems
Deterministic response: The users expect 
response to their inputs in a second or less. 
Application response (e.g., interaction 
with a remote device) is often measured in 
milliseconds. The entire environment must 
act in concert to reliably and consistently 
provide the deterministic level of response 
under all system conditions. 
Ultra-high Availability: The systems must 
be operational 24 X 365. Users are reliant 
on these systems continuously, and even 
small periods of downtime mean that the 
associated critical system is unobservable. 
In the case of an energy utility, response 
to primary system events is therefore im-
paired, with associated liabilities.
•
•
Proprietary Environments: Meeting the 
response and availability requirements 
often requires the use of special purpose 
hardware, software (including operating 
systems), and communications. The intel-
ligent devices and communications net-
works are typically resource constrained, 
and may rely heavily on fixed prioritisa-
tion and predictable system resource re-
sponse.
Most control systems in use today were designed 
to perform specific tasks and contain only limited 
processing power and memory. Therefore, they 
don’t have the computing resources needed to le-
verage the authorization, authentication, encryp-
•
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tion, intrusion detection and filtering capabilities 
of modern security technology. These constraints 
preclude the use of technologies like block encryp-
tion and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) without 
seriously degrading control system performance. 
These technologies are too resource-intensive for 
many legacy control systems and may actually 
cause the systems to fail as they attempt to keep 
up with the intensive demands on their limited 
resources. In addition, although modern control 
systems are based on standard operating systems, 
they are typically customized to support control 
system applications. Because of this, vendor-pro-
vided software patches may be either incompat-
ible with the customized version of the operating 
system or difficult to implement without compro-
mising service. 
The fundamental technical problem with securing 
control systems is the impact on performance. The 
fundamental culture problem is that Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M) personnel are measured 
by system reliability and availability, not security. 
Security policies, testing, and technologies exist, 
or can be readily modified, to protect the operator 
interfaces. However, traditional IT security poli-
cies, testing, and technologies can significantly 
impact the operation of real time controllers and 
field devices. Therefore, there is a need to devel-
op security policies, testing, and technologies to 
protect the real time controllers and field devices. 
Often times, systems must be “opened up” to ven-
dors and others to optimize performance or mini-
mize potential down time even though this creates 
cyber vulnerabilities. It should also be noted that 
there is still a significant “us vs. them” attitude be-
tween the control system community and IT. This 
needs to be overcome as the technologies for con-
trol systems and IT systems are blurring. In fact, 
the control systems community often uses IT in-
frastructure (e.g., LANS, WANS, firewalls, IDS, 
VPNs, etc.) for control system networks.
2.0 Control System Cyber Security Expertise
The area of control system cyber security is relative-
ly new compared to traditional IT security. There 
is a dearth of people who truly understand control 
system cyber security, possible less than 100 world-
wide (see Figure 1). As can be seen from Figure 1, 
most of the people entering the area of “SCADA 
Security” are not control system engineers. Rather, 
they are information security experts without the 
same grounding in the field of control system de-
sign, operations, and maintenance as control system 
engineers. This can lead to unintentional reduction 
in control system availability if inappropriate poli-
cies are applied or testing performed. Table 1 pro-
vides a listing of popular control system cyber se-
curity myths. There are few resources available for 
training or education that deals specifically control 
system cyber security. At a recent U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS)-National Science 
Foundation (NSF) workshop, it was evident that 
the universities need specific course material. Ad-
ditionally, security certifications such as the CISSP 
and CISM have no test questions that directly relate 
to control system cyber security. 
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Myth Reality
IT	security	policies	are	adequate IT	policies	many	not	be	adequate	or	appro-priate	for	control	systems
Firewalls	make	you	secure Firewalls	are	only	as	good	as	the	riles	em-ployed
VPNS	make	you	secure
VPNs	proide	a	secure	tunnel	for	the	data	en-
tering	–	VPNs	do	not	ensure	the	data	is	trust-
ed	–	generally,	people	do	not	question	the	
alidity	of	information	coming	from	a	VPN
Encryption	makes	you	secure
Encryption	scrambles	the	information-	it	
does	not	ensure	the	data	is	trusted-	generally,	
people	do	not	question	the	alidity	of	infor-
mation	that	has	been	encrypted
IDSs	can	identify	potential	control	system	at-
tacks
IDs	hae	not	been	trained	to	recognize	con-
trol	system	specific	attacks
TCP/IP	messaging	can	be	one-way TCP/IP	message	requires	two-way	acknowl-edgement	for	session	initiation
Field	deices	can’t	be	hacked Field	deices	hae	been	hacked
You	can	keep	hackers	out It	is	ery	difficult	to	keep	a	knowledgeable,	dedicated	hacker	out
You	are	secure	if	hackers	can’t	get	in Intentional	or	unintentional	internal	threats	also	exist
More	and	better	technology	can	sole	secu-
rity	problems
Without	appropriate	security	policies	and	
procedures,	any	technology	can	be	circum-
ented
Table 2
Common Control System Cyber Security Myths
Figure 1 Control System vs IT Security Ex-
pertise Why Are There So Few Experts
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3.0 Control System Vulnerabilities
Control systems offer some of the most attractive 
targets since they contain the enterprise’s most 
critical data. If an intruder is able to access one of 
these systems, they would have access to opera-
tional data critical to the operation of the system. 
Additionally, it could also enable a knowledge-
able attacker to modify the data used for opera-
tional decisions, the programs that control critical 
industry equipment or the data reported to control 
centers, the resulting impact could be extremely 
destructive. Such attacks can cause equipment de-
sign and safety limits to be exceeded, potentially 
causing damage, premature system shutdown, dis-
ablement of control equipment and interference 
with safety system operation. The consequences 
include endangerment of public health and safe-
ty, environmental damage, and/or significant fi-
nancial impacts due to loss of power production, 
generation or distribution. Several other critical 
factors have also contributed to the escalation of 
risks specific to control systems, most notably the 
adoption of standardized technologies with known 
vulnerabilities, connecting control systems with 
other networks, insecure remote connections and 
the widespread availability of technical informa-
tion about control systems. Table 2 provides a list-
ing of typical control system threats and exploits 
that have been found in actual practice.
When access is available, weaknesses can be 
exploited. Utilizing those weaknesses, control 
system researchers at the U.S. Department of 
Energy’s national laboratories have publicly dem-
onstrated the feasibility of cyber attacks on control 
systems at electric power facilities and chemical 
facilities. Using tools readily available, they have 
modified input from Corporate Networks, Control 
Networks, and field devices. Figure 2 is a typical 
network configuration utilized in one of the dem-
onstrations. The compromised packets needed to 
pass through two sets of firewalls before reach-
ing their ultimate target, the SCADA LAN. Once 
reaching the SCADA LAN, the compromised 
packets were able to take over direct control of 
control center SCADA and substation LANs as 
well as modifying operator screens. The demon-
strations have also been able to change settings 
and create new output that could incapacitate sub-
stations and open valves in power plants and other 
process facilities.
Threat Exploit
Disgruntled	employee New/modified	files
Viruses/Worms/Trojans New	sockets/new	processes
Prohibited	software Remoable	media/games
Vendor	updates Files	modified
Software	malfunction Process	termination
Hacker	reconnaissance NIDS	alert
Contractors Rogue	deices
Inappropriate	policies/testing Control	system	performance	degradation
Table 3
Typical Cyber Security Threats and Exploits
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Figure 2 Control System Cyber Security Vulnerability Demonstration
Many forms of remote access have caused control 
center vulnerabilities. Insecure communication 
protocols between control systems and insecure 
applications of tools, such as ActiveX controls, 
cause further risks. Damage can range from loss 
of confidential data to altering data resulting in er-
roneous equipment operation or operator informa-
tion leading to miss-operation. Many operational 
facilities have no firewalls or electronic intrusion 
detection systems. Often, the only indication of an 
attack will be the damage caused by the intrusion. 
Control systems and transient monitoring systems 
have been designed to identify and trend potential 
physical system impacts not electronic intrusions.
As mentioned previously, control systems gener-
ally utilize two operating systems. One is at the op-
erator station that has the capability for role-based 
access, encryption, and other information secu-
rity technologies. The other is at the “distributed 
processing unit,” where the sensor information is 
collected and calculations made. These are RTOS 
that are usually proprietary systems. The RTOS 
have been configured with specific prioritization 
and communication threads. Information security 
policies have not been included in the kernel of 
these systems. Consequently, these RTOS do not 
have the capability to make the requisite calls to 
authorize, authenticate, or encrypt/decrypt before 
data is sent. Additionally, RTOS dedicate most of 
their resources to performing calculations related 
to system operational performance. Security is 
viewed as an overhead function.
4.0 Field Results
Based on the numerous vulnerability assessments 
performed by KEMA in North America, South 
America, Europe, and Asia there have been sev-
eral common findings:
Dial-up modems: Almost all utilities had 
modems they were unaware of and mo-
dems that were not supposed to be con-
nected that were connected;
Security policies: Almost all existing secu-
rity policies were IT policies and did not 
address control system-unique issues;
•
•
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Configuration control: Almost all utilities 
had ”rogue” programs and/or applications 
on critical systems;
Architecture: Many utilities had their con-
trol networks directly connected to the 
Corporate LAN, though often in an incon-
spicuous manner; and
System integration: Many utilities did not 
address the vulnerabilities of other systems 
that were being integrated into SCADA or 
the plant DCS.
5.0 Need for a Quantitative Business Case
All industries including electric power are in need 
of a quantitative business case that documents the 
impacts of cyber incidents. Currently, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for operational managers to 
perform economic trade-offs between O&M ex-
penditures and control system cyber security miti-
gation. Consequently, a study is being performed 
to develop representative case histories of compa-
nies that have had their control systems impacted 
by cyber (some of these are transmission and dis-
tribution cases). Results to date are:
Companies are very reticent to report con-
trol system cyber security incidents; 
Control system cyber security impacts can 
be very expensive even if power is not in-
terrupted;
Penetration testing and scanning of control 
systems is causing a growing number of 
control system impacts; and
Most of the cases identified to date could 
have been prevented or mitigated with ad-
equate control system cyber security pro-
cedures.
6.0 Control System Cyber Impacts
There are three major categories of cyber impacts:
Unintentional impacts caused by inade-
quate or inappropriate security policies or 
testing;
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Unintended impacts caused by viruses or 
worms that were created to attack general 
purpose operating systems, etc. that have 
been integrated with control systems; and
Intentional targeted attacks.
Generally, the first category is the most probable, 
but generally has short-term impacts. The second 
category is also probable, but generally causes 
denial of service of communications or operator 
awareness. While a problem, it generally is not di-
rectly life-threatening or a threat to control system 
integrity. The third category is by far the most sig-
nificant, but also the lowest probability as it gen-
erally requires detailed knowledge of the systems 
and their vulnerabilities. 
There have been more than 80 cases where control 
systems have been impacted by cyber in electric 
power, water, oil/gas, chemicals, and manufactur-
ing. These cases have occurred in North America, 
South America, Europe, and Asia. Impacts have 
ranged from trivial to significant equipment and/
or environmental damage to deaths. The major-
ity of the control system cyber cases to date have 
been unintentional or virus/worms. In most cases, 
appropriate control system security policies and 
procedures could have either prevented the event 
or minimized the impacts. 
7.0 What Can Be Done Now
Prudence dictates that a control system cyber se-
curity program be developed for these critical sys-
tems. The following aspects can form a prudent 
control system cyber security program:
1. Governance:
Get active senior management support.
Identify who is responsible and who 
needs to be involved.
Make the organization known to all 
throughout the enterprise.
Make sure the program is reviewed pe-
riodically.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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2. Awareness and Training:
Make the training and awareness ap-
propriate.
Specifically address control systems 
as IT awareness and training may not 
be appropriate for control systems. In-
clude traditional IT security awareness 
and training for non-control system ap-
plications.
People tend to want to do what is best 
so tell them what is expected of them 
and why.
Policies and Procedures:
Make them appropriate and prudent by 
specifically address control systems. 
Control system cyber security policies 
and procedures are different than IT. 
Ensure that the control system policies 
and IT policies are consistent.
If they aren’t written down, they prob-
ably aren’t being followed - modem ac-
cess is a classic example.
Map the policies to industry or regula-
tory standards and guidelines where ap-
propriate.
NERC CIPC 002-009, ISO 17799, ISA 
SP99, AGA12, prudent engineering 
practices, etc.
ISO 17799
3. Perform Vulnerability/Risk Assessments:
Identify all known vulnerabilities in a 
device or architecture. It is important to 
know what is installed. Scans can im-
pact control systems and do not always 
identify all open ports or identify mo-
dems.
Perform risk assessments try to pri-
oritize vulnerabilities and assess the 
impact. Good probabilities for risk as-
sessments are not available, but vul-
nerabilities can be prioritized. Risk 
assessments are a good way to involve 
the stakeholders in the process and get 
acceptance.
4. Configuration Management:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Document the field configuration and 
status of hardware and software, in-
cluding security patches. Maintain a 
list of individuals who should be noti-
fied of pending changes. Enforce a time 
limit in which changes are reviewed be-
fore being implemented. Require back 
out procedures in case something goes 
wrong. Require and maintain documen-
tation of what tests were performed on 
the proposed change.
5. Secure Architecture:
Identify your critical assets.
Define the electronic perimeter for your 
control environment.
Isolate the control environment using 
firewalls to the extent possible with no 
access by default.
No connections initiated from the out-
side to the extent possible. Try to pull 
data into or push data out of the control 
environment. Don’t allow devices on 
the outside to push data in or pull data 
out.
Allow only needed services and ports 
which is not always possible to do for 
control systems and devices.
Don’t allow browsing of the Internet or 
incoming e-mail from the control envi-
ronment.
Keep unauthorized devices out.
6. Remote Access:
Should be severely restricted.
Don’t allow devices on the outside to 
become part of the Control Network.
Use VPNs where appropriate.
Do not allow split tunneling.
Require anti-virus and personal fire-
walls, where it doesn’t affect perfor-
mance.
Enforce patch levels on software, where 
possible.
Try to avoid dial-up modems which are 
not always possible even with new con-
trol system equipment. Where possible, 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
12	 Selected	Essays	on	State	Open	Goernment	Law	and	Practice	in	a	Post-9/11	World
use dial-back modems, encrypting mo-
dems, or other security approaches are 
advised. 
Think of wireless (802. – Wi-Fi) as re-
mote access and use encryption, direc-
tional antennas, etc. Be careful in using 
wireless for any critical control loops.
7. Patch management:
Patch management deals with testing 
and applying patches released for in-
stalled products.
Control systems may not be able to 
utilize non-customized patches. Avoid 
automated patch management tools for 
control systems. Assure that control 
system vendor will support the patch. 
Test on your system before applying in 
an operating environment!
8. Monitoring:
Anti-Virus is needed for the Windows 
environment, but be careful. Anti-vi-
rus can impact control system perfor-
mance.
Host Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS) generally require about 5% of 
system resources. Control systems may 
not have available resources. Identify 
what really needs to be monitored. Ex-
isting IDS/IPS may not be appropriate 
for control system networks and could 
cause control system performance im-
pacts – TEST!
Network IDS/IPS are “passive” in that 
they do not cause latency in network 
traffic. 
IPS’s rely on detecting anomalies which 
is difficult to train in chaotic Corporate 
environment. The more stable Control 
System environment might be ideal for 
anomaly-based intrusion detection sys-
tems if appropriately designed.
9. Incident Response:
Needs to be tailored to identify who is 
in charge, where to get emergency ap-
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
provals. Need to recognize that cyber is 
different and team membership can be 
different in different circumstances.
Table top drills need to be formalized 
with clear communication. Need to ex-
pect and plan to be ignored or not be 
sufficient. However, recall the adage 
that “Planning is essential, but plans are 
worthless.”
8.0 Legal and Law Enforcement Issues
There are several issues with control systems that 
can impact law enforcement and legal proceed-
ings following a control system cyber event. 
1. Forensics: With the exception of modern 
control center SCADA systems, there of-
ten are no logs that collect communications 
between control system devices. In other 
cases, the logs are erased when power is 
removed. Additionally, many field facili-
ties do not have firewall logs or intrusion 
detection logs. There often are shared log-
ins that make it difficult to which specific 
individuals have logged in. Availability 
of control systems are critical for contin-
ued operation of critical processes. For 
general IT, the affected computer can be 
quarantined following a cyber event until 
all data and files have been thoroughly ex-
amined. With control systems, the control 
system needs to be returned to service in 
the most expeditious manner possible. The 
systems cannot be “yellow-tagged” while 
the investigation continues. Because con-
trol system cyber security can be affected 
by the cyber communication between sys-
tems, event diagnostics can be problemat-
ic unless there is a complete mirror image 
of the software, hardware, and integrated 
systems.
2. International issues: Approximately half 
of the industrial control system suppliers 
•
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are based in North America. Addition-
ally, many large control system users are 
multinational and communicate globally. 
Consequently, there is a need to assure 
that international agreements are in place 
to complete investigations. 
3. Information Sharing: There has been an 
extreme reticence by private industry to 
share control system cyber impact infor-
mation with the government. Consequent-
ly, the majority of control system cyber 
events to-date have not been reported to 
law enforcement or the Information Shar-
ing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). There 
is also a prevailing feeling that when the 
government is made aware of threats or 
events, it is not passed onto the appropri-
ate industry organizations in a timely man-
ner.
Recommendations
Develop forensics for control system cy-
ber security.
1.
Include the control system community in 
the investigations.
Establish a CERT for Control Systems 
with control system expertise and industry 
credibility. Use this interface to “sanitize” 
information prior to reaching the govern-
ment so as to minimize disclosure issues. 
Provide timely, useful feedback.
Summary
Cyber vulnerabilities are real. They can, and have 
impacted control system operation. It is crucial 
that the end-users understand the impacts of con-
trol system cyber security and have plans to ad-
dress trying to prevent an intrusion, but also how 
to deal with an intrusion when it occurs. A good 
control system cyber security program provides 
due diligence and can potentially maintain or im-
prove control system reliability and availability. 
Coordinating legal and law enforcement issues 
with the control system community can help both 
the legal and operational communities address 
their respective concerns.
2.
3.
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5.1 Creating an Information Sharing 
Environment in a Post-9/11 World
by Richard Weitz 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ex-
posed major gaps in how the U.S. political struc-
tures had transitioned from the old threats of the 
Cold War to the new challenges of the post-9/11 
world. In response, political authorities at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels—as well as influential 
policy makers within the business and nonprofit 
sectors—have struggled determine how Ameri-
cans can strike the optimal balance between the 
public’s right to access public information and the 
requirement to protect genuine secrets from as-
sisting hostile terrorist groups.
The U.S. National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commis-
sion) identified information sharing as a glaring 
weakness in the United States’ ability to combat 
terrorism and ensure homeland security. Recog-
nizing that lingering Cold War procedures have 
prevented executive departments and agencies 
from effectively managing current threats to U.S. 
national security, the 9/11 Commission recom-
mended that the United States establish policies 
for sharing terrorism information more effectively 
across federal, state, and private sector entities.1 
In the period leading up to the 9/11 attacks, the 
CIA and FBI had each gathered information on 
several of the hijackers. Nevertheless, legal re-
strictions and a cultural predisposition in favor 
of safeguarding rather than sharing information 
prevented the timely integration and evaluation 
of this data.2 For example, the reluctance of the 
FBI and the CIA to exchange information with 
other agencies meant that in September 2001, the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s no-fly list cata-
logued the names of only twelve potential terror-
ists. None of these individuals matched the identi-
ties of the al-Qa’eda hijackers who would attack 
the United States that morning.3 
Since the report’s publication, the United States 
has made considerable progress towards establish-
ing an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) in 
which public and private actors at all levels can 
manage information securely but also sufficiently 
effectively to allow for the timely assessment of 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.
pdf [hereinafter National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks]. 
2 Ibid.
3 Government Accountability Office, Progress 
Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities Exposed by 
911, But Continued Federal Action is Needed to Further 
Mitigate Security Risks, Jan. 24, 2007, http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d07375.pdf. 
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threats and vulnerabilities. Yet, much work re-
mains given the substantial evidence that a terror-
ist threat to the U.S. homeland persists.
The need to reform terrorism information sharing 
policies remains urgent. In an August 2007 report, 
the New York City Police Department’s Intel-
ligence Division identified at least ten major in-
stances since 9/11 in which state and local law en-
forcement agencies, the FBI, and European police 
and intelligence agencies cooperated to disrupt 
terrorist plots by “homegrown actors” who had lit-
tle of any support from al-Qa’eda or other foreign 
terrorist movements. The authors warned that the 
number of homegrown Islamic radicals appeared 
to be growing, establishing a basis for future ter-
rorist threats.4 These homegrown Islamists com-
municate with other radicals through jihadist web-
sites and local “radicalization incubators” such as 
mosques, cafes, prisons, student associations, and 
hookah bars.5 Local law enforcement officials, 
who are often in the optimal position to observe 
homegrown terrorist threats, must be able to ef-
fectively provide information on the threat posed 
by domestic radicals to federal partners with coun-
ter-terrorism functions. 
The threat of international terrorism also remains 
disturbingly great. Then Attorney General Alber-
to Gonzales reminded his audience at the recent 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
Law Enforcement Summit of Osama bin Laden’s 
4 Mitchell D. Silber & Arvin Bjatt, Radicalization 
in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York City Police 
Department) 2007, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
nypd/pdf/dcpi/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.
pdf. 
5 Study: Local Law Enforcement in Best Position 
to Monitor Potential Terrorists, Associated Press, Aug. 
15, 2007, available at http://www.wreg.com/Global/story.
asp?S=6937014; Dan Eggen, Terror Threat Grows Qui-
etly, Report Warns, Wash. Post, Aug. 16, 2007, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar-
ticle/2007/08/15/AR2007081502156_pf.html; Richard 
Weitz, Countering Islamic Terrorism in U.S. Prisons, Psi.
praeger.com, Mar. 15, 2007, available at http://psi.praeger.
com/doc.aspx?d=/commentary/Weitz1.xml.
persistence in trying to obtain nuclear weapons 
over the course of more than a decade.6 Gonzales 
called combating nuclear terrorism the “challenge 
of our generation as law-enforcement and intel-
ligence professionals” and claimed that “commu-
nication, sharing, and coordination” must be “ap-
plied in combating the proliferation of WMD and 
their many components.”7
Yet, civil liberty groups, privacy advocates, and 
other concerned individuals have expressed alarm 
that the sharing of data within the United States 
and with foreign countries would unduly compro-
mise Americans’ fundamental rights for question-
able progress in the war on terrorism. After the 
United States and the European Union agreed in 
June 2007 to renew their agreement to share per-
sonal data about millions of U.S.-bound transat-
lantic airline passengers, Stavros Lambrinidis, a 
member of the European parliament from Greece 
and vice chairman of that body’s civil liberties, 
justice and home affairs committee, warned that 
the new accord represented dangerous “function 
creep” by allowing the information to be used for 
non-terrorist crimes.8 
Many privacy advocates also expressed alarm af-
ter the Director of National Intelligence, Michael 
McConnell, agreed in August 2007 to work with 
the Department of Homeland Security to allow 
more federal and local authorities to access data 
from U.S. reconnaissance satellites for counter-
terrorism and other law enforcement purposes. 
Steven Aftergood, director of the Project on Gov-
ernment Secrecy for the Federation of American 
6 Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, “Remarks 
at the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Law 
Enforcement Summit,” June 11, 2007 (transcript available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2007/ag_speech_
070611.html).
7 Ibid. Additional information on this conference is 
available in Richard Weitz, The Global Initiative to Com-
bat Nuclear Terrorism Drives Forward, WMD Insights, 
no. 17, pp. 17-23, July-Aug. 2007.
8 Paul Lewis & Spencer S. Hsu, Travelers Face 
Greater Use of Personal Data, Wash. Post, July 27, 2007, 
at 7.
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Scientists, acknowledged that the program could 
be useful but quickly added that it “comes with 
risk to privacy and to the integrity of our political 
institutions.”9 Kate Martin, director of the Cen-
ter for National Security Studies, warned that the 
move toward “Big Brother in the sky” is “laying 
the bricks one at a time for a police state.”10 
Some specialists complained that, since the U.S. 
Department of Defense owns many of the satel-
lite systems, their use for law enforcement pur-
poses would violate the Posse Comitatus Act.11 
The courts have never ruled on the permissibility 
of warrantless searches of private property by spy 
satellites. A 2005 study commissioned by the U.S. 
intelligence community cautioned that “There is 
little if any policy, guidance or procedures regard-
ing the collection, exploitation and dissemination 
of domestic MASINT” [“Measurement and Sig-
natures Intelligence”].12
This paper provides a context for assessing re-
search into state anti-terrorism legislation and 
open government laws and practice by examin-
ing primarily federal changes designed to create 
an ISE. The first section reviews these changes 
and describes the policies and procedures under-
pinning the ISE. It devotes much attention to the 
national implementation strategy, legal frame-
work, and civil liberties issues affecting the ISE 
process. The second section of the paper exam-
ines the information sharing initiatives that have 
been launched by the defense, homeland security, 
intelligence, and law enforcement communities, 
as well as the private sector. This section evalu-
ates both the progress that has been achieved since 
9/11 as well as remaining technical, cultural, and 
strategic challenges to creating a genuine infor-
mation sharing environment. The paper ends with 
9 Cited Joby Warrick, Domestic Use of Spy Satel-
lites To Widen, Wash. Post, Aug. 16, 2007, at 1.
10 Ibid.
11 Eric Schmitt, Liberties Advocates Fear Abuse of 
Satellite Images, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2007.
12 Cited in Robert Block, U.S. to Expand Domestic 
Use of Spy Satellites, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at 1.
some preliminary conclusions and recommenda-
tions for improving ISE implementation. 
I. An Approach to Information Sharing
The Information Sharing Environment (ISE) con-
sists of policies, procedures, and technology that 
permit the exchange of terrorism information, in-
cluding intelligence, homeland security, and law 
enforcement data. The ISE, which is “not a place 
or an information system” but rather a policymak-
ing “approach,” connects federal, as well as state, 
local, and tribal (SLT) governments.13 The ISE also 
envisions a critical role for private sector and for-
eign actors in sharing information to counter ter-
rorist threats. Created by the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),14 
the ISE is intended to advance a culture of sharing 
among its participants and ensure that information 
is readily available to support its participants’ mis-
sions. 
In May 2006, Ambassador Ted McNamara, the 
current program manager for the Information 
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), explained to 
Congress the four-fold mission of the ISE. The 
foremost aim of the ISE is to establish a “trusted 
partnership”15 among ISE participants, a collab-
orative relationship that promotes vigorous in-
formation exchange. Recognizing that a flow of 
terrorism information is only beneficial when it 
is exchanged with appropriate actors, verified for 
accuracy, and managed in accordance with legal 
protections on privacy and security, McNamara 
stated that the second chief objective of the ISE 
is to establish policies that effectively coordinate 
terrorism information sharing. McNamara insist-
13 Ise.gov, Program Manager, Information Sharing 
Environment, http://ise.gov/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2008) 
[hereinafter Ise.gov]. 
14 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004, 6 U.S.C. § 485 (2004). 
15 Challenges of Information Sharing Implemen-
tation, CQ Congressional Testimony, May 10, 2006 
[hereinafter Challenges of Information Sharing Implemen-
tation].
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ed that, “We want to get the right information, to 
the right people, at the right time to ensure suc-
cess.”16 Third, in order to enhance the content and 
usefulness of shared information, the ISE is de-
signed to be a “decentralized” and “distributed” 
system that addresses the needs of multiple public 
and private sector partners but also harmonizes 
sharing through common practices and quality 
standards.17 Finally, the ISE seeks, to the greatest 
extent possible, to build upon existing capabilities 
for information sharing and to develop innovative 
strategies and technologies to augment current ef-
forts.18
In the long term, the ISE is intended to create 
marked cultural change in government operations 
by eroding “need to know” policies on the handling 
of intelligence and national security information. 
The “need to know” approach, which stems from 
Cold War procedures, holds that individuals and 
entities requiring information can be identified be-
fore any sharing takes place. Access regulations, 
formulated in advance, can thus provide informa-
tion to those who “need to know” and exclude all 
others.19 The “need to know” approach creates an 
environment hostile toward sharing by encourag-
ing officials to guard information to a maximum 
degree. However, this hostility is poorly suited for 
managing terrorism information, which is often 
collected by diverse members of the intelligence, 
homeland security, and law enforcement commu-
nities but must be synthesized in order to provide 
a coherent picture of national security threats. 
“Need to know” policies must therefore give way 
to the development of a “need to share” culture. 
Under a “need-to-share” regime, ISE participants 
will understand that the benefits of sharing infor-
mation in a post-9/11 world far outweigh the risks. 
Through training, collaboration, and coordinated 
information exchange efforts, they will develop 
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. 
18 Ise.gov, supra note 13. 
19 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, supra, 
note 1.
the trust necessary to overcome the “need to know” 
mentality. Though one of the ISE’s most signifi-
cant long-term goals, effecting cultural change, is 
likely to be challenging. In a statement to Con-
gress in 2005, Lee H. Hamilton, former Vice Chair 
of the 9/11 Commission, emphasized that altering 
ISE participants’ mindsets will require persistent 
effort. “You can change the law, you can change 
the technology, but you still need to change the 
culture; you still need to motivate institutions and 
individuals to share information,”20 he reminded 
Congress. 
Over time, however, a well-managed ISE will de-
construct perceptions that individuals and institu-
tions misinterpret or misuse information that is 
initially collected by others. Director of National 
Intelligence Mike McConnell has stated that as 
“need to share” policies overcome hostilities to-
ward information sharing, the ISE itself should 
evolve to embrace a “responsibility to provide” 
strategy.21 By fostering a culture in which informa-
tion sharing is not only encouraged but also oblig-
atory, ISE participants can achieve a “high[er] 
degree of coordination and interaction to improve 
our collective intelligence capability.”22
Role of the Program Manager
The office of the program manager was created 
by section 1016(f) of the IRTPA to oversee imple-
mentation of the ISE. Though the program man-
ager was initially slated to serve a two-year ten-
ure,23 his position has been extended until the year 
2009 to enable him to supervise completion of 
all phases of the ISE Implementation Plan.24 The 
20 Role of the Information Sharing Program Manag-
er in Homeland Security, CQ Congressional Testimony, 
Nov. 8, 2005 [hereinafter Role of Information Sharing]. 
21 Creation of New Information Sharing Steering 
Committee for the Intelligence Community, PR Newswire-
US Newswire, Mar. 6, 2007. 
22 Ibid. 
23 6 U.S.C. §485(f)(1) (2004).
24 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environ-
ment, ISE Implementation Plan, Nov. 2006, http://ise.
gov/docs/ise-impplan-200611.pdf [hereinafter ISE Imple-
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program manager’s office is small, consisting of 
roughly fifteen to twenty-four employees,25 but is 
delegated wide authority to create a plan for ISE 
implementation, develop strategies to promote 
and coordinate information sharing, and assess 
the ISE’s progress by submitting regular reports to 
Congress. Current program manager McNamara 
has stated that his role is best understood as that of 
a “facilitator.”26 
On May 20, 2005, President Bush appointed John 
Russack, formerly the director of intelligence at 
the Department of Energy, as the first program 
manager. However, Russack found that his of-
fice was understaffed and under-funded and he 
experienced considerable difficulties in beginning 
the process of launching the ISE.27 Some confu-
sion surrounding Russack’s responsibilities arose 
early on in his tenure, as the IRTPA had failed to 
designate the official to whom the program man-
ager reports. In March 2005, the Commission on 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Re-
garding Weapons of Mass Destruction noted the 
problem, stating that “The confused lines of au-
thority over information sharing created by the 
intelligence reform act should be…reconciled and 
coordinated.”28 
A June 2005 presidential memorandum rectified 
the omission by placing the program manager 
mentation Plan]. 
25 Challenges of Information Sharing Implementa-
tion, supra note 15.
26 Ted McNamara, Program Manager, Information 
Sharing Environment, Remarks at the DNI’s Information 
Sharing Conference and Technology Exposition, Federal 
News Service, Aug. 22, 2006 [hereinafter McNamara 
Remarks]. 
27 Patrick Yoest, Sharing of Information on Terror-
ism Intelligence Draws Fire, Presents Challenges, Apr. 18, 
2006 [hereinafter Yoest].
28 Memorandum on Strengthening Information 
Sharing, Access, and Integration—Organizational, Man-
agement, and Policy Development Structures for Creating 
the Terrorism Information Sharing Environment, Pub. 
Papers, June 6, 2005, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
news/2005/12/wh121605-memo.html [hereinafter Memo-
randum on Strengthening Information Sharing]. 
within the Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence (ODNI), then under the direction of John 
Negroponte.29 Critics, however, were quick to 
point out that the decision significantly weakened 
the intended role of the Department of Homeland 
Security in creating the ISE.30 They further con-
tended that the responsibility of overseeing the 
program manager would likely distract the DNI 
from his other duties.31 Others complained that 
the decision placed undue emphasis on the role 
of the intelligence community in the ISE, to the 
detriment of other participants.32 McNamara has 
attempted to refute such a perception in stating, 
“We’re [the office of the program manager] not 
an intelligence agency; that is, we’re not just con-
cerned with intelligence. We’re responsible for all 
terrorism information, whether or not it’s intelli-
gence. And there is a lot of information out there; 
in fact most of it, which is not intelligence.”33 
The difficulties of operating under the direction of 
the DNI have been cited as a reason for Russack’s 
resignation in January 2006.34 Russack’s depar-
ture challenged Congress and the President’s goal 
of achieving timely establishment of a functional 
ISE. As Illinois Senator Dick Durbin commented, 
Russack’s resignation was a “troubling setback” 
and showed that “our best efforts to implement 
21st-century for information-sharing [were] still 
far behind.”35 
In March 2006, President Bush named Ambassa-
dor Ted McNamara, formerly the head of counter-
terrorism at the State Department, as Russack’s 
successor.36 McNamara assumed his role with a 
29 Ibid. 
30 Challenges of Information Sharing Implementa-
tion, supra note 15.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. 
33 McNamara Remarks, supra note 26.
34 Challenges of Information Sharing Implementa-
tion, supra note 15. 
35 Shaun Waterman, Replacement of Infoshare Boss 
Spells Delay, UPI, Feb. 7, 2006.
36 Challenges of Information Sharing Implementa-
tion, supra note 15.
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fresh and energetic attitude.37 Despite delay caused 
by Russack’s resignation, McNamara’s office re-
leased its ISE Implementation Plan in November 
2006. McNamara remains aware, however, of the 
challenges he faces in achieving “progress” in 
implementing the ISE, promoting “technological 
consistency,” and ensuring “policy compliance” 
among the ISE’s participants.38 
McNamara emphasizes that the office of the 
program manager plays an essential role in ISE 
implementation but is “not a substitute”39 for ef-
fective leadership within the ISE’s participating 
federal departments and agencies. McNamara’s 
management and oversight function also requires 
a strategic partnership with and the continued sup-
port of Congress. 
Lee H. Hamilton, former Vice Chair of the 9/11 
Commission, told Congress in a 2005 hearing that 
the program manager’s success is largely depen-
dant on Congress’ willingness to provide his of-
fice with sufficient resources.40 Because section 
1016 of the IRTPA does not address the program 
manager’s budget, another gap in the statutory lan-
guage tending to suggest that the creation of the 
ISE was advanced without careful consideration 
of its complexities, it is essential that Congressio-
nal oversight of ISE implementation supplement 
the program manager’s efforts. As the program 
manager’s role is central to the deployment of the 
ISE, Hamilton has urged that the program manag-
er also receive “strong support from the President 
and the direct engagement of senior leadership of 
the Homeland Security Council”41 in carrying out 
his mandate.
The Information Sharing Council
The Information Sharing Council (ISC), estab-
lished by section 1016(g) of the IRTPA, is an 
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 McNamara Remarks, supra note 26.
40 Role of Information Sharing, supra note 20 
41 Ibid.
advisory body that assists the President and the 
program manager, its chair, in “developing poli-
cies, procedures, guidelines, roles, and standards 
necessary to establish, implement, and maintain 
the ISE.”42 The ISC had its first meeting in No-
vember 2005, and has since continued to meet on 
a regular basis.43
Membership of the ISC consists of the Depart-
ment of Commerce, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Department of Defense, Director of National In-
telligence, Department of Energy, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, Joint Staff, Department of Home-
land Security, National Counter Terrorism Center, 
Department of the Interior, Office of Management 
and Budget, Department of Justice, Department 
of State, Department of Transportation, and De-
partment of Treasury.44 The body has two standing 
subcommittees, the State, Local, and Tribal Sub-
committee and the Private Sector Subcommittee, 
as well as several ISC Working Groups that as-
sist members in performing their advisory func-
tions.45 
Despite the role of the State, Local, and Tribal 
Subcommittee, the ISC has been criticized for 
its exclusively federal membership and the gen-
eral lack of SLT representation.46 McNamara has 
stated that it is his “intention as chair of the ISC to 
keep in close contact with state, local, tribal, and 
private sector partners through regular meetings 
with them and by inviting them to work closely 
with the ISC.”47 However, critics posit that such 
an intention can only be fulfilled if those partners 
42 6 U.S.C. § 485(g)(2)(A) (2004).
43 The Federal Government Needs to Establish 
Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related 
and Sensitive but Unclassified Information, Government 
Accountability Office, Mar. 17, 2006, available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06385.pdf. [hereinafter Federal 
Government Needs to Establish] 
44 Ise.gov, supra note 13
45 Ibid.
46 Challenges of Information Sharing Implementa-
tion, supra note 15.
47 Ibid.
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are full members and in a position to influence 
recommendations made directly to the President 
and program manager.
Consistent with the requirements of the IRTPA, 
however, the ISC has provided the President and 
PM-ISE with recommendations addressing spe-
cific challenges to ISE implementation, including 
technological questions and the problems caused 
by the over-classification and pseudo-classifica-
tion of terrorism information.48 The ISC has also 
guided the allocation of ISE resources and assists 
PM-ISE McNamara in deciding how to leverage 
members’ existing sharing capabilities in estab-
lishing the ISE. 
Implementing the ISE
In mid-November 2006, DNI John Negroponte 
delivered to Congress the Information Shar-
ing Environment Implementation Plan (Plan), 
a report PM-ISE McNamara called a “roadmap 
for the successful implementation of the ISE” 
which “responds to the recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission…[and] builds on the progress 
of the past five years to further improve the way 
in which we share information and fight terror-
ism.”49 Developed over the course of a year, the 
Plan is the product of McNamara and the ISC’s 
close collaboration with officials of fifteen federal 
departments and agencies, including the Depart-
ments of Justice, Homeland Security, Defense, 
and State, as well as the FBI, and ODNI.50 The 
Plan provides overarching strategies to ensure the 
full integration and active participation of federal, 
SLT, foreign, and private sector entities. The Plan 
explains that “[o]nce implemented,” its strategies 
should “facilitate the sharing of analytic products 
48 Siobhan Gorman, New Chief Faces Pressure to 
Advance Data-Sharing, The Baltimore Sun, Mar. 3, 
2006. 
49 Information Sharing Environment Implementation 
Plan Report Sent to Congress, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 16, 
2006 [hereinafter Information Sharing Environment Imple-
mentation Plan Report Sent to Congress]. 
50 Ibid.
and other information by all information-sharing 
environment participants.”51
The Plan sets forth two phases of action items, the 
first designed to capitalize on and improve sharing 
capabilities existing at the time of the Plan’s issu-
ance and the second calculated to provide a frame-
work for “comprehensive implementation” of the 
ISE by 2009.52 While meeting the Phase 2 timeta-
ble is crucial for success of the ISE, its action items 
tend to require more preparation and funding than 
those of Phase 1, which detail concrete means to 
meet the most urgent information sharing needs.53 
However, both phases are necessary for the imple-
mentation process to culminate in the development 
of an enduring culture of information sharing that 
ensures long-term operation of the ISE. 
The Plan recognizes that developing a fully 
functional ISE will require strong oversight and 
organized management. The Plan therefore rec-
ommends that the PM-ISE, whose position was 
created as a temporary, two-year tenure under sec-
tion 1016(f)(1) of the IRTPA, remain in office un-
til the completion of Phase 2 of the Plan in 2009.54 
This recommendation has been met with praise, 
as many ISE participants recognize that the “pro-
gram manager’s position is integral to continued 
success of the program.”55 Mary Fetchet, Found-
ing Director of Voices of September 11th, and oth-
ers have told Congress that the PM-ISE should be 
established as a permanent office.56 Fetchet com-
mented that a permanent PM-ISE could ensure 
long-term success of the ISE with “authority to 
issue government wide standards for information 
sharing…create incentives for improving informa-
tion sharing as well as impose sanctions for agen-
cies that fail to share information properly.”57 
51 ISE Implementation Plan, supra note 24. 
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Com-
mission, CQ Congressional Testimony, Jan. 9, 2007 
[hereinafter Implementing Recommendations].
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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The Technical Front
Though the 9/11 Commission emphasized that 
creating an ISE has more to do with developing 
policy and promoting a culture of sharing than 
creating systems or additional technology, the 
Implementation Plan discusses several technical 
initiatives necessary to enhance participants’ ca-
pacity to share information through the ISE. It is 
important, however, that the Plan adopts a decen-
tralized approach to technological improvement 
and avoids the establishment of any collective 
information systems. A decentralized information 
sharing environment is more flexible, upgrade-
able, and better able to meet the needs of its users 
in a world of evolving security threats. 
According to the Plan, technical aspects of ISE im-
plementation are intended to “add value to current 
and future [ISE processes] in three dimensions,”58 
which include the acquisition of information shar-
ing tools, the expansion of information shared in 
the ISE, and the development of new capabilities. 
Phase 1 of the ISE Implementation Plan requires 
the PM-ISE and members of the ISC to identify 
developing technology and best practices that will 
enhance their ability to share information in the 
ISE. Phase 2 will then build upon previous efforts 
by incorporating emerging technology into the 
ISE and assessing capabilities vis-à-vis new needs 
and security threats. 
Though the technological needs of the ISE’s par-
ticipants will vary, Phase 2 of the Plan contem-
plates the integration of certain key technologies 
into the ISE. For example, the PM-ISE and ISC 
support current pilot programs aimed at provid-
ing wireless access to Sensitive but Unclassified 
(SBU) information.59 Additionally, the Plan en-
courages speedy implementation of the IRTPA’s 
directive to create Electronic Directory Services 
(EDS).60 EDS enables users to identify and locate 
58 ISE Implementation Plan, supra note 24. 
59 Ibid.
60 6 U.S.C. § 485(b)(2)(G) (2004).
people and organizations with whom they would 
like to communicate in the ISE. Though certain 
small-scale EDS technologies are already avail-
able,61 the PM-ISE is interested in building upon 
existing technology to provide more accessible 
and comprehensive means for contact information 
searches in a large ISE. The Plan contemplates 
the development of EDS that provide Blue Pages, 
containing contact information of counterterror-
ism organizations; Yellow Pages, offering infor-
mation about the roles and specializations of or-
ganizations listed in the Blue Pages; Green Pages, 
listing data sharing resources; and White Pages, 
cataloging contact information for individuals.62 
In order to strengthen interagency sharing initia-
tives, the Plan also emphasizes the importance of 
integrating cross-community technological servic-
es into the ISE. Cross-community technological 
services would horizontally connect federal ISE 
participants across the intelligence, defense, law 
enforcement, and homeland security communi-
ties, as well as facilitate vertical information shar-
ing between federal and SLT partners. Some ex-
amples of cross-community technological services 
include mechanisms for sending and receiving 
alerts and notifications; logging on to terminals, 
Web interfaces, and mobile devices containing 
shared terrorism information; conducting higher-
powered searches; and developing complex infor-
mation “access control” processes that take into 
account users’ roles and security clearances, as 
well as the level at which data is classified.63 
Identifying technical development as a “major pri-
ority in both phases”64 of ISE implementation, the 
Plan stresses that emerging technology and best 
practices incorporated into the ISE reflect both 
business and technical expertise. The Plan pro-
61 Jason Miller, Directory Services at the Core of 
Sharing Intelligence Info, Gov’t Computer News, Sept. 
19, 2005, available at http://www.gcn.com/print/24_
28/37038-1.html [hereinafter Miller].
62 ISE Implementation Plan, supra note 24
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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vides for long-term technical support for the ISE’s 
operations by encouraging participants to continu-
ally assess their capabilities and changing needs.
 
Multi-Level Government Sharing and Partici-
pation of Non-Government Actors
An effective terrorism information sharing envi-
ronment must ensure the full integration and par-
ticipation of not only federal actors, but also key 
SLT, foreign, and private sector entities. The Plan 
views multi-level government sharing and shar-
ing with non-government actors as an opportunity 
to pool expertise and develop a sense “shared re-
sponsibility” among participating entities for “the 
timely processing and dissemination” of terrorism 
information.65 Attaining this objective requires 
that common standards, including privacy laws, 
guide participants’ activities and ensure that each 
“meet a certain baseline level of capability.”66 
On a cultural level, the Plan recognizes that suc-
cessful multi-government sharing in the ISE re-
quires deconstructing perceptions that federal and 
SLT sharing processes are competitive, rather than 
collaborative. The Plan therefore promotes efforts 
to homogenize the variety of exiting sharing prac-
tices concerning terrorism “alert, tip, advisory, 
situational awareness, and warning systems.”67 To 
ensure active participation of SLT officials in the 
ISE, the Plan also requires the PM-ISE and mem-
bers of the ISC to reach out to a number of key 
SLT and interagency actors. These include Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), Field Intelligence 
Groups (FIGs), Information Sharing Analysis 
Centers (ISACs), and state and local intelligence 
information fusion centers. The roles, responsibil-
ities, and contributions to the ISE of each of these 
institutions are addressed in detail in the second 
section of this paper: “Information Sharing Across 
Critical Communities.” While reaching out to 
these institutions, the PM-ISE and ISC must also 
65 ISE Implementation Plan, supra note 24.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
seek to improve coordination among federal de-
partments and agencies, including the DoD, DHS, 
CIA, and FBI. Improved coordination across these 
departments and agencies will enable the federal 
government to better support the operations of the 
ISE’s SLT participants and integrate information 
provided by SLT actors into federal processes. 
Integration of foreign actors into the ISE likewise 
involves the development of a culture of col-
laboration. The Plan contemplates that policies 
facilitating information sharing with foreign ac-
tors will be developed across Phases 1 and 2 and 
will address such issues as access and control of 
restricted U.S. or foreign information, maintain-
ing privacy rights of U.S. citizens, and ensuring 
the quality and timeliness of data exchanged with 
foreign partners. These policies will also assist 
U.S. agencies in understanding domestic practices 
of foreign governments and will enable them to 
develop a framework for international terrorism 
information exchange. According to the Plan, the 
Foreign Government Information Sharing Work-
ing Group, a body created by the State Department 
in November 2005, will provide recommenda-
tions on privacy issues, assist in the negotiation of 
international agreements facilitating information 
sharing, and work with the PM-ISE to compile 
“best practices” on terrorism information sharing 
with foreign partners. The Plan also requires the 
ISC to develop common policies for the handling 
electronic foreign information. 
As for non-government actors, the Plan stresses 
that data exchange with private entities involve the 
development of a “robust” cross-sector public/pri-
vate partnership. The central aim of information 
sharing between government and private sector 
actors in the ISE is to protect the nation’s critical 
infrastructure. The Plan notes, “The private sec-
tor understands its processes, assets, and opera-
tions best and can be relied upon to provide the 
required private sector subject matter expertise.” 
Improved cross-sector sharing will require stan-
dardizing threat alerts and notifications and ensur-
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ing the rapid exchange of information between 
businesses and government on “incidents…and 
vulnerabilities” relevant to securing the nation’s 
critical infrastructure. 
The Plan urges that the Private Sector Subcom-
mittee of the ISC develop a plan for public/private 
sector sharing that encourages participants to de-
velop trust, build strong relationships, and imple-
ment a culture of mutual sharing. In the course of 
its work, the Private Sector Subcommittee will be 
guided by the President’s standards and policies 
on the protection of privacy in the ISE.68 
Challenges to Implementing the ISE
While setting forth strategies to organize and di-
rect the establishment of the ISE, the Plan also dis-
cusses challenges to creating an environment of 
robust information exchange. Advancing a culture 
of sharing, protecting privacy and civil liberties, 
and reforming security clearance procedures, are 
identified as key areas of difficulty in implement-
ing the ISE. In general, challenges to implement-
ing the ISE tend to stem from the tension between 
the value of information sharing and the need to 
ensure data security. 
The Plan acknowledges that cultivating a willing-
ness to share and creating favorable perceptions 
of ISE policies will require proactive efforts on 
the part of the PM-ISE, the ISC, and the internal 
staffs of ISE participants. As a first step, depart-
ments and agencies that comprise the ISC have 
each selected a senior official that will supervise 
efforts to implement the ISE within their respec-
tive entities. The Plan urges that these officials 
collaborate closely with the PM-ISE and the ISC 
to “develop high-level information sharing perfor-
mance measures” and provide the DNI with an an-
nual assessment report. 
The Plan also offers several practical strategies 
on transforming a “need to know” culture into a 
68 Ibid.
“need to share” environment. The Plan stresses 
the importance of training initiatives (both “core” 
training programs on common policies estab-
lished across the ISE as well as programs specific 
to a department or agency’s function in the ISE), 
the development of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives to share information, and the acknowl-
edgment of individuals who advance information 
sharing within their department or agency. The 
Plan recommends that ISE participants circulate 
bulletins among their staffs detailing concrete 
benefits gained by sharing initiatives and compile 
information on “best practices.” Additionally, the 
Plan suggests that an annual Federal award be of-
fered to the department or agency that has best 
cultivated a culture of sharing. To eliminate disin-
centives to information sharing, the Plan reminds 
federal ISE participants that the President has au-
thorized them to notify the Attorney General and 
DNI of legal restrictions, not required to protect 
civil liberties, which obstruct information sharing. 
Upon such a notification, the Attorney General and 
DNI may recommend specific changes to the As-
sistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism (APHS-CT), the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), 
and the Director of OMB for their review.69 
On privacy and civil liberties, the Plan affirms that 
implementation of the ISE will stress the impor-
tance of constitutional and other legal restrictions 
on participants’ access, control, and use of shared 
data. The Plan expects federal ISE participants to 
identify the legal requirements that specifically 
pertain to information they seek to transmit or 
receive in the ISE. It also reminds them of their 
responsibility to fully implement the ISE Privacy 
Guidelines, which are discussed in detail in the 
portion of this paper entitled, “Protecting Priva-
cy and Civil Liberties.” Finally, the Plan recom-
mends that federal ISE participants offer training 
on privacy procedures and foster public aware-
ness of the legal restrictions that guide their use of 
information in the ISE.
69 Ibid.
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Another major challenge to the success of infor-
mation sharing policies involves the reform of 
security clearance procedures. The Plan provides 
an overview of efforts to initiate reform and urges 
that agencies work together to develop standard-
ized certification and accreditation policies. The 
Plan also notes that in Executive Order 13381, 
Strengthening Processes Relating to Determin-
ing Eligibility for Access to Classified National 
Security Information, the President has delegated 
authority to the Office of Management and Bud-
get (OMB) “for the government-wide initiative to 
make clearance processes uniform, centralized, 
efficient, timely and reciprocal.” Though the Of-
fice of Personnel Management (OPM) is creating 
a cross-agency security clearance database and the 
ODNI is issuing recommendations to facilitate rap-
id reform, the Plan urges that the PM-ISE and the 
ISC to supervise and assess both reform processes 
and ISE participants’ compliance with them.70 
Assessment and Criticism
With the resignation of former PM-ISE John Rus-
sack, issuance of the Implementation Plan had 
been delayed. However, when Negroponte deliv-
ered PM-ISE McNamara’s Implementation Plan 
to Congress in November 2006, the response was 
largely positive. John Negroponte, then DNI, rec-
ognized McNamara’s hard work in producing the 
Plan and emphasized the Plan’s significance.71 
Similarly, in January 25, 2007, Charles E. Allen, 
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analy-
sis at the Department of Homeland Security, told 
Congress that the Plan reflects a “coordinated ap-
proach” that should lead to “improved flow of in-
ternal information, reduced redundancy and over-
lapping activities, and improved collaboration 
with the members to ensure that the Information 
Sharing Environment supports DHS’ missions 
and requirements.”72 
70 Ibid.
71 Information Sharing Environment Implementation 
Plan Report Sent to Congress, supra note 49.
72 Intelligence Revision, CQ Congressional Testi-
mony, Jan. 25, 2007 [hereinafter Intelligence Revision]. 
The Plan was also lauded as a “major step for-
ward”73 in the incremental process of realizing the 
recommendations set forth by the 9/11 Commis-
sion. The Plan’s timetable, which requires Phase 2 
implementation actions to be completed by 2009, 
is a benchmark that many ISE participants con-
sider ambitious, but reachable.74 Phase 1 was due 
for completion in June 2007, though the PM-ISE 
has yet to issue a report assessing the success of 
this implementation phase. 
The Plan has generally been commended for pro-
viding the broad strategies necessary for success-
ful ISE implementation but has received some 
criticism for not adequately addressing the needs 
of SLT government and law enforcement officials. 
Though the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police notified Congress that it “strongly supports 
the Plan” and is “particularly pleased that the ISE 
plan emphasizes the vital role”75 of law enforce-
ment officers, others have asserted that the Plan 
does not effectively coordinate federal and SLT 
information sharing. Critics complain that the Plan 
fails to emphasize the need for federal officials to 
pay careful attention to the content and format of 
the information they provide to SLT partners.76 
Furthermore, SLT participants have encountered 
both technical challenges and difficulties in deci-
phering their roles and responsibilities in the ISE 
vis-à-vis federal entities.77 Slade Gorton, a former 
9/11 Commissioner, testified before Congress on 
January 9, 2007, stating, “We continue to hear 
about turf fights about who is in charge of informa-
tion sharing with state and local governments. We 
continue to hear complaints from state and local 
officials about the quality of the information they 
73 Implementing Recommendations, supra note 55. 
74 Ensuring Full Implementation of the 9/11 Com-
mission’s Recommendations, CQ Congressional Testi-
mony, Jan. 9, 2007 [hereinafter Ensuring Full Implementa-
tion]. 
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid. 
77 Stew Magnuson, Local’s Role in Intelligence 
Sharing Pondered, National Defense, June 1, 2006 
[hereinafter Magnuson].
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receive. Suffice it to say many questions and is-
sues remain about the implementation plan for the 
information-sharing environment. The problem 
with information sharing is far from resolved.78” 
Legal Framework of the ISE
The impetus for the IRTPA’s creation of the ISE 
may be traced to the 9/11 Commission Report, 
which offered a detailed analysis of how the lack 
of information sharing contributed to the gov-
ernment’s failures in the period leading up to the 
September 11th attacks. While the dominance of 
a “need-to-know” culture had greatly influenced 
information decision-making prior to September 
2001, the 9/11 Commission pointed out that the 
application of Department of Justice procedures 
under the Clinton administration had also ob-
structed information sharing.79 Because of suspi-
cions of inappropriate use of Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants, then Attorney 
General Janet Reno had devised information shar-
ing policies that heavily regulated the exchange 
of information between the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities. These procedures had 
the effect of reducing information sharing to such 
a degree that they eventually earned the epithet, 
“the Wall.”80
According to the report, other factors also contrib-
uted to this perception, for example, a perceived 
lack of enthusiasm for information sharing on the 
part of the Office of Intelligence Policy Review 
and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court cre-
ated the perception that exchanging data between 
intelligence and criminal investigators was, if not 
forbidden, than at least very discouraged. The 
National Security Agency (NSA) likewise hin-
dered sharing through its reluctance to exchange 
information on Osama bin Laden with prosecu-
tors. When the September 11th attacks occurred, 
a persistent lack of information sharing prevented 
78 Ensuring Full Implementation, supra note 74.
79 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, supra 
note 1.
80 Ibid.
personnel of the New York Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM), the Fire Department of New 
York (FDNY), the New York Police Department 
(NYPD), and the Port Authority Police Depart-
ment (PAPD) from coordinating a unified re-
sponse.81 
In response to these observations, the 9/11 Com-
mission recognized that effective information 
sharing would require unity of effort. It therefore 
recommended that the president, being in the opti-
mal position to initiate government-wide change, 
guide the development of robust information shar-
ing practices. The 9/11 Commission further ac-
knowledged, as has current PM-ISE McNamara, 
that developing information sharing strategies, 
rather than implementing technological changes, 
will constitute the primary challenge of reforming 
information handling practices. The Commission 
wrote, “Despite the problems that technology cre-
ates, Americans’ love affair with it leads them to 
also regard it as the solution. But technology pro-
duces its best results when an organization has the 
doctrine, structure, and incentives to exploit it.” 
Information sharing legislation enacted following 
the 9/11 attacks attempts to dismantle Cold War 
“need to know” mentalities and coordinate inter-
agency communications. The legal framework of 
the ISE incentivizes sharing and heeds the 9/11 
Commission’s recommendation that “intelligence 
gathered about transnational terrorism…be pro-
cessed, turned into reports, and distributed” to ap-
propriate federal, foreign, SLT, and private sector 
actors, no matter where the information is initially 
collected.
The USA PATRIOT Act
The USA PATRIOT Act made an early attempt to 
improve information sharing by deconstructing 
barriers between the intelligence and law enforce-
ment communities. Recognizing that the nation’s 
security is jeopardized when officials across fed-
81 Ibid.
.	Political	Structure	 1
eral departments and agencies fail to collaborate 
effectively on terrorism issues, the framers of the 
legislation sought to mitigate tendencies to sharp-
ly divide criminal investigations from intelligence 
collection and analysis missions. 
Section 203 of the Act, which addresses “author-
ity to share criminal investigative information,” 
amends the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to permit the sharing of grand jury information 
involving “foreign intelligence,” “counterintel-
ligence,” or “foreign intelligence information.”82 
Federal persons authorized to receive grand jury 
information under the Act represent a variety of 
relevant communities, including law enforcement, 
intelligence, immigration, national defense, and 
national security.83 Shared information may like-
wise derive from diverse collection techniques, as 
the Act permits the exchange of electronic, wire, 
and oral interception data.84 
The USA PATRIOT Act bridges gaps between 
law enforcement and intelligence officials by also 
amending relevant provisions of the National Se-
curity Act of 1947. In section 905, the Act requires 
that the Attorney General and heads of other feder-
al law enforcement agencies provide the Director 
of Central Intelligence with foreign intelligence 
information acquired in the course of criminal in-
vestigations.85 To avoid ambiguity and overcome 
the perceptions that had discouraged sharing be-
tween law enforcement and intelligence officials 
prior to 9/11, the Act explicitly invokes the defini-
tions of “foreign intelligence” and “counterintel-
ligence” contained in the National Security Act of 
1947 and carefully defines “foreign intelligence 
information.” 
Because the USA PATRIOT Act attempts to ef-
fect cultural change, the Attorney General and 
Director of Central Intelligence must collaborate 
82 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C).
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid. 
85 See 50 U.S.C. § 403-5(b). 
to implement its provisions.86 These officials must 
develop information disclosure guidelines and en-
sure that relevant agencies provide training oppor-
tunities that stress procedures for identifying and 
exchanging foreign intelligence information.87 
According to section 908 of the Act, training pro-
grams should address both horizontal and vertical 
sharing practices by targeting federal officials not 
accustomed to handling foreign intelligence infor-
mation as well as SLT officials likely to encounter 
foreign intelligence information in the course of 
their daily operations or in the event of a terrorist 
attack.88 
The USA PATRIOT Act sets the stage for in-
creased sharing initiatives by not only deconstruct-
ing “the Wall” between the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities but also by improving 
coordination among federal agencies with coun-
ter-terrorism functions. For example, the Act’s 
amendments to section 106 of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) encourage 
federal officers conducting electronic surveillance 
to “consult with federal law enforcement officers” 
and synchronize their “efforts to investigate or 
protect against” national security threats.89 In par-
ticular, the Act emphasizes the need for increased 
coordination in response to threats emanating 
from foreign powers, international terrorism, and 
clandestine intelligence activities. 
Though enacted rapidly after the 9/11 attacks, the 
USA PATRIOT Act provides an important under-
pinning for the ISE by addressing the critical role 
of non-federal actors in ensuring the nation’s se-
curity. In addition to mandating that training op-
portunities be extended to SLT officials, the Act 
recognizes the importance of local law enforce-
ment officers in protecting critical infrastructure 
and investigating acts of domestic terrorism. By 
recognizing that the investigation of “terrorist 
conspiracies and activities” will often be “multi-
86 See 28 U.S.C. § 509.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806. 
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jurisdictional” in nature, the USA PATRIOT Act 
encourages active cooperation among federal and 
SLT entities that have since been integrated into 
the ISE.90 
Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 
The Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 builds 
upon sharing opportunities contained in the USA 
PATRIOT Act by integrating the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) into the 
community of law enforcement and intelligence 
officials permitted or directed to exchange infor-
mation under the USA PATRIOT Act. In section 
202, the HSA ensures that DHS is included in ex-
isting sharing practices by requiring that the DHS 
Secretary has access “to all information…relating 
to threats of terrorism against the United States,” 
including data concerning “infrastructure” and 
other homeland “vulnerabilities.”91 Because of the 
urgency with which DHS needed to begin its op-
erations, the HSA urged that shared information 
include data in a variety of formats, such as, “re-
ports, assessments, [and] analyses.” Furthermore, 
the HSA specified that sharing with DHS should 
occur irrespective of which agency initially col-
lected or prepared the information to be shared or 
“whether…such information has been analyzed.” 
The ISE would later refine attempts to share high 
volumes of information by requiring that partici-
pating departments and agencies establish appro-
priate data quality control policies. 
To ensure that information exchange practices 
endure, the HSA calls for the DHS Secretary and 
other department and agency heads to develop 
sharing policies such that DHS receive homeland 
security information from other agencies “on a 
regular or routine basis.” Section 202(d)(2), for 
example, requires the DHS Secretary and the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence to jointly develop 
policies for sharing across the homeland securi-
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 3796(h).
91 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 122 
(2002). 
ty and intelligence communities. Before the ISE 
could develop communications pathways for sus-
tained vertical sharing, these elements of the HSA 
encouraged coordination and effective response to 
threats or attacks on critical infrastructure. 
The content of the HSA that most foreshadows 
the goals of the ISE is section 892 on “facilitat-
ing homeland security information sharing pro-
cedures.”92 Like the IRTPA, section 892 contem-
plates unified guidance of sharing procedures by 
requiring the President to prescribe and imple-
ment procedures under which federal agencies can 
share homeland security information with other 
federal partners, as well as with appropriate state 
and local personnel. The President’s responsibili-
ties include delineating procedures for the sharing 
and handling of both classified and sensitive but 
unclassified information across interagency lines. 
Federal agencies have the reciprocal duty of des-
ignating an individual to manage the implementa-
tion of the President’s procedures.93 
Since section 892 directs that the President’s poli-
cies “apply to all agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment,” it represents significant step toward 
Congress’ 2004 decision to establish a govern-
ment-wide information sharing environment. 
However, unlike the ISE, which concentrates on 
the development of sharing strategies and a gov-
ernment-wide policy “approach,” the HSA em-
phasizes the creation of sharing “systems,” which 
may be too restrictive to effect long-term cultural 
change. Section 892, for example, requires federal 
agencies and appropriate state and local officials 
to share homeland security information systems 
that can exclude users on the basis of “geographic 
location,” “type of organization,” “position” or 
“need to know.” The ISE later improved upon 
the HSA by launching an effort to replace “need 
to know” with “need to share.” By incorporating 
“need to know” criteria into the establishment of 
information sharing systems, section 892 of the 
92 6 U.S.C. § 482. 
93 Ibid.
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HSA does little to reform the culture that hinders 
sharing. 
Executive Order 13311 Homeland Security In-
formation Sharing 
This order delegates much of the President’s au-
thority under sections 892 and 893 of the Home-
land Security Act of 2002 to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. Thus, the Secretary assumes 
responsibility for developing and implementing 
homeland security information sharing proce-
dures between federal departments and agencies 
as well as state and local officials. Consistent with 
the Act, these procedures must include mecha-
nisms for identifying and maintaining the security 
of sensitive and classified information. However, 
the order indicates that the Secretary’s procedures 
remain subject to exceptions made by the Presi-
dent or an official to whom he delegates this re-
sponsibility.
To develop the sharing procedures, the President 
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to col-
laborate with other officials, including the “Secre-
tary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attor-
ney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Director 
of the Office of Management and Budget, the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, [and] the Archivist 
of the United States.”94 The President also permits 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to consult 
other federal officials that the Secretary deems 
could provide proper assistance to his efforts to 
carry out the mandate of section 892 of the HSA. 
The President retains, however, his authority un-
der sections 892(a)(2) and 892(b)(7) under the 
Act.95 Section 892(a)(2) authorizes him to see 
that homeland security information sharing pro-
cedures apply to all federal agencies.96 Under sec-
tion 892(b)(7), the President must identify federal 
agencies to evaluate homeland security informa-
94 Exec. Order No. 1331, 68 Fed. Reg. 147 (July 31, 
2003).
95 Ibid.
96 See 6 U.S.C. § 42.
tion being shared and synthesize such data with 
intelligence information.97 
Executive Order 13356 Strengthening the 
Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect 
Americans 
Executive Order 13356 guides federal agencies’ 
efforts to develop and improve information shar-
ing by mandating that they concentrate on four pri-
orities: (1) the “detection, prevention, disruption, 
preemption, and mitigation of terrorist activities” 
against the United States; (2) the effective sharing 
of terrorism information across federal agencies; 
(3) the successful integration of SLT entities into 
sharing initiatives; and (4) the continued acquisi-
tion of terrorism information.98 The President re-
minds federal agencies that these tasks shall be 
accomplished while safeguarding Americans’ pri-
vacy and civil liberties. 
To achieve these goals, E.O. 13356 requires heads 
of federal agencies that “possess or acquire ter-
rorism information” to rapidly share such data 
with heads of agencies responsible for “counter-
terrorism functions.” Additionally, the President 
instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to 
cooperate with the Attorney General and other 
agency heads in developing common sharing pro-
cedures. According to E.O. 13356, the procedures 
should aim to mitigate obstacles to sharing caused 
by the information classification system. For ex-
ample, the President states that agencies should 
“creat[e] unclassified versions [of terrorism in-
formation] for distribution whenever possible.” 
The Director of Central Intelligence and Attorney 
General’s procedures should also address civil 
liberties concerns by stipulating in “clear, under-
standable, consistent, effective, and lawful” terms 
how information, once collected, is to be used, 
disseminated, and stored.99 
97 Ibid.
98 Exec. Order No. 13356, 69 Federal Register 169 
(September 1, 2004).
99 Ibid.
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The President recognizes that greater unity of ef-
fort is required for effective information sharing 
and in section five of his order, mandates the es-
tablishment of an Information Systems Council. 
The Council’s principal obligation is to develop, 
within 120 days, a plan for creating an “interop-
erable terrorism information sharing environ-
ment.”100 Serving as a prelude to establishment 
of the ISE by the IRTPA four months later, this 
plan describes the “functions, capabilities, and re-
sources” of an interoperable terrorism information 
sharing environment, identifies challenges to its 
implementation, and suggests feasible short-term 
solutions. The Council is also directed to propose 
strategies on how state and local authorities may 
be integrated into the environment and to recom-
mend ways in which the “interoperable” environ-
ment could be transformed into a fully operational 
ISE.101 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004
The IRTPA mandates an even more extensive 
information sharing regime than either the USA 
PATRIOT Act or the Homeland Security Act of 
2002. The legislation establishes and provides 
the principal management architecture for the 
endeavor now referred to as the Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE). Though neither the 
USA PATRIOT Act nor the HSA promoted shar-
ing through an “information environment,” both 
acts worked toward integrating information poli-
cies across the intelligence, law enforcement, and 
homeland security communities. By encouraging 
horizontal cooperation across federal agencies and 
vertical cooperation between federal and SLT of-
ficials, the USA PATRIOT Act and HSA provided 
a foundation for the IRTPA’s creation of a govern-
ment-wide sharing initiative. 
Under section 1016(b)(1) of the IRTPA, the Presi-
dent must facilitate the sharing of “terrorism in-
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
formation” by establishing an ISE that combines 
policies, procedures, and technologies linking 
people, systems, and information among all fed-
eral, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as the 
private sector.102 The President must also ensure 
protection of privacy and civil liberties in promul-
gating information sharing procedures. “Terrorism 
information” shared throughout the ISE refers not 
only to intelligence, law enforcement, military, 
and homeland security information, but also to 
any information relevant to individuals or groups 
involved in the “existence, organization, capabili-
ties, plans, intentions, vulnerabilities, means of fi-
nance or material support or communications” of 
transnational terrorism. Though the IRTPA does 
not address the establishment of common quality 
control procedures, it does require that informa-
tion shared through the ISE be accessible “in a 
form and manner that facilitates its use in analysis, 
investigations and operations.”103
The IRTPA recognizes the practical difficulties of 
information sharing and therefore requires partici-
pating departments and agencies to develop and 
maintain electronic directory services for locating 
people, organizations, and locations connected by 
the ISE. Unlike the HSA’s reliance on information 
systems, however, the IRTPA clarifies that the ISE 
will be created through the use of both “policy 
guidelines and technologies.” The framers of the 
IRTPA echoed the 9/11 Commission’s warning 
that improved information technology alone is not 
sufficient to advance the nation’s anti-terrorism 
efforts. Rather, as the IRTPA states, the ISE, while 
protecting information security, must succeed in 
managing “access to data rather than just systems 
and networks.”104 
One weakness of the statute is its lack of specific-
ity in discussing several key issues on ISE estab-
lishment. For example, in section 1016(b)(2)(B), 
the Act requires that the ISE “incorporate strong 
102 6 U.S.C. § 485, supra note 14.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
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mechanisms to enhance accountability and fa-
cilitate oversight.” The use of the relative term 
“strong mechanisms” does not appear to provide 
an adequately clear benchmark for assessing the 
effectiveness of the executive branch’s efforts. 
Similarly, as earlier noted, the statute fails to des-
ignate the official to whom the program manager 
reports and only briefly mentions his budget, a sig-
nificant factor affecting the extent of the program 
manager’s involvement in ISE implementation.
However, the IRTPA greatly advances information 
sharing by creating a coordinated “environment,” 
rather than simply adding to the list of sharing 
responsibilities stipulated by the USA PATRIOT 
Act and the HSA. The information sharing initia-
tive set forth by the IRTPA capitalizes on existing 
sharing capabilities and allows ISE participants 
“direct and continuous” access to information so 
as to establish a sharing environment in which 
there are “no single points of failure.” 
Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening 
Information Sharing, Access, and Integra-
tion—Organizational Management, and Policy 
Development Structures for Creating the Ter-
rorism Information Sharing Environment 
This memorandum resolves the IRTPA’s ambigu-
ity regarding the program manager’s authority by 
following the recommendation of the Commission 
on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction that the 
PM-ISE be designated as part of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The 
change empowers the DNI to “exercise authority, 
direction, and control” over the PM-ISE and en-
sure that the PM-ISE fulfills his responsibilities 
under section 1016 of the IRTPA effectively and 
in accordance with the President’s directions.105 
Though the memorandum clarifies the issue of 
authority over the PM-ISE, it raises the question 
105 Memorandum on Strengthening Information Shar-
ing, supra note 28.
of whether the DNI is the appropriate official to 
fulfill this function. The President’s decision is 
logical given the DNI’s roles and responsibilities, 
as the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion recognized. However, there is a concern that 
requiring the DNI to perform an oversight role in 
the process of establishing the ISE may detract 
him from his duties of coordinating activities of 
intelligence community. 
Executive Order 13388 Further Strengthening 
the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Pro-
tect Americans 
Executive Order 13388 represents in large part an 
updated version of the President’s directions in 
E.O. 13356, which is officially revoked by E.O. 
13388. While acknowledging the advances in ter-
rorism information sharing set in motion by the 
enactment of the IRTPA in December 2004, E.O. 
13388 repeats many of the policy goals listed in 
E.O. 13356. The President revises his previous di-
rections by requiring that the “common standards” 
on information sharing being developed by the 
Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney 
General in response to E.O. 13356 concentrate 
on facilitating implementation of the ISE.106 The 
President’s order also establishes the Information 
Sharing Council, the advisory body whose mis-
sion, as previously discussed, involves collaborat-
ing with the program manager and guiding imple-
mentation of the ISE.107 
Presidential Memorandum to the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies on the 
Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the 
Information Sharing Environment 
This memorandum directs establishment of the 
ISE by issuing instructions for the PM-ISE as well 
as five ISE implementation guidelines. The PM-
ISE is to assess the needs and information shar-
106 Exec. Order No. 13388, 70 Federal Register 
62023 (Oct. 27, 2005). 
107 Ibid.
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ing capabilities of ISE participants. He must con-
sult with the Information Sharing Council (ISC) 
in preparing, within 90 days, a report on federal 
departments and agencies’ information sharing 
resources.108 This assessment is intended to en-
able the ISE to “leverag[e]” and enhance existing 
information sharing policies, resources, and tech-
nological capabilities. Then, the PM-ISE must 
supplement his assessment of information sharing 
resources by collaborating with the Director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to re-
port on the needs and missions of ISE participants 
with “counterterrorism responsibilities.” When 
this information is compiled and analyzed, the 
DNI must direct the PM-ISE to work with the ISC 
to develop strategies, policies, and procedures to 
implement the ISE.109 
After discussing the PM-ISE’s duties, the Presi-
dent provides five guidelines for ISE implemen-
tation, consistent with his responsibilities under 
section 1016(d) of the IRTPA. First, the President 
emphasizes the need for creating “common stan-
dards” for information collection, access, sharing, 
and use within the ISE. The President directs the 
DNI to collaborate with the Attorney General and 
the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland 
Security to create these information handling poli-
cies. 
Second, the President states that SLT and private 
sector officials must “have the opportunity to par-
ticipate as full partners in the ISE.” He therefore 
designates the Secretary of Homeland Security 
and the Attorney General to collaborate with the 
Secretaries of State, Defense, Health and Human 
Services, and the DNI to establish a “common 
framework” describing the roles and responsibili-
ties of ISE participants. 
Third, the President recognizes that effective in-
formation sharing will require the development 
108 Memorandum on Guidelines and Requirements 
in Support of the Information Sharing Environment, Pub. 
Papers, Dec. 26, 2005. 
109 Ibid.
of procedures to homogenize various departments 
and agencies’ policies on handling and sharing 
Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information. 
While ensuring that sufficient security is provided 
for shared information, the Secretary of Home-
land Security and the Attorney General, in coop-
eration with the Secretaries of State, Defense, En-
ergy, and the DNI, must submit recommendations 
on the “the standardization of SBU procedures for 
homeland security information, law enforcement 
information, and terrorism information.” 
Fourth, the President orders the Secretary of State 
to work with the Secretaries of Defense, the Trea-
sury, Commerce, and Homeland Security, as well 
as the Attorney General and the DNI, to develop 
procedures enabling effective information sharing 
between executive departments and foreign allies. 
These procedures must facilitate “international 
access and exchange” and provide consistent 
practices for handling information received from 
foreign governments.
Fifth, the President affirms the federal govern-
ment’s “solemn obligation…to protect the legal 
rights of all Americans in the effective perfor-
mance of national security and homeland secu-
rity functions.” He requires the Attorney General 
and the DNI to develop ISE privacy guidelines. 
Furthermore, he instructs the heads of federal ISE 
participants to “ensure on an ongoing basis” that 
“personnel, structures, training, and technologies 
are in place” to protect privacy rights and that the 
guidelines developed by the Attorney General and 
the DNI are fully implemented. 
The President concludes his memorandum in em-
phasizing the importance of establishing a “need 
to share” culture throughout the ISE. He directs 
that executive departments and agencies prepare 
for ISE participation by developing information 
sharing accountability procedures, dismantling 
policies that discourage sharing, and allocating 
personnel and resources to the goal of advancing 
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terrorism information sharing.110 Furthermore, he 
directs that senior officials be appointed by partic-
ipating departments and agencies to oversee infor-
mation sharing within their respective offices and 
work closely with the PM-ISE and ISC in imple-
menting the ISE. These officials will provide an-
nual information sharing assessments to the DNI 
as well as notify the Attorney General of any spe-
cific legal requirements that should be reviewed 
because of their effect of obstructing information 
sharing.111
Protecting Privacy and Civil Liberties
Section 1016 of the IRTPA and E.O. 13388 treat 
the goals of improved information sharing and 
privacy protection as twin aims of the ISE. Rather 
than representing increased security and the pro-
tection of legal rights as mutually exclusive goals, 
the legal underpinning of the ISE takes the posi-
tion that both goals can be reconciled within the 
framework of the ISE. Relevant law suggests that 
implementation of the ISE should create a “cul-
ture of privacy,”112 while fostering a “culture of 
sharing,” in order to strike an appropriate balance 
between security and privacy needs. 
The procedures for establishing the ISE therefore 
offer both a strategy and structure for protecting 
privacy and civil liberties. Pursuant to the Decem-
ber 2005 Presidential Memorandum on the Guide-
lines and Requirements in Support of the Informa-
tion Sharing Environment, the Attorney General 
and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) es-
tablished the President’s Information Sharing 
Environment Guideline 5 Working Group, which 
consisted of privacy officials of the ISE’s partici-
pating departments and agencies. The working 
group’s task was to assess the privacy and civil 
liberties implications of existing information shar-
ing procedures and then to develop guidelines for 
continued protection of legal rights as information 
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Protection of Privacy, CQ Congressional Testi-
mony, Apr. 6, 2006. 
is collected, used, shared, and stored by ISE par-
ticipants. 
Sharing Information While Safeguarding Le-
gal Rights
In December 2006, the President approved the 
working group’s Guidelines to Ensure that the 
Information Privacy and Other Legal Rights of 
Americans are Protected in the Development 
and Use of the Information Sharing Environment 
(Guidelines). The ISE Privacy Guidelines treat as 
“protected information” data about U.S. citizens 
or lawful permanent residents subject to privacy 
or other legal restrictions under the U.S. Consti-
tution and federal law, or specifically designated 
by executive orders or international agreements.113 
Though the Guidelines apply only to federal enti-
ties, they require that federal participants in the 
ISE collaborate with information sharing partners 
in SLT and foreign governments, as well as the 
private sector, to “develop and implement appro-
priate policies and procedures that provide protec-
tions that are at least as comprehensive as those 
contained in these Guidelines.” The Guidelines 
also contemplate that the public will act as a check 
on information sharing activities and therefore en-
courage public awareness of the ISE and relevant 
privacy restrictions. 
The Guidelines stress that the ISE comply with all 
existing legal restrictions on protected informa-
tion and remind participants that personally iden-
tifiable information may be distributed through 
the ISE only if it meets the definition of terror-
ism information, homeland security information, 
or law enforcement information as specified in 
section 1016 of the IRTPA and section 482(f) of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Participating 
agencies are therefore directed to review data it 
113 Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy 
and Other Legal Rights of Americans are Protected in the 
Development and Use of the Information Sharing Environ-
ment, Dec. 2006, available at http://ise.gov/docs/ise%20p
rivacy%20guidelines%2012-4-06.pdf [hereinafter Guide-
lines to Ensure that the Information Privacy]. 
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intends to share through the ISE for classification 
as “protected information,” as well as relevant 
law, on a continual basis. Agencies must develop 
internal procedures for monitoring compliance 
with legal restrictions on the information it ac-
cesses, shares, or stores as a result of its participa-
tion in the ISE. To facilitate the sharing process 
and ensure that personally identifiable informa-
tion receives continued protection as it is shared 
and used in the ISE, the Guidelines call for each 
agency to develop a system for informing ISE 
partners when shared information falls within the 
category of “protected information” or is subject 
to particular legal restrictions.
While offering necessary guidance on compliance 
with existing legal requirements, the Guidelines 
provide additional measures to protect privacy 
and civil liberties. The Guidelines emphasize in-
formation security by requiring ISE participants 
to take appropriate “physical, technical, and ad-
ministrative” measures to safeguard against inap-
propriate access, use or distribution of protected 
information in the ISE. To prevent the use or shar-
ing of erroneous data, the Guidelines stipulate that 
agencies develop procedures to minimize error, 
promptly correct erroneous information, and no-
tify ISE participants when errors do occur. 
As an added safeguard, agencies are required 
to exercise care when synthesizing information 
about an individual from several sources and are 
instructed to “retain protected information only so 
long as it is relevant and timely for appropriate 
use by the agency, and update, delete, or refrain 
from using protected information that is outdated 
or otherwise irrelevant for such use.” Further-
more, any protected information shared through 
the ISE later determined not to meet the statutory 
requirements of “terrorism information,” “home-
land security information,” or “law enforcement 
information” must be promptly deleted. 
Enforcement mechanisms for privacy policies are 
also addressed by the Guidelines, which require 
that agencies participating in the ISE appoint at 
least one senior official as an ISE privacy of-
ficial, with the responsibility of overseeing, en-
forcing, and updating their respective agencies’ 
procedures for complying with the Guidelines. 
Privacy officials are additionally directed to see 
that its agency offers training on ISE privacy poli-
cies, as well as “consider[s] and implement[s], 
as appropriate, privacy enhancing technologies.” 
Agencies should supplement the efforts of its pri-
vacy officials by developing policies that ensure 
accountability, provide for timely and appropri-
ate investigations of possible privacy violations, 
and implement mechanisms to redress complaints 
from individuals. 
Finally, the ISE provides a governance structure 
for managing privacy policies. Pursuant to the 
Guidelines, the PM-ISE established a standing 
ISE Privacy Guidelines Committee on December 
4, 2006.114 The Committee consists of privacy of-
ficials of the departments and agencies that com-
prise the Information Sharing Council (ISC).115 
Co-chaired by Alexander Joel, the ODNI’s Civil 
Liberties Protection Officer, and Jane Horvath, 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer of the Depart-
ment of Justice,116 the ISE Privacy Guidelines 
Committee supervises implementation of the 
Guidelines, ensures uniformity in the application 
of the Guidelines across agencies, highlights “best 
practices,” and serves as “a forum for resolving 
issues on an inter-agency basis.”117 
The ISE Privacy Guidelines Committee is assist-
ed by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board (PCLOB), which was created by section 
1061 of the IRTPA pursuant to a recommendation 
by the 9/11 Commission. The PCLOB is autho-
114 Program Manager for the Information Sharing 
Environment Releases Privacy Guidelines, US Newswire, 
Dec. 4, 2006 [hereinafter Privacy Guidelines]. 
115 Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy, 
supra note 113.
116 Privacy Guidelines, supra note 114.
117 Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy, 
supra note 113.
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rized to review and provide guidance on a variety 
of policies designed to enhance the nation’s secu-
rity against the threat of terrorism, including in-
formation sharing.118 Consisting of five presiden-
tial appointees,119 the Board held its first meeting 
on March 14, 2006, and is working to provide the 
President and the heads of executive departments 
and agencies with appropriate recommendations 
to ensure that privacy and civil liberties are ad-
equately protected within the ISE.120 
The ISE Privacy Guidelines are intended to enable 
ISE participants to develop privacy procedures 
best suited to their respective missions. However, 
the Guidelines also seek to ensure consistency in 
the application of legal requirements and unifor-
mity in the oversight of information sharing ac-
tivities. As Horvath and Joel remarked in the “In-
troduction to the ISE Privacy Guidelines,” “[T]he 
ISE Privacy Guidelines strike a balance between 
consistency and customization, substance and 
procedure, oversight and flexibility.”121
Concerns Remain
Despite efforts to ensure that the protection of 
privacy and civil liberties is, as McNamara has 
stated, “a core tenet of the ISE,”122 concerns linger 
about the extent and adequacy of the protections 
provided. Civil liberties advocates and members 
of Congress have been vocal in criticizing the ISE 
Privacy Guidelines as providing only minimal 
guidance. Critics contend that protecting privacy 
has not been adequately emphasized as informa-
tion sharing policies are implemented and claim 
that the Guidelines, though attractive on paper, are 
flawed in practice. 
118 See 6 U.S.C. § 485.
119 Balancing Civil Liberties and National Security 
Needs, CQ Congressional Testimony, June 6, 2006 
[hereinafter Balancing Civil Liberties]. 
120 Ibid.
121 Joel, Alexander & Jane Horvath, An Introduc-
tion to the ISE Privacy Guidelines, Dec. 2006, available at 
http://ise.gov/docs/ise%20privacy%20guidelines%20intro
%20-rev.pdf. 
122 Privacy Guidelines, supra note 114.
The existence of improved and more powerful 
information technology has consistently caused 
worry about federal capabilities for accessing, us-
ing, and storing personally identifiable informa-
tion. The implementation of the ISE heightens 
these concerns by facilitating the dissemination 
of protected information and increasing the likeli-
hood that attempts to synthesize information from 
numerous sources will result in errors with impli-
cations for individual rights. In addition, many 
agree with the 9/11 Commission’s observation 
that the sense of heightened urgency on security 
matters prompted by the nation’s experience on 
September 11, 2001 could jeopardize civil liber-
ties over the long haul. 
Before the ISE Privacy Guidelines had been draft-
ed, Benjamin Powell, general counsel for the DNI, 
had been tasked with reviewing legal restrictions 
on the federal government’s access, use, and dis-
semination of information as of July 2005. Con-
cerns that privacy and other civil liberties would 
be overlooked in the effort to maximize the value 
of information for security purposes arose when 
Powell’s work was to be carried out confidential-
ly.123 Additionally, at his confirmation hearings, 
Powell had been instructed by some members 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
to distinguish, as precisely as possible, true le-
gal requirements from prudential, but not legally 
mandated, practices to preserve privacy and other 
legal rights.124 
Republican Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas told 
Powell to avoid “overly cautious and inaccurate 
interpretations” of restrictions on information han-
dling and urged, “I expect the lawyers of the intel-
ligence community—along with its analysts and 
operators—to step right up to those lines [of what 
is legally permissible]. Don’t go over them, but 
step up to them.”125 Roberts’s view caused ample 
123 Shaun Waterman, Intelligence Chief to Review 
Privacy Rules, UPI, July 25, 2005 [hereinafter Waterman, 
Intelligence]. 
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
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anxiety among civil libertarians, who argued that 
the line separating permissible from impressible 
behavior is not clearly visible. They also claimed 
that comfortableness with minor legal violations 
could lead to increased and more alarming viola-
tions in future security practices. 
Powell, however, resolved to determine the “proper 
balance between the national interest in the col-
lection, dissemination, and maintenance of intel-
ligence, and the national interest in protecting the 
legal rights of all US persons” and pointed out that 
that much of the law he had been asked to review 
dated to the Reagan administration. Legal opinions 
lingering from the 1980s, he stated, are not neces-
sarily compatible with efforts to manage current 
national security threats. In addition, Powell com-
mented on the importance of enabling privacy law to 
“keep[] pace with current technology” and changes 
within agencies that perform national security func-
tions, such as “the continuing transformation of the 
CIA and FBI.” He explained that updating privacy 
would ensure that “appropriate safeguards are put 
in place during this transformation.”126 
Though the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board (PCLOB) was intended to provide a com-
petent mechanism for protecting individual rights 
while the federal government intensifies national 
security measures, members of Congress and civil 
liberties activists have claimed that creation of the 
PCLOB had not been treated as a priority by the 
Bush administration. In December 2005, a con-
gressional reported card gave the administration 
a grade of “D” under the two categories of “Civil 
Liberties and Executive Power” and “Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board.”127 Though Con-
gress gave the grade of “B” under the category 
“Balance Between National Security and Civil 
Liberties,” it expressed concern that establishment 
of the PCLOB and appointment of its five mem-
bers had been unreasonably slow, suggesting that 
126 Ibid.
127 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Balancing 
Civil Liberties and Security, CQ Congressional Testi-
mony, June 6, 2006. 
the PCLOB was of little import to the executive 
branch.128 According to Representative Christo-
pher Shays, the process of establishing the board 
took more than 15 months and the Board has since 
“had to struggle with issues of budget, staff sup-
port, [and] office space.”129 
Criticism of the Board extends to its functions and 
powers, which some claim are inadequate given 
the body’s purpose of overseeing implementa-
tion of the ISE as well as other security measures 
taken to protect the nation against terrorism. Un-
like some original proposals for legislation on in-
telligence reform, the IRTPA did not provide the 
Board with subpoena power.130 Some civil liber-
ties advocates have concluded that the PCLOB 
cannot offer competent oversight so long as it 
lacks the power to compel agencies participating 
in the ISE to provide witnesses or relevant infor-
mation. They also contend that the PCLOB’s lack 
of subpoena power is exacerbated by the Attorney 
General’s ability to veto certain Board requests for 
information.131 The Los Angeles Times went so far 
as to refer to PCLOB as a “paper tiger.”132 
Presidential approval and incremental implemen-
tation of the ISE Privacy Guidelines have also not 
alleviated concerns about privacy and civil liber-
ties in the handling and sharing of terrorism in-
formation. The Guidelines, which consist of only 
nine pages, have been criticized for not providing 
the level of specificity required to ensure adequate 
protection of legal rights. In March 2007, Linda 
D. Koontz, Director of Information Management 
Issues at the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), remarked to the House Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security that the Guidelines “provide 
only a high-level framework for ensuring privacy 
protection and do not address how the collection 
of information is to be limited.”133 
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Enhancing Privacy and Civil Rights While Meet-
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Koontz pointed out that the document highlights 
core values worthy of heightened protection but 
does not instruct participating agencies on imple-
menting privacy requirements.134 The Guidelines’ 
reliance on vague language, such as phrases that 
require agencies to “implement appropriate poli-
cies”135 or “put in place a mechanism”136 for no-
tifying ISE participants of protected information, 
provide little assurance of consistency in privacy 
standards across the ISE’s participating communi-
ties. 
Counter-Arguments and Conclusions
Despite criticism of the Guidelines and the lengthy 
process of establishing the PCLOB, both the Guide-
lines and Board do provide a considerable level of 
protection for legal rights as the ISE is being imple-
mented. Fears that a critical review of privacy laws 
dating to previous decades threatens civil liberties 
fail to consider both the changes of U.S. security 
needs and the federal government’s technological 
capabilities in a post-9/11 world. For instance, both 
Barry Steinhardt, director of technology and liber-
ty for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
and ODNI General Counsel Benjamin Powell, 
have expressed the view that privacy law needs to 
take current technology into account in order to of-
fer effective protection of legal rights.137 
Though critics correctly point out that the Guide-
lines were drafted at a level of generality, a highly 
specific document would not be able to account 
for the disparate missions of the various agencies 
participating in the ISE or provide sufficient flex-
ibility for changing information sharing needs. 
Civil liberties specialists, such as Jane Horvath, 
Civil Liberties and Protection Officer at the Jus-
tice Department, and Alexander Joel, Civil Lib-
ing Homeland Security Needs, CQ Congressional Testi-
mony, Mar. 21, 2007. 
134 Ibid.
135 Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy, 
supra note 113. 
136 Ibid.
137 Waterman, Intelligence, supra note 123.
erties and Protection Officer at the ODNI, have 
opined that the Guidelines provide an appropriate 
foundation for ensuring that specific procedures 
protecting privacy and other rights are imple-
mented by ISE participants. The two have writ-
ten, “These government-wide privacy guidelines 
establish key protections as agencies share infor-
mation on terrorism…The Guidelines do, in fact, 
require agencies to establish appropriate redress 
and transparency mechanisms.”138 Horvath and 
Joel have also stressed that implementation of the 
Guidelines will be supervised by both the PCLOB 
and the ISE Privacy Guidelines Committee, com-
prised of the privacy officers of each agency par-
ticipating in the ISE.139 
It is also worth noting that members of the PCLOB 
have agreed with Congress’s decision not to pro-
vide the body with subpoena power in drafting the 
IRTPA. As Board member Carol E. Dinkins stated 
to Congress in June 2006, “It is incongruous to 
even consider an office within the White House 
requiring subpoena power to compel executive 
branch agencies or officials to provide it with in-
formation.”140 Furthermore, the lengthy process of 
establishing the Board has been mitigated by its 
recent progress. According to Dinkins, the Board 
has established “working relationships” with pri-
vacy officials across federal agencies and has also 
met with many senior officials of agencies partici-
pating in the ISE.141 While the President was not 
required to appoint a bipartisan membership to 
the Board, the body has reached out to civil liber-
ties advocates on both sides of the aisle, including 
such organizations as the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU), the Center for Democracy an 
Technology (CDT), the American Conservative 
Union, and the Markle Foundation.142 
138 Jane Horvath & Alexander Joel, Editorial—Shar-
ing Necessary Data While Protecting Privacy, Wash. 
Post, Dec. 18, 2006, available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/17/
AR2006121700683.html. 
139 Ibid.
140 Balancing Civil Liberties, supra note 119. 
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
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One remaining problem is that civil liberties advo-
cates, as well as members of Congress, continue 
to view security and civil liberties as inevitable 
trade-offs. However, the ISE Privacy Guidelines 
as PCLOB adopt the refreshing position that en-
hancing security through increased information 
sharing need not compromise privacy and other 
legal rights. As Alexander Joel, Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Officer of the ODNI remarked, “It is 
our view that you can do both and you have to 
do both.”143 Violations of privacy and other legal 
rights must be addressed with seriousness and 
consistency, though not at the expense of discour-
aging activities that will make the nation safer. By 
increasing information sharing and providing bod-
ies for oversight functions, the structure of the ISE 
maintains a watchful eye over government activ-
ity while also reducing privacy invasions caused 
by the very threat of terrorist attacks. 
II. Information Sharing Across Critical Com-
munities
Defense
The Department of Defense (DoD), whose mis-
sions depend upon coordination and agility for 
success, has taken a natural lead in improving in-
formation sharing. The DoD enters the ISE with 
a sizeable budget and a capacity to conduct so-
phisticated information technology research. Its 
experience in synchronizing the needs of military 
personnel with the capabilities of military intel-
ligence agencies and foreign allies has prepared 
the Department for the challenges of effective 
data sharing across participating communities of 
the ISE. 
Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
underscored the value of reliable information as a 
vital asset in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
Coordinating battlefield activity and orchestrating 
strategies employed by U.S. troops with those of 
143 Shaun Waterman, Analysis: DNI Debates Privacy 
Rule Changes, UPI, Aug. 21, 2006. 
supporting allies depend as heavily upon effective 
field communication as upon warfighter prepared-
ness and skill. The unique challenges of counter-
insurgency operations, as opposed to conventional 
offensive missions, have also emphasized the need 
for improved access to information. Increased av-
enues of communication enable troops to spread 
information on insurgents’ locations and capabili-
ties and enhance awareness of imminent threats. 
The “need-to-know” approach to information 
management, which the ISE is designed to trans-
form into a “need to share” culture, has proven 
inadequate to support the DoD’s operations. Mili-
tary commanders assert that “stovepipe” systems, 
where data flows along “top down” vertical path-
ways on a very limited basis, prevent warfighters 
from receiving sufficient and reliable data. They 
also pinpoint inadequate access to information as 
the cause of a number of tactical errors on the bat-
tlefield.144 “We have bombed things we shouldn’t 
have bombed,” Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Michael 
Ennis, former Defense Intelligence Agency Direc-
tor for Human Intelligence, has stated frankly.145 
He explained that in certain cases, errors have oc-
curred because information could not be accessed 
from the databases where it was stored, not be-
cause the information had never been acquired146. 
The ability of Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 
to conduct accurate homeland security missions is 
also jeopardized by a lack of effective information 
sharing policies. In the event of a terrorist attack 
or natural disaster, NORTHCOM would need to 
collaborate with first responders and other state 
and local officials that have struggled to obtain 
requisite clearances for accessing and dissemi-
nating information in a restricted “need to know” 
system.147
144 Grace Jean, Information Miscues Lead to Bad 
Targeting Decisions, National Defense, Aug. 1, 2006, 
available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/is-
sues/2006/August/InformationMiscuesLead.htm [hereinaf-
ter Jean]. 
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Press Release, Swan Island Networks, Inc., Swan 
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John Grimes, DoD Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Net-
works and Information Integration, urges that in-
formation be “given the same level of emphasis as 
traditional weapon systems such as guns, tanks, 
ships and airplanes.”148 He considers access to in-
formation critical to success on the ground and has 
affirmed that “[l]everaging the power of informa-
tion will provide the agility to deal with uncertain-
ty, make better decisions faster and act sooner.”149 
However, the success of military efforts to deploy 
information as a weapon will hinge upon the fed-
eral government’s ability to intensify the flow of 
terrorism and homeland security information to 
the DoD, as well as to ensure the accuracy and 
security of shared data. Interagency cooperation 
through the ISE will therefore comprise a critical 
component of the DoD’s strategy to synthesize 
information from a multiplicity of sources and 
provide war-fighters with a more comprehensive 
understanding of security threats.
Admiral Poindexter’s Attempt to Improve De-
fense Information Capabilities
Before the attacks of September 11, 2001, exposed 
the need to strengthen security by reforming infor-
mation policies, the DoD had experimented with 
programs to enhance data collection and analysis. 
In 1996, the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (DARPA) issued a Broad 
Agency Announcement (BAA) communicating 
the DoD’s objective of developing technology that 
would enable the Department to “identify poten-
tial future crises and our options for preemption 
and prevention.”150 
Island Networks Will Participate in JWID—Premier 
Interagency and Military Interoperability Event (June 14, 
2004), available at http://www.swanisland.net/news/releas-
es/032904-01.html [hereinafter Press Release, Swan Island 
Networks]. 
148 Dawn Onley, Barriers to Info Sharing Remain: 
Interview with Defense Department CIO John Grimes, 
Government Computer News, Sept. 11, 2006, available 
at http://www.gcn.com/print/25_27/41900-1.html [herein-
after Onley]. 
149 Ibid.
150 Scott Berinato, Poindexter Comes in from the 
By 1997, Project Genoa had been established to 
coordinate several DARPA initiatives involving 
the research and development of sophisticated 
information technology.151 Some of the initia-
tives launched under Project Genoa were aimed 
at supplementing human analysis capabilities and 
facilitating information sharing.152 During the late 
1990s, DARPA collaborated with Virginia com-
pany Syntek Technologies on Project Genoa, pro-
viding an opportunity to Admiral John Poindexter, 
then Syntek’s vice president, to become closely 
involved in the DoD’s budding information tech-
nology research.153 
For Poindexter, Project Genoa’s goal of enabling 
the Pentagon to take preemptive security mea-
sures was reminiscent of his experiences as White 
House military assistant, and later national se-
curity adviser, under the Reagan administration. 
Following John Hinckley Jr.’s failed 1981 assas-
sination attempt on President Reagan, Poindexter 
developed an interest in “crisis preplanning” and 
established a White House “crisis preplanning 
group” that discussed the use of information tech-
nology to forecast security threats.154 However, 
the group’s discussions faded in importance as the 
nation’s political machinery became embroiled 
in the controversies surrounding the Iran-Contra 
Affair and Poindexter’s central role in the scan-
dal was revealed.155 Not long after, Poindexter 
was convicted of five felonies, including perjur-
Cold: The man behind the government’s canceled antiter-
rorism Total Information Awareness program explains for 
the first time what went wrong and how, in fact, it may not 
really have been canceled after all, CIO, Aug. 1, 2004, Vol. 
17, No. 20 [hereinafter Berinato]. 
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Total Business Awareness: The Corporate 
Contracting Behind John Poindexter’s Total Information 
Awareness Program, Multinational Monitor, Jan. 1, 
2003, at 21 [hereinafter Total Business Awareness]. 
154 Berinato, supra note 150.
155 George Edmonson, Poindexter’s new Caldron: 
Senators Suspect Admiral in Terrorism Wager Plan, The 
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, July 31, 2003, at 15A 
[hereinafter Edmonson]. 
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ing to Congress.156 Though his convictions were 
later overturned on grounds that prosecutors had 
violated Poindexter’s right against self-incrimina-
tion,157 his political career appeared to have come 
to a close.
In January 2002, however, after Poindexter had 
collaborated with DARPA for five years as the 
vice president of Syntek, the Pentagon hired him 
to direct its information technology research.158 By 
this time, Project Genoa had evolved into a pro-
gram called Total Information Awareness (TIA), 
a multi-dimensional data-mining project that em-
braced Poindexter’s strategy of managing terrorist 
threats preemptively.159 
The primary objective of TIA was to develop the 
technological capability to track terrorists’ prepa-
rations for planned attacks. Software designed as 
part of the TIA program would enable computers 
to search a high volume of commercial transac-
tions for activities that, while alone may seem 
innocent, together form a pattern suggesting an 
individual is involved in planning acts of terror-
ism.160 Information yielded from the searches 
would be shared with appropriate intelligence and 
law enforcement officials so that potential terror-
ists could be identified and intercepted before the 
threat of attack became imminent. As Poindexter 
explained, “If terrorist organizations are going to 
plan and execute attacks against the United States, 
their people must engage in transactions, and they 
will leave signatures in this information space.”161 
By searching for series of transactions that signal 
terrorist activity rather than investigating individ-
uals to determine if they match a “terrorist pro-
file,” TIA had the potential to spotlight suspicious 
activities of individuals not yet known to intelli-
gence agencies. 
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Total Business Awareness, supra note 153.
159 Berinato, supra note 150.
160 William New, The Poindexter Plan, The Nation-
al Journal, Sept. 7, 2002, Vol. 34, No. 36. 
161 Ibid.
An operational TIA would have required the de-
velopment of technologies facilitating large-scale 
government surveillance of international commer-
cial transactions. Airline ticket purchases, hotel res-
ervations, and medical records, as well as informa-
tion about credit cards, passports, driver’s licenses, 
and gun purchases162 were some of the transactions 
TIA sought to monitor in order to decipher patterns 
of suspicious behavior. Some reports indicated that 
information gathered from transaction searches 
would be by surveillance obtained from highly so-
phisticated cameras installed in public areas.163 
In addition to data mining, TIA also involved ini-
tiatives to improve information sharing. One at-
tempt to encourage policy experts to share their 
insights was a developing program known as 
FutureMAP. The goal of FutureMAP was to es-
tablish an electronic futures market in which ex-
perts could wager on hypothetical political and 
economic events.164 The possibility of winning a 
wager would provide an incentive for policy and 
terrorism experts to participate actively and offer 
accurate predictions. At the same time, informa-
tion gathered on the experts’ collective predic-
tions would be valuable to policymakers in as-
sessing the likelihood that particular events would 
or would not occur.165 Poindexter urged that inno-
vative measures for collecting information would 
significantly enhance the nation’s security against 
terrorist threats. He insisted, “We must become 
much more efficient and more clever in the ways 
we find new sources of data, mine information 
from the new and old, generate information, make 
it available for analysis, convert it to knowledge, 
and create actionable options.”166
162 Michael J Sniffen, Pentagon’s Terrorism Research 
Lives on at Other Agencies, USA Today, Feb. 22, 2004, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/tech-
policy/2004-02-22-tia-lives-on_x.htm [hereinafter Sniffen, 
Pentagon’s Terrorism Research]. 
163 Daniel Weintraub, Too Much Information: Feds 
Can’t Get Enough of It, Sacramento Bee, Nov. 19, 2002, 
at B7. 
164 Berinato, supra note 150.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
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Understanding the Failure of Total Informa-
tion Awareness
Congress’s awareness of the FutureMAP program 
instigated the unraveling of most TIA initiatives 
and led to the rapid dissolution of Poindexter’s 
office. Though TIA and its predecessor, Project 
Genoa, had received some $42 million in funding 
over a five-year period167 and would have received 
$8 million more by 2007,168 members of Congress 
of both parties were dismayed by the civil liberties 
implications of Poindexter’s information technol-
ogy initiatives.169 In particular, FutureMAP was 
not viewed as an innovative sharing tool, but 
rather as a disturbing gambling proposal. Cali-
fornia Senator Barbara Boxer opined that there 
was “something very sick about” the program.170 
When the website of an independent contractor 
involved in the project listed the assassination of 
Yasser Arafat and the overthrow of Jordan’s King 
Abdullah II as examples of events on which wa-
gers could be placed on FutureMAP, Democratic 
Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon criticized the pro-
gram as “a federal betting parlor on atrocities and 
terrorism.”171 Poindexter insisted that such futures 
would not have been permitted on FutureMAP and 
that the program had been gravely misunderstood. 
He claimed that the information appearing on the 
contractor’s website had offered “extremely bad 
examples [of the FutureMAP program] that had 
not been approved”172 by the DoD. Nevertheless, 
Congress deemed the program “unbelievably stu-
pid” and decided to shut it down within twenty-
four hours. 
167 Berinato, supra note 150.
168 Jim Mannion, Poindexter to Resign: Defense Of-
ficial, Agence France Presse, July 31, 2003 [hereinafter 
Mannion].
169 Ibid.
170 George Edmonson, Poindexter to Quit Job at 
Pentagon, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Aug. 
1, 2003.
171 Michael J Sniffen, Poindexter Says He Hopes 
Congress Will Save Part of his Terrorism Research, Asso-
ciated Press, Aug. 14, 2003 [hereinafter Sniffen, Poindex-
ter Says He Hopes]. 
172 Ibid.
Poindexter’s data mining strategies likewise re-
ceived an unfavorable reception from Congress. 
Several vocal Republicans considered the strategy 
“absurd,” with then Senate minority leader Tom 
Daschle denouncing TIA as “perhaps the most ir-
responsible, outrageous, and poorly thought-out 
of anything that I have heard the administration 
propose to date.”173 Over Poindexter’s objections, 
his technology program was renamed “Terror-
ism Information Awareness.”174 Though the DoD 
maintained that all legal restrictions on the collec-
tion and use of personally identifiable information 
would guide TIA programs, public relations initia-
tives were not sufficient to quell virulent reactions 
to Poindexter’s programs. Public interest and civil 
liberties advocates lamented the difficulty of pre-
venting and detecting abuse of data mining tech-
nology and argued that Poindexter’s programs 
blurred the boundaries between the national secu-
rity agencies of the military, intelligence, and law 
enforcement communities.175 
At the same time, editorialists and members of the 
public criticized TIA as a massive operation for 
spying and collecting data records on law-abiding 
Americans without warrants or probable cause.176 
Represented by a logo containing the pyramid and 
eye that appear on the back of a dollar bill and 
the motto, “Knowledge is power,” TIA was con-
demned by the media as an alarming government 
effort to create an “Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ soci-
ety.”177 In response to Poindexter’s controversial 
173 Berinato, supra note 150.
174 Ted Bunker, Capital Focus: DARPA, Like It or 
Not, Must Push Envelope, The Boston Herald, Aug. 4, 
2003, at 27. 
175 John Markoff, Poindexter’s Still a Technocrat, 
Still a Lightning Rod, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2003, available 
at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=techno
logy&res=9A07E4DF1530F933A15752C0A9659C8B63 
[hereinafter Markoff]. 
176 Siobhan Gorman, Adm. Poindexter’s Total Aware-
ness, Nat’l Journal, May 8, 2004, Vol. 36, No. 19 [here-
inafter Gorman]. 
177 Bob Keefe, Poindexter: Domestic Monitoring 
Program May Come Back, Cox News Service, Apr. 20, 
2004.
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less, Congress discontinued funding for TIA in 
September 2003, several weeks after Poindexter 
resigned from office.184 Poindexter would later 
explain that anxiety over TIA reflected a deficit 
of public awareness about terrorism and national 
security policy, which he referred to as a “failure 
of public diplomacy.”185 
Despite Congress’s unwillingness to openly con-
sider the merits of Poindexter’s research, it per-
mitted the transfer of some of his projects, esti-
mated at a cost of approximately $64 million,186 to 
classified, or “black,”187 elements of the defense 
budget that defy public awareness. Congress’s de-
cision offered a rapid response to public outcry but 
in the long-term, deepened the anxieties of civil 
liberties advocates and citizens concerned about 
privacy. Unlike TIA, the classified programs are 
no longer subject to public monitoring and lack 
the degree of transparency necessary to prevent 
the abuse or misuse of information. Requiring 
that the DoD conduct information technology in 
secret also prevents the Department from foster-
ing public confidence in new security strategies. 
Steve Aftergood of the Federation of American 
Scientists has referred to Congress’s decision as 
a “shell game” and suggested that the classified 
DoD programs may be conducting research indis-
tinguishable from Poindexter’s TIA, minus public 
scrutiny.188
The collapse of TIA was arguably triggered as 
much by controversy surrounding Poindexter’s po-
litical history as by ill reception to his unorthodox 
technological proposals. When the goals of TIA 
clashed with civil liberties agendas, memories of 
Poindexter’s involvement in the Iran-Contra Af-
184 Michael J. Sniffen, Poindexter Resigns, Says 
His Terrorism Research Was Misunderstood, Associated 
Press, Aug. 13, 2003.
185 Gorman, supra note 176. 
186 Sniffen, Pentagon’s Terrorism Research, supra 
note 162.
187 Hiawatha Bray, A Wasted Opportunity in War on 
Terror, Boston Globe, Aug. 15, 2005, at E2.
188 Sniffen, Pentagon’s Terrorism Research, supra 
note 162.
programs, websites belonging to Cryptome, San 
Francisco Weekly, and several private individuals 
began to collect and list information about Poin-
dexter, including his address, telephone numbers, 
email address, and home photos.178 Stephen De-
Voy, a computer scientist who created a website 
called the “John Poindexter Awareness Office” in 
November 2002, argued that such forms of Inter-
net protest were designed to “mak[e] him [Poind-
exter] feel watched in the same way other people 
would feel watched”179 by TIA programs. 
Amid the controversy, the DoD affirmed that tech-
nologies being developed by Poindexter’s office 
were not the basis of a domestic spying system 
and that their use would be guided by legitimate 
policies to protect the nation against terrorist 
strikes. In late 2002, Rumsfeld suggested that the 
public outcry had severely misrepresented TIA’s 
programs, commenting, “The hype and alarm ap-
proach is a disservice to the public.”180 Poindex-
ter defended his research programs by explain-
ing that data-mining technologies were not to be 
used to amass government data records on private 
individuals but rather to aid human intelligence 
analysis capabilities by identifying patterns of 
suspicious behavior.181 He claimed his office was 
aware that it would not receive “an uncontrolled 
flow of information”182 and stated that privacy 
and civil liberties policies would necessarily limit 
the use of new technologies. He also emphasized 
the importance of continued funding for TIA re-
search and reminded policymakers that his office 
was also responsible for several non-controver-
sial programs for improving information sharing 
and foreign language translation.183 Neverthe-
178 William Reitz, Poindexter’s Past Haunts TIA 
Program, California Policy St. Univ., Feb. 28, 2003. 
179 Puzzanghera, Turning Tables on Government: 
Web Site Posting Data on Database Monitor, San Jose 
Mercury News, Dec. 19, 2002. 
180 Derrick Z Jackson, Who’s Watching the Watch-
ers?, Boston Globe, Nov. 22, 2002, at A25. 
181 Markoff, supra note 175.
182 Berinato, supra note 150.
183 Sniffen, Poindexter Says He Hopes, supra note 
171. 
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fair contributed to a sense of mistrust regarding 
the expansion of information technology research. 
Though Poindexter graduated first in his class at 
the Naval Academy in 1958, possesses a doctor-
ate in nuclear physics, and is credited with having 
superior computer expertise,189 he is criticized as 
“politically tone-deaf.”190 Dr. John Prados, a mili-
tary historian at the National Security Archive, 
summarized perceptions of Poindexter with his 
claim that “From the beginning Poindexter has 
been a technocrat involved with the manipulation 
of information.”191 
An expert on electronic records at the of Univer-
sity of Michigan’s School of Information named 
David A. Wallace argued that Poindexter’s past 
indicated a propensity to use technical expertise 
to circumvent safeguards on civil liberties. “When 
faced with a system of checks and balances [dur-
ing the Reagan administration], he [Poindexter] 
decided to act illegally. What does this say about 
the person who we are putting in charge of design-
ing the most comprehensive surveillance system 
on U.S. citizens ever?,”192 Wallace asserted when 
controversy over TIA flared in January 2003. Wal-
lace, as well as other critics of Poindexter’s char-
acter, however, failed to carefully consider the 
purpose of the TIA program. Poindexter’s technol-
ogy would have enabled the government to con-
duct high-powered searches to discover patterns 
within vast amounts of data but was not designed 
to support massive databases warehousing private 
information about American citizens. In his resig-
nation letter, Poindexter expressed his “regret that 
we have not been able to…reassure the public that 
we do not intend to spy on them.”193 
Democratic Senator Byron L. Dorgan of North 
Dakota, who was vocal in denouncing TIA, has 
insisted, “The issue wasn’t Poindexter. The is-
189 Edmonson, supra note 155.
190 Markoff, supra note 175.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 Sniffin, Poindexter Says He Hopes, supra note 
171.
sue was preposterous ideas that in some cases 
threatened the privacy of the American people.”194 
However, both Poindexter and Rumsfeld have 
acknowledged that Poindexter’s controversial 
past made it difficult for the DoD to engage in an 
informed dialogue with Congress and the public 
concerning TIA.195 One indication that the de-
bate over TIA had been clouded by judgments of 
Poindexter’s political past was that similar DoD 
technology research projects had been led by John 
Hamre, President Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, with little controversy. Hamre did expe-
rience difficulties in his work, though his prob-
lems stemmed not from public opposition but 
rather from the technical complexity of develop-
ing pattern-detecting technology. In fact, Hamre 
acknowledged that under Poindexter’s direction, 
the DoD had made significant strides in resolving 
technical challenges as well as developing priva-
cy safeguards that he considered “much stronger 
than the privacy protection we have now” for the 
handling of personally identifiable information.196 
Former Deputy Attorney General and 9/11 Com-
missioner Jamie Gorelick concurred, admitting 
that “If it [TIA] hadn’t been at the Pentagon, if it 
hadn’t been John Poindexter, it might have gotten 
a different reception.”197
Before Congress had even considered drafting a 
legal framework to support an information shar-
ing environment, Poindexter recognized the in-
tegral role of information collection, analysis, 
and sharing in managing terrorist threats to U.S. 
national security. In his view, privacy safeguards 
would necessarily regulate technological capabili-
ties developed by TIA. However, he considered it 
more appropriate that elected officials, rather than 
DARPA’s technical specialists, determine the bal-
ance between security needs and civil liberties pro-
tection demanded by the Constitution. At a mini-
194 Carl Hulse & Thom Shanker, Senators Want 
to Block Spending on Terrorist Initiatives, N.Y. Times, 
Aug.14, 2003, at 20. 
195 Mannion, supra note 168.
196 Gorman, supra note 176.
197 Ibid.
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mum, continued funding of Poindexter’s research 
would have provided policymakers with a greater 
variety of security tools, which likely would have 
aided current interagency information sharing ini-
tiatives. Though Poindexter has never officially 
stated that TIA could have prevented September 
11th, the 9/11 Commission identified an inability 
to “connect the dots” as a primary government 
failure leading up to the terrorist attacks. TIA 
would have provided analysts with many more 
“dots” and assisted them in deciding which were 
important and how they should be connected. 
DoD Collaboration with the Intelligence Com-
munity
At the time when TIA faced imminent collapse, 
the DoD was also working on other initiatives 
to enhance horizontal data sharing and replace 
“stovepipe” mentalities with information policies 
better suited to support modern missions. By July 
2003, the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA) in Arlington, Virginia had broadened ci-
vilian agencies’ access to terrorism information by 
integrating eighteen federal agencies into the Pen-
tagon’s Defense Switched Network (DSN).198 Lt. 
Gen. Harry Raduege Jr., DISA’s director, also led 
projects to increase the availability of DoD band-
width for the improvement of communications in 
anti-terrorism operations.199 
Since the enactment of the IRTPA, the DoD has 
taken steps to implement the ISE by advancing 
its relationship with the Intelligence Commu-
nity (IC) and developing a more comprehensive 
strategy for information sharing. DoD CIO John 
Grimes has stated that he is “aggressively collabo-
rating”200 with the IC through frequent meetings 
198 John Rhea, DoD Information Network Expands to 
Support Anti-Terrorism Activities, Military & Aerospace 
Electronics, July 1, 2003, No. 7, Vol. 14. 
199 Ibid.
200 Wilson P. Dizard III, DOD, Spy Agencies Expand 
Sharing Plans: Project Aims to Cross Classification Levels, 
Government Computer News, Mar. 19, 2007, Vol. 26, 
No. 6 [hereinafter Dizard]. 
with retired Air Force Major General Dale Meyer-
rose, who has served as CIO of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) since 
August 2005. General Richard B. Myers, former 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Con-
gress in 2005 that increased collaboration between 
defense and intelligence officials will enable the 
DoD to “incorporat[e] Intelligence Campaign 
plans into Operational plans” and better “inform 
the intelligence community of what the war-fight-
ers need.”201 
In their conferences, CIOs Grimes and Meyerrose 
have concentrated on fostering trust between the 
DoD and the ODNI and building upon technical 
improvements in defense and intelligence infor-
mation sharing that have occurred over the last 
18 months.202 In March 2006, the DoD and ODNI 
established the Unified Cross Domain Manage-
ment Office to oversee the merger of hundreds of 
information systems, holding data of various clas-
sification levels, into approximately twenty basic 
cross domain solutions (CDS).203 The primary 
mission of the Office, which is headquartered in 
Adelphi, Maryland, is to facilitate the movement 
of classified information across secure federal net-
works.204 Meyerrose has described the creation of 
the Unified Cross Domain Management Office as 
“the first of many combined endeavors” that the 
ODNI and DoD will initiate to fuse defense and 
intelligence information capabilities “into closer 
alignment as we move to a more integrated, col-
laborative enterprise.”205 
The operations of the Unified Cross Domain Man-
agement Office are facilitated by the Certifica-
tion and Accreditation (C&A) Transformation, a 
201 Fiscal 2006 Appropriations: Defense, CQ Con-
gressional Testimony, Apr. 27, 2005 [hereinafter Fiscal 
2006 Appropriations]. 
202 Dizard, supra note 200.
203 Ibid.
204 DoD CIO and DNI CIO Establish New Office 
to Enhance Information Sharing Between DoD and the 
Intelligence Community, Pub. Interest Services, Mar. 8, 
2007. 
205 Dizard, supra note 200.
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joint DoD and IC initiative seeking to standardize 
procedures governing access to information. By 
ensuring that certifications and accreditations ap-
ply across intelligence and defense agencies, the 
Transformation will simplify security controls 
and avoid duplicative “re-accreditation” proce-
dures.206 After eight-months of collaboration with 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST), Commonwealth Partners, as well as 
independent contractors and academia, Grimes 
and Meyerrose have developed common goals 
to guide the reform of C&A procedures.207 Their 
objectives, announced in March 2007, include 
diminishing the numbers of IC Protection Levels 
and DoD Mission Assurance Categories (MAC) 
by creating common “trust levels.”208 Coordina-
tion of security control procedures will be further 
supplemented by the formation of joint risk man-
agement policies209 that cultivate a culture of sup-
port and collaboration.
Integration of DoD and IC information handling 
procedures was advanced in July 2007, when 
Grimes and Meyerrose signed a memorandum 
of agreement setting forth a joint strategy for im-
proving defense and intelligence interoperability. 
The strategy guides implementation of a services-
based information environment that will be man-
aged by a cooperative body co-chaired by the 
Grimes and Meyerrose.210 By offering services, 
rather than “stand alone applications”211 to support 
206 DNI & DoD Chief Information Officers An-
nounce Certification and Accreditation Transformation 
Goals, PR Newswire-US Newswire, Mar. 27, 2007, 
available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/sto-
ries.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/03-27-
2007/0004554328&EDATE=. 
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Press Release, Department of Defense, DoD and 
DNI Chief Information Officers Establish Shared Vision 
for a Joint Services Based Environment to Enable Infor-
mation Sharing,(July 19, 2007), available at http://www.
defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11146. 
211 Ibid.
the DoD and IC’s respective missions, the strategy 
adopts a commercial approach to improving data 
flow through the use of Web-based technology. 
The agreement and “services oriented” strategy 
are likely to serve as a sharing model for other 
federal ISE participants. 
DoD Information Sharing Strategy and Net 
Centric Operations
Continued collaboration between the defense and 
intelligence communities has shaped the DoD 
strategy for implementation of the ISE, which was 
released in May 2007. The DoD Information Shar-
ing Strategy, which sets forth a vision for sharing 
with federal, SLT, foreign, and private sector part-
ners, was created by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff through 
close collaboration with ISE program manager 
Ambassador Ted McNamara. The DoD Strategy 
provides objectives and values that will guide the 
incremental processes of creating a “transparent, 
open, agile, and…trusted” information environ-
ment.212 
The strategy is largely the result of the Pentagon 
Office of Transformation’s (OFT’s) numerous 
studies analyzing the role of information sharing 
in military missions and defense actions requiring 
interagency cooperation, such as the response to 
Hurricane Katrina.213 These studies highlighted 
concrete benefits of information exchange and ex-
plored ways to increase sharing. The studies also 
emphasized that past efforts to improve defense 
communications have consisted primarily of in-
vestments in technology rather than organizational 
or structural changes.214 According to John Garts-
ka, assistant director of concept and operations at 
the OFT, the studies exposed the need to eliminate 
212 Press Release, Department of Defense, New DoD 
Strategy Outlined for Information Sharing, (May 4, 2007), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.
aspx?releaseid=10831. 
213 Michael Sirak, DoD Expands Studies of Combat 
to Understand Networked Forces, C41 News, Feb. 2, 2006. 
214 Ibid.
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the “chasm” between information sharing technol-
ogy and policy, a military need he considers “just 
as important as stealth.”215 
Among the DoD’s goals to improve information 
sharing, the DoD Information Sharing Strategy 
prioritizes four aims for achieving greater in-
tegration of information capabilities. First, the 
DoD will intensify efforts to shift from a “need to 
know” culture to a “need to share” environment by 
providing incentives for sharing and ensuring that 
DoD leaders promote this key cultural change.216 
Second, the DoD will “achieve an extended en-
terprise,” which includes all participants of a mis-
sion, that functions with greater coordination and 
agility.217 Third, the DoD will expand capabilities 
to manage unexpected events and sharing part-
ners, “proactively plan for information sharing,” 
and preempt potential challenges.218 Finally, the 
DoD will concentrate on building trust with its 
sharing partners.219 
Though the DoD Information Sharing Strategy is 
only a twenty-four-page document addressing in-
formation sharing in broad terms, a more detailed, 
comprehensive plan for guiding the DoD’s role 
in implementing the ISE is expected in October 
or November of 2007. This supplementary report 
will address governance, resources, technology, 
and infrastructure issues involved in the informa-
tion sharing policy transformation, as well as the 
culture, organization, and philosophies that are 
critical to its success.220 
The DoD approach to information sharing is in-
formed by the Pentagon’s decision to modify 
military strategies to accommodate Net Centric 
215 Ibid.
216 Dept. of Defense, DoD Information Sharing 
Strategy (May 4, 2007), available at www.defenselink.
mil/cio-nii/docs/InfoSharingStrategy.pdf. 
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 Daniel Friedman, Strategy Set for Sharing Infor-
mation, Federal Times, May 14, 2007, at 9. 
operations, a goal embodied in the DoD’s Joint 
Vision 2020.221 The concept of Net Centric War-
fare (NCW) combines battlefield strategy with 
Information Age technology to augment military 
capabilities for coordinated decision-making. En-
gaging in NCW involves “networking” forces, on 
“all levels of command and control down to the 
individual soldier,” to receive real-time battlefield 
information and achieve synchronized situational 
awareness.222 U.S. forces are striving to move to-
ward networking. However, NCW as described 
in Joint Vision 2020 will require an expensive 
transformation and technological capabilities that 
are currently in the research and development 
phase.223 
The key to success as a networked force is im-
proved information sharing among the DoD’s 
internal forces and organizations as well as its 
foreign allies. Kenneth Krieg, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logis-
tics, has emphasized that networks and informa-
tion sharing “are the lifeblood of military and civil 
operations.”224 The DoD has therefore issued a Net-
Centric Data Strategy that relies upon networks to 
enhance coordination, information management, 
and interoperability.225 Because data net-centricity 
is “user-oriented,”226 the Net-Centric Data Strat-
egy encourages authorized participants to post 
information on DoD networks rapidly to ensure 
that it is available for users needing to pull data.227 
Thus, the Strategy avoids a “pre-formatted, tightly 
221 Gregory Belenky, et al, Cognitive Readiness in 
Network-Centric Operations, Parameters, Spring 2005. 
222 Ibid.
223 Michael J Golden, JNN—Network Selected as 
2006 IDGA Network Centric Warfare Award Winner, Army 
Communicator, Sept. 22, 2006, Vol. 31, No. 4. 
224 Defense Science Board Examines Military Impli-
cations of Google, Blogs, Inside the Pentagon, Apr. 13, 
2006, Vol. 22, No. 15 [hereinafter Defense Science Board]. 
225 Dept. of Defense, DoD Net-Centric Data 
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mil/cio-nii/docs/Net-Centric-Data-Strategy-2003-05-092.
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226 Onley, supra note 148.
227 Ibid.
.	Political	Structure	 19
controlled approach” to data management by urg-
ing that users “post [information] before process-
ing.”228 Though the Net Strategy was disseminated 
before he assumed his position as DoD CIO, John 
Grimes has advanced net-centricity by directing 
the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and 
the Defense Information Systems Agency to es-
tablish a center for facilitating data sharing across 
DoD organizations.229 In addition, the DoD is 
implementing a Global Information Grid that will 
serve as a framework for net-centric operations 
among U.S. forces and foreign allies. When fully 
operational, the system will coordinate collabora-
tive decision-making, data management, and in-
formation services in a user-oriented “worldwide 
information network.”230
 
According to a 2006 Navy study, information 
sharing and the early development of net-centric 
technologies have resulted in “dramatic improve-
ments in performance,” even where networking 
efforts remain “limited.”231 However, the DoD 
faces challenges in ensuring information security 
in a networked system and promoting a culture 
of sharing. David S. Alberts, research director in 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Networks and Information Integration, has 
lamented, “Some older officers don’t want to get 
out of their comfort zone.”232 Overcoming hos-
tile mindsets, he suggested, will involve efforts to 
clearly define the concepts driving NCW and the 
benefits of increased sharing.233 Training, deter-
228 Ibid.
229 STRATCOM, DISA Plan New Center to Improve 
DoD Information Sharing, Inside the Pentagon, Dec. 7, 
2006, Vol. 22, No. 49. 
230 Joint Staff Directorate Calls for Multinational 
Info Sharing Review, Inside the Pentagon, Oct. 21, 
2004, Vol. 20, No. 43. 
231 Study: Net-Centric Enhancements Yielded ‘Dra-
matic’ Results in OEF, Inside the Pentagon, Mar. 15, 
2007, Vol. 23, No. 11. 
232 Peter Buxbaum, DoD Prepares to Leap Net-Cen-
tricity Gaps: IT Security, Change Management Among the 
Most Prominent, Gov’t Computer News, Vol. 25, No. 24 
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233 Ibid.
mined leadership, and incentive driven policies to 
share are factors that will play a key role in cre-
ating a more coordinated and integrated environ-
ment for defense information. 
Multinational Information Sharing
The need for improved interoperability among 
U.S. forces and coalition partners in the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) drives the DoD to de-
velop processes and technologies to advance the 
establishment of an international information 
sharing environment. In addition to promoting 
net-centric operations through the creation of the 
Global Information Grid (GIG), the DoD estab-
lished a Joint Program Office and multinational 
executive agent in 2005 to support the Pentagon’s 
Multi-National Information Sharing (MNIS) ef-
forts.234 
The U.S. has recently coordinated sharing initia-
tives with NATO allies through a system known 
as Link 016235 and through joint efforts to estab-
lish net-centricity. In addition, NATO, as well as, 
the national forces of “Australia, Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Sweden, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom” have participated in information shar-
ing tests and demonstrations with the U.S. mili-
tary.236 An organization known as the Multi-sensor 
Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Interoperability Co-
alition (MAJIIC) Project Working Group, which 
consists of representatives of U.S. Joint Forces 
Command (USJFCOM) and NATO’s Consulta-
tion, Command and Control Agency (NC3A), 
has advanced multinational sharing by hosting 
information exchange simulations and technology 
demonstrations.237 These events have provided an 
opportunity for U.S. military personnel and NATO 
allies to test emerging technology, understand the 
234 Fiscal 2006 Appropriations, supra note 201.
235 Onley, supra note 148.
236 Buxaum, supra note 232.
237 USJFCOM, Coalition Partners Seek MAJIIC 
Solution to Coalition ISR Interoperability, News from 
USJFCOM, Feb. 10, 2006, available at http://www.jfcom.
mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/pa021006.htm. 
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challenges of information exchange, and hone 
data sharing techniques. 
While information sharing efforts are expected 
to improve coordination with NATO forces, DoD 
CIO John Grimes has stressed that “[o]perations 
in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the need 
to…incorporate unanticipated coalition members 
and partners.”238 For example, U.S. Air Force Gen. 
Paul V. Hester has explained that information ex-
change with allies in the Pacific presents difficul-
ties as “the lack of a NATO-like structure” means 
“the United States must often deal with each na-
tion independently.”239 The MNIS, according to 
Grimes, is thus designed provide a “standardized 
means for sharing information with ad hoc coali-
tions.”240 
On a regional level, the DoD has conducted simu-
lation exercises between U.S. Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM) and South American forces, in-
cluding the Argentine Military and the Honduran 
Permanent Committee on Contingencies (CO-
PECO) in order test the effectiveness of emerging 
information technology in crisis situations.241 In 
Africa, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), 
along with representatives of Austria, Sweden, 
and Norway, has hosted a program called Africa 
Endeavor (AE) to integrate U.S. military informa-
tion capabilities with those of over twenty Afri-
can nations.242 While AE will likely assist a range 
of military operations, including humanitarian 
238 Onley, supra note 148.
239 Passing the Efficiency Test With Flexible, De-
ployable Comm, Air Force Communications Agency, 
June 1, 2007, http://public.afca.af.mil/news/story.
asp?id=123055539. 
240 Onley, supra note 148.
241 USSOUTHCOM Conducts Multinational Cri-
sis Management Experiment, United States Army 
News, Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://www.army.
mil/-news/2006/12/14/977-ussouthcom-conducts-multi-na-
tional-crisis-management-experiment/. 
242 Multinational Workshop to Integrate Commu-
nications Systems Among African Militaries, European 
Command Pub. Affairs, July 6, 2006, http://www.eucom.
mil/english/FullStory.asp?art=1044. 
and disaster responses, U.S. Air Force Brigadier 
General Thomas Verbeck has urged that the infor-
mation sharing program “will help USEUCOM 
achieve its goals [in the] war on terrorism, region-
al security and transformation.”243
In addition to engaging in multilateral efforts to 
improve sharing, the DoD has also cooperated 
with individual nations. Since 2006, the U.S. and 
Japan have explored networking mechanisms that 
will facilitate the sharing of missile defense data 
collected by each nation’s respective radars.244 
The two nations also reached a general security 
of military information agreement (GSOMIA) in 
May 2007 to promote the sharing of defense and 
intelligence information.245 Similarly, the U.S. 
and Canada have shared intelligence information 
on the North American maritime environment that 
will allow each nation to achieve “comprehensive, 
combined” awareness of vulnerabilities and secu-
rity threats.246 United States Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM), the North American Aero-
space Defense Command (NORAD), and Canada 
Command have additionally collaborated in train-
ing exercises designed to identify effective infor-
mation sharing processes for responses to home-
land security threats.247
Supporting Technology
The DoD’s strategic and organizational efforts to 
improve information sharing have been supple-
mented by IT development and innovative uses 
of existing technology. Many initiatives to im-
243 Ibid.
244 Takashi Imai Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan, U.S. to 
Boost Antiballistic Info Sharing, The Daily Yomiuri, Jan. 
15, 2006. 
245 3rd LD: Japan, U.S. Press N. Korea on Denuke 
Step, Allies Expand Data Sharing, Japan Policy & Poli-
tics, May 7, 2007.
246 U.S., Canada Developing Shared Maritime Intelli-
gence Picture, Inside the Pentagon, Nov. 20, 2003, Vol. 
19, No. 47. 
247 DND: Canada Command Exercises in Support of 
Civil Authorities, Canadian Corporate Newswire, Apr. 
11, 2007. 
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prove data collection, analysis, and sharing have 
been prompted by the need to assist war fighters 
in Afghanistan and Iraq in maintaining situational 
awareness and some have already had their effec-
tiveness tested on the battlefield. 
One effort to expand technical capabilities has 
centered on information sharing software in de-
velopment at Swan Island Networks, Inc., a five-
year old Portland, Oregon company that special-
izes in enabling organizations to share sensitive 
information across secure networks.248 In 2004, 
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) fea-
tured Swan Island Networks’ software in the Joint 
Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID), 
an esteemed annual event that evaluates emerging 
command and control, communications, comput-
ers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) technologies.249 Of particular interest to 
the DoD is Swan Island Networks’ SWARM tech-
nology, which facilitates the sharing of sensitive 
homeland security data by maintaining informa-
tion security across federal, state, and local net-
works.250 In addition to providing a secure system 
to connect organizations, SWARM can support 
NORTHCOM’s coordination of homeland de-
fense missions by transmitting alerts, enabling ex-
changes, and targeting users.251 
Emerging technology is also critical in support-
ing military operations abroad. U.S. Joint Forces 
Command (USJFCOM) has effectively relied 
upon the WebFile Server (WFS) developed by 
Xythos Software. The WFS enhances coordination 
and information sharing within the Cross Domain 
Collaborative Information Environment (CDCIE) 
that currently links U.S. and Coalition Forces in 
Iraq.252 The Web-based system provides a secure 
248 Press Release, Swan Island Networks, supra note 
147.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid.
252 U.S. Joint Forces Command Deploys Xythos to 
Support Multinational Forces in Iraq, Business Wire, 
Mar. 29, 2005. 
environment for document management and ex-
change by multiple users.253 The WFS also offers 
a “scalable collaboration application,”254 as it was 
specifically designed to support larger collabora-
tive environments such as the CDCIE. In addition 
to its use of Xythos Software, the DoD enhances 
communication among coalition partners through 
the Combined Enterprise Regional Informa-
tion Exchange System (CENTRIX), which links 
thousands of users representing more than sixty 
countries in order to improve the coordination of 
operations in Iraq.255 Army Brig. Gen. Jeffrey W. 
Foley has commented that use of CENTRIX is a 
key step toward moving from a “need to know” to 
a “need to share” culture between the U.S. and its 
foreign allies.256 According to Foley, the support 
provided by CENTRIX is “one of the most monu-
mental success stories in the history of joint and 
coalition war fighting.”257 
While integrating innovative software into the 
collaborative environments of its domestic and 
overseas operations, the DoD is also leveraging 
existing technology to meet emerging needs. In-
stant messaging, typically thought of as a civil-
ian recreational technology, has proven a useful 
tool for expanding communications across the 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines.258 The dis-
tinguishing feature of military instant messaging 
technology, much of which has been provided by 
the Washington company Bantu, Inc., is that the 
communications remain secure.259 
In Iraq, where web-based technology like Xythos 
software, as well as CENTRIX, e-mail, and vid-
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
255 Information Access Key in Terror War, CENT-
COM General Says, American Forces Press Service, 
Mar. 31, 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsar-
ticle.aspx?id=31057 [hereinafter Information Access Key]. 
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
258 Deborah Funk, Military Services to Enlist Instant 
Messaging Network, Federal Times, Apr. 10, 2006, at 8 
[hereinafter Funk]. 
259 Ibid.
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eo teleconferencing have all been integrated into 
military communications, secure chat rooms are 
also being established to allow rapid exchanges 
of information. Army Brig. Gen. Foley has stated 
that chat rooms, which simultaneously coordinate 
the instant messages of multiple users into a single 
conversation, have facilitated numerous military 
activities, including the dissemination of infor-
mation gathered from patrols and the tracking 
and striking of “lucrative target[s].”260 One of the 
greatest assets of instant communication technol-
ogy, he explained, is that they “effectively coordi-
nate the time-sensitive targeting process.”261
The need for greater sharing of terrorism and 
homeland security information has provided an 
impetus for creating a consolidated DoD instant 
messaging network that allows military personnel 
to target and communicate with users of dispa-
rate branches of the service. Since Bantu, Inc. has 
provided similar software to the Departments of 
Commerce, State, and Homeland Security, some 
government users predict that the ease and speed 
of instant communications systems will encourage 
the development of interagency instant messaging 
capabilities.262 Kenneth Krieg, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logis-
tics, has also stated that search engine technolo-
gies supporting “googling” and “blogging” activi-
ties “are making their way into military operations 
at all levels.”263 However, he added that the use of 
such technologies is experimental. “The full im-
plications of this revolution are as yet unknown 
and we have no clear direction and defined doc-
trine,”264 he claimed. 
While expanding its communication networks, the 
DoD has remained cognizant of the need for data 
security and continues to stress the risks of cyber 
threats. In 2007, the DoD decided to devote $2.5 
billion to projects on “information assurance,” 
260 Information Access Key, supra note 255.
261 Ibid.
262 Funk, supra note 258.
263 Defense Science Board, supra note 224.
264 Ibid.
which include the research and development of 
biometric identification systems.265 Currently, 
the DoD relies upon firewalls and technology re-
ferred to as “software patches”266 to prevent unau-
thorized access to data. However, DoD CIO John 
Grimes has recently stated that the frequency of 
Internet and e-mail attacks on defense data by 
hackers has increased dramatically.267 He claims 
that the department is “under attack 24 hours a 
day.”268 Grimes explained, “If you can’t protect 
information, you can’t share it.”269 Thus, as ISE 
implementation makes information sharing an 
increasing priority, the DoD may be expected to 
intensify its efforts to develop expanded security 
capabilities and sophisticated access controls.
Assessing Remaining Challenges
The DoD has launched numerous information 
sharing initiatives and is producing technology 
that will more effectively coordinate sharing with 
both internal and external partners. However, the 
Department still faces cultural hurdles and obsta-
cles to developing trust. Overcoming these chal-
lenges will be necessary if the DoD is to success-
fully promote a “need to share” environment. 
Though the DoD Information Strategy and the 
implementation plan due later this year should 
assist cultural transformation, available evidence 
indicates the need for the DoD to clarify, in practi-
cal terms, how information sharing should affect 
daily operations. In addition, the DoD must close 
gaps between emerging technology and personnel 
training. Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Michael Ennis 
has explained that in some cases, “The people in 
the field don’t have a clue that the [relevant] web 
site even exists, much less the ability to go find 
265 DoD Intertwines Data Security, Interoperability 
Challenges, Government Computer News, Mar. 19, 
2007, Vol. 26. No. 6. 
266 Onley, supra noe 148.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid.
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it.”270 Striking a balance between advancing infor-
mation sharing through technology research and 
implementing organizational strategies should 
therefore remain a priority. Technology alone will 
not be sufficient to deconstruct the “stovepipe sys-
tems” that DoD CIO John Grimes claims still im-
pedes information sharing efforts.271 
The DoD information sharing processes have also 
been criticized as inadequate in the context of 
homeland security. In 2004, a report by a Defense 
Science Board task force urged that the Pentagon 
“fundamentally rethink”272 homeland security 
information sharing and clarify its role vis-à-vis 
civilian agencies in this area. Critics have also 
pointed out that the DoD should intensify efforts 
to exchange information on critical infrastruc-
ture vulnerabilities to bolster the preparedness of 
NORTHCOM.273 
Homeland Security
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has played an integral role in pioneering efforts 
to increase vertical information sharing between 
federal and state, local, and tribal (SLT) ISE par-
ticipants. DHS has developed an increasingly 
successful partnership with state and local intel-
ligence fusion centers, enabling federal authori-
ties to more carefully integrate fine-grained in-
formation about domestic terror threats into their 
understanding of the nation’s security landscape. 
The Department has also endeavored to create a 
large-scale network to support federal and SLT 
communications on homeland security issues. 
The network, however, has encountered great dif-
ficulty in meeting the needs of its users and must 
be urgently improved if a fully operational ISE is 
to be implemented by 2009. 
270 Jean, supra note 144.
271 Onley, supra note 148.
272 DoD Urged to ‘Fundamentally Rethink’ Home-
land Security Info Sharing, Inside the Pentagon, Oct. 
14, 2004, Vol. 20, No. 42. 
273 Ibid.
“Fusing” Federal, State, and Local Terrorism 
Information
In response to its observation that a lack of verti-
cal communications had severely hampered the 
nation’s ability to connect evidence of the 9/11 
plot, the 9/11 Commission promoted the concept 
of state and local information fusion centers.274 
These information centers are designed to syn-
thesize, analyze, and share federal, state, and 
local information on homeland security issues. 
Since September 11, 2001, fusion centers have 
been established in forty-two states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In December 2005, President 
George W. Bush directed that these states and 
local institutions be integrated into the ISE, an 
effort that is largely coordinated by the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security’s (DHS) State and 
Local Fusion Center Implementation Plan (SLFC 
Plan).275 
By gathering, investigating, and sharing available 
local evidence, each fusion center contributes to 
the mosaic-like effort of forming a coherent pic-
ture of national homeland security threats. PM-
ISE Ted McNamara has referred to the work of 
fusion centers as a “critical part of the information 
sharing capability” and U.S. antiterrorism efforts. 
He has also emphasized that as federal and SLT 
entities “work[] towards an era of increasing col-
laboration” through implementation of the ISE, 
fusion centers are likely to emerge as examples of 
how strategic partnerships can result in tangible 
accomplishments.276 Similarly, Charles E. Allen, 
the DHS’ CIO, has referred to fusion centers as 
a “center of gravity”277 for information sharing 
across multiple levels of government.
274 Shane Harris, Fusion Centers Raise a Fuss, The 
Nat’l Journal, Feb. 10, 2007 [hereinafter Harris].
275 Ibid.
276 Officials Hold First Ever National Fusion Center, 
PR Newswire-US Newswire, Mar. 8, 2007 [hereinafter 
Officials Hold Fist Ever National Fusion Center].
277 Information Sharing, CQ Congressional Testi-
mony, Sept. 7, 2006 [hereinafter Information Sharing]. 
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Existing fusion centers differ greatly across states 
and localities in both size and the nature of their 
operations. Though some fusion centers concen-
trate on information sharing with federal entities, 
such as DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI), many others focus on enhancing local 
investigations of suspicious activity.278 States and 
localities have also devoted varying amounts of 
resources to their fusion centers. Therefore, some 
rely primarily upon human analysis while others 
have incorporated sophisticated software and data-
mining technology into their daily operations.279 
Most centers, however, collect their information 
from a variety of sources and seek to synthesize 
data gathered from public informants, the me-
dia, and local investigations.280 A fusion center in 
Phoenix, Arizona for example, has made regular 
use of a myriad of sources, including “police re-
ports…names, addresses, contact information, 
business cards, [and] tickets”281 in its attempt to 
analyze local homeland security threats. Other fu-
sion centers have reported using both “public and 
commercial databases” and “data discovery” soft-
ware, such as the Factual Analysis Criminal Threat 
(FACTS) program provided by LexisNexis.282 
While enhancing security through information 
analysis, fusion centers also amass a body of “ac-
tionable intelligence”283 for local law enforcement 
authorities and first responders. A fusion center 
278 Mary Beth Sheridan, & Spencer S. Hsu, Locali-
ties Operate Intelligence Centers to Pool Terror Data; 
‘Fusion’ Facilities Raise Privacy Worries as Wide Range 
of Information is Collected, Wash. Post, Dec. 31, 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar-
ticle/2006/12/30/AR2006123000238.html [hereinafter 
Sheridan]. 
279 Ibid.
280 Harris, supra note 274.
281 Sheridan, supra note 278.
282 Alice Lipowicz, Data Mining Gets a Makeover: 
Call It Fusion as New Tools Expand Hunt for Terrorists, 
Wash. Technology, Sept. 18, 2006 [hereinafter Lipow-
icz]. 
283 State and Local Information Sharing, CQ Con-
gressional Testimony, Mar. 14, 2007 [hereinafter State 
and Local Information Sharing]. 
called the Maryland Coordination and Analysis 
Center, which is located outside Baltimore, runs 
a twenty-four-hour “watch section” that tracks 
informants’ tips and real-time evidence of suspi-
cious activity. 284 Lt. Robert Fox, the co-program 
manager of a Los Angeles intelligence fusion cen-
ter, claims that fusion centers make it possible to 
“do what everyone calls ‘connecting the dots,’”285 
the intelligence analysis effort that the 9/11 Com-
mission had concluded was weak and uncoordi-
nated in the period leading up to the September 
11th attacks. 
Despite fusion centers’ varied approaches to ana-
lyzing intelligence information, the integration of 
fusion centers into the ISE requires some degree 
of uniformity across jurisdictions. The SLFC Plan, 
which was approved by Secretary Michael Chert-
off on June 7, 2006, offers a framework for coordi-
nating both horizontal information sharing across 
fusion centers as well as vertical sharing between 
fusion centers, state and local governments, and 
federal authorities. The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terror-
ism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 both provide 
statutory authority for DHS’ development of the 
SLFC Plan. To allow for continuity of operations 
and efficient integration of fusion centers into the 
ISE, DHS has relied heavily upon the President’s 
Information Sharing Guidelines in developing the 
policies outlined by the Plan.286 
According to DHS CIO Charles Allen, the goal 
of the SLFC plan is to “ensure that state and local 
officials are tied into the Department’s [of Home-
land Security] day-to-day operations” and that 
DHS officials are “embedded” in the daily work 
of fusion centers.287 The federal strategy for real-
284 Sheridan, supra note 278.
285 Lipowicz, supra note 282.
286 Homeland Security Information Network, CQ 
Congressional Testimony, Sept. 13, 2006 [hereinafter 
Homeland Security Information Network]. 
287 Fiscal 2008 Budget: DHS Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis, CQ Congressional Testimony, Feb. 14, 
2007 [hereinafter Fiscal 2008 Budget]. 
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izing this strategic partnership involves supple-
menting fusion center staffs with DHS personnel, 
who will assist local officials in collecting and an-
alyzing homeland security information. DHS rep-
resentatives will also facilitate the sharing of fu-
sion center information with federal intelligence, 
homeland security, and law enforcement authori-
ties. On the federal level, Allen, who considers the 
integration effort “one of the Department’s most 
important initiatives,”288 coordinates and oversees 
the federal/state networking process. Currently, 
DHS officials have been stationed in twelve fu-
sion centers across the country, including loca-
tions in Georgia, California, Louisiana, Maryland, 
and New York.289 
By providing personnel support to fusion centers 
across the country, the SLFC Plan embraces the 
notion that “one size does not fit all.”290 Instead, 
the Plan seeks to tailor federal efforts to the needs 
of specific fusion centers. DHS’ commitment to 
meeting the needs of individual fusion centers is 
reflected by its initiative to conduct detailed as-
sessments of fusion centers’ information strate-
gies, technological and analytic capabilities, data 
security, and mission concentrations. Upon com-
pletion of each study, DHS devises a set of rec-
ommendations on integrating the particular fusion 
center into the ISE. DHS also collaborates with 
the FBI, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Na-
tional Counter-Terrorism Center, and intelligence 
agencies to ensure that homeland security, law en-
forcement, and intelligence information gathered 
by fusion centers are all adequately and effective-
ly shared in the ISE.291 This collaborative effort 
enables the federal government to “speak[] with 
‘one voice’ to state and local partners.”292 By Sep-
288 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
289 Assessment of Information Sharing Centers, CQ 
Congressional Testimony, Sept. 7, 2006 [hereinafter As-
sessment of Information Sharing Centers]. 
290 Ibid.
291 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
292 Ibid.
tember 2006, DHS had conducted assessments of 
twelve fusion centers, including those located in 
Columbus, Ohio; Phoenix, Arizona; North Central 
Texas; Albany, NY; Richmond, VA; Springfield, 
IL; Tallahassee, FL; San Diego, CA; Los Ange-
les, CA; San Francisco, CA; and Sacramento, 
CA.293 In addition to DHS’ willingness to review 
the needs of individual fusion centers, the Depart-
ment has provided considerable policy and techni-
cal support, as well as funding totaling over $380 
million, in the period between 2001 and 2006.294
DHS’ leadership recognizes that successfully in-
tegrating fusion centers into the ISE will require 
a considerable amount of time and careful work. 
The SLFC Plan therefore sets forth a timetable 
that permits integration to occur at a gradual and 
manageable pace.295 The Plan has received praise 
for avoiding the temptation of setting unrealistic 
goals. In a September 7, 2006 hearing of the House 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Shar-
ing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Allen stated, 
“I want to promise only what we can deliver and 
expect only that which each center can provide to 
us.”296 
According to McNamara, integration of fusion 
centers into the ISE will allow the centers to re-
main directed by state and local entities while also 
guiding them to perform “primarily analytical” 
functions that aid national counter-terrorism and 
homeland security initiatives.297 McNamara envi-
sions the development of a genuine partnership 
between federal and fusion center analysts and 
continues to emphasize the importance of two-
way vertical information sharing. Just as local law 
enforcement officials require federal cooperation 
to effectively protect their jurisdictions from ter-
rorist activity, federal authorities are increasingly 
relying upon information gathered and analyzed 
293 Information Sharing, supra note 277.
294 Sheridan, supra note 278.
295 Assessment of Information Sharing Centers, supra 
note 289.
296 Ibid.
297 Sheridan, supra note 278.
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by local officials in order to detect homegrown 
terror plots.298 
In the long-term, DHS hopes to fulfill the President’s 
goal of establishing a National Network of Fusion 
Centers.299 Secretary Michael Chertoff explained to 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs on September 12, 2006, that 
such a Network would create a system wherein fed-
eral “intelligence and operations personnel [would 
be] at every state and major metropolitan fusion 
center in the United States, sitting in the same 
room, sharing and analyzing information and intel-
ligence in real time.”300 In March 2007, the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the 
DOJ, DHS, the FBI, and the Office of the Program 
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment 
advanced the President’s goal by hosting over 580 
attendees at the first annual National Fusion Cen-
ter Conference.301 The purpose of the conference 
was to discuss the potential establishment of a 
National Fusion Center and other mechanisms for 
coordinating federal analysis and use of informa-
tion provided by state and local fusion centers.302 
Secretary Michael Chertoff affirms that realizing a 
National Network of Fusion Centers is a priority 
for his Department. “Working together—leverag-
ing our networks, moving relevant information and 
intelligence quickly, and enabling rapid analytic 
and operational judgments,”303 he maintains, will 
be a critical asset to the nation’s security that DHS 
is working vigorously to implement.
Challenges of Vertical Information Sharing 
While the federal government has experienced 
early successes in improving vertical sharing, ef-
298 Assessment of Information Sharing, supra note 
289.
299 Fiscal 2008 Budget, supra note 287.
300 State and Local Information Sharing, supra note 
283. 
301 Officials Hold First Ever National Fusion Center, 
supra note 276.
302 Ibid.
303 Fiscal 2008 Budget, supra note 287.
forts to increase federal collaboration with fusion 
centers have illustrated the challenges of sharing 
across multiple levels of government in a feder-
alist system. Varying state law on the operation 
of fusion centers has compounded the difficulty 
of promoting some measure of uniformity across 
state and local homeland security initiatives.304 
Additionally, in a study conducted by the Nation-
al Governors Association, sixty-percent of state 
homeland security directors claimed they were 
“unhappy about the specificity of intelligence” 
provided by federal partners.305 These complaints 
suggest that the federal government has not ef-
fectively consolidated efforts to conduct vertical 
information sharing and that DHS’ collaboration 
with the IC, the FBI, and the Office of the Pro-
gram Manager should be strengthened. 
State and local fusion center officials claim that 
they receive “mixed and at times competing mes-
sages”306 from federal authorities, whose attempt 
to increase sharing has sometimes suffered from 
a lack of effective quality controls. In some cases, 
information from federal authorities duplicates 
what is already known by fusion centers or has 
not been updated by the time it is received by state 
officials.307 One example of these difficulties sur-
faced publicly in October 2005, when New York 
City Mayor Bloomberg, informed by local fusion 
authorities, announced that “a specific threat” im-
plicated the city’s mass transit system.308 Federal 
officials had already concluded that the threat was 
“noncredible,”309 though timely communication 
between federal and state authorities analyzing 
the issue did not occur. 
In other cases, state and local officials have strug-
gled to receive urgently needed sensitive or clas-
sified information because they must wait lengthy 
304 Harris, supra note 274.
305 Sheridan, supra note 278.
306 Ibid.
307 Assessment of Information Sharing Centers, supra 
note 289.
308 Sheridan, supra note 278.
309 Ibid.
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periods for security clearances. In September 2006, 
Col. Kenneth Bouche of the Illinois State Police 
briefed the House Homeland Security Subcommit-
tee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Ter-
rorism Risk on the difficulties imposed on fusion 
centers by federal security clearance procedures.310 
He called the classification system “archaic”311 
and “cumbersome”312 and lamented that, contrary 
to the goals of the ISE, the system is “designed to 
keep information secret.” DHS claims that it recog-
nizes the difficulties pointed out by Bouche and is 
actively working to hasten background checks.313 
However, rapid improvement is unlikely, as fed-
eral agencies have only just begun the process of 
establishing uniform accreditation policies. Under 
the current system, a fusion center official who ob-
tains an accelerated clearance from DHS will often 
still be unable to receive information classified at 
the same level from other agencies. 
In response to testimony from state and local of-
ficials, Rep. Bennie Thomspon of Mississippi 
concluded that federal authorities are simply “not 
reaching out well enough”314 to the state and local 
officials that need to be integrated into the ISE. 
While officials from DHS and the Office of the 
PM for the ISE continue to stress that fusion cen-
ters possess highly valuable information and play 
an integral role in ensuring the nation’s security, 
the difficulties of seamlessly sharing real-time 
information on a vertical level mean that some-
times, fusion centers have been treated as “junior 
partners in the war on terrorism.”315 For example, 
Louis Quijas, assistant director of the office of 
state and local coordination at the FBI, has com-
plained that years after Congress called for estab-
lishment of the ISE, he must often repeat to FBI 
officials that sharing with state and local partners 
at fusion centers should occur on a daily basis.316
310 Assessment of Information Sharing Centers, supra 
note 289.
311 Ibid.
312 Ibid.
313 Ibid.
314 Sheridan, supra note 278.
315 Magnuson, supra note 77. 
316 Ibid.
Efforts to increase vertical sharing by pushing data 
“up” from fusion centers to the federal government 
have also experienced difficulties. While state of-
ficials display enthusiasm for increased collabo-
ration with federal officials, they claim that they 
are often unsure which officials or agencies they 
should contact when they seek to share specific 
terrorism, homeland security, or law enforcement 
information. Moreover, the information they do 
provide is not always useful for federal purposes 
or arrives out of context. Continued difficulties on 
both sides of the sharing equation have prompted 
some authorities to predict that seamless shar-
ing and full integration of fusion centers into the 
ISE may take as many as ten or more years to 
achieve.317
The Future of Fusion
Federal authorities must not be discouraged by 
the challenges of integrating fusion centers into 
the ISE. Despite difficulties, state officials claim 
that they can point to specific incidents in which 
increased collaboration has enhanced security.318 
Similarly, DHS officials have affirmed that ef-
forts to pool federal, state, and local information 
analysis efforts by integrating fusion centers into 
the ISE have already strengthened U.S. counter-
terrorism capabilities.319 
Improvements are likely to result from DHS’ re-
cently adopted, “aggressive schedule”320 to station 
thirty-five more federal officials at fusion centers 
by the end of 2008. DHS is currently working with 
federal and state authorities to “determine which 
centers have the greatest need”321 for immediate 
federal cooperation. However, DHS should also 
heed calls from state officials to develop a “clear-
317 Ibid.
318 Assessment of Information Sharing, supra note 
289.
319 Ibid.
320 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
321 Fiscal 2008 Budget, supra note 287.
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er road map”322 for coordinating the flow of infor-
mation to and from fusion centers. As the number 
homegrown terror threats, such as those experi-
enced by the United Kingdom over the last three 
years, continues to increase, effective federal co-
operation with state and local fusion centers will 
be necessary to identify and disrupt them.323 
State and local fusion centers are likely to require 
enhanced federal assistance to fulfill their mis-
sions as participants in the ISE and DHS must be 
prepared to meet fusion centers’ needs over the 
long haul. As local operations improve, federal 
agencies will benefit from the integration of infor-
mation gathered by more than 800,000 local law 
enforcement officers into the ISE.324 While much 
work remains to be accomplished, DHS’ coopera-
tion with fusion centers represents one of the fed-
eral government’s most significant efforts to foster 
the robust vertical information sharing envisioned 
by the ISE Implementation Plan.
Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN)
The Department of Homeland Security’s second 
major initiative to facilitate ISE implementation 
is the Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN). HSIN provides a national network for 
homeland security alerts, information, and re-
sponse coordination to federal, SLT, and private 
sector ISE participants. HSIN is also a medium 
for reaching public health officials, transportation 
security officials, state homeland security advi-
sors, governors’ offices, and the National Guard, 
to whom DHS owes the responsibility of provid-
ing routine notifications and “threat-based risk as-
sessments.”325 DHS has intended HSIN to serve 
322 Wilson P. Dizard III, States Rap DHS Info-Shar-
ing, Gov’t Computer News, Sept. 8, 2006, http://www.
gcn.com/online/vol1_no1/41924-1.html. 
323 Fiscal 2008 Budget, supra note 287.
324 Assessment of Information Sharing Centers, supra 
note 289.
325 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
as the primary sharing environment for sensitive 
but unclassified homeland security information. 
Since its rapid assembly in 2004, the HSIN has 
linked locations across all fifty States, as well as 
fifty-three major cities and five U.S. territories, 
to DHS’ Homeland Security Operations Center 
(HSOC), which watches real-time homeland se-
curity threat information and coordinates domes-
tic incident management.326 
HSIN evolved from a pilot program originally 
sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) known as the Joint Regional Informa-
tion Exchange System (JRIES). JRIES had been 
launched in December 2002, to facilitate commu-
nication between the California Anti-Terrorism 
Information Center, the New York Police Depart-
ment, and the DIA. After JRIES had assisted users 
in sharing information rapidly during the north-
east blackout of summer 2003, management of the 
sharing initiative was offered to DHS, which had 
a larger budget for maintaining and expanding the 
system.327 
Though the JRIES communications network was 
originally supported by Groove software, DHS 
transferred the system to secure web-based portals 
that allow for instant messaging and the develop-
ment of document archives. In September 2006, 
Frank W. Deffer, Assistant Inspector General for 
Information Technology at DHS, told the House 
Homeland Security Subcommittee of Intelligence, 
Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assess-
ment that HSIN was also supplemented with a 
series of other information sharing features, in-
cluding “suspicious incident and preincident in-
formation, mapping and imagery tools, 24/7 situ-
ational awareness, and analysis of terrorist threats, 
tactics, and weapons.” The design of HSIN appli-
cations is intended to provide a platform for real-
time communications and nearly comprehensive 
homeland security resources.328 
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
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HSIN also hosts two pilot sharing projects known 
as HSIN-Intel and HSIN-Secret (HSIN-S). HSIN-
Intel was created to augment the flow of sensitive 
but unclassified (SBU) data, unclassified intel-
ligence, and state and local law enforcement in-
formation through the HSIN network.329 In 2006, 
intelligence officers, fusion center analysts, and 
senior law enforcement executives from the states 
of Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, New 
York, and Virginia were linked to the experimen-
tal system.330 Since then, documents exchanged 
on HSIN-Intel have included both “finished” in-
telligence information, which has been processed 
and analyzed, as well as “raw” information that 
may be of immediate assistance to various par-
ticipants.331 The design of the HSIN-S program is 
very similar to the HSIN-Intel network. HSIN-S, 
however, provides access to information classi-
fied at the secret level, and only carries a minimal 
amount of unclassified data.332
Evaluations of the pilot programs HSIN-Intel and 
HSIN-S, separate from the general functioning of 
the broader HSIN network, indicate a fair amount 
of success. In addition to accelerating the speed 
with which information flows between federal, 
SLT, foreign, and private sector actors, HSIN-In-
tel’s sharing tools have enabled federal authorities 
to better synthesize information from fusion cen-
ters with DHS and IC data.333 In a September 2006 
congressional hearing, DHS CIO Charles Allen 
reported that HSIN-Intel participants have made 
active use of the experimental network, resulting 
in over five hundred document posts within the 
first five months of the pilot.334 He also noted that 
the system greatly aided domestic and internation-
al communications following the July 11, 2006 
329 Ibid.
330 Assessment of Information Sharing Centers, supra 
note 289.
331 Homeland Secuirty Information Network, supra 
note 286. 
332 Ibid.
333 Ibid.
334 Ibid.
transit bombings in Mumbai, India.335 On that day, 
DHS “transmitted relevant intelligence reporting, 
held a ‘quick-look’ teleconference…and was able 
to provide valuable information that was not al-
ready widely available to the public” all through 
HSIN-Intel.336 DHS is currently seeking to expand 
HSIN-Intel and prepare the network to become 
fully operational.337
Because of the difficulties of sharing classified 
information, particularly across multiple levels 
of government, HSIN-S has seen fewer posts 
and less frequent use from connected authori-
ties.338 Therefore, DHS has decided to integrate 
HSIN-S into “a more robust Secret-level clas-
sified communications network system” called 
the Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN) 
that is expected to enhance sharing opportunities 
for public and private sector personnel already 
possessing a Secret level clearance.339 HSDN is 
currently being installed at state and local fusion 
centers.340 
While DHS should build upon the successes HSIN-
Intel and work to expand HSIN-S, it is imperative 
that the Department devotes sufficient resources 
to improving the primary information platform, 
HSIN. As further discussed below, HSIN has ex-
perienced difficulties to such considerable extent 
that there is a risk DHS officials may recoil from 
HSIN’s problems to focus on the more successful, 
unclassified and secret networks. However, HSIN 
offers connectivity to a wider array of participants 
for broader horizontal and vertical sharing than 
does either of the pilot programs. Moreover, many 
private sector actors essential to the nation’s ef-
fort to protect critical infrastructure are not linked 
to HSIN-Intel and lack necessary security clear-
335 Assessment of Information Sharing Centers, supra 
note 289.
336 Ibid.
337 Ibid.
338 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
339 Ibid.
340 Ibid.
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ances to participate in an expanding HSIN-S net-
work.341
Problems Abound
Nearly all assessments of HSIN indicate that the 
system has failed to perform its intended function 
of serving as the principal nationwide network for 
homeland security information sharing. Since DHS 
took control of the JRIES program and launched 
HSIN, state and local law enforcement officials 
and fusion center analysts, HSIN’s primary users, 
have claimed that the system does not aid them 
in accomplishing their missions.342 DHS must re-
double efforts to improve HSIN and enable users 
to view the system in light of its capabilities rather 
than its previous failures. So long as state and lo-
cal officials turn to other sharing mechanisms, the 
nation faces the risk that an effective, consolidated 
network for exchanging terrorism and homeland 
security information on a nationwide scale will 
not be implemented. 
Though DHS intended HSIN to provide an outlet 
for seamless and nearly comprehensive vertical 
information sharing, many current users are un-
familiar with the network’s purpose and design.343 
They find that the system fails to meaningfully 
supplement state information sharing policies and 
tools, as much of the classified and situational 
awareness information they need is not available 
on HSIN.344 Moreover, state and local officials 
have expressed reservations about information se-
curity on HSIN.345 In September 2006, Frank W. 
Deffer, Assistant Inspector General for Informa-
tion Technology at DHS, claimed that an “erosion 
in trust”346 has occurred between law enforcement 
341 DHS Web Portals See Scant Use by Law Enforce-
ment, Wash. Internet Daily, Sept. 14, 2006.
342 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
345 Stephen Losey, IG Blasts Data-Sharing Network, 
Federal Times, July 10, 2006 [hereinafter Losey].
346 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
officials and DHS since management of JRIES 
had been transferred from DIA. DHS CIO Charles 
Allen has similarly concluded that state and local 
users “are not fully committed to the HSIN ap-
proach.”347 
Numerous reports from the DHS Inspector Gen-
eral and the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) agree with state and local assessments of 
HSIN’s inadequacy. Evidence of the network’s 
failure to effectively enhance information sharing 
is disheartening in light of one GAO report’s esti-
mation that DHS has been spending approximate-
ly $300 million per year to operate and maintain 
HSIN. David Powner, Director of Information 
Technology Management Issues at GAO summa-
rized criticism of HSIN when he told Congress 
that the system “has been poorly managed and 
poorly coordinated” and that without considerable 
improvement, HSIN “will not be the key informa-
tion sharing network it is intended to be.”348 
HSIN’s failures are largely attributable to its 
hurried implementation. The September 11th at-
tacks had prompted not only a sense of urgency 
in improving security measures but also created 
the perception that a hastily planned information 
sharing tool was preferable to the delay of exe-
cuting a carefully designed network. As the 2004 
presidential elections drew near and intelligence 
officials warned of several possibly imminent ter-
ror threats, DHS officials faced considerable pres-
sure to install a nationwide information system.349 
Lacking the time to develop a detailed framework 
or overarching vision for guiding HSIN’s devel-
opment, DHS simply pursued a rigorous timetable 
for installing HSIN across domestic and interna-
tional locations.350 
Time constraints prevented DHS from sufficiently 
cooperating with state and local officials to en-
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid.
349 Losey, supra note 345.
350 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
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sure that HSIN would be synthesized with exist-
ing state sharing practices. Though the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) provided DHS 
with guidelines on vertical collaboration, DHS 
did not thoroughly assess the needs of SLT actors, 
particularly fusion centers and law enforcement 
officers.351 Many difficulties cited by local HSIN’s 
local users stem from the federal “top down”352 
approach that DHS relied upon while rapidly in-
stalling the system. According to Connecticut 
Representative Christopher Shays, “The story of 
HSIN is a story of the federal government trying 
to impose a one size fits all approach on states 
and locals.”353 Given certain conditions beyond 
the federal government’s control, such as varying 
state law on privacy and the use of homeland se-
curity information, many DHS officials adopted 
the position that a “top down” approach facilitated 
installation of the network and that any HSIN in-
adequacies could be reformed while the network 
is already in use.354
However, state and local complaints testify to the 
difficulty of contending with HSIN’s ad hoc im-
plementation plan retrospectively. HSIN’s current 
functioning continues to reflect its history as an 
initiative that lacked clear goals, an organized gov-
ernance structure, performance metrics or an un-
derstanding of its users’ missions. Admiral Roger 
Rufe, Director of DHS’ Office of Operations Co-
ordination, wrote in an April 2007 memorandum 
that HSIN has “grown without sufficient plan-
ning and program management” but “for better or 
worse, is tied to DHS missions and operations.”355 
351 Government Accountability Office, Numerous 
Federal Networks Used to Support Homeland Security 
Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local 
Information-Sharing Initiatives, Apr. 16, 2007.
352 Fiscal 2008 Budget, supra note 287. 
353 Fixing the Homeland Security Information Net-
work: Finding the Way Forward for Better Information 
Sharing, CQ Congressional Testimony, May 10, 2007 
[hereinafter Fixing the Homeland Security Information 
Network].
354 Fiscal 2008 Budget, supra note 287.
355 Fixing the Homeland Security Information Net-
work, supra note 353.
The question that remains is, as California Repre-
sentative Jane Harman commented, whether the 
“HSIN DHS relationship” is simply “some bad 
marriage that we’re all supposed to accept?”356
DHS’s inability to reconcile the needs of its users 
has resulted in a situation where HSIN is frequent-
ly ignored in the course of fusion center and local 
law enforcement operations.357 Even as the fed-
eral government attempts to prioritize information 
sharing through implementation of the ISE, DHS 
CIO Charles Allen has admitted that DHS is “be-
hind in information management” and claimed, 
“I’m not happy with it, and I know the Secretary 
[Michael Chertoff] isn’t either.”358 
Users are continually dismayed that many of 
HSIN’s resources are already available on law 
enforcement networks while the system has done 
little to improve their ability to obtain federal in-
telligence information, often classified, that they 
urgently need.359 Though some officials have 
claimed that HSIN has facilitated their information 
sharing efforts, Rep. Christopher Shays acknowl-
edged that existing evidence suggests that the sys-
tem “simply gathers dust” in many states.360 Be-
cause local officials have had trouble discerning 
the purpose and goals of the system and federal 
authorities have not sustained an effort to integrate 
HSIN with existing sharing practices, many users 
are increasingly turning to other mechanisms to 
transmit and receive needed information.361 
In some cases, these alternative mechanisms, such 
as telephone calls to officials’ personal contacts in 
various locations, are admittedly slower and less 
efficient than web portal technology.362 During the 
356 Ibid.
357 Losey, supra note 345.
358 Ibid.
359 Fixing the Homeland Security Information Net-
work, supra note 353.
360 Ibid.
361 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
362 Ibid.
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2005 London bombings, for example, U.S. law 
enforcement and transportation security officials 
found that HSIN “was no more useful or timely 
than information available via public news servic-
es” and preferred to communicate with contacts 
connected to London authorities than to rely upon 
HSIN.363 
Perhaps of greater concern than officials’ reli-
ance on personal contacts than coordinated shar-
ing mechanisms are recent initiatives is the reac-
tion of some agencies, such as the U.S. Secret 
Service, to develop its own web-based systems 
for “information sharing among…limited user 
group[s].”364 While these efforts may enable of-
ficials to provide enhanced security in the short-
term, they severely disrupt DHS’s and the federal 
government’s broader goal of creating a consoli-
dated sharing environment. Grassroots initiatives 
catering to the needs of particular users have the 
potential to increase the difficulty of resolving 
HSIN’s inadequacies and establishing the net-
work as the nation’s primary homeland security 
information sharing tool. Ironically, as IG Richard 
Skinner pointed out, DHS’s failure to provide a 
network meeting the needs of its users creates the 
risk that the alternative sharing mechanisms be-
ing developed will “only perpetuate[] the ad hoc, 
stove piped information sharing environment that 
HSIN was intended to correct.”365 
Improving HSIN
Implementation of a successful ISE demands that 
DHS prioritize efforts to improve HSIN. While 
DHS lacks the authority to require state and local 
officials to increase their use of HSIN or directly 
influence local sharing practices, DHS has the re-
sponsibility to offer its state and local partners a 
more efficient, useful system for information ex-
change. 
363 Ibid.
364 Ibid.
365 Losey, supra note 345.
Improving the current system must begin with 
increased DHS collaboration with state and local 
officials, the factor that was notably absent from 
HSIN’s implementation procedure. As DHS has 
conducted studies on the missions and needs of 
fusion centers, the Department must similarly un-
dertake a serious effort to recognize the needs of 
HSIN’s targeted users. While developing an under-
standing of why HSIN has proven unsatisfactory 
to its users, DHS must also clarify the goals and 
purpose of the network for local officials who have 
expressed confusion and frustration about HSIN’s 
intended role in their current operations.366 
To ensure that the improved system will be used 
effectively, DHS should allocate resources for 
training and, as recommended by the DHS In-
spector General, for the creation of “stakeholder-
specific standard operating procedures” and the 
publication of “user manuals.”367 By assisting us-
ers in developing strategies for combining HSIN 
with current sharing practices, DHS can also re-
duce the problems of information duplication.368 
To improve the system’s content, DHS must heed 
state and local officials’ calls for inclusion of a 
greater amount of situational awareness informa-
tion. DHS efforts to expedite security clearance 
procedures for fusion center personnel and private 
sector officials will also greatly enable the Depart-
ment to update HSIN with greatly needed classi-
fied information. 
DHS has made some improvements to HSIN’s 
technical capabilities, content, and governance 
structure. The recently established Homeland Se-
curity Information Network Advisory Committee, 
a body of fourteen members, promises to repre-
sent federal, state, and local needs, as well as the 
specific concerns of first responders and private 
sector actors, regarding HSIN.369 DHS recently 
366 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
note 286.
367 Ibid.
368 Fixing the Homeland Security Information Net-
work, supra note 353.
369 Homeland Security Information Network, supra 
.	Political	Structure	 211
hired an HSIN Program Manager and created the 
HSIN Joint Program Management Office to over-
see cooperation with strategic partners and ensure 
that HSIN meets standards mandated by the ISE 
Implementation Plan and the IRTPA. 370 
Despite these developments, DHS has yet to ar-
ticulate a set of clear guidelines defining its strat-
egy to improve HSIN and periodically assess the 
network’s performance. Recent improvements of 
HSIN’s governance structure are only first steps 
toward resolving HSIN’s difficulties and consoli-
dating sharing efforts among federal, state, and lo-
cal officials with homeland security responsibili-
ties. Until DHS demonstrates an ability to clear 
those obstacles, the ISE may experience signifi-
cant shortcomings in the sharing of homeland se-
curity information.
Intelligence Community
The U.S. intelligence community (IC) has 
launched a sustained drive to modernize its intel-
ligence-sharing procedures to respond better to 
21st-century threats. Despite some valiant efforts, 
the available evidence suggests this initiative re-
mains incomplete and requires a significant re-
doubling of efforts to achieve enduring results.
Since September 2001, the intelligence communi-
ty has endeavored to improve information sharing 
by expanding its use of Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT). Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is 
defined by the Department of Defense as “intel-
ligence that is produced from publicly available 
information and is collected, exploited, and dis-
seminated in a timely manner to an appropriate 
audience for the purpose of addressing a specific 
intelligence requirement.”371 Open-source intelli-
note 286.
370 Ibid.
371 National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
Year 2006, H.R. 1815, 109th Cong. (2007) (enacted), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:
publ163.109.
gence is important today in fighting the War on 
Terror and protecting national security and shows 
“both great promise and great production” accord-
ing to CIA director General Michael Hayden. He 
also notes that former Director of National Intelli-
gence John Negroponte “has been pushing for the 
agency to boost its analysis of open source intel-
ligence.”372 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 advocated the need for more open-
source intelligence. Section 1052 discusses open-
source intelligence and calls for the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) to “establish an intel-
ligence center for the purpose of coordinating the 
collection, analysis, production, and dissemina-
tion of open-source intelligence to elements of the 
intelligence community.”373 Furthermore, it states 
that “open-source intelligence is a valuable source 
that must be integrated into the intelligence cycle 
to ensure that United States policymakers are fully 
and completely informed.”374
Recent initiatives have made U.S. OSINT capa-
bilities more robust. Nevertheless, several prob-
lems continue to impede the optimal exploitation 
of OSINT. The most important of these barriers 
are cultural rather than technological. Many ana-
lysts continue to undervalue unclassified sources 
of information.
 
History of Open-Source Intelligence within the 
IC
The convention within the U.S. intelligence com-
munity has been to focus intelligence gathering 
on three major sources. First, Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT) refers to the use of human intelligence 
agents and the recruitment of foreign agents. Sec-
ond, Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) is the use of 
various eavesdropping methods to gather infor-
mation. Third, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) is 
372 Martin Sieff, Analysis: Hayden faces uphill fight 
at CIA, UPI, May 8, 2006. 
373 6 U.S.C. § 485 at § 1052, supra note 14.
374 Ibid.
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intelligence gathered by taking photos taken from 
satellites, unmanned vehicles or other types of re-
connaissance.375
The fourth major source of intelligence that has 
been relatively untapped in the past is the use of 
Open Source Intelligence. Open Source Intelli-
gence is derived from the collection, processing, 
and analysis of publicly available and unclassified 
information. This information is collected from a 
huge number of sources such as newspapers, tele-
vision, training manuals, atlases, and even T-shirt 
slogans or graffiti376. Perhaps the most important 
source of OSINT today is the Internet, where web-
sites, forums, blogs and chat rooms are all treasure 
troves of open source information.
The first modern use of open-source intelligence 
by the intelligence community started in the 1930s 
when the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service 
(FBIS), later renamed the Foreign Broadcast In-
formation System, was established to collect and 
translate foreign open source intelligence infor-
mation. It served as the open-source arm of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Its collection 
and translation efforts of open source intelligence 
continued into the Cold War where OSINT “con-
stituted a major part of all intelligence on the So-
viet Union, China, and other adversaries.”377 
In general, however, the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity has considered secret information far more 
valuable than the readily available media outlets 
that could technically be monitored by anyone. 
During most of the Cold War, OSINT operations 
were given approximately 1% of the total intelli-
gence funding. With the end of the Cold War, this 
375 Scott Shane, Intelligence Gathering Moves Out 
Into the Open, The International Herald Tribune, 
Nov. 14, 2005, at 5 [hereinafter Shane]. 
376 Ibid.
377 Stephen C. Mercado, Sailing the Sea of OSINT 
in the Information Age, Studies in Intelligence, Vol 48 
No.3 (2004), available at https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/
vol48no3/article05.html#rfn1 [hereinafter Mercado].
number went down to about half a percent378. By 
1996, the Aspin-Brown commission found that 
there was a serious lack in the U.S. capability and 
efforts to gather and monitor Open Source Intelli-
gence. The recommendations of the Aspin-Brown 
Commission to put more effort into OSINT were 
not followed through by several successive Direc-
tors of National Intelligence379.
A major shift in the perception of OSINT came in 
the wake of 9/11. Several former intelligence pro-
fessionals argued that al-Qa’eda threats prior to 
the 9/11 attacks could be found in openly available 
sources such as interviews and newspaper articles 
that were largely disregarded because they were 
not classified or secret documents.380 In the 2002 
Joint Congressional Inquiry into the Terrorist At-
tacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Republican Senator Mike 
DeWine lamented that the intelligence community 
was “more inclined to use open-source material 
as a last resort, not as a primary source, no matter 
how compelling the information.381” 
In a report on the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2007, the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), stated that 
“the Intelligence Community must embrace more 
fully unconventional and open sources of infor-
mation. Many estimate that large percentages of 
information needs can be satisfied by open source 
materials, and the Committee believes that the 
growth of the Internet and mass media has dra-
matically altered the amount of information avail-
able through open and unconventional sources.”382 
378 Charlie Allen, The Department of Homeland 
Security: Second Review Oct 19, 2005. 
379 OSS CEO Challenges DNI to Intelligence Duel, 
PR Newswire, Apr. 13, 2006. 
380 U.S. Ignores Open-Source Intel Warning, UPI, 
July 29, 2005.
381 Mike DeWine, Additional Comments: Joint 
Inquiry Staff Report, Report of the Joint Inquiry into 
the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, S. Rep. No. 
107-351, at 611 (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://a257.
g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/24jul20031400/www.gpoac-
cess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
382 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
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Congress sees the importance of open source in-
telligence and says, “To ignore the value of such 
information is dangerous.” Finally, the Committee 
emphasized that “it will take a dramatic change in 
cultural philosophy to trust and use open source 
materials that weren’t collected or discovered by 
‘secret means.’”
The Open-Source Intelligence Center
The September 2001 terror attacks catalyzed a 
major effort within the U.S. intelligence com-
munity to use open-source information more ef-
fectively. Subsequent investigations concluded 
that U.S. analysts had overlooked evidence of the 
impending al-Qa’eda attack that had appeared in 
publicly available sources such as interviews and 
newspaper articles. 
In its final report, issued in 2004, the 9/11 Commis-
sion advocated the creation of a new Open Source 
Intelligence Agency. Following this recommenda-
tion, section 1052 of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 called on the 
new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
“establish an intelligence center for the purpose of 
coordinating the collection, analysis, production, 
and dissemination of open-source intelligence 
to elements of the intelligence community.” The 
subsequent WMD Intelligence Commission made 
a more detailed recommendation to establish an 
OSINT agency within the CIA.
In November of 2005, the Director of National In-
telligence, John Negroponte, acted on the numer-
ous recommendations and announced the creation 
of the Open Source Center (OSC), which was 
placed under the management of the CIA. OSC 
has become the new main body for OSINT, tak-
ing the place of its predecessor FBIS. The OSC is 
charged with supplying Open Source Intelligence 
to the sixteen intelligence agencies, the U.S. De-
fense Department and the U.S. Department of 
2007, H.R. 109-411 (2006), available at http://www.fas.
org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/hrpt109-411.html.
Homeland Security. In addition, the OSC devel-
ops guidelines and standards to create effective 
ways of exploiting open source material. The cen-
ter centrally purchases and filters necessary data 
and thus relieves the need and the cost for other 
agencies to procure expensive data sets separately. 
The OSC is also a hub for training a new genera-
tion of open source experts.
By the middle of 2006, the OSC monitored rough-
ly 300 Jihadist web sites and in terms of more 
conventional media outlets, OSC tracked approxi-
mately 500 television stations and a vast number 
of newspapers and radio broadcasts.383 The OSC 
technology covers the filtering of data, foreign 
language processing, multimedia delivery and 
production, and the means of sharing information 
and collaborating with other agencies.384 During 
2006, at least 30 of the Daily Briefs presented to 
President Bush were based on Open Source Intel-
ligence.385
Data archived by OSC permits its analysts to 
“draw upon it in response to queries from all lev-
els of government,”386 including state and local 
law enforcement and defense and national secu-
rity agencies. DHS, for example, has “developed 
a concept of operations for aggressive use of open 
sources (OSINT) that leverages current activities 
of the Department, other departments and agen-
cies including the DNI Open Source Center, the 
private sector, and our state and local partners in 
order to improve analysis and, when applicable, 
to protect intelligence sources and methods.”387 
383 Patience Wait, Intelligence Units Mine the Ben-
efits of Public Sources, Gov’t Computer News, Mar. 20, 
2006.
384 Ibid.
385 Intelligence: Lawmaker Calls for Center to Be-
come Independent Agency, Technology Daily PM, June 
7, 2006, Vol. 10:9 [hereinafter Intelligence: Lawmaker 
Calls for Center].
386 Open-source intelligence moving to the fore, 
Gov’t Computer News, Nov. 16, 2006, Vol. 1, No.1. 
387 Statement, Charles E. Allen, Asst. Secretary for 
Intelligence & Analysis Chief Intelligence Officer, Dept. of 
Homeland Security, Examining Chief Intelligence Officer 
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Furthermore, Assistant Secretary Charles Allen 
stated that “DHS officers will handle open-source 
information as a normal part of their everyday 
routine.”
At the Annual Threat Assessment Hearings on 
January 11, 2007, Director of National Intelli-
gence, John Negroponte, called U.S. intelligence 
“the best in the world,” stating that recent reforms 
within the intelligence community, such as the 
establishment of the OSC, have further improved 
the intelligence gathering capabilities.388 At the 
hearings, CIA Director Michael Hayden told the 
Senate Select Intelligence Committee that the CIA 
has raised the status and visibility of the newly 
formed Open Source Center (OSC) inside the CIA 
and that they “recognize its unique and growing 
contributions to integrated collection and analy-
sis.”389
Changes with Technology
With advances in technology, open-source in-
telligence has greatly expanded. According to 
Stephen Mercado’s article on open-source intel-
ligence, “The revolution in information technol-
ogy, commerce, and politics since the Cold War’s 
end is only making open sources more accessible, 
ubiquitous, and valuable.”390 Besides the con-
stantly changing technology, the issues important 
to policy makers and the IC are also changing. 
A 2006 Congressional Research Services report 
entitled “Intelligence Issues for Congress” noted 
that OSINT “is increasingly important given re-
quirements for information about many regions 
and topics (instead of the former concentration on 
political and military issues affecting a few coun-
tries).”391 The report also expresses the belief of 
Progress, CQ Congressional Testimony, May 24, 2006. 
388 Senator John D. Rockefeller Holds Hearing on 
the Annual Threat Assessment, CQ Transcripts, Jan. 11, 
2007.
389 Ibid.
390 Mercado, supra note 377.
391 Richard A. Best, Jr., Intelligence Issues for 
Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Report 
some observers “that intelligence agencies should 
be more aggressive in using OSINT; some believe 
that the availability of OSINT may even reduce 
the need for certain collection efforts.”392 
Besides monitoring Internet sites, U.S. intelli-
gence analysts have sought to use new Internet 
tools—especially wikis and blogs—to store and 
manage information in innovative ways on its se-
cure internal communication networks. Managers 
hope that wikis and blogs will make it easier for 
analysts to collaborate on issues that other ana-
lysts, typically working on related issues at differ-
ent offices, might also be examining. 
Blogs and Intellipedia
The use of blogs and wikis on intelink, “’the spy 
agencies’ secure internal computer network”393 is 
creating a new way to analyze intelligence. The 
new “Intellipedia” provides employees with a wiki 
(a website that allows for collective authorship) of 
people, places, and issues that all cleared employ-
ees can access and edit. The thought behind wikis 
and blogs is that analysts can contribute informa-
tion on an issue that other analysts, perhaps at oth-
er agencies, are trying to figure out. In the fall of 
2005, the DNI’s head analyst got together with the 
chief technology officer and members of the CIA 
to create a prototype of Intellipedia, “a wiki that 
any intelligence employee with classified clear-
ance could read and contribute to.”394 The reason 
for incorporating this into the intelligence com-
munity is to garner more collaboration and allow 
greater access to information and sources. By the 
fall of 2006, Intellipedia had 3,600 users and over 
28,000 pages of information. Around the same 
RL33539, July 12, 2006, available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/intel/RL33539.pdf.
392 Ibid.
393 Clive Thompson, Open-Source Spying, N.Y. 
Times Magazine, Dec. 3, 2006, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/12/03/magazine/03intelligence.html?ei=
5090&en=46027e63d79046ce&ex=1322802000&partner=
rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=print.
394 Ibid.
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time, a project was underway to create a National 
Intelligence Estimate from the information found 
on Intellipedia. 
Members of the U.S. intelligence community are 
also relying more on Internet blogs (a web page 
that serves as a publicly accessible personal jour-
nal). Analysts can now create their own blogs on 
classified networks to express their opinions and 
ask for assistance on projects and issues they are 
examining. Analysts hope that the use of blogs 
and Intellipedia will help prevent another 9/11 or 
other serious terrorist attacks. 
Problems Remain
Efforts to extend Open Source Intelligence gather-
ing are still in the early stages, and a culture of re-
luctance towards open information within the in-
telligence community may continue to plague the 
efforts that are being made. In December 2006, 
CIA Director Michael Hayden told a large assem-
bly of agency employees that CIA management 
intended to give OSINT specialists equal stand-
ing with agents relying on covert sources of data, 
thereby perhaps unintentionally acknowledging 
that many U.S. intelligence analysts and collec-
tors continue to view OSINT experts as less than 
equal partners. 
The biggest challenge facing the new Open 
Source Center is being able to provide the intel-
ligence community with the intelligence, training, 
standards and personnel that it needs.395 One of the 
most fervent advocates for increased OSINT gath-
ering, former clandestine officer Robert Steele, 
has argued that the new OSC is both under-funded 
and understaffed.396 
Concerns arise about the ability of the OSC to 
exploit Internet-based information, especially po-
395 Robert K Ackerman, Intelligence Center Mines 
Open Sources, SIGNAL Magazine, Mar. 2006.
396 Lawmakers want DHS to Make Full Use of Open-
Source Intelligence, Inside the Pentagon, Vol, 22:12, 
Mar. 23, 2006.
tentially rich data available on the growing num-
ber of Jihadist web sites. In a time where terrorist 
groups often use the Internet for recruitment and 
planning, there is a strong need for the U.S. intelli-
gence community to further extend the capability 
to tap into these sources. The intelligence com-
munity has only recently modified its procedures 
to make it easier to recruit native Arab speakers as 
analysts and grant them security clearances.
Critics also worry that the U.S. intelligence com-
munity continues to undervalue OSINT relative to 
classified information. In a report to accompany 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence urged the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity to embrace open as well as unconventional 
information sources. The report cautioned that re-
cent experience suggested “it will take a dramatic 
change in cultural philosophy to trust and use open 
source materials that weren’t collected or discov-
ered by ‘secret means.’” Eliot A. Jardines, Assis-
tant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for 
Open Source says that such cultural change within 
the CIA is the most important goal. “Our culture 
is one that values secrecy, and we need to move 
beyond the notion that the higher the classification 
the better the intelligence,” argues Jardines.397 
House Republican Rob Simmons is a strong pro-
ponent of increased OSINT gathering, but he dis-
agrees with the placing of OSC within the CIA. 
Simmons calls the OSC the “ugly stepchild” of the 
CIA and argues that it needs to be placed outside 
of the scope of the CIA in order to make it more 
independent.398 The OSC is well aware of this is-
sue and it has ensured that at least 25% of the per-
sonnel trained in OSINT were recruited from out-
side the CIA 399 The reliance on new recruits from 
397 Bill Gertz & Rowan Scarborough, Untitled, The 
Wash. Times, Apr. 21, 2006, at A05.
398 Intelligence: Lawmaker Calls for Center, supra 
note 385.
399 Patience Wait, Open Source Intelligence Moving 
to the Fore, Gov’t Computer News, Vol. 1:1, Nov. 16, 
2006.
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outside the CIA may work to counter the reluc-
tance within the intelligence community regard-
ing the use of open source information. Outside 
recruitment is likely to bring in young intelligence 
professionals who may be more inclined to look 
to open sources for information and more used to 
the idea that the Internet can be the best source 
of finding information. In order to make OSINT 
truly incorporated as an equal to the conventional 
intelligence gathering methods, a cultural shift 
also needs to occur on the highest levels of the 
intelligence community. The best way for this to 
occur is to simply create continuing evidence that 
OSINT is on par with conventional all-source in-
telligence gathering.
Conclusion
Open Source Intelligence will be a primary tool 
in gathering intelligence on several threats to U.S. 
security, including terrorism and the spread of avi-
an flu. The new OSINT capabilities are far more 
robust today than they were a couple of years ago 
and the amount of open source intelligence that 
reaches policy makers has increased significantly 
as a result of changes in the intelligence commu-
nity. Eliot Jardines, assistant deputy director of 
national intelligence for open source said that “the 
amount of open source reporting that goes into the 
president’s daily brief has gone up rather signifi-
cantly.”400 Mr. Jardines adds that “[t]here has been 
a real interest at the highest levels of our govern-
ment, and we’ve been able to consistently deliver 
products that are on par with the rest of the intel-
ligence community.”401
U.S. Intelligence Managers Fighting with Over-
classification
Notwithstanding the IRTPA’s requirements, the 
campaign to establish the ISE has been plagued by 
“overclassification” and “pseudoclassification,” 
400 Bill Gertz, CIA mines ‘rich’ content from blogs, 
Wash. Times, Apr. 19, 2006, available at http://www.wash-
times.com/national/20060418-110124-3694r.htm. 
401 Ibid.
both presenting major barriers to effective infor-
mation sharing. The Chief Intelligence Officer in 
the Department of Homeland Security, Charles 
Allen, recently acknowledged that his staff was 
encountering serious resistance to implementing 
the “responsibility to provide” model propounded 
by current Director of National Intelligence Mike 
McConnell. Most prominently, the revelation that 
the Office of Vice President Richard Cheney has 
refused to comply with an executive order requir-
ing it to file an annual report on how it handles 
classified national security information has high-
lighted several complex issues in this area.402 
Within the U.S. government, classified informa-
tion falls into two main categories. Information 
can be classified by the authority of Executive Or-
der 12598, as amended, as Top Secret, Secret, or 
Confidential. Information that does not meet the 
standards established by the executive order, but 
that an agency considers sufficiently sensitive to 
warrant restricted dissemination, is classified as 
Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). Documents un-
der these seals range from law enforcement testi-
mony to critical infrastructure data. The Informa-
tion Security Oversight Office (ISOO) within the 
National Archives and Records Administration 
monitors implementation of federal government 
classification policies.
Proponents of generally limiting classified infor-
mation offer six main reasons for revising cur-
rent restrictions. First, greater information shar-
ing promotes a more informed citizenry. Second, 
it makes government policies and practices more 
transparent and accountable. Third, it facilitates 
congressional oversight of intelligence operations. 
Fourth, reduced classification promotes efficiency 
in government management by reducing unneeded 
security costs. Fifth, the government can concen-
trate resources on protecting the most important 
information. Finally, greater information sharing 
402 Richard Weitz, Executive Order Dispute High-
lights Problems with U.S. Government Secrecy Policy, 
World Politics Review, June 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=879#.
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makes it easier for analysts to integrate data from 
different sources, to counter groups (such as oc-
curred with Iraq’s nonexistent WMD), and helps 
achieve superior situational awareness of poten-
tial threats. 
Overclassification and Pseudoclassification
The problem of overclassification refers to the 
classification of information that should not have 
been classified in the first place or that was given 
a higher than necessary level of classification. The 
challenge of pseudoclassification refers to the im-
proper or overuse of the SBU designation. 
The main cause of overclassification within the 
U.S. intelligence community is the continued ad-
herence to the “need to know” principle. The So-
viet bloc’s comprehensive intelligence collection 
efforts during the Cold War justified the use of 
compartmentalized and decentralized intelligence 
operations. Terrorist groups, however, primar-
ily use open source material and on-site obser-
vations to plan operations rather then attempt to 
steal classified information. For this reason, it is 
generally more effective to encourage a more lib-
eral exchange of information to allow analysts to 
“connect the dots” to identify and preempt terror-
ist threats. The U.S. needs to replace the “need to 
know” approach with a “need-to-share” principle. 
One easy application of such an approach would 
involve the greater use of “tear-lines” to separate 
out data from the sources and the methods used 
to obtain it. The tear-line report system protects 
the sources and methods—essential for recruit-
ing human agents and obtaining information from 
foreign intelligence services—while allowing in-
teragency exploitation of potentially illuminating 
intelligence. Its greater use would also facilitate 
intelligence sharing with Congress as well as state 
and local authorities.
In addition, President Bush has mandated the stan-
dardization of procedures for designating, mark-
ing, and handling SBU information across the fed-
eral government, but this goal remains unrealized 
five years after the 9/11 attacks. A 2006 audit by 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of 
how federal agencies treat SBU information identi-
fied 56 different designations for SBU information 
among the 26 agencies it surveyed. For example, the 
Department of Energy may mark documents with 
SBU information as “Official Use Only (OUO)”, 
or it may choose to use another one of its sixteen 
designations for SBU information. In contrast, the 
Department of Defense uses the designation “For 
Official Use Only (FOUO),” and the Department of 
Homeland Security employs the designation “Pro-
tected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII).” 
Only a few of these categories, which probably 
number over a hundred in total, have any basis in 
formal statute. Most were created by individual 
agencies employing their own criteria and poli-
cies, resulting in the uncoordinated growth of des-
ignations that restrict vaguely defined classes of 
information. Unlike with classified information, 
moreover, government agencies typically do not 
provide means by which public groups can chal-
lenge SBU classifications.
This lack of a government-wide comprehensive 
interoperable SBU designation classification sys-
tem interferes with information sharing in two 
ways. Not only do different agencies classify dif-
ferent information using different labels, but they 
often classify different information under the same 
labels. Indeed, the 2006 GAO report Information 
Sharing stated that half of the agencies covered 
reported encountering challenges in sharing SBU 
info. The GAO also found that most agencies do 
not limit who or how many employees have au-
thority to make designations, provide adequate 
training for employees making designation deci-
sions, or undertake periodic reviews to verify the 
proper use of classified designations. 
In recent congressional hearings, many speakers 
from diverse backgrounds testified that the federal 
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government had yet to overcome these problems. 
For example, ISOO Director William Leonard 
stated that the number of federal government clas-
sification decisions has approximately doubled 
since the September 2001 terrorist attacks. As a 
result, the cost of managing the U.S. information 
classification system has reached a record high. 
An ISOO audit last year also found that almost 
two-thirds of trained classifiers they reviewed 
made mistakes in determining the appropriate lev-
el of classification. 
Leonard did not address the issue of SBU data 
since it fell outside the oversight authority of his 
office—or any other independent executive branch 
body. Instead, individual agencies can decide for 
themselves whether they are correctly designat-
ing and managing sensitive information, effective 
vitiating the ISE. The program manager respon-
sible for its implementation, Thomas McNamara, 
anticipates needing at least five more years before 
achieving “minimally” satisfactory progress—a 
problematic timeline. 
Responding to long-standing concerns about the 
procedures and amount of classification within 
the federal government, the House Subcommit-
tee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and 
Terrorist Risk Assessment held hearings on the 
risks posed by overclassification of information 
by government officials. Speakers from a variety 
of backgrounds testified on the issues surround-
ing government classification and how it affects 
crucial information-sharing between all levels of 
government.
Almost all those who gave testimony to the com-
mittee agreed that the present culture of classifica-
tion is excessive and dangerous both to national 
security and the right of the public to have access 
to non-vital information relating to government 
activities. The current system often fails to prop-
erly designate what truly needs to be kept confi-
dential as well as hindering the effective sharing 
of information between federal agencies and local 
authorities. These tensions over the levels of gov-
ernment classification have existed for decades 
during the Cold War, but were brought to the fore-
front by the attacks on September 11th.
The 9/11 Commission in their final report directly 
cited overclassification as a major impediment to 
effective intelligence sharing in preventing future 
terrorist attacks. Security requirements fostered 
agencies to needlessly classify information and 
hoard intelligence within their own departments 
rather then effectively share it with other agen-
cies.403 The Commission further found penalties 
rather than incentives for individuals who effec-
tively share intelligence between departments.
The Classification System
Classification authority is stipulated by Executive 
Order 12958 originally created by President Clin-
ton and later amended by President Bush in 2003. 
Under the order, classification can only be man-
dated by assigned officials or by non-specified in-
dividuals who can clearly establish a line linking 
decisions by mandated officials that would justify 
classifying information. This system is monitored 
by the Information Security Oversight Office 
(ISOO), operating out of the National Archives 
and Records Administration.
This system relies on the ability of officials to re-
sponsibly classify truly sensitive information and 
not broadly use their authority to keep documents 
secret. With the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the 
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the amount of 
information that could potentially be seen as sen-
sitive has increased. This has strained the abilities 
of officials to gauge what should be considered 
secret. In response to these increased pressures, 
officials have been erring on the side of caution 
and labeling more documents as classified. The 
Director of the ISOO William Leonard testified 
to this large increase citing that, “Classification 
403 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, supra 
note 1 at 435.
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has multiplied, reaching 14.2 million classifica-
tion decisions in 2005, nearly double the number 
in 2001.”404
ISOO conducts yearly audits of the classification 
process of the federal government, including the 
financial costs associated with it. Its staff in con-
junction with 41 executive agencies, excluding 
the CIA, calculated that $7.7 billion was spent on 
all aspects classification procedures in fiscal year 
2005.405 This sum was up nearly 5.8 percent from 
the previous year and represented an all time high 
for classification costs. Most of these increases 
dealt with physical security for classified informa-
tion, including new employees and infrastructure 
costs.
In its annual report on the overall effectiveness of 
the classification process, the ISOO found numer-
ous shortcomings in 2005. Its review of selected 
documents extrapolated that almost 66 out of ev-
ery 100 documents had some form of error. Most 
problematic were the 10.6% of documents that had 
no label to designate why the document was be-
ing classified.406 Furthermore the audit found that 
agencies did not effectively train their staff to be 
able to recognize what information truly needed 
to be classified.
ISOO’s ability to help maintain a balance between 
the needs of national security and public disclo-
sure has been difficult. They have struggled with 
the Bush administration’s embrace of much more 
secrecy with regards to government information 
then previous administrations. One of the most 
404 William Leonard, Testimony to House Sub-Com-
mittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorist 
Risk Assessment, Congressional Quarterly, Mar. 22, 
2007.
405 Report on Cost Estimates For Security Classifica-
tion Activities for 2005, Information Security Oversight 
Office, 2006, available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/re-
ports/2005-cost-report.pdf. 
406 2005 Report of the Information Security Over-
sight Office, Information Security Oversight Office, May 
25, 2006, available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/re-
ports/2005-annual-report.pdf. 
public signs of this policy was a recent scandal 
at the National Archives. Historians were puzzled 
and shocked when seemingly innocuous docu-
ments previously declassified were suddenly re-
moved and reclassified by various government 
agencies.407
The ISOO was asked to review the documents and 
found from a sample size that none of them ap-
peared pose any threat to national security. How-
ever, the ISOO has no power to force an agency 
to change course. ISOO can merely make sug-
gestions to the administration and Congress. The 
President is the only one who has that authority 
and has seemed unwilling to do so.408
Sensitive but Unclassified Data
The growth of a separate entity broadly identified 
as sensitive but unclassified information (SBU) 
has alarmed many observers. These documents 
have not been given a formal classification un-
der Executive order 12958 but are instead given 
a variety of security labels that restrict access to 
them. Documents under these seals range from 
law enforcement testimony to critical infrastruc-
ture data. Agencies do not have to make the same 
reports on these decisions as they would under the 
formal classification system, eliminating ISOO 
oversight.
Around 56 different sensitive but unclassified la-
bels are applied by a broad spectrum of federal 
agencies, the majority of them used by agencies 
involved in homeland security.409 Only a few of 
these categories have any basis in formal statute, 
most are the product of individual agency poli-
cies. The individualistic nature of these classifi-
407 Scott Shane, US Reclassifies Many Documents 
in Secret Review, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/21/politics/21reclassify.
html?pagewanted=1&ei=5088&en=370552525a85278d&e
x=1298178000. 
408 Ibid.
409 Federal Government Needs to Establish, supra 
note 43.
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cations has at times inhibited effectively sharing 
them amongst agencies, since no overarching sys-
tem exists on what information can be given out 
and to whom.
One of the major problems associated with SBU 
designations is the broad number of federal em-
ployees who can restrict access to data. At the 
DHS, Defense department, and Department of 
Energy almost any employee can apply a SBU re-
lated label on documents or information.410 Com-
pounding the large number of potential classifiers 
is the lack of effective training to help employees 
identify what needs to be kept sensitive and when 
the label is unnecessary. The DOE and DOD were 
cited in one report for their lack of a required train-
ing program for employees so they can accurately 
apply sensitive labels on materials.411
 
Ms. Meredith Fuchs of the National Security Ar-
chive noted, “The absence of reporting mecha-
nisms for sensitive but unclassified control mark-
ings makes any assessment of the extent to which a 
policy is being used difficult, if not impossible.”412 
Trying to get a completely accurate report on the 
entirety of SBU usage remains difficult. The lack 
of ISOO like body to watchdog SBU procedures 
means individual agencies are left with the re-
sponsibility of ensuring that they mark the correct 
information as being sensitive.
Rep. Christopher Shays(R-CT) member of the 
House Committee on Government Reform was 
highly critical of SBU data saying, “Legally am-
biguous markings, like sensitive but unclassified, 
sensitive homeland security information and for 
official use only, create new bureaucratic barriers 
410 David Perera, Unveiling Secrets, Gov’t Execu-
tive, May 15, 2006, available at http://www.govexec.
com/features/0506-15/0506-15na2.htm. 
411 Managing Sensitive Information: Departments of 
Energy and Defense Policies and Oversight Could be Im-
proved, Government Accountability Office, Mar. 7, 2006, 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06369.pdf 
412 Meredith Fuchs, Testimony to House Sub-Commit-
tee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorist Risk 
Assessment, Congressional Quarterly, Mar. 22, 2007.
to information sharing.”413 He and many others 
finds these non-standardized security labels have 
the potential to impede vital intelligence sharing 
due to lack of a clear and recognized system for 
managing the variety of different brands.
Effects on Information Sharing
The Cold War mentality of compartmentalized 
and decentralized intelligence operations has 
proven ineffective in the new strategic environ-
ment. With the current emphasis on counter-ter-
rorism, the Cold War mindset with “their dual re-
quirements of appropriate security clearance and 
‘need to know’ designation inhibit[s] the free flow 
of information to and from today’s diverse com-
munity of relevant federal, state, local, and private 
sector actors.”414
Al-Qa’eda does not operate the same sort of wide-
ranging and extensive network of spies and infor-
mants as the Soviet Union once did. It primarily 
uses open source material and on-site observa-
tions to plan its operations rather then attempt-
ing to steal classified information. This calls into 
question the necessity of agencies tightly holding 
sensitive information to the degree that it impedes 
other intelligence community members from ac-
cessing it.
Even though more effective information sharing 
was both a recommendation of the 9/11 Commis-
sion and made law by various homeland security 
bills, a comprehensive system is still not in place 
with regards to sharing classified data. The Intel-
ligence Sharing Environment (ISE), a product 
413 Rep. Christopher Shay, Opening Remarks to 
House Sub-Committee on National Security, Emerging 
Threats, and International Relations Regarding Psudeo-
Classifiation, U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, Mar. 2, 2005, 
available at http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/
07jun20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/
109hrg/20922.pdf. 
414 James B. Steinberg, Mary Graham, & Andrew Eg-
gers, Building Intelligence to Fight Terrorism, Brookings 
Institute, Sept. 2003, available at http://www.brookings.
edu/comm/policybriefs/pb125.htm. 
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of the Intelligence Reform Act, was created to 
streamline the sharing between agencies at all lev-
els of government.
 
As part of its mandate, it is attempting to create a 
government-wide plan for sharing and standard-
izing SBU information.415 Its program manager, 
Thomas McNamara bluntly said, “We got ev-
eryone to agree, back in December of last year, 
that in principle, we need to change the way the 
federal government handles SBU.”416 No informa-
tion has been released to suggest that a final set of 
recommendations has been given to the President 
for review. Analysts have been skeptical about 
the success of the program with Mary DeRosa of 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
commenting, “The program manager has a huge 
job and not enough staff...It has a long way to 
go.”417
One of the continuing outcomes of this problem 
has been the lackluster information sharing be-
tween federal officials and their state and local 
counterparts. The FBI in particular has been very 
hesitant to give out clearances to state or local 
officials that would allow them to access more 
sensitive information.418 Officials at the state and 
municipal level constantly feed information up to 
DHS and FBI, but frequently receive little recip-
rocal information back.
Local law enforcement has been continually frus-
trated by the current situation. Michael Downing 
of the Los Angles Police Department’s Counter-
415 ISE Implementation Plan, supra note 24.
416 Shane Harris, All Together Now, Gov’t Execu-
tive, Mar. 15, 2007, available at http://www.govexec.com/
features/0307-15/0307-15adif.htm [hereinafter Harris]. 
417 Alice Lipowicz, Drift Into Nothingness: Informa-
tion Sharing Initiative Slowed By Questions of Mission, 
Complexity at 20, Wash. Technology, Oct. 10, 2005, 
available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/
print/20_20/27160-1.html.
418 Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Infor-
mation Sharing Need to be Strengthened, Government 
Accountability Office, Aug. 27, 2003, available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d03760.pdf. 
Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau noted 
his agency’s problem that local FBI offices can 
classify information as Secret, but do not have 
the authority to do the opposite and declassify 
documents.419 Since state and local authorities are 
the first responders and the initial line of defense 
against potential terrorist threats, the current rela-
tionship badly hinders their ability to effectively 
coordinate security programs.
The question remains if there is enough impetus 
to try and fully implement the ISE, improve the 
classification system, and standardize SBU proce-
dures. To do so would require massive shifts in the 
bureaucratic mentalities in numerous federal agen-
cies as well as the full backing of the President and 
Congress. Ambassador McNamara noted, “We’ve 
got another at least five years of work to do before 
I would even be minimally satisfied that they’re 
sharing information the way they ought to.”420
Law Enforcement
The law enforcement community’s investigative 
functions have prepared many of its officials for 
the responsibilities of information sharing in a na-
tional security context. However, a lack of consis-
tent information procedures across law enforce-
ment community participants has hindered the 
sharing of terrorism information on a nationwide 
scale. Recent Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiatives 
seek to establish a strategic partnership between 
federal and SLT law enforcement officials and 
improve the community’s ability to develop stan-
dardized information sharing procedures. 
The U.S. federal system of governance currently 
separates the law enforcement community into 
more than 18,000 SLT jurisdictions.421 This struc-
419 Michael Downing, Testimony to House Sub-Com-
mittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorist 
Risk Assessment, Congressional Quarterly, Mar. 22, 
2007.
420 Harris, supra note 416.
421 Mark A. Marshall, Understanding the National 
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ture divides power among self-regulated law en-
forcement entities and maximizes accountability 
to local citizens. However, it also presents numer-
ous challenges in launching unified policy initia-
tives, such as the establishment of a coordinated 
information sharing environment. Like fusion 
centers, law enforcement agencies must contend 
with variations in state law on issues such as in-
formation security, freedom of information, and 
privacy when attempting to share information 
across jurisdictions. Information access and qual-
ity control are two additional areas where the poli-
cies developed by autonomous law enforcement 
agencies tend to differ widely.422 
Compounding the difficulties of reconciling in-
consistent policies and legal requirements are cul-
tural barriers to information sharing. Perpetuated 
in part by “need to know” practices, hostilities to-
ward sharing have deterred some law enforcement 
officials from working collaboratively to “connect 
the dots” in gathering and analyzing terrorism in-
formation.423 According to the DOJ, the law en-
forcement community’s “institutional mistrust” 
represents “one of the most intractable barriers to 
improving information sharing.”424 
Despite the challenges of coordinating informa-
tion sharing practices across a multiplicity of ju-
risdictions, the law enforcement community offers 
a valuable resource for increasing national aware-
ness of terror threats. Effectively integrating the 
law enforcement community into the ISE prom-
ises to provide information on suspicious activ-
ity gathered by more than 800,000 police officers 
across the nation.425 Local police officers likely 
Data Exchange (N-DEx) System, PoliceOne, Aug. 7, 
2007, available at http://www.policeone.com/writers/col-
umnists/MarkMarshall/articles/1295732/ [hereinafter 
Marshall]. 
422 LEISP: United States Department of Justice Law 
Enforcement Information Sharing Program, Department of 
Justice, Oct. 2005, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/
ocio/onedoj_strategy.pdf [hereinafter LEISP]. 
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid.
425 Assessment of Information Sharing Centers, supra 
have the greatest access to information about radi-
cal Islamists inspired by Osama bin Laden but 
not formally linked to the al-Qa’eda network. 
Through their ability collect information related 
to homegrown terrorist cells, law enforcement 
officers play a critical role in the nation’s effort 
to counter domestic radicalization and develop a 
more coherent picture of terror threats. 
Department of Justice Provides Needed Guid-
ance
Noting that the law enforcement community suf-
fers from the lack of a national strategy to coor-
dinate information policy, the DOJ has launched 
the Law Enforcement Information Sharing Pro-
gram (LEISP). The endeavor is intended to guide 
data exchange policies among law enforcement 
officials and prepare them for developing trusted 
information sharing partnerships with the defense 
and intelligence communities. Similar to the ISE, 
the LEISP is not an information “system” but rath-
er a policy approach that facilitates the develop-
ment of “need to share” procedures and encour-
ages regular cooperation among participants. By 
emphasizing relationship building, accountability 
policies, and unity of effort, the LEISP seeks to 
ensure that law enforcement officials incorporate 
sharing into their daily operations. 
The LEISP, which contains a National Informa-
tion Sharing Strategy (NISS),426 provides a frame-
work for integrating the DOJ, as well as state and 
local law enforcement officials, into the ISE by 
identifying three “tracks”427 of information shar-
ing progress. First, the DOJ is responsible for 
implementing an internal reorganization strategy 
note 289.
426 Gary M. Bald, Executive Assistant Director, 
National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Remarks before the United States Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Sept 21, 2005, transcript available at http://www.
fbi.gov/congress/congress05/bald092105.htm [hereinafter 
Bald]. 
427 LEISP, supra note 422.
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called OneDOJ.428 According to the guiding prin-
ciples of OneDOJ, the initiative will reform and 
consolidate the Department’s information sharing 
policies such that the Department may “share in-
formation among its components and present it-
self to law enforcement partners as a single entity 
for information exchange.”429 Second, the DOJ is 
working to build upon existing information shar-
ing capabilities by improving, integrating, and 
expanding access to law enforcement databases, 
thereby preventing the “stovepiping” of informa-
tion by independent law enforcement agencies.430 
This process will also address cultural barriers to 
sharing by deconstructing causes of agency mis-
trust and preventing information from being cat-
egorized, outside standard privacy and security 
policies, as “non-shareable.”431 Finally, the LEISP 
envisions a collaborative process by which the 
DOJ and SLT law enforcement officials will de-
velop strategies to coordinate policy, privacy, and 
technology issues in multi-jurisdictional sharing. 
Progress on these three tracks is currently occur-
ring simultaneously.432 
In March 2006, the DOJ enhanced the abstract, 
policy-oriented guidance contained in the LEISP 
with its release of Sharing Justice Information: 
A Capability Assessment Toolkit. The Toolkit is a 
web-based program providing law enforcement 
agencies with practical guidelines for evaluating 
and improving sharing practices. Regina B. Scho-
field, Assistant Attorney General for the Office 
of Justice Programs (OJP) explained, “Informa-
tion sharing initiatives are extremely complex, so 
agencies must constantly assess their organiza-
tional and technical capabilities.”433 
The Toolkit enables law enforcement agencies to 
assess information sharing initiatives by examin-
428 Ibid.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid.
431 Ibid.
432 Ibid.
433 Department of Justice Announces Information 
Sharing Toolkit, US Newswire, Mar. 30, 2006. 
ing such factors as organization, management, en-
terprise architecture, governance, cooperation with 
key participants, information security and privacy 
policies, performance metrics, and technological 
capabilities.434 The assessment mechanisms dis-
cussed by the Toolkit underscore the importance 
of “collaboration readiness,” which refers to “the 
degree to which relationships among information 
users and other resources support collaboration” 
and collective decision-making.435 The Toolkit’s 
emphasis on relationships and trust-building seeks 
to prevent cultural barriers to effective informa-
tion sharing, including stovepiping, interagency 
mistrust, and the dominance of “need to know” 
procedures.436 The guide is also designed to enable 
law enforcement agencies to design and imple-
ment cost-effective sharing procedures. According 
to Schofield, “The toolkit can save time and mon-
ey while providing a necessary and user-friendly 
guide for justice information sharing among agen-
cies. In some cases, an agency could complete a 
mini-assessment of certain system components in 
as little as an afternoon.”437 
The DOJ’s oversight of law enforcement agen-
cies’ efforts to expand information sharing is 
guided by the Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative (Global), a Federal Advisory Committee 
(FAC) consisting of representatives of more than 
thirty law enforcement and judicial.438 Global ad-
vises the Attorney General on information shar-
ing issues, striving for “efficient sharing of data 
among justice entities”439 as its principal mission. 
Although Global meets only twice a year, its col-
434 Bureau of Justice Assistance, Sharing Justice 
Information: A Capability Assessment Toolkit, Aug. 2005, 
available at http://www.ctg.albany.edu/publications/guides/
sharing_justice_info/sharing_justice_info.pdf [hereinafter 
Dep’t of Justice Announces]. 
435 Ibid.
436 Ibid.
437 Dep’t of Justice Announces, supra note 433.
438 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 
(Global), U.S. Dep’t of Justice-Office of Justice Programs, 
Information Technology Initiatives, available at http://
www.it.ojp.gov/topic.jsp?topic_id=8. 
439 Ibid.
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lection of justice professionals and information 
experts provide valuable recommendations in 
white papers, which address both technological 
and strategic policy issues.440 As Global advises 
the Attorney General, it highlights key issues fac-
ing the DOJ’s SLT partners and provides a forum 
for law enforcement entities to discuss common 
challenges to information sharing. 441
The DOJ’s efforts to reform internal information 
policies and collaborate with non-federal justice 
entities allows for more effective coordination of 
sharing procedures, even if the legal framework 
informing those procedures varies across jurisdic-
tions. By providing unified strategies, as well as 
standardized information sharing goals and as-
sessment tools, the DOJ’s initiatives are improv-
ing sharing within the law enforcement communi-
ty and preparing federal and SLT justice agencies 
for broader integration into the ISE. 
A History of Sharing
In many cases, a lack of coordination across juris-
dictions and the perpetuation of Cold War “need 
to know” policies had prevented effective infor-
mation sharing within the law enforcement com-
munity prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Nevertheless, the law enforcement community 
has had some history of sharing information on 
criminal investigations, an experience upon which 
ISE implementation policies should capitalize. 
In particular, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) has reached out to state and local law en-
forcement officials by exchanging wants, war-
rants, fingerprints, and forensic data while inves-
tigating specific cases.442 In discussing potential 
440 Ibid.
441 Ibid.
442 Robert J. Jordan, FBI, Testimony before the 
United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Sub-
committee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, 
Apr. 17, 2007, transcript at Information Sharing Initiative, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Apr. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jordan041702.htm 
for increased information sharing with the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Bor-
der Security, Larry A. Mefford, executive assistant 
director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism-Counterin-
telligence Division acknowledged that “collection 
of information/intelligence has always been a core 
function of the FBI’s investigative mission,”443 a 
role that has prepared the agency for broader shar-
ing among ISE participants.
In 1995, the FBI established Law Enforcement On-
Line (LEO), a secure web-based program that has 
allowed for the exchange of sensitive but unclas-
sified data among some 30,000 users represent-
ing over 17,000 local law enforcement agencies 
and sixty federal agencies.444 The system, which 
provides a discussion forum and features interac-
tive training sessions, supports information span-
ning topics on terrorism, criminal investigations, 
and cyber crime.445 The FBI also relies on LEO to 
transmit weekly intelligence reports, which have 
recently been made available to fusion center ana-
lysts linked to HSIN.446 Unlike HSIN, however, 
LEO has proven a more effective tool for linking 
federal and SLT communications. After HSIN had 
been launched in 2004, analysts had referred to 
[hereinafter Jordan].
443 Larry A. Mefford, Executive Assistant Direc-
tor, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division, FBI, 
Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sub-
committee on Immigration and Border Security, Sept. 23, 
2003, transcript at Improvements with Information Sharing 
and Watch Lists, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sept. 
23, 2003, available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/con-
gress03/mefford092303.htm [hereinafter Mefford]. 
444 Willie T. Hulon, Deputy Assistant Director, 
Counterterrorism Division, FBI, Statement before the 
House Government Reform Subcommittee on Technology, 
Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the 
Census, July 13, 2004, transcript available at http://www.
fbi.gov/congress/congress04/bald071304.htm [hereinafter 
Hulon].
445 Ibid.
446 Maureen A. Baginski, Executive Assistant Direc-
tor, Intelligence, FBI, Statement before the House Repre-
sentatives Select Committee on Homeland Security, Aug. 
17, 2004, transcript available at http://www.fbi.gov/con-
gress/congress04/baginski081704.htm [hereinafter Bagin-
ski]. 
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the system as a “poor shadow of the FBI’s Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO).”447
LEO is also connected to the Regional Informa-
tion Sharing System (RISS), which has facilitated 
data exchange within the law enforcement com-
munity since 1974 and been updated to meet the 
evolving needs of current investigations.448 RISS 
is a nationwide network that is congressionally 
funded and organized around six RISS centers, 
which emphasize the sharing of information rel-
evant to their respective regions.449 The network 
has a larger user base than LEO, connecting over 
7,700 law enforcement agencies as well as near-
ly 75,000 officers on multiple levels of govern-
ment.450 The RISS program is managed by a Na-
tional Policy Group, which considers the needs of 
participating agencies and develops strategies on 
increasing information sharing on multi-jurisdic-
tional criminal activity.451 
Like LEO, RISS offers users several interactive 
information sharing tools, including chat rooms, 
document archives, encrypted email, and an 
electronic bulletin board (RISS Leads) in a user-
friendly and secure environment.452 RISS Leads is 
partitioned to provide special subject-matter con-
tent on national criminal intelligence (RISS Intel) 
and gang-related crime (RISS Gang).453 The RISS 
network enables users to connect to numerous 
other databases on drug-related crime and white-
collar crime, which are hosted by a variety of 
agencies, including the U.S. Secret Service. Over 
time, RISS has undergone numerous expansions 
and now offers a sophisticated mechanism for 
447 Fixing the Homeland Security Information Net-
work, supra note 353.
448 Assessment of Information Sharing Centers, supra 
note 289.
449 DHS Security Information Network, CQ Con-
gressional Testimony, May 10, 2007 [hereinafter DHS 
Security Information Network]. 
450 Ibid.
451 Ibid.
452 DHS Security Information Network, supra note 
449.
453 Ibid.
sharing data pertaining to drug trafficking, cyber 
crime, gangs, “emerging criminal groups,” as well 
as terrorism.454 
By linking thousands of law enforcement and 
criminal justice officials to a nationwide net-
work, the longstanding RISS program represents 
a valuable asset to the ISE. Donald F. Kennedy, 
executive director of the New England State Po-
lice Information Network, one of the six regional 
centers participating in RISS, commented, “In the 
aftermath of 9/11, RISS recognized the critical 
need for timely exchange of national security and 
terrorist threat information, not only among law 
enforcement officials but to all first responders 
and officials involved in homeland security.”455 
To advance broader information sharing, RISS 
established the Automated Trusted Information 
Exchange (ATIX) in 2003. Kennedy explained 
that ATIX provides “a communication system that 
allows first responders, critical infrastructure per-
sonnel, and other public safety personnel including 
firefighters and public utility and school person-
nel and local, state, and federal law enforcement 
to share terrorism and homeland security informa-
tion in a secure, real-time environment.” ATIX’s 
effectiveness was recognized promptly and in 
2004, ATIX was selected as the “official system 
for secure communication and information shar-
ing” for the G8 Summit.456 
The online networks LEO and RISS have proven 
efficient, successful, and worthy of integration 
into the ISE.457 LEO and RISS have been particu-
larly useful given that DHS’ more recent sharing 
initiative, the HSIN, has failed to adequately link 
SLT officials and avoid cross-database duplica-
tion. At the same time, officials have recognized 
that many policy-oriented data sharing initiatives 
developed by the law enforcement community in 
the pre-9/11 period have been limited in scope. 
For instance, Larry A. Mefford, executive assis-
454 Ibid.
455 Ibid.
456 Ibid.
457 Baginski, supra note 446.
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tant director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism-Coun-
terintelligence Division, pointed out that aside 
from LEO and RISS, procedures for sharing in-
formation to enhance criminal investigations has 
traditionally been “case oriented.”458 Rather than 
an “enterprise-wide activity” of the nature that the 
ISE seeks to establish, law enforcement informa-
tion sharing has previously focused on particular 
investigative missions. Even as late as mid-2002, 
sharing was limited by the viewpoint of many 
FBI officials that “need to know” policies were 
intertwined with adequate information security. 
In many cases, the position that “need to know” 
access controls were necessary to maintain the in-
tegrity of law enforcement information resulted in 
a great amount of data being categorized as “non-
shareable”459 by independent agencies. Still, LEO 
and RISS represent valuable tools for expanding 
information exchange and integrating sharing 
practices into daily law enforcement operations. 
FBI Initiatives Improve Existing Sharing Pro-
cedures
Since 9/11, the FBI has aggressively advanced 
its capability to gather intelligence, investigate 
emerging terror threats, and manage information 
sharing initiatives. Robert J. Jordan, head of the 
FBI’s Information Sharing Task Force, has com-
mented that the FBI “is an organization in change” 
that has seen “massive shifts in…resource deploy-
ments,…missions and priorities to better reflect 
the post-9/11 realities.”460 
The FBI’s capacity to improve terrorism informa-
tion sharing is linked to the agency’s recent inter-
nal organizational reform, which added branches 
to manage national security issues, including in-
telligence/counterintelligence, counterterrorism, 
and weapons of mass destruction.461 Information 
policies have also received fresh guidance from 
the recently appointed Chief Information Officer 
458 Mefford, supra note 443.
459 LEISP, supra note 422.
460 Jordan, supra note 442.
461 Bald, supra note 426.
and the new security division, which concentrates 
on information security.462 Though the FBI has 
always carried dual functions as an intelligence 
and investigative agency, the organization has re-
doubled its intelligence efforts by adding an Of-
fice of Intelligence charged with maintaining a 
“vigorous and fluid flow” of intelligence informa-
tion within the law enforcement community and 
with the IC.463 The FBI is also devoting more time 
and resources to the development and dissemina-
tion of Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), 
Intelligence Assessments (IAs), and Intelligence 
Bulletins (IBs) on national security and terrorist 
threats.464 
Enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act has greatly 
expanded the FBI’s information sharing capa-
bilities. Deconstructing the “wall” of previous 
restrictions on the sharing of law enforcement 
information, the legislation enables the FBI to ex-
change data and cooperate more closely with the 
IC. As Steven C. McCraw, FBI assistant director, 
explained to the House Select Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security in 2003, the framers of the 
USA PATRIOT Act recognized that “the benefits 
of sharing information far exceeds risks” and that 
“transparency in…knowledge of terrorist threats” 
is one of the most critical counterterrorism tools.465 
McCraw also explained, “In today’s threat en-
vironment, cooperation rather than competition 
must be the guiding principle.”466 The USA PA-
TRIOT Act, as well as revised Attorney General 
Guidelines,467 promote collaboration among law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies by permit-
ting, in some cases for the first time, the sharing 
462 Jordan, supra note 442.
463 Ibid.
464 Ibid.
465 Steven, C. McCraw, Assistant Director, FBI, 
Testimony before the House Select Committee on Home-
land Security Subcommittee, July 24, 2003, transcript 
at, Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, July 24, 2003, available at http://www.fbi.
gov/congress/congress03/mccraw072403.htm [hereinafter 
McCraw].
466 Ibid.
467 Mefford, supra note 443.
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of grand jury information and foreign intelligence 
information acquired in the course of criminal in-
vestigations.
Since 9/11, the FBI has adopted a vigorous ap-
proach to increasing sharing and has taken sev-
eral important steps to collaborate with a variety 
of ISE participants. Many of the FBI’s current 
information sharing initiatives stem from its re-
cent organizational transformation and amplified 
emphasis on intelligence and counterterrorism 
functions.468 As Maureen A. Baginski, FBI execu-
tive assistant director for intelligence, remarked, 
the FBI’s information sharing initiatives is driven 
by the “core guiding principle…that intelligence 
and law enforcement operations must be integrat-
ed.”469
As part of the DOJ’s LEISP, the FBI has released 
a National Information Sharing Strategy (NISS), 
which coordinates law enforcement collaboration 
and contributions to ISE implementation.470 NISS 
outlines a three-track technical plan for increasing 
law enforcement information sharing, which con-
sists of use of LEO, as well as two new databases, 
National Data Exchange (N-DEx) and Regional 
Data Exchange (R-DEx). 
N-DEx, a recently developed network nearing 
fully operational status, is an investigative tool 
that enables law enforcement officers to compare 
their cases to similar incidents being examined 
by other agencies. FBI Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) Zalmai Azmi stated, “The development and 
deployment of N-DEx will provide nationwide 
capability to share information derived from in-
cident, arrest and event reports. This will expedite 
coordination across law enforcement so that we 
can remain one step ahead of the criminals and 
terrorists despite jurisdictional boundaries.”471 
468 Baginski, supra note 446.
469 Ibid.
470 FBI Announces Contract Award in Information 
Sharing Program, States News Service, Feb. 16, 2007 
[hereinafter FBI Announces].
471 Ibid.
By compiling information on suspicious activity 
gathered by law enforcement officials across the 
nation, N-DEx will facilitate the process of mak-
ing analytical connections that had been lacking 
before 9/11. As SLT officers will be the primary 
users of the system, the N-DEx “Statement of Re-
quirements” largely reflects the views of local of-
ficers and organizations, such as the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, on information 
sharing.472 At the same time, however, federal 
agencies such as ATF, DEA, Bureau of Prisons, 
FBI, and U.S. Marshals will contribute to the da-
tabase supported by N-DEx.473
Though programs like LEO and RISS already 
link law enforcement officials across jurisdic-
tions, N-DEx improves upon earlier information 
sharing efforts by integrating data. Mark A. Mar-
shall, Chief of Police of Smithfield, Virginia, has 
assessed N-DEx as a highly useful and efficient 
data exchange system. He commented, “Participa-
tion in N-DEx will complement and expand those 
capabilities, using a model of incident data aggre-
gation that did not exist on a national scale. N-
DEx will provide well-defined integration points 
which allow for inclusion of…already established 
groups, technologies, etc. into the broader N-DEx 
information sharing architecture.”474 
The Regional Data Exchange, or R-DEx, which 
was launched in St. Louis in February 2005, pro-
vides a bank of investigative data, including in-
formation on “individuals, vehicles, weapons, ad-
dresses, [and] phone numbers.”475 In addition, the 
network’s analytical assistance tools also enable 
investigators to construct maps and examine geo-
graphical information relevant to their cases.476 
The program provides connectivity to informa-
tion stored in several other databases, such as the 
Naval Criminal Investigative Services’ Law En-
forcement Information Exchange (LinX), a law 
472 Marshall, supra note 421.
473 FBI Announces, supra note 470.
474 Marshall, supra note 421.
475 Jordan, supra note 442.
476 Ibid.
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enforcement network developed and maintained 
by the city of Seattle.477 
Reliance on R-DEx has achieved early successes. 
The FBI, the Illinois State Police, the Missouri 
State Highway Patrol, the St. Louis Metropoli-
tan Police, the St. Louis County Police, and the 
St. Clair County (Illinois) Sheriff’s Department 
all access R-DEx on a regular basis to assist each 
other’s investigations.478 Like N-DEx, the R-DEx 
system provides a useful mechanism for coordi-
nating investigations that are inter-jurisdictional 
in nature. Increased use of the system encourages 
law enforcement officials to overcome barriers 
to sharing by integrating sharing and investiga-
tion-enhancing tools into daily procedures.479 By 
providing access to highly specific information on 
items that are frequently the subject of investiga-
tions, R-DEx also advances the FBI and DOJ’s 
broad goal of ensuring that law enforcement agen-
cies “share by rule and withhold by exception.”480 
Use of both N-DEx and R-DEx greatly enhances 
law enforcement officials’ ability to integrate data, 
make appropriate deductions, and notify SLT and 
federal partners about potential terrorist threats. 
The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)
Outside the information technology initiatives 
launched by NISS, the FBI has endeavored to 
boost information sharing by improving opera-
tions at the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). An 
information sharing institution launched shortly 
after the 9/11 attacks, the TSC is an interagency 
organization that consolidates information on sus-
pected terrorists into a Terrorist Screening Data-
base (TSDB) and offers a 24/7 real-time terrorism 
watch to law enforcement and intelligence agen-
cies.481 The Center was established under Home-
477 More Data for FBI’s National Information Shar-
ing System, Gov’t Technology Beta, June 29, 2006, 
available at http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/100047. 
478 Jordan, supra note 442.
479 Ibid.
480 Ibid.
481 Mefford, supra note 443.
land Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-6 and 
is subject to federal privacy restrictions. Repre-
sentatives from the FBI, as well as the DOJ, DHS, 
DOS, and Treasury Department contribute to the 
TSC’s operations.482
The TSC currently manages a Terrorism Watch 
List (TWL), which is intended to serve as the FBI’s 
“single, integrated listing of individuals of investi-
gative interest.”483 The TWC contains names and 
information about individuals falling into one of 
three categories: (1) individuals against whom 
criminal charges or indictments have been issued; 
(2) names and information about individuals “of 
investigative interest” to the FBI; and (3) names 
of individuals, offered by intelligence agencies or 
foreign governments, who are suspected of engag-
ing in terrorist activities.484 The TSC also manag-
es Interpol resources and data on consular issues, 
border security, flight lists, warrants, gangs, and 
fugitives.485 Information handled by the TSC can 
be used to notify law enforcement officials if indi-
viduals of interest to terrorism investigations en-
ter their respective jurisdictions.486 The TSC also 
permits law enforcement officials to run “name 
checks” and permits terrorist screenings to be con-
ducted for visa applicants.487 
According to FBI Director Robert Mueller, 
“What’s different about the TSC is the ability to 
make…[terrorism] information available in real 
time, constantly updated, 24 hours a day and 
482 Donna A. Bucella, Director, Terrorist Screen-
ing Center, Statement before the House Committee on 
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats and International Relations, transcript at, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, available at http://www.
fbi.gov/congress/congress04/bucella071304.htm [hereinaf-
ter Bucella].
483 Jordan, supra note 442.
484 Ibid.
485 Bucella, supra note 482.
486 Jordan, supra note 442.
487 Press Release, Office of Homeland Security, New 
Terrorist Screening Center Established, Sept. 16, 2003, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releas-
es/2003/09/20030916-8.html.
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across the board.”488 Mueller added, “By provid-
ing this around-the-clock service to anti-terrorist 
screeners throughout the federal government, the 
new Center will ensure not only that those who 
need it will have access to the best, most cur-
rent information, but they will also have access 
to on-call experts who can support them in taking 
immediate and appropriate action to stop terror-
ists and prevent attacks at any hour of the day or 
night.”489
The TSC, however, has raised questions about pri-
vacy and the reliability of information that results 
in an individual’s name being entered in the TSDB. 
Under HSPD-6, only individuals “who are known 
or appropriately suspected to be or have been en-
gaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, 
in aid of, or related to terrorism” are suitable for 
inclusion in the TSDB.490 Still, HSPD-6 standards 
are vague and, in order for the TSC to function 
effectively, it cannot inform an individual as to 
whether he or she has been added to the database. 
Some concerns are alleviated by the requirement 
that names be removed from the TSDB as soon as 
an individual no longer meets HSPD-6 standards. 
Additionally, since TSC is an interagency organi-
zation, it may only handle information constitu-
tionally collected by its member agencies, which 
are subject to restrictions designed to protect pri-
vacy and civil liberties.491
In a June 2005 study, the Department of Justice’s 
Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) re-
ported that the TSC has had some difficulties en-
suring the accuracy and comprehensiveness of 
its database.492 Some information included in the 
database lacked tagging codes and in other cases, 
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
490 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterror-
ism-Terrorist Screening Center, http://www.fbi.gov/terror-
info/counterrorism/faqs.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
491 Ibid.
492 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspec-
tor General, Audit Division, Review of the Terrorist Screen-
ing Center, June 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/
FBI/a0527/final.pdf. 
the TSDB was missing information on known 
domestic and international terrorists.493 The OIG 
recommended that the TSC review its holdings to 
rectify problems created by “missing, conflicting, 
or duplicate information.”494 The report also sug-
gested the adoption of improved search engines 
and information assurance policies.495 
On the whole, the TSC has received a mixture 
of criticism and praise. Some Center officials 
claim that the TSC is “well-positioned to assist 
communications between agencies,”496 despite 
critics’ complaints that the TSC is “riddled with 
problems…management deficiencies, immature 
information technology, and high personnel turn-
over.”497 Many of the TSC’s inadequacies appear 
rectifiable through enhanced personnel training, 
improved oversight and management, as well as 
the development of procedures on data quality 
control and information updates. Though the TSC 
must continue working to improve information as-
surance and accuracy, the multi-agency endeavor 
represents a considerable step toward seamless in-
formation sharing on suspected terrorists. 
Information Sharing Working Groups
The FBI contributes representatives to a number 
of interagency working groups seeking to en-
hance sharing across the ISE’s participating com-
munities. The Information Sharing Policy Group 
(ISPG), created by the FBI in 2004, advises policy 
on both federal/SLT law enforcement information 
sharing as well as efforts to develop a more trusted 
partnership with intelligence officials.498 In Sep-
tember 2005, the FBI completed an Intelligence 
Policy Manual that builds upon the ISPG’s work. 
493 Ibid.
494 Ibid.
495 Ibid.
496 Bucella, supra note 482.
497 Chris Strohm, Terrorist Screening Center Plagued 
by Deficiencies, Audit Finds, Gov’t Executive, June 14, 
2005, available at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0605/
061405c1.htm.
498 Bald, supra note 426.
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The Manual guides law enforcement and intel-
ligence agencies on maintaining equilibrium be-
tween “need to share” policies and information 
security strategies.499
The FBI is also a member and chair of the Justice 
Intelligence Coordinating Council (JICC). Cre-
ated by the Attorney General in 2004, the JICC 
examines methods for strengthening and coordi-
nating the DOJ’s intelligence functions. The JICC 
provides recommendations on collaboration with 
the IC, examines emerging information technolo-
gy, and improves strategies set forth in the LEISP. 
Additionally, the group addresses technical issues 
and contributes to the development of intelligence 
sharing training programs.500
Finally, the FBI participates in the GLOBAL Intel-
ligence Working Group and the GLOBAL Crimi-
nal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC). 
These bodies, both established in 2004, develop 
policies guiding the work of law enforcement offi-
cials stationed at state and local fusion centers.501 
Sharing with Defense Partners
The FBI’s robust sharing initiatives extend to 
partnerships with defense and foreign ISE partici-
pants. In 2003, the FBI created secure information 
sharing web-pages, where DoD officials could 
post Top Secret and Secret information.502 To fos-
ter cooperation with the defense community, the 
FBI shares biometric data, including fingerprints, 
photographs, and biographical information on de-
tainees and enemy prisoners of war, to military 
officials.503 The FBI’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking 
Task Force (FTTTF) also provides analytical sup-
port to DoD Counterintelligence Field Activity 
(CIFA). The DoD and FBI collaborate as mem-
bers of the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical 
Center, which manages forensic data and provides 
499 Ibid.
500 Ibid.
501 Ibid.
502 McCraw, supra note 465.
503 Bald, supra note 426.
the military with useful information about impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs).504 
Close FBI and DoD collaboration is also achieved 
through the placement of Special Agent Bomb 
Technicians (SABTs) and FBI investigators with 
U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.505 FBI in-
vestigators stationed abroad have contributed to 
the development of the Intelligence and Terrorist 
Photograph Identification Database (INTREPID), 
which contains over 12,000 images and videos 
of suspected terrorists.506 INTREPID has greatly 
aided the DoD’s counterterrorism and counterin-
surgency missions and military personnel to regu-
larly update the system by providing images ac-
quired during operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.507
Expansion of Joint-Terrorism Task Forces 
(JTTFs)
One of the FBI’s most significant interagency 
sharing initiatives involves the increased employ-
ment of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). 
These organizations share and analyze classified 
information to coordinate federal and SLT coun-
terterrorism efforts. 
Although created before 9/11, the FBI has suc-
cessfully adopted them to deal with post-9/11 
terrorist threats within the United States as part 
of the Bureau’s own restructuring to focus on 
preventing terrorism and other national secu-
rity threats as well as prosecuting perpetrators 
of these acts and other criminals after the fact. 
Most significantly, in November 2001, Director 
Robert S. Mueller oversaw a major reorganiza-
tion that established several new offices designed 
to enhance the FBI’s information sharing capaci-
ties in the area of counterterrorism. These issues 
included several related to information technol-
ogy, intelligence, records management, and law 
504 Ibid.
505 Ibid.
506 Ibid.
507 Ibid.
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enforcement coordination with state and local 
partners.
The FBI established first JTTF in New York City 
in 1980 following a surge in local bank robber-
ies. After the new structure proved successful in 
enhancing cooperation between the FBI and the 
New York Police Department (NYPD), the FBI 
expanded the use of JTTFs, in part to respond to 
terrorist threats.508 The FBI defines terrorism as 
any unlawful use of force or violence, by an in-
dividual or group of individuals, against persons 
or property to intimidate or coerce a government, 
civilians, or any of the above, to gain political or 
social objectives.509 
The JTTFs now regularly include full-time par-
ticipation of investigators from 17 Federal, state 
and local law enforcement agencies. The federal 
agencies included the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service (INS), Marshal’s Service, Secret 
Service, FAA, Customs Service, ATF, State De-
partment, Postal Inspection Service, IRS, and the 
U.S. Park Police. Numerous state and local law 
enforcement agencies are likewise full-time mem-
bers of JTTFs.510
JTTFs provide training to their participants, host 
dialogues to support case-specific investigations, 
and foster the sharing of intelligence. According 
to Robert J. Jordan, head of the FBI Information 
Sharing Task Force, “Years of experience have 
demonstrated that Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
(JTTFs) have proven to be one of the most effec-
tive methods of unifying federal, state and local 
law enforcement efforts to prevent and investigate 
terrorist activity by ensuring that all levels of law 
enforcement are fully benefiting from the infor-
mation possessed by each.”511 
508 Nevada Emergency Operations & Notification 
Network, Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), NEONN.org, 
available at http://neonn.org/index.cfm/MenuItemID/224.
htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Nevada Emer-
gency Operations]. 
509 Ibid.
510 Jordan, supra note 442.
511 Ibid.
JTTFs have significantly aided investigations of the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing, crimes com-
mitted by the Ku Klux Klan, financial transactions 
by Hamas through U.S. Islamic charities, and the 
activities of homegrown Hizbollah terrorist cells 
and the Palestine Islamic Jihad within the United 
States.512 JTTFs also played a role in securing the 
conviction of Ramzi Yousef and Eyad Mahamoud 
Ismail for conspiracy in the bombing of the World 
Trade Center as well as in the arrest and prosecu-
tion of Richard Reid, charged with attempting to 
destroy a civilian passenger plane in mid-flight 
over the Atlantic.513 More recently, the JTTFs 
helped secure the extradition of Syed Hashmi from 
the United Kingdom for providing al-Qa’eda with 
material support and helped detect an alleged plot 
to bomb John F. Kennedy International Airport.514 
The JTTFs also regularly coordinate security prep-
arations for major special events such as the 2002 
Winter Olympics, the NFL Super Bowls, and re-
curring national holidays (e.g., Independence Day) 
and international meetings (e.g., the annual Inter-
national Monetary Fund conference).
Regional Terrorism Task Forces (RTTFs) supple-
ment the work of the JTTFs. These bodies have the 
same objective of enhancing information sharing 
between the FBI and other public bodies, but are 
less institutionalized than the JTTFs. They typi-
cally involve semi-annual meetings on counterter-
rorism issues among law enforcement personnel 
from the FBI and other federal, state, and local 
law enforcement personnel.515
512 Office of the Inspector General, The Department 
of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forces, June 2005, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0507/background.
htm. 
513 Nevada Emergency Operations, supra note 508.
514 Press Release, Department of Justice, Four Indi-
viduals Charged in Plot to Bomb John F. Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport, June 2, 2007, available at http://newyork.
fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel07/plot060207.pdf; Press Re-
lease, Federal Bureau of Investigation New York Division, 
United States Announces First Extradition form United 
Kingdom on Terrorism Charges, May 26, 2007, available 
at http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel07/extradi-
tion052607.htm. 
515 Jordan, supra note 442.
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A National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), 
which is based at the Strategic Information and 
Operations Center of the FBI Headquarters, serves 
as venue for exchanging information among fed-
eral and SLT entities belonging to the intelligence, 
law enforcement, and public safety communi-
ties.516 The NJTTF originated immediately after 
9/11 as an ad hoc group of representatives from 
federal agencies involved in the counterterror-
ism mission. The participating federal agencies 
now include representatives from the intelligence 
community, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
the Railroad Police, and from the Departments of 
Homeland Security, Defense, Justice, Treasury, 
Commerce, Transportation, Energy, State, and the 
Interior.517
The NJTTF currently hosts electronic terrorism 
databases and daily intelligence conferences, in-
tegrates and analyzes data to achieve comprehen-
sive assessments of national terror threats.518 As 
a result, besides providing administrative, logisti-
cal, and training support to the JTTFs, the NJTTF 
effectively serves as a “fusion” center for intel-
ligence collected by JTTFs.519 
Eleven JTTFs existed in 1996.520 After 9/11, the 
FBI devoted considerable resources to increase 
this number to over one hundred. For example, the 
FBI increased its budget for JTTF-related funding 
from $216 million in FY 2003 to $375.2 million 
in FY 2005.521 The New York JTTF remains the 
largest, with approximately 500 investigators, an-
alysts, and other experts from over forty different 
public sector agencies among the region. 
516 Baginski, supra note 446.
517 Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Statement to Committee on Senate Judiciary, 
CQ Congressional Testimony, Dec. 6, 2006.
518 Bald, supra note 426.
519 Baginski, supra note 446.
520 Jordan, supra note 442.
521 The Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forc-
es Evaluation & Inspections Report I-2005-007, Office of 
the Inspector General, June 2005, available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0507/background.htm [herein-
after Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forces].
In line with the FBI’s new post-9/11 focus on de-
tecting national security threats before they ma-
ture, the Bureau has augmented the ability of the 
JTTFs to share information with the intelligence 
community by tasking a Special Agent or Intelli-
gence Analyst within each JTTF for this purpose.522 
These officials are responsible for the collection 
of “raw” intelligence data “for the entire national 
security community,” which includes SLT law en-
forcement officials and JTTF participants.523 
The FBI has also established Field Intelligence 
Groups (FIGs), in each of its fifty-six field offices, 
to enhance the JTTFs. They include Intelligence 
Analysts (IAs), Special Agents (SAs), Language 
Analysts (LAs), and Surveillance Specialists.524 
Their purpose is to ensure that JTTFs support fed-
eral initiatives to exchange terrorism information 
with the IC.525 They also provide guidance to JTT-
Fs on the dissemination of JTTF work products to 
state and local fusion centers. Willie T. Hulon, the 
FBI’s Deputy Assistant Director of the Counterter-
rorism Division, explained that, “The FIGs play a 
major role in ensuring that from now on, ‘we know 
what we know’ and we tell others in the Intelligence 
Community and our federal, state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement partners ‘what we know.’”526
For law enforcement officials unable to participate 
in JTTFs, the FBI offers special training programs.527 
Many attempt to share the latest counterterrorism 
tradecraft employed by the FBI. They provide addi-
tional evidence that the FBI considers that all SLT 
law enforcement officers, including those outside 
major urban areas, have a critical role to play in 
collecting and disseminating terrorism information. 
Since 2003, more than 27,000 local police officers 
have benefited from expanded FBI efforts to pro-
vide up-to-date counterterrorism training.528
522 Baginski, supra note 446.
523 Ibid.
524 Intelligence Revision, supra note 72.
525 Hulon, supra note 444.
526 Ibid.
527 McCraw, supra note 465.
528 Ibid.
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The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) at the 
Department of Justice has identified 28 recom-
mendations that the DOJ could take to improve 
the operations of the department’s various coun-
terterrorism task forces and councils. Several ap-
pear especially relevant to improving information-
sharing within the JTTF process.529 
First, the FBI needs to develop more national ori-
entation and training plans for JTTF members to 
ensure a certain degree of uniform preparedness 
and to counter perceptions that FBI members re-
ceive privileged access to training opportunities. 
Second, the JTTF network needs to ensure that 
it more effectively extends to law enforcement 
personnel working in remote areas so mutual ex-
change of data with these communities occurs. 
(Terrorists might perceive such gaps as opportuni-
ties to establish safe havens.)
Third, as with many government programs, the 
FBI has yet to develop optimal measures of ef-
fectiveness to evaluate the work of JTTFs. Inputs 
in terms of dollars spent or personnel assigned to 
JTTFs can easily be measured, but assessing the 
precise contribution of JTTFs is difficult given the 
multidimensional nature of the terrorist challenge 
and the fact that the most important success—pre-
venting a terrorist incident—is by definition a 
non-event.
Fourth, some JTTFs had inadequate administrative 
and analytical support, high turnover in task force 
leadership, or exceeded their authorized staffing 
levels. Some of these problems resulted from the 
urgent need to expand the JTTF program after 
9/11, but the recent stabilization in the growth of 
the JTTFs should allow the FBI to address some 
of these problems more comprehensively. Rather 
than increase the number of JTTF further, the FBI 
might find it optimal to meet authorized staffing 
levels of existing JTTFs. The current practice of 
529 Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forces, 
supra note 521.
diverting personnel from other FBI programs, such 
as those designed to counter narcotics trafficking 
or white-collar crime, risks weakening the U.S. 
ability to achieve those important objectives. 
In terms of meeting ISE objectives, it is essential 
for FBI personnel to have access to the most ad-
vanced computer and information technologies, 
both at headquarter facilities and more remote lo-
cations. All JTTF members need software capable 
of searching information that might exist in the 
databases of all the participating agencies. The 
OIG found that JTTF participants sometimes had 
to waste time and return to their parent agencies to 
perform data searches.
Fifth, the OIG concluded that the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA) needed to increase 
its involvement in the JTTF process given the 
connection between narcotics trafficking and ter-
rorism. The cases of Columbia and Afghanistan 
show most vividly how terrorists can use illicit 
drug dealing to fund their operations and weaken 
government authority.
One original ISE-related problem that appears to 
have been largely overcome is the need to ensure 
that state and local law enforcement personnel re-
ceive security clearances at the level of their FBI 
counterparts. Inequities in this area were common 
immediately after 9/11, but during the last few 
years increasing numbers of non-USG personnel 
have received adequate security clearances after 
the standard lengthy background investigations.
Non-Government Actors
The ISE Implementation Plan envisions a criti-
cal role for non-government actors in information 
sharing. Establishing a “distributed, decentralized, 
and coordinated”530 information flow requires in-
tegration of not only SLT governments, but also 
private sector entities, which play an essential role 
in protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. 
530 ISE Implementation Plan, supra note 24.
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It is likewise important to consider the impact of 
non-profit entities on the development of informa-
tion sharing strategies. One non-profit organiza-
tion, the Markle Foundation, has made notable 
research contributions and influenced the devel-
opment of the ISE’s legal framework. 
The Private Sector
Private sector participation is essential to success 
of the ISE. Over eighty percent of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure is currently owned and 
controlled by private industry.531 The increas-
ing sophistication of terrorist activities also calls 
for greater government reliance upon emerging 
technology and the capabilities of private sector 
experts.532 As the international presence of many 
large private sector entities requires them to col-
lect information to ensure the security of their 
operations worldwide, their data offers a key as-
set to government partners. For the private sector, 
robust information exchange with the government 
represents an opportunity to better assess potential 
threats, develop needed security technology, and 
efficiently allocate resources for the protection of 
the nation’s critical infrastructure.533 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce counsel Carol Hal-
let has asserted that private businesses, many of 
which have apportioned a considerable amount of 
funds to protect their employees and operations 
from terrorism since 9/11, are “eager to share”534 
information with government partners. As with 
vertical federal/SLT sharing, however, the success 
of information exchange between the public and 
private sectors largely depends upon participants’ 
ability to develop trusted relationships. An effec-
531 Ibid.
532 The Private Sector’s Role in Building the Intel-
ligence Community of the 21st Century: Increased Partner-
ing with Industry to Maintain America’s Edge, PR News-
wire, Mar. 3, 2005 [hereinafter The Private Sector’s Role].
533 U.S. Chamber of Commerce National Security 
Business Forum: John Negroponte, Director of National 
Intelligence, Federal News Service, July 10, 2006. 
534 Ibid.
tive ISE must foster a collaborative approach to 
protecting critical infrastructure that provides ad-
equate communications pathways as well as train-
ing opportunities. Participants must engage in a 
genuine bilateral information exchange whereby 
government entities develop a more comprehen-
sive understanding of infrastructure vulnerabili-
ties and businesses receive “actionable, timely 
and threat-specific information.”535 
A Framework for Private/Public Sector Part-
nerships
In Homeland Security Presidential Directive-
7(HSPD), issued in December 2003, President 
Bush emphasized that “critical infrastructure 
and key resources provide the essential services 
that underpin American society.”536 He therefore 
ordered that federal departments and agencies 
“identify and prioritize”537 these resources in or-
der to “deter, mitigate, or neutralize potential at-
tacks.”538 To implement HSPD-7, DHS developed 
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 
which was released in 2006. The NIPP, which de-
tails cooperatives strategies for improving the se-
curity of critical infrastructure and key resources, 
also provides a framework for public and private 
sector homeland security information sharing. 
Developed through collaboration with private sec-
tor partners, the NIPP recognizes private sector 
owners and operators as “the first line of defense” 
for critical infrastructure and key resources.539 
The NIPP therefore considers two-way informa-
tion sharing between the government and private 
industries the most efficient mechanism for as-
535 Ibid.
536 Press Release, President George W. Bush, Home-
land Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, Dec. 17, 
2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-
leases/2003/12/20031217-5.html. 
537 Ibid.
538 Ibid.
539 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, 2006, available at www.dhs.
gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf [hereinafter National 
Infrastructure Plan].
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sessing risks, allocating resources, disseminating 
security notifications, and improving public/pri-
vate sector coordination.540 While recognizing the 
need for confidentiality in business operations, the 
NIPP emphasizes the importance of integrating 
information collected by government and private 
entities to maximize situational awareness. 
Under the NIPP, information sharing between 
public and private sector partners relies upon a 
network approach coordinated by HSIN, the web-
based data exchange portal also used to facilitate 
vertical sharing between federal and SLT entities. 
This approach allows for “multidirectional” shar-
ing and ensures that data is exchanged in a secure 
environment. The NIPP requires that “strategic 
and specific threat assessments, threat warnings, 
incident reports, all-hazards impact assessments, 
and best practices” be through HSIN and shared 
between government and private sector actors.541
The strategies contained in the NIPP also depend 
upon several institutions that facilitate informa-
tion exchange between the public and private sec-
tors. Advisory councils, such as the Critical Infra-
structure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) 
and the Homeland Security Advisory Council 
(HSAC), pool private and public sector expertise 
and offer recommendations on improving collab-
orative efforts to protect critical infrastructure.542 
Additionally, the NIPP highlights the role of In-
formation Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), 
whose primary mission is to offer secure data ex-
change platforms that facilitate the collection and 
analysis of security threat information.543 The in-
formation handled by ISACs is largely provided 
by authorized private sector participants, who may 
also receive threat alerts from ISACs.544 However, 
ISACs’ analysis specialists also receive data from 
540 Ibid.
541 Ibid.
542 Ibid.
543 Ibid.
544 World Wide/Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center, available at http://www.wwisac.com (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2008).
other entities, including law enforcement agen-
cies, technology specialists, and security associa-
tions.545 Much like fusion centers, ISACs work to 
integrate numerous sources of information in or-
der to develop a better understanding of emerging 
security threats. 
Currently, ISACs address fourteen critical infra-
structures, including communications, electricity, 
emergency management and response, financial 
services, highway, information technology, public 
transit, surface transportation, and water.546 They 
are assisted by Sector Coordinating Councils 
(SCCs), which organize and direct information 
sharing processes within particular sectors, as well 
as assist sharing across industries and with the fed-
eral government.547 SCCs encourage a robust flow 
of information on security threats, vulnerabilities, 
and incidents while also providing policy rec-
ommendations to improve critical infrastructure 
protection and emergency preparedness.548 The 
work of both ISACs and SCCs is supplemented 
by the National Infrastructure Coordination Cen-
ter (NICC). Identified by the NIPP as one of the 
“primary conduits for sharing terrorism informa-
tion today,”549 the DHS institution is responsible 
for synchronizing public and private sector infor-
mation in response to a security incident. NICC 
brings together industry experts and members of 
ISACs in order to integrate information collected 
by the fourteen critical infrastructure sectors.550 
In addition to the strategies outlined by the NIPP, 
information sharing between the public and pri-
vate sectors receives considerable support from 
InfraGard, a program established by the FBI in 
545 Ibid.
546 ISACCouncil.org, Representing the Combined 
ISAC Council Members, available at www.isaccouncil.
org/about (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). 
547 Communications Sector Coordinating Council 
(CSCC), available at http://www.commscc.org (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2008). 
548 Ibid.
549 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, supra 
note 539.
550 Ibid.
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1996 at its Cleveland field office.551 Originally 
developed to assist cyber crime investigations 
through collaboration with information technol-
ogy experts and academia, InfraGard, which has 
cultivated a trusted relationship between law en-
forcement agencies and private sector entities, 
has evolved since 9/11 to enhance FBI investiga-
tions on intelligence and security matters. Infra-
Gard Chapters located across the nation provide 
resources for information collection and analysis, 
training opportunities, and forum discussions to 
foster an energetic discourse between law en-
forcement and private sector partners. The Infra-
Gard program also provides a secure web-based 
communications platform to enhance information 
sharing among its participants. According to the 
FBI, InfraGard advances “ongoing dialogue and 
timely communication” between the FBI and the 
private sector, exchanging information on coun-
terterrorism, cyber crime, critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities, and threat alerts.552
Moving Forward
InfraGard and the NIPP provide an important 
framework for the protection of critical infra-
structure that is expected be strengthened via ISE 
implementation. In the short-term, however, im-
proving the sharing strategies and mechanisms 
outlined in the NIPP should remain a priority for 
DHS. Since the NIPP relies heavily upon HSIN 
for data collection and integration, DHS must 
work persistently to improve the sharing network, 
which has suffered from hurried implementation, 
data duplication and omissions, and ineffective 
management. DHS must likewise encourage more 
robust private sector collaboration with ISACs. 
According to Andrew Howells, former vice-presi-
dent of homeland security for the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, many private sector entities have not 
fully capitalized on opportunities for information 
sharing with ISACs. “They never…figured out 
551 InfraGard: Guarding the Nation’s Infrastructure, 
available at http://www.infragard.net/index.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 27, 2008). 
552 Ibid.
their relationship” with ISACs, he commented.553 
Because the ISACs and SSCs are divided into sep-
arate groups representing each of fourteen critical 
infrastructures, information sharing efforts have 
occasionally resulted in duplicated efforts.554 
Implementation of the ISE, however, should im-
prove private/public sector partnerships by pro-
viding more effective leadership and clearer goals 
to coordinate private sector sharing initiatives. Pri-
vate sector representatives have already been in-
corporated as participants in the ISE management 
structure through the creation of the ISC’s Private 
Sector Subcommittee, which consists of private 
sector experts and is co-chaired by the DOJ and 
DHS.555 The Subcommittee provides recommen-
dations and updated strategies for improving the 
integration of private sector data into government 
processes and enhancing implementation of the 
sharing procedures envisioned by the NIPP.556 
The ISE Implementation Plan will also enhance 
public/private sector relationships by requiring 
the establishment of liability and antitrust protec-
tion policies. By alleviating industry concerns, 
these policies enable private sector and govern-
ment partners to build needed trust for vigorous 
information sharing. The strategies contained in 
the ISE Implementation Plan, as well as the on-
going efforts of the ISC and PM-ISE to advance 
information sharing, are expected to enhance situ-
ational awareness of both government and private 
entities and facilitate the dissemination of infor-
mation necessary to protect the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.
New Information Technology
In addition to providing the government with need-
ed information on critical infrastructure threats 
and vulnerabilities, the private sector makes an 
553 FBI Announces, supra note 470.
554 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, supra 
note 539.
555 Ibid.
556 Ibid.
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important contribution to the ISE through the de-
velopment of innovative information technology. 
As previously discussed, Xythos has created soft-
ware improving the DoD’s communications and 
situational awareness. Similarly, Raytheon has en-
hanced sharing within the law enforcement com-
munity through the development of the N-DEx 
information system.557 Several other companies 
have likewise played a significant role in enhanc-
ing the information capabilities of the ISE’s fed-
eral and SLT participants.
AEP Networks, which specializes in information 
security, has developed a number of applications 
that facilitate homeland security information shar-
ing. At the 2005 All Hazards Forum Conference 
and Exhibition in Baltimore, Maryland, AEP 
Networks unveiled several technologies that im-
prove access control and maintain the integrity of 
information shared on web-based portals.558 AEP 
Networks’ contributions include AEP SmartGate, 
a program designed for “large-scale distributed 
information sharing environments” that manages 
data access across several servers; AEP Net, which 
relies upon encryption procedures to provide “high 
data confidentiality and source authentication” for 
LAN and WAN networks; and AEP Keyper, which 
allows for secure data storage. AEP is also de-
veloping improved identity-based access control 
technologies. Some of AEP’s developments have 
already been selected for use by ISE participants. 
For instance, the law enforcement community has 
successfully relied on AEP applications to ensure 
data security on the Regional Information Sharing 
Systems Network (RISS).559 
Two other companies, General Dynamics Ad-
vanced Information Systems and Jabber, Inc. have 
collaborated to provide “secure and scalable en-
terprise messaging and presence solutions” to the 
defense, intelligence, and homeland security com-
557 FBI Announces, supra note 470.
558 AEP Networks Exhibit at All Hazards Forum 
Showcases Homeland Security Solutions, Market Wire, 
Oct. 24, 2005. 
559 Ibid.
munities.560 Their technology products, currently 
offered by Jabber, Inc., include the Jabber Exten-
sible Communications Platform (Jabber XCP), 
a programmable Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) that augments messaging capabilities. Jab-
ber XCP is said to “weave applications, networks, 
devices, multi-media and protocols together into a 
real-time information sharing environment, where 
context is dynamically added to new and continu-
ous data streams.” Jabber XCP also offers Exten-
sible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), 
an application which has received approval from 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) for 
instant messaging at the DoD and other federal 
departments and agencies. Mark Kusiak, Director 
of Homeland Security and Information Assurance 
at General Dynamics Advanced Information Sys-
tems commented, “XMPP has gained significant 
traction within the federal government as an in-
teroperable, extensible, real-time routing protocol 
for the movement of mission-critical information, 
such as instant messages, presence and structured 
data between previously non-interoperable sys-
tems.”561 
The ISE also relies heavily on the creation of elec-
tronic directories, which is made possible through 
private sector research and development. As em-
phasized by the ISE Implementation Plan, the cre-
ation of electronic directories is often a government 
department or agency’s first step toward improv-
ing information sharing with other ISE partners. 
Kevin McCook, director of federal sales for Verity 
Inc., has argued that “EDS [electronic directory 
services] is essential plumbing”562 for information 
sharing initiatives. “It has to be there for the rest 
of the ISE to work,” he claimed. Since September 
2005, the federal government has tapped into the 
expertise of private sector entities to develop im-
proved means for ISE participants to locate and 
communicate with others. Private sector experts 
560 General Dynamics and Jabber, Inc. Partner to 
Facilitate Information Sharing and Systems Interoperabil-
ity, Business Wire, Sept. 20, 2005. 
561 Ibid.
562 Miller, supra note 61.
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are currently working to build upon existing tech-
nology and provide EDS for more complex, larger 
scale information sharing environments.563
 
Companies of interest to ISE participants also 
include Lockheed Martin, which has recently 
acquired The Sytex Group, ChoicePoint, which 
specializes in the development of large-scale data 
networks, and LexisNexis, which has purchased 
Seisint, Inc. and provided information technology 
to the CIA.564 
Non-Profit Sector Involvement: The Markle 
Foundation
The John and Mary R. Markle Foundation, Inc. 
finds creative uses for information and informa-
tion technology in addressing critical public needs. 
Founded in 1927, the Foundation’s general mission 
is “to promote the advancement and diffusion of 
knowledge...and the general good of mankind.”565 
From initial work in traditional social welfare and 
medical research projects, the Foundation’s focus 
shifted in the 1960s to mass communications and 
information technology, which has since dominat-
ed the Foundation’s programming. 
When Zoë Baird became Markle’s president in 
1998, the Foundation began researching ways in 
which communications could facilitate the reso-
lution of complex issues, empower people, and 
serve public needs. These efforts prompted the 
Foundation to develop a roundtable problem-solv-
ing approach that brings together leaders from the 
fields of technology, business, and government. 
The Foundation’s determination to collaborate 
with public and private sector experts enables it to 
have a broader impact on the development of pub-
lic policies in areas where information technology 
plays a critical role. Recently, the Markle Founda-
tion has concentrated on modernizing healthcare 
563 Ibid.
564 The Private Sector’s Role, supra note 532.
565 Markle.org, Markle Foundation, Foundation His-
tory, http://www.markle.org/about_markle/foundation_his-
tory/index.php (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
and strengthening national security and terrorism 
prevention.566 In both of these areas, the Founda-
tion has demonstrated a commitment to safeguard-
ing privacy and civil liberties.567 
The Foundation’s work on the intersection of in-
formation technology and counter-terrorism poli-
cy has been carried out by the Markle Task Force 
on National Security in the Information Age. Es-
tablished in April 2002, Task Force members have 
included national security policymakers of the 
Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations, 
as well as senior executives from the information 
technology industry, civil liberties advocates, law-
yers, and intelligence experts.568 The purpose of 
the Task Force has been to advise federal, state 
and local governments as they develop policy on 
the collection, use, and sharing of terrorism infor-
mation. By proposing ways to enhance America’s 
security while protecting civil liberties, the Task 
Force has shaped the strategies and legal issues 
that inform ISE implementation. 
Research Contributions
Since its inception, Markle’s Task Force on Na-
tional Security in the Information Age has released 
three reports on establishing an information sharing 
environment. The Task Force’s research contains 
careful reviews of the nation’s current national se-
curity infrastructure and makes recommendations 
on leveraging technology for improved informa-
tion sharing while protecting civil liberties. 
Not long after the 9/11 attacks, the Task Force 
emerged as a strong voice advocating the use of 
information policy and technology to improve 
counter-terrorism efforts. Its 2002 report, Protect-
ing America’s Freedom in the Information Age, 
provided strategies on harmonizing the domestic 
566 Ibid.
567 Ibid.
568 Markle.org, National Security, Markle Founda-
tion, http://www.markle.org/markle_programs/policy_for_
a_networked_society/national_security/index.php (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2008). 
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security functions of DHS and the FBI while also 
advancing the Task Force’s position that “infor-
mation analysis is the brain of homeland securi-
ty.”569 In the report, the Task Force argued that the 
newly created Department of Homeland Security 
should be a “hub” for information policy decision-
making. The Task Force urged that DHS’ respon-
sibilities include improving data collection and 
analysis procedures and shaping information shar-
ing initiatives. The report also recommended that 
DHS “take the lead” in developing guidelines to 
protect privacy and civil liberties, which “should 
harness “authentication, certification, verification, 
and encryption technologies.”570 
This first report elaborated on civil liberties con-
cerns by suggesting that information handling 
accountability policies, audits, and carefully de-
signed rules on the retention and dissemination 
of personally identifiable information be created. 
The Task Force also called for strong presidential 
leadership of efforts to protect privacy: “Only the 
President can establish and be accountable for the 
proper balance between development of domestic 
intelligence and preservation of liberty.”571 
Recognizing the value of terrorism information 
collected by SLT entities and law enforcement of-
ficers in the field, Protecting America’s Freedom 
in the Information Age advocated a decentralized 
approach to information sharing, a key recom-
mendation that has since guided the architecture 
of the ISE. The report recommended the develop-
ment of multi-level government sharing networks, 
which should be designed “from the bottom up” 
to meet the needs of local participants. If “imple-
mented with the simplest design possible,” these 
networks could be easily updated as policies and 
technology change to meet evolving threats. The 
report also argued that vertical information shar-
569 The Markle Foundation Task Force on National 
Security in the Information Age, Protecting America’s 
Freedom in the Information Age, available at http://www.
markle.org/downloadable_assets/nstf_full.pdf. 
570 Ibid.
571 Ibid.
ing should be strengthened by efforts to “empow-
er local participants” and enable local experts to 
contribute their expertise at the “edge” of sharing 
networks. The Task Force flagged allocation of 
funding and the availability of training as crucial 
to changing “need to know” mentalities, upgrad-
ing technological capabilities, and enhancing hu-
man analysis skills.572 
Finally, the Task Force’s initial report offered sug-
gestions on improving information analysis. Not-
ing that “intelligence is often conceived as perpe-
trator-centered and event focused,” the Task Force 
recommended that DHS strengthen its “peripheral 
vision” by identifying “valuable potential targets” 
and “the most dangerous means that could be used 
to attack them.” Such “wide scans” for vulnerabil-
ities would enhance risk and threat management 
and optimize the value of real-time information 
exchange.573
In 2003, the Task Force built upon previous infor-
mation sharing recommendations with the release 
of its second report, Creating a Trusted Informa-
tion Network for Homeland Security. The report 
renewed many of the recommendations set forth 
in Protecting America’s Freedom in the Informa-
tion Age and provided more detailed strategies 
on adopting a decentralized network approach to 
information sharing. The report praised the gov-
ernment’s greater willingness to advance a “need 
to share” culture but also lamented the absence 
of a national strategy for improved information 
sharing and noted that between 2002 and 2003, 
“progress…[had] been ad hoc and sporadic at 
best.”574 To provide a more concrete model for 
horizontal and vertical information sharing, the 
Task Force proposed that the government imple-
ment its vision of the Systemwide Homeland 
572 Ibid.
573 Ibid.
574 The Markle Foundation Task Force on National 
Security in the Information Age, Creating a Trusted 
Network for Homeland Security, available at http://www.
markle.org/downloadable_assets/nstf_report2_full_report.
pdf. 
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Analysis and Resource Exchange (SHARE) Net-
work.
As described by the Task Force, the SHARE Net-
work would link federal, SLT, and private sector 
entities to an information sharing system that does 
not depend upon any centralized databases and 
therefore would have “no single points of fail-
ure.” The network would offer a “decentralized, 
peer-to-peer environment” through which infor-
mation sharing could occur across “multiple and 
redundant communication pathways.” The system 
would be flexible, upgradeable, and able to ac-
commodate both routine and ad hoc information 
sharing. In the Task Force’s envisioned system, us-
ers could identify and locate participating persons 
through complex EDS capabilities. The network 
would also host real-time communications while 
securing information through access control, en-
cryption, and electronic audit mechanisms.575 
In addition to outlining the capabilities of its com-
munications model, the Task Force’s second re-
port also offered recommendations on how the 
SHARE Network could be implemented. The re-
port devoted considerable discussion to the roles 
and responsibilities of key federal actors and ar-
gued that strong leadership, clear objectives, and 
the development of processes to assess agencies’ 
progress would be critical to the success of such 
a network. To provide a concrete “action plan,” 
the Task Force proposed the contents of two hypo-
thetical Executive Orders, which would delineate 
privacy guidelines and designate DHS as the “lead 
agency” for interagency sharing initiatives. As 
part of its “action plan,” the Task Force also rec-
ommended that the FBI work directly with state 
and local law enforcement agencies to develop 
data sharing policies that protect privacy and en-
sure robust participation in the proposed network. 
Finally, the Task Force urged that Congress fulfill 
an essential oversight role by reviewing federal 
performance, evaluating privacy policies, and ex-
amining the extent to which SLT and the private 
575 Ibid.
sector entities are integrated into the sharing net-
work.576 
By 2006, the Task Force recognized that many of 
its recommendations regarding the SHARE Net-
work had not been implemented and that critical 
ISE participants were still “stovepiping” informa-
tion. The Task Force commented, “We have wit-
nessed some genuine improvements in information 
sharing…[but] two years since the publication of 
our last report, and almost five years since the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, systematic, trusted 
information sharing remains more of an aspiration 
than a reality.”577 This observation provided the 
impetus for the release of the Task Force’s third 
report, entitled, Mobilizing Information to Prevent 
Terrorism: Accelerating Development of a Trusted 
Information Sharing Environment. This publica-
tion “call[ed] for a renewed commitment by our 
nation’s leaders to the development of an informa-
tion sharing environment” and set forth proposals 
to accelerate ISE implementation.578 
Whereas the Task Force’s earlier reports concen-
trated on key organizational and technical issues, 
Mobilizing Information to Prevent Terrorism em-
phasized the need to overcome cultural and bu-
reaucratic barriers to information sharing. The 
Task Force asserted that improved accountability 
and coordination policies, as well as increased 
training opportunities, are needed to facilitate a 
collaborative working environment among ISE 
participants. The report also promoted a “risk 
management approach” to classified information 
sharing that would help deconstruct remaining 
“need to know” policies. This approach would re-
quire officials to make information handling deci-
sions by “balanc[ing] the risks of disclosure with 
576 Ibid.
577 The Markle Foundation Task Force on National 
Security in the Information Age, Mobilizing Information to 
Prevent Terrorism: Accelerating Development of a Trusted 
Information Sharing Environment, available at http://www.
markle.org/downloadable_assets/2006_nstf_report3.pdf 
[hereinafter Markle, Mobilizing Information]. 
578 Ibid.
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the risks of failing to share information.” The Task 
Force’s recommendations on closing cultural gaps 
also included a suggestion on establishing a new 
Information Sharing Institute. The Institute, con-
sisting of public and private sector experts, would 
provide materials on best practices and further in-
vestment in the research and development of in-
formation sharing technology.579 
In addition to addressing cultural barriers to shar-
ing, the Task Force’s third report highlighted key 
trust issues, which spanned the following topics: 
(1) the need for ISE participants to build trustful 
relationships that support information sharing; (2) 
the need for policymakers to trust that the legal 
framework of the ISE is “being implemented, fol-
lowed, and enforced in good faith;” and (3) the 
need for the public’s trust that the ISE is being 
implemented with appropriate regard to privacy 
and civil liberties values. The Task Force claimed 
that persistent leadership; healthy oversight from 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
government; transparent sharing policies; and the 
use of technology that includes privacy mecha-
nisms, are all crucial to effective trust-building.580 
On civil liberties protection, the Task Force’s 
third report advocated the development of an 
“authorized use” standard for sharing classified 
information. Task Force member Jim Dempsey, 
who is also policy director of the Global Internet 
Policy Initiative at the Center for Democracy and 
Technology, remarked, “The borderless nature 
of the threat has rendered unworkable some of 
the old rules on sharing lawfully collected infor-
mation.”581 The Task Force’s proposed method 
would therefore base information access deci-
sions on the use to which the information will be 
put and ISE participants’ specific missions, rather 
than on users’ nationality or the place of the in-
579 Ibid.
580 Ibid.
581 Markle Task Force on National Security in the 
Information Age Releases Third Report, Business Wire, 
July 13, 2006 [hereinafter Markle Task Force Release].
formation’s collection.582 Dempsey added, “Un-
der the authorized use approach we propose, each 
agency can get the information it needs to pursue 
a clearly articulated mission, subject to auditing 
to ensure accountability and protect privacy.”583 
The Task Force instructed that principles guid-
ing the development of an “authorized use” stan-
dard should be developed through “open public 
debate.”584 
The Markle Foundation’s Task Force on National 
Security in the Information Age has not met since 
the release of its third publication in 2006. Task 
Force members have claimed that they wish to 
provide the government with needed time to im-
plement the recommendations contained in their 
publications.585 Dempsey has also stated that the 
body halted its work because too frequent issu-
ance of recommendations and criticism could in-
advertently jeopardize the Task Force’s goal of 
advancing needed policy change.586 There remains 
the possibility that the Task Force will reconvene 
in the near future to assess and guide the adminis-
tration’s information sharing initiatives.
Assessing the Markle Foundation’s Impact on 
ISE Implementation
The Markle Foundation’s Task Force on National 
Security in the Information Age has emerged as 
one of the most vocal expert bodies on informa-
tion sharing issues and has been credited with a 
considerably influential role on national security 
policymaking. The Task Force’s recommendations 
have resulted in tangible legal and policy shifts, 
though some critics assert that the Task Force’s 
impacts on policy are often overstated.
582 Markle, Mobilizing Information, supra note 577. 
583 Markle Task Force Release, supra note 581.
584 Ibid.
585 Michael Arnone, IT For the Common Good, 
Gov’t Health IT, available at http://govhealthit.com/
article95712-08-21-06-Print&printLayout [hereinafter 
Arnone]. 
586 Ibid.
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The quality of the Task Force’s reports and the 
content of its recommendations reflect careful 
consideration of relevant law and policy, as well 
as strategic and technical issues. The Task Force’s 
methodology has been met with praise from non-
profit and private sector entities.587 Thomas Mars-
den, assistant vice president of Dun and Brad-
street’s Government Solutions, has commented 
that the Task Force’s extensive research enables 
its members to pinpoint clear, specific, and reach-
able information sharing objectives.588 
The Task Force’s careful work has resulted in 
Congress’s decision to embody many of its rec-
ommendations in the provisions of the IRTPA. 
Senators Joseph Lieberman and Susan Collins, in 
debating the IRTPA’s contents, advanced the Task 
Force’s proposals on policies protecting civil liber-
ties and argued for the Task Force’s conception of 
the “attributes” of a “trusted information sharing 
environment.”589 The Task Force’s work has also 
achieved greater awareness of information issues 
and their importance. Along with the 9/11 Com-
mission Report, the Task Force’s 2002 and 2003 
reports permitted policymakers and members of 
the public to develop a better understanding of the 
way in which inadequate information sharing pol-
icies hindered the nation’s ability to detect, pre-
vent, and respond to the 9/11 attacks. The Markle 
Foundation’s impressive reputation on analyz-
ing civil liberties issues has likewise highlighted 
privacy concerns that continue to challenge ISE 
implementation. 
However, some critics contend that the Markle 
Foundation has concentrated far less on privacy 
and civil liberties issues in the national security 
context than in its other research areas. Though 
the Task Force proposed the adoption of the “au-
thorized use” standard and technologies featuring 
electronic audit mechanisms in its third report, 
critics claim that the Task Force’s recommenda-
587 Ibid.
588 Ibid.
589 Privacy of Health Records, CQ Congressional 
Testimony, Feb. 1, 2007. 
tions on protecting privacy are far less concrete 
or extensive than its recommendations on the in-
creased collection, retention, and flow of data.590 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attor-
ney Timothy Sparapani has argued that members 
of the Task Force “say all the right stuff” but that 
their discussion of privacy issues ultimately lack 
substance.591 Similar accusations by other civil 
libertarians have raised some questions as to the 
extent of the Markle Foundation’s commitment 
to privacy and civil liberties issues in the national 
security arena.592
Others have pointed out that despite Congress’ 
adoption of several of the Markle Foundation’s 
recommendations, the Task Force’s impact on 
the development of the ISE has been limited. 
For example, Jim Harper, director of information 
policy studies at the Cato Institute, has criticized 
the Markle Foundation as “wonderfully self-con-
gratulatory” in assessing its own influence on 
the development of the ISE.593 While advancing 
information sharing, the Bush administration has 
maintained a distance from the Task Force’s insis-
tence that its particular vision of the SHARE Net-
work be implemented.594 After all, the fact that an 
insufficient number of its recommendations had 
been implemented was admittedly one of the Task 
Force’s reasons for issuing its third report.595 
Though the Markle Foundation’s direct influence 
on policymakers is debatable, the non-profit orga-
nization has certainly offered a valuable contribu-
tion to ISE implementation by gathering experts 
from diverse backgrounds to analyze the most 
challenging information sharing issues. When 
still convening, the Task Force’s members con-
sisted of representatives from government, aca-
demia, the information technology industry, law 
firms, and policy think tanks. Though Sparapani 
590 Arnone, supra note 585.
591 Ibid.
592 Ibid.
593 Ibid.
594 Ibid.
595 Markle, Mobilizing Information, supra note 577. 
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critiqued some of the Task Force’s recommenda-
tions regarding civil liberties, he acknowledged 
that the Markle Foundation “brings the focus of 
serious people to bear on pressing problems.”596 
The Foundation’s work has refined the public dis-
course on homeland security issues and fostered a 
greater understanding of the urgency with which 
policymakers should implement the ISE. 
III. Future of the ISE: Conclusions and Pre-
liminary Recommendations
Continuing foreign and domestic terrorist threats 
to the United States makes it essential to continue 
national efforts to create an information sharing 
environment among federal, SLT, foreign, and pri-
vate sector actors. Considerable progress has been 
made in this regard since 9/11. Nevertheless, sub-
stantial legal, policy, technical, and cultural im-
pediments remain. 
Under its first program manager, John Russack, 
the ISE had struggled to launch large-scale shar-
ing efforts. Russack frequently complained that 
his office was understaffed and that Congress had 
failed to allocate sufficient funds for him to effec-
tively carry out his duties.597 Russack determined 
that his office required $30 million “as a mini-
mum” for launching a sustained information shar-
ing effort, but he had received only $9.6 million 
in FY 2005.598 His resignation in January 2006 
presented a considerable impediment for timely 
achievement of the goals set forth in the IRTPA, 
leaving members of Congress very concerned.
Despite having to overcome this legacy of a slow 
start, Russack’s successor as Program Manager, 
Ambassador Ted McNamara, has enjoyed certain 
advantages. For example, Enhanced awareness of 
the necessity for improved sharing, promoted by 
both the 9/11 Commission Report and the Markle 
Foundation’s publications, has enabled ISE poli-
596 Arnone, supra note 585.
597 Yoest, supra note 27. 
598 Ibid.
cies to occupy the foreground of homeland se-
curity debates. As ISE implementation has pro-
gressed, policymakers have demonstrated a deeper 
commitment to the incremental transformation of 
“need to know” policies into a “need to share” 
culture that favors decentralized information col-
lection and robust dissemination practices. 
On a strategic level, enactment of the IRTPA has 
greatly improved upon sharing initiatives launched 
by the USA PATRIOT Act and the Homeland Se-
curity Act of 2002. By providing clearer sharing 
objectives and calling for needed presidential guid-
ance, the IRTPA defined the ISE and established a 
framework for managing the structural changes of 
evolving information sharing practices. The leg-
islation also provided needed institutions, such as 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 
for safeguarding legal rights. 
Though its release had been delayed, the ISE 
Implementation Plan (Plan) also offers essential 
guidance for expanding collaborative information 
sharing strategies. The Plan carefully delineates 
the roles and responsibilities of participants in im-
plementing horizontal and vertical sharing prac-
tices and sets an aggressive, but reachable, time-
table ending in 2009. MacKenzie Eaglen, a policy 
analyst at the Heritage Foundation, has remarked 
that “coordinated strategies,” such as those con-
tained in the Plan, offer “sound policies,”599 rather 
than initiatives that simply encourage the devel-
opment of technology “in a vacuum.”600 As chal-
lenges to information sharing tend to be more 
cultural than technical, the strategies and goals set 
forth in the Plan provide an important framework 
for enabling ISE participants to achieve greater 
cooperation and therefore optimize the value of 
emerging technologies. 
Recent initiatives have also resulted in tangible 
information sharing improvements. The law en-
599 Security; Federal Information-Sharing Plan May 
Face Hurdles, Technology Daily, Nov. 29, 2006. 
600 Ibid.
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forcement community’s expansion of the JTTFs, 
use of the RISS and N-DEx networks, and devel-
opment of consolidated terrorism databases at the 
TSC have strengthened interagency partnerships. 
The DoD’s information technology upgrades and 
ongoing efforts to incorporate foreign actors into 
the ISE have also yielded tangible results in mili-
tary operations. The DHS, while facing numer-
ous challenges in implementing the HSIN, has 
contributed to vertical information sharing and 
multi-jurisdictional relationship building through 
increased collaboration with state and local fu-
sion centers. Though the intelligence community 
continues to struggle with the information classi-
fication system, DNI CIO Meyerrose has affirmed 
that intelligence officials have greater access to 
information collected by other agencies. “Large 
volumes of information,” he stated, are now often 
accessible to intelligence analysts “at the stroke of 
a keyboard.”601
These successes must stimulate ISE participants 
to vigorously tackle remaining challenges. One 
of the most urgent issues involves the status of 
HSIN. Haphazard implementation and reliance on 
a “top down” approach has severely prevented the 
network from meeting the needs of its SLT users. 
DHS must redouble its efforts if HSIN is to per-
form its intended role as the primary mechanism 
for vertical information sharing. Where sharing 
has generally been more successful, such as on 
the horizontal level, bureaucratic processes and 
resistance to change have allowed “need to know” 
policies to persist in a variety of contexts. This cul-
tural hurdle illustrates that while the government 
depends upon effective information technology in 
implementing the ISE, improved sharing cannot 
be purchased.602 Rather, technological capabilities 
will prove useful only when combined with strong 
leadership, clear goals, and insightful strategies. 
As the 9/11 Commission cautioned in its Report, 
601 Shaun Waterman, Report Slams U.S. Terror Info 
Sharing, UPI, Apr. 18, 2006. 
602 Michael Bruno, Info-Sharing Solutions Sought, 
Homeland Defense Commander Says, Aerospace Daily & 
Defense Report, Feb. 24, 2005. 
“even the best information technology will not im-
prove information sharing so long as…agencies’ 
personnel and security systems reward protecting 
information rather than disseminating it.”603
Federal authorities must accelerate security clear-
ance reforms and ISE implementation procedures 
if the ISE is to fully integrate SLT and private sec-
tor partners by the Implementation Plan’s 2009 
deadline. GAO and DHS IG reports of sluggish 
and cumbersome information sharing initiatives, 
though frustrating, must serve to invigorate shar-
ing initiatives. Six years after 9/11, the federal 
government has succeeded in identifying many 
gaps in information sharing but has been only par-
tially able to resolve them.
The following preliminary recommendations aim 
to strengthen the ongoing implementation of the 
ISE. As time progresses, the President, Congress, 
PM-ISE, and heads of relevant departments and 
agencies bear the responsibility of ensuring that 
ISE participants remain focused on the need to 
overcome remaining information sharing challeng-
es. Establishing a multi-jurisdictional information 
sharing environment is a difficult, but reachable, 
goal. The nation’s ability to protect itself from ter-
ror and other security threats will depend upon the 
effectiveness of leadership and oversight provided 
by all three branches of government, as well as 
ISE participants’ commitment to developing more 
robust communications. 
Preliminary Recommendations
• Federal and SLT departments should offer im-
proved information sharing training opportunities 
for their workforces.
A review of ISE implementation efforts across 
participating communities indicates that, while 
numerous sharing initiatives have been launched, 
some with considerable success, sharing has not 
603 National Commission of Terrorist Attacks, supra 
note 1.
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yet become an integral element of these commu-
nities’ daily operations. Training opportunities 
should educate workforces on how to integrate 
emerging technology and altered information han-
dling policies more effectively into routine pro-
cedures. Interagency training exercises can also 
foster a cooperative atmosphere and provide trust 
and relationship-building opportunities, elements 
that encourage information sharing. 
• Agencies must engage in a collaborative effort, 
guided by the Office of the Program Manager and 
the ISC, to develop clearer quality-control poli-
cies for shared information.
Examining the sheer quantity of shared informa-
tion does not provide an accurate measure of the 
ISE’s success. Rather, shared information must be 
filtered to avoid duplication and ensure that in-
formation is provided in a form most valuable to 
receiving parties. Officials across the ISE’s par-
ticipating communities have complained that, at 
least occasionally, their agencies have been over-
whelmed by the “volume, velocity and variety” of 
information transmitted to them. One senior intel-
ligence official, for example, referred to shared in-
formation as a “tidal wave” and claimed, “We can 
either be drowned by it or we can get on our surf-
board and surf it and let it propel us.”604 To ensure 
that ISE participants remain “on the surfboard,” 
departments and agencies must establish clearer 
policies on the processing and filtering of the data 
to be shared through the ISE. 
• The DHS must urgently develop policies to im-
prove the sharing capabilities of the HSIN.
The HSIN was intended to link homeland secu-
rity, fusion center, intelligence, and law enforce-
ment officials in a comprehensive, decentralized 
network. Because of the network’s current failure 
to provide a central artery for homeland security 
communications, its intended users have turned 
toward ad hoc, and often inefficient, means for 
604 The Private Sector, supra note 532.
obtaining needed information. Unchanged, this 
situation could lead to the “stovepiping” of in-
formation in compartmentalized, limited-access 
databases and thwart the development of trusted 
partnerships necessary for successful information 
sharing. Steps toward improving the HSIN should 
include the adoption of a “bottom up” approach 
that carefully considers the needs of SLT users 
and filters duplicative HSIN. The DHS must also 
prioritize efforts to accelerate security clearance 
procedures so that classified information needed 
by fusion center and SLT officials may be inte-
grated into HSIN. 
• The ISE should offer first responders greater ac-
cess to information sharing portals.
Senator Lieberman has asserted: “9/11 showed 
that it is imperative in a disaster for first respond-
ers to be able to talk to each other. It’s clear that 
many of the first responders died on 9/11 in New 
York because they couldn’t communicate with one 
another. Hurricane Katrina showed us four years 
later that we still have a long way to go.”605 Many 
current policies tend to assume that SLT and law 
enforcement officials will disseminate needed in-
formation to first responders. However, the criti-
cal role of first responders in mitigating the effects 
of a terrorist attack warrant their increased par-
ticipation in the ISE. First responders must have a 
clear understanding of how to access and transmit 
information to both SLT and federal entities in the 
event of a homeland security incident. 
• In addition to establishing accountability and au-
dit policies, ISE participants should engage in sim-
ulations to test the progress of information sharing 
initiatives and identify remaining vulnerabilities.
While ISE implementation has already improved 
departments and agencies’ situational awareness, 
605 Ensuring Full Implementation, supra note 74. See 
also Richard Weitz, Enhancing Emergency Communica-
tions Interoperability, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/02/15/AR2007021500816.html. 
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ISE participants should carry out simulations to 
enhance their ability to share information in an 
emergency. Simulation exercises offer ISE par-
ticipants an opportunity to refine coordination 
and communications capabilities in highly com-
plex hypothetical scenarios. Simulations serve as 
important tools for assessing the effectiveness of 
information sharing strategies and preparing ISE 
participants for managing the effects of both natu-
ral disasters and terrorist attacks. 
• The Office of the Program Manager should de-
velop clearer guidelines for facilitating vertical 
information sharing.
Many SLT partners have complained that, de-
spite collaboration with federal officials at fusion 
centers, they are generally uncertain about which 
information should be shared and how the data 
sharing should occur. If a local law enforcement 
official observes suspicious activity in the field, 
he or she needs clear guidelines to: (1) assess 
whether that information should be reported to 
federal and/or SLT participants in the ISE; (2) un-
ambiguously determine which agencies must re-
ceive information that he or she decides warrants 
reporting; and (3) easily locate a point of contact 
through efficient electronic directory services. 
• The Office of the Program Manager should pro-
mote greater public awareness of the ISE as well 
as informed discussion of information sharing and 
privacy initiatives. 
Smooth functioning of the democratic process 
represents an essential element of the ISE’s suc-
cess in protecting privacy and civil liberties. 
Transparent information sharing practices will 
improve the public’s ability to influence policy-
makers’ decisions on security and privacy needs. 
Transparency also cultivates public trust in new 
security measures and ensures that public debate 
of information sharing issues consists of informed 
discussion. Unlike the aftermath of Poindexter’s 
Total Information Awareness (TIA), public delib-
erations of ISE policies should reflect careful con-
sideration of relevant issues, rather than fear or 
hype. An informed public discourse will improve 
Congress’ ability to provide appropriate oversight 
for information sharing activities and assess the 
risks and benefits of emerging technological ca-
pabilities, such as data mining. 
• Congress should consider the Markle Founda-
tion’s recommendation of establishing an Infor-
mation Sharing Institute.
According to the Foundation’s proposal, an In-
formation Sharing Institute could minimize gaps 
in federal, SLT, and private sector data exchange 
by developing and improving sharing strategies. 
The Institute would also enhance the efficiency 
of sharing procedures by analyzing and compil-
ing information on best practices. Similar to non-
profit policy organizations or think tanks, the In-
stitute would provide recommendations of experts 
representing a variety of backgrounds, including 
government, industry, information technology, 
policy, and law. 
5.2 Preventing the Poisoning of the Well: 
A Consideration of the Necessity and 
Legality of Broadening the Protection of 
Critical Infrastructure Information in the 
Interest of National Security and Public 
Safety
by Paul D. Barkhurst, Jr., J.D.606
Introduction
In the U.S. Air Force, when you receive a “Frag” 
(literally a“fragment” of the Air Tasking Order) of 
that evening’s target, your first task is to gather all 
available information on the target so as to figure 
out the best way to blow it up. This would entail 
maps, diagrams, photographs, or anything else 
606 The author is a former USAF aviator and JAG 
who processed FOIA Appeals for the Secretary of the 
Air Force and defended FOIA cases against the USAF in 
federal court. He currently represents local governmental 
entities in condemnation and construction litigation.
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that would show the vulnerability of the target. 
Some aircraft, such as the venerable F-111, the F-
117, and the F-15E, fly an air-to ground mission 
known as “air interdiction,” which often means the 
destruction of the enemy’s public infrastructure 
which exists well beyond the battlefield and deep 
inside enemy territory.607 Interdiction has been de-
fined as “an attack against the source of men and 
material.”608 In Desert Storm, for example, many 
power plants, telecommunications systems, bridg-
es, highway intersections, factories, etc. were tar-
geted by these aircraft using laser-guided bombs 
(“LGBs”).609
The idea behind strategic interdiction is that if you 
destroy enough of a country’s ability to function, 
transport, travel, communicate, etc., you can un-
dermine the war fighters and destroy the enemy 
nation’s will to fight. Terrorists think in much the 
same way, but they do not have (a) a legitimate 
declaration of war under Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations610, or (b) the luxury of multi-
million dollar fighter attack jets. Of course, as we 
witnessed on September 11, 2001, they neverthe-
less mounted a successful aerial attack against 
some of our critical economic and military infra-
structure using flying bombs that were intended to 
be commercial passenger jets.
Continuing with this analogy, then, if one was the 
mastermind of a terrorist cell, and one was tasked 
with killing as many Americans as possible by, for 
example, poisoning the water supply, blowing up 
a nuclear power station, or gassing a subway sys-
tem’s air ventilation system, then one would want, 
as a starting point, the designs and plans for these 
items of critical infrastructure. In the U.S. mili-
tary, such documents, as they relate to an enemy’s 
607 See generally John A. Warden, III, The Air Cam-
paign: Planning for Combat, National Defense University 
Press, 1988.
608 See id.
609 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to 
Congress, U.S. Dept. of Defense, 3 vol. The Air Campaign, 
v. 1, pp 113-247 (1991).
610 June 26, 1945, T.S. No. 993.
infrastructure, are classified typically as “Top Se-
cret” documents.611 This begs the question of why 
we as a nation, a state, or a city would want to 
simply hand over those plans to those who wish to 
destroy our critical infrastructure.
“Critical Infrastructure”
It is not hard to imagine what we should term 
“critical infrastructure” when all we need to do is 
look at the targets which terrorists have histori-
cally chosen to attack: public buildings, airports, 
airplanes, trains, subway systems, nuclear power 
stations, water supply systems, etc. The legal defi-
nition of “critical infrastructure” is contained in 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001 
(“CIPA”).612 The CIPA defines critical infrastruc-
ture as “systems and assets, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the United States that the inca-
pacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, na-
tional economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.”613
Furthermore, the Office of Infrastructure Protec-
tion (“OIP”) of the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (“DHS”) has a list of some 77,000 assets 
in the National Asset Database614 that it consid-
ers important enough to consider protecting, in the 
interest of national security, and public health and 
safety.
Constitutional Implications of Protecting 
Information
This Paper is not intended to be an examination 
of whether our government should protect criti-
cal infrastructure information, but whether it can. 
This study will be made not just under the existing 
611 See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14874 
(Apr. 6, 1982).
612 42 U.S.C. § 5195c (2001).
613 See id.
614 See John Moteff, CRS Report for Congress, Criti-
cal Infrastructure: The National Asset Database (Updated 
July 16, 2007).
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laws, but will delve into potential future legisla-
tion. At the center of this endeavor is the proper 
balance between open government and national 
security. Where and how to draw these lines is a 
continual debate, with the pendulum swinging to-
wards increased protection as the threat of further 
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil increases.
As James Madison said, “A popular government 
without popular information or the means of ac-
quiring it, is but a Prologue to Farce, or a Tragedy, 
or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern 
ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own 
Governors, must arm themselves with the power 
which knowledge gives.”615 However, this state-
ment was made in a time and in a context where 
Americans had only recently won freedom from 
tyranny and an oppressive imperial government 
which refused to afford its far flung colonies even 
the most basic of inalienable rights. In a techno-
logical environment that allows instant informa-
tion access from cyber space and instant death 
from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, 
the potential effects of terrorist activity are more 
disastrous then ever before. As a result, the protec-
tion of information has never been so important. 
As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, “In any civi-
lized society, the most important task is achieving 
a proper balance between freedom and order. In 
wartime, reason and history suggest that this bal-
ance shifts to some degree in favor of order – in 
favor of the government’s ability to deal with con-
ditions that threaten the national well being.”616 
This statement seems more fitting for the mod-
ern United States than the words of James Madi-
son. Finally, it must not be forgotten that while 
the freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly 
are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, freedom 
of information is a creature of statutory creation 
which can expand and contract based on the needs 
of the time. And these indeed are troubled times.
615 James Madison, August 4, 1822.
616 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, All the Laws 
But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (New York: 
Knopf, 1998), p. 222.
The Freedom of Information Act and its 
Exemptions
The federal government and all fifty states have 
some sort of open records legislation on the books, 
of varying degree and quality.617 Most of these are 
modeled after the federal Freedom of Informa-
tion Act of 1966618 (“FOIA”) which was passed 
in response to public outcry against government 
secrecy spawned by the Cold War, and public mis-
trust caused by the Vietnam War.619 The FOIA has 
an initial presumption of disclosure, but contains 
nine discrete exemptions based on a careful bal-
ancing of the harm of disclosure with the public’s 
right to know.620 Of the nine enumerated exemp-
tions, there are four which appear at first blush to 
be viable candidates for the protection of critical 
infrastructure information: Exemption 1 (classi-
fied information in the interest of national secu-
rity), Exemption 2 (internal agency procedures), 
Exemption 3 (exempted by statute), and Exemp-
tion 4 (confidential business information). 
FOIA Exemption 1 exempts matters of national 
security from disclosure such as classified mili-
tary information, pursuant to Executive Order of 
the President.621 It would be difficult for anyone 
to argue that making information about military 
weapons, tactics and operations freely available to 
the world would be a good thing. Indeed, the courts 
have historically allowed the various federal agen-
cies, particularly the Department of Defense, the 
Department of State, and the Department of Jus-
tice, considerable deference in the classification 
of documents in the interest of national security. 
In EPA v. Mink,622 the Supreme Court held that 
records which were classified pursuant to proper 
617 See generally 37A Am. Jur. 2d Freedom of 
Information Acts § 2, “State Freedom of Information Acts” 
(2007).
618 5 U.S.C. § 552.
619 Robert L. Saloschin, The Department of Justice 
and the Explosion of Freedom of Information Act Litiga-
tion, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1401, 1407. (2000).
620 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
621 See Exec. Order No. 12,958.
622 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
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procedures were per se exempt from disclosure, 
without further review by the courts. Congress re-
acted in 1974 with an amendment which expressly 
provided for de novo review by the courts, and for 
in camera review of classified documents, where 
appropriate.623 As a result, the practice developed 
whereby the federal agencies would file an affida-
vit and a summary judgment based on agency dis-
cretion, and this practice has largely been upheld 
by the courts.624
However, when one reviews this case law regard-
ing Exemption 1, and sees the substantial judi-
cial deference that has largely gone into uphold-
ing such agency determinations, one realizes that 
critical infrastructure, while important to national 
security, does not rise to the level of Exemption 1 
protection, and trying to pigeon-hole it here would 
only muddy the water of some otherwise crystal-
line case law.
Exemption 2, likewise, does not initially appear 
to be a good place to put the protection of criti-
cal infrastructure as the exemption applies to in-
formation “related solely to the internal personnel 
rules and practices of an agency.”625 However, Ex-
emption 2 applies to more than just trivial internal 
matters such as routine personnel policies, leave 
procedures, etc. (known as “Low 2” information). 
It also applies to more substantial internal matters, 
the disclosure of which could risk the circumven-
tion of a statute or agency regulation; e.g. law en-
forcement manuals.626
In 1981, the D.C. Circuit, which has become the 
preeminent court in FOIA litigation through the 
sheer volume of its FOIA decisions, handed down 
623 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
624 See Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (noting that judges “lack the expertise necessary to 
second guess such agency opinions in the typical national 
security case”).
625 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
626 See, e.g., Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 
425 U.S. 352, 364 (1976) (recognizing the category but 
expressly leaving open the question of Exemption 2’s ap-
plicability).
the seminal “High 2” category case of Crooker 
v. ATF.627 The Crooker Court, in holding that the 
ATF’s training manual was exempt from disclo-
sure under Exemption 2, held that, to be protected 
under the “High 2” exemption, a document should 
be “predominantly internal”, and that its disclo-
sure “significantly risks circumvention of agency 
regulations or statutes.”628 Indeed, the DOJ’s Of-
fice of Information and Privacy (“OIP”) issued 
a memo in 2001 which encourages agencies to 
use Exemption 2 to protect critical infrastructure 
information: “Agencies should be sure to avail 
themselves of the full measure of Exemption 2’s 
protection for their critical infrastructure informa-
tion as they continue to gather more of it, and as-
sess its heightened sensitivity, in the wake of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks.”629
However, the problems with Exemption 2 are: (1) 
most of the nation’s critical infrastructure is held 
in private ownership; e.g., AT&T;630 or (2) is held 
by state and local governments; e.g., Three Mile 
Island Unit 2 nuclear power plant; and (3) Exemp-
tion 2 patently applies to the internal records of 
federal agencies. Thus, since most of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure is held by private enterprise, 
the next most logical place to seek protection from 
disclosure would be Exemption 4. 
FOIA Exemption 4 protects information that is 
comprised of “trade secrets and commercial or fi-
nancial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential.”631 The vast majority 
of the documents protected by Exemption 4 are 
referred to as “confidential business information”. 
In the watershed case of National Parks & Con-
627 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
628 Id. at 1073-74.
629 See OIP, New Attorney General FOIA Memoran-
dum Issued, posted Oct. 15, 2001, available at www.usdoj.
gov/ oip/foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm.
630 “The private sector … owns and operates the vast 
majority of America’s critical infrastructure.” Remarks of 
HAS Director Thomas Ridge, Oct. 9, 2001, available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10.
631 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
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servation Association v. Morton,632 the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that commercial business information 
is protected if its release would either: “(1)…im-
pair the Government’s ability to obtain necessary 
information in the future; or (2)…cause substan-
tial harm to the competitive position of the per-
son from whom the information was obtained.”633 
In 1992, the D.C. Circuit further fleshed out this 
standard in the case of Critical Mass Energy Proj-
ect v. NRC.634 The Critical Mass Court held that 
the threshold matter to be determined is whether 
the information was submitted to the government 
“voluntarily,” and if so, then the information is 
protected, provided that it is not “customarily” 
disclosed to the public by the private party.635
It is clear that Exemption 4 protects a greater class 
of critical infrastructure information that Exemp-
tion 2; however, it still does not go far enough for 
two reasons. First, Exemption 4 does not protect 
information which a private critical infrastructure 
owner chooses not to voluntarily share with the 
federal government; i.e., because they do not want 
to risk the disclosure of their confidential, propri-
etary trade secret information. Second, much of 
critical infrastructure is owned and operated by 
state and local governments, and this too is not 
covered by Exemption 4. This leads us to a con-
sideration of Exemption 3.
FOIA Exemption 3 protects information “specifi-
cally exempted from disclosure by statute…pro-
vided that such statute (A) requires that the matters 
be withheld from the public in such a manner as to 
leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes 
particular criteria for withholding or refers to par-
ticular types of matters to be withheld.”636 Broadly 
speaking, Exemption 3 of the FOIA incorporates 
the prohibitions against disclosure which are con-
tained in various other federal statutes. As original-
ly passed into law, the provision simply exempted 
632 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
633 See id. at 770.
634 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
635 Id. at 878.
636 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
from disclosure all information which other feder-
al statutes sought to protect. Indeed, the high wa-
termark for this exemption was expressed by the 
Supreme Court, in FAA v. Robertson637, wherein 
the Court held that statutes enacted prior to the 
FOIA, which gave broad withholding power to 
various federal agencies, were largely unaffected 
by the disclosure mandate of the FOIA. Congress 
responded in 1976 by amending Exemption 3 to 
allow withholding of information under Exemp-
tion 3 only if one of two specific criteria are met; 
i.e., if the withholding statute “(A) requires that 
the matters be withheld from the public in such 
a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, 
or (B) establishes particular criteria for withhold-
ing or refers to particular types of matters to be 
withheld.”638 With these criteria in mind, we turn 
now to Congress’ efforts to protect critical infra-
structure laws fashioned to fit into Exemption 3’s 
exacting criteria.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 
2001 and the Critical Infrastructure Informa-
tion Act of 2002
Effective October 26, 2001, Congress passed the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Act (“CIPA”),639 
which defines critical infrastructure as “systems 
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to 
the United States that the incapacity or destruc-
tion of such systems and assets would have a de-
bilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of those matters.”640
With the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 
2002 (“CIIA”),641 Congress brought information 
relating to “critical infrastructure” under the um-
brella of FOIA Exemption 3 protection. The CIIA 
provides, in pertinent part:
637 422 U.S. 255, 266 (1975).
638 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
639 42 U.S.C. § 5195c.
640 Id.
641 6 U.S.C. § 131, et seq. (Amended July 7, 2004).
.	Political	Structure	 21
Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, critical infrastructure information … 
that is voluntarily submitted to a covered 
Federal agency for use by that agency 
regarding the security of critical infra-
structure and protected systems, analysis, 
warning, interdependency study, recovery, 
reconstitution, or other informational pur-
pose, when accompanied by an express 
statement specified in paragraph (2)—
(A) shall be exempt from disclosure under 
section 552 of Title 5 (commonly referred 
to as the Freedom of Information Act);
(B) shall not be subject to any agency rules 
or judicial doctrine regarding ex parte 
communications with a decision making 
official;
(C) shall not, without the written consent 
of the person or entity submitting such in-
formation, be used directly by such agency, 
any other Federal, State, or local authority, 
or any third party, in any civil action aris-
ing under Federal or State law if such in-
formation is submitted in good faith;
(D) shall not, without the written consent 
of the person or entity submitting such in-
formation, be used or disclosed by any of-
ficer or employee of the United States for 
purposes other than the purposes of this 
part, except--
(i) in furtherance of an investigation or the 
prosecution of a criminal act; or
(ii) when disclosure of the information 
would be--
(I) to either House of Congress, or to the 
extent of matter within its jurisdiction, any 
committee or subcommittee thereof, any 
joint committee thereof or subcommittee 
of any such joint committee; or
(II) to the Comptroller General, or any au-
thorized representative of the Comptroller 
General, in the course of the performance 
of the duties of the Government Account-
ability Office. [FN1]
(E) shall not, if provided to a State or local 
government or government agency--
(i) be made available pursuant to any State 
or local law requiring disclosure of infor-
mation or records;
(ii) otherwise be disclosed or distributed to 
any party by said State or local government 
or government agency without the written 
consent of the person or entity submitting 
such information; or
(iii) be used other than for the purpose of 
protecting critical infrastructure or pro-
tected systems, or in furtherance of an in-
vestigation or the prosecution of a crimi-
nal act…642
The intent of the above language is very clear; 
i.e., that broad categories of information related to 
critical infrastructure are considered non-releas-
able to the general public in the interest of national 
security. The “voluntary” provision appears to be 
modeled after FOIA Exemption 4’s jurisprudence 
as set out in the Critical Mass decision, supra,643 
perhaps in deference to the fact that not all of the 
federal circuits have adopted the D.C. Circuit’s 
well-reasoned opinion.
Criticism of the Critical Infrastructure Infor-
mation Act
The CIIA has been criticized both for its inclu-
siveness as well as for its exclusiveness.
Stephen Gidiere and Jason Forrester wrote in 
2002:
The [CIIA] has been severely criticized as 
creating a major new loophole to FOIA’s 
right of public access. But whether the 
[CIIA’s] disclosure exemption is either 
“new” or “major” is subject to debate. In 
fact, much, if not all, of the information 
that falls within the ambit of the [CIIA] 
642 Id.
643 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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may be protected already by Exemption 
4.644
Gidiere and Forrester appear to write from the 
standpoint that, while the new statute may be 
largely redundant given the legal framework, it 
is at least well intentioned. Other commentators, 
however, have been pointedly more critical:
Present and future efforts to erode FOIA 
will harm requesters who are entitled to 
most of the information they seek. With 
the broad new CIIA FOIA exemption and 
a DOJ that will vigorously defend almost 
all agency FOIA decisions, the time peri-
od for responding to the requesting public 
could expand greatly, especially in light 
of preexisting backlogs and the amount 
of time it could take for administrative 
appeals and further litigation. The signifi-
cance of September 11, 2001 and its im-
pact on the freedom of information cannot 
be ignored--it has affected the perception 
of privacy, congressional lawmaking, and 
perhaps even court decisions. But this does 
not justify the expansion of governmental 
secrecy post-September 11, 2001. One 
would be hard-pressed to find a spokes-
person for the notion that even sensitive 
information should flow unimpeded to the 
public in the name of governmental trans-
parency. We all want to keep our country 
secure and our people safe, but the exemp-
tion framework codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 
protects adequately against the release of 
sensitive data that could place the U.S. at 
risk. [I]n this era of increased government 
secrecy…governmental transparency ap-
pears to have become a casualty of war. 
Only time will reveal the effects of these 
new restrictions on the public’s right to 
government information. As long as the 
644 Stephen Gidiere & Jason Forrester, Balancing 
Homeland Security and Freedom of Information, 16 Nat. 
Resources & Env’t 139, 139 (Winter 2002).
Bush Administration and Congress refuse 
to work within the adequate preexisting 
FOIA framework to address national se-
curity concerns, the prospects for govern-
mental transparency in this new era appear 
grim.645
Indeed, the new legislation, while very broad in 
purpose, is still “voluntary” and, even though it 
purports to apply to critical infrastructure informa-
tion in the hands of state and local governments, 
such an attempt to usurp the broad protections of 
the Tenth Amendment is likely to fail to pass Con-
stitutional muster.646
The CIIA provides that critical infrastructure 
information “shall not, if provided to a State or 
local government…be made available pursuant 
to any State or local law requiring disclosure of 
information or records…otherwise be disclosed 
or distributed to any party by said State or local 
government…”647 The Tenth Amendment states, 
“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved for the States respectively, or to the 
people.”648 The Tenth Amendment does not give 
Congress authority to require states to regulate, 
no matter how powerful the federal interest in-
volved.649 Rather, the Constitution gives Congress 
the authority to regulate matters which are directly 
within its purview, and to preempt contrary state 
regulation.650
The Supreme Court has recently reiterated these 
constitutional principles in the field of telecom-
munications facilities. In Nixon v. Missouri Mu-
645 Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom Of 
Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to 
Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, And Homeland 
Security, Am. U. L. Rev., Oct. 2003 (citations omitted).
646 See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Federal Informa-
tion Disclosure, Ch. 27, “State Information and Access 
Laws” (3d ed. 2007).
647 6 U.S.C. § 131, et seq. (Amended July 7, 2004).
648 U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 10.
649 New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
650 See id.
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nicipal League,651 the Federal Communication 
Commission (“FCC”) attempted to preempt a 
Missouri statute which prevented its municipali-
ties and public utilities from providing telecom-
munications services or facilities. In holding for 
the state, the Court stated, “[F]ederal legislation 
threatening to trench on the States’ arrangements 
for conducting their own governments should be 
treated with great skepticism, and read in a way 
that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its 
own power…”652 The Court also pointed out that 
upholding the FCC provision “would treat States 
differently depending on the formal structures of 
their laws…”653 Consequently, the CIIA appears 
to be infirm not only on constitutional grounds, 
but in its application with respect to the varying 
state open records laws. And when we recall that 
much of the nation’s critical infrastructure is in-
deed owned by the state and local governments; 
a cursory review of their attempts to protect this 
information is in order.
State Open Records Laws
Many states moved, after September 11, 2001, to 
provide more protection to the flow of informa-
tion related to critical infrastructure.654 In Texas, 
the Government Code has been amended to pro-
tect broad categories of information, including 
documents which “identify the technical details 
of particular vulnerabilities of critical infrastruc-
ture.”655 Further, the Texas Attorney General has 
determined that “utility, drainage and engineering 
plans” of a Citigroup data processing center were 
protected from disclosure under state law, and that 
the data processing center was determined to be 
651 541 U.S. 125 (2004).
652 Id. at 140.
653 Id. at 138.
654 A relatively comprehensive listing of these stat-
utes can be found in a publication by the St. Mary’s Uni-
versity School of Law Center for Terrorism Law entitled 
State Open Government Law and Practice in a Post-
9/11 World, Lawyers & Judges Pub. Co., Inc. (2007); see 
also, Thomson/West, “50 State Surveys Utilities/Telecom-
munications Utilities” (November 2006).
655 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 418.181.
critical infrastructure.656 Other states have gone 
even farther. Alabama, for example, has exempted 
from public disclosure:
Records concerning security plans, pro-
cedures, assessments, measures, or sys-
tems, and any other records relating to, 
or having an impact upon, the security or 
safety of persons, structures, facilities, or 
other infrastructures, including without 
limitation information concerning critical 
infrastructure (as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 
5195c(e)…657
While this statute is exceptionally broad, not all 
of the states have followed suit. For example, no 
statutes relating to the additional protection of 
critical infrastructure were found on the books in 
Hawaii, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. In 
New York, a 2004 law pertains to the reporting 
of security efforts by power generation and trans-
mission facilities; however, the statute states that 
it is subject to New York’s open records law, the 
Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”).658 On the 
opposite coast in California, Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger signed legislation exempting 
“vulnerability assessments” from disclosure, as 
well as information related to facility security that 
“could be used to aid a potential terrorist or other 
criminal attack.”659
Perhaps the inconsistent, and in some cases lais-
sez-faire, attempts by the statehouses at protect-
ing critical infrastructure is based on a reliance of 
the sweeping federal legislation. Or perhaps some 
states balance the public’s right to access infor-
mation above the perceived threat to public safety 
and security posed by disclosure. In New York, 
because the subway has been in existence since 
1904,660 and much of the City’s other infrastruc-
656 June 25, 2004, Texas Attorney General Opinion.
657 Ala. Code § 36-12-40; see also § 31-9A-14.
658 N.Y. Stat. Law § A9718 (2004).
659 Cal. Gov’t Code § AB1209 (2004).
660 See New York Metropolitan Transit Authority 
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ture is even older than that, one could argue that 
there is little critical infrastructure information left 
to protect. Meanwhile, in Nevada, home of Las 
Vegas and the Hoover Dam, the Legislature has 
enacted some of the most sweeping critical infra-
structure legislation which exempts “[d]rawings, 
maps, plans or records that reveal the critical in-
frastructure of primary buildings or facilities and 
other structures used for storing, transporting or 
transmitting water or electricity, natural gas or 
other forms of energy.”661
The Problems with the Current State of the 
Law
The one inescapable conclusion of the above 
coast-to-coast study is that the states’ collective 
efforts or non-efforts create a legal hodge-podge 
that is simply not rescued by the federal statute, 
given its questionable constitutional validity as it 
pertains to the states.662 Indeed, the federal law has 
already been called into question in some instanc-
es. For example, the Maine Public Utilities Com-
mission, in overruling AT&T’s bid to withhold 
critical infrastructure information under the CIIA, 
stated that such federal legislation “does not limit 
the ability of a state agency to obtain such infor-
mation independently.”663 Meanwhile, a New Jer-
sey Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held that 
the CIIA exempted from disclosure a “digital copy 
format of the Brick Township Municipal Utilities 
Authority’s GIS topographic mapping data.”664 In 
that case, however, the local governmental entity 
had voluntarily made the required submission and 
statement to the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (“DHS”).665
(“MTA”) website at http://www.mta.info/mta/centennial.
htm.
661 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 239C.210 (2003).
662 See supra text and notes at and after Note 41.
663 Me. Pub. Util. Comm’n. Order, Re Utility Ser-
vice Area and Infrastructure Maps (Ch. 140), Docket No. 
2001-284, 9 (May 7, 2003).
664 Robert Tombs v. Brick Township M.U.A., OAL 
DKT. NO. GRC 06786-04S (December 13, 2005).
665 See id. at 7.
The CIIA and the extant state open records laws 
together do not form an impenetrable shield for 
the protection of the nation’s collective critical in-
frastructure information. Thus, a model solution 
should be implemented to address these weak-
nesses, and such that no one state is a weak link in 
the chain of critical infrastructure protection such 
that its assets could be seen as an easier target for 
a terrorist attack.
A Proposal for a Uniform Critical 
Infrastructure Information Protection Act
As a starting point, a Uniform Act could be mod-
eled after the CIIA, and the following is an ex-
ample of how such a model would begin:
Critical infrastructure information that is 
voluntarily submitted to the state or any 
of its political subdivisions for use by the 
state or any of its political subdivisions 
regarding the security of critical infra-
structure and protected systems, analysis, 
warning, interdependency study, recovery, 
reconstitution, or other informational pur-
pose, when accompanied by an express 
statement specified in paragraph (2)—(A) 
shall be exempt from disclosure under this 
state’s open records laws…
Additionally, a Uniform Act may want to increase 
the protection for critical infrastructure informa-
tion by (1) adding specific protection for local 
public works projects; (2) providing that request-
ers provide identifying information; and (3) pro-
hibiting the dissemination of critical infrastructure 
information via e-mail or other electronic means.
As suggested by Christopher Alonzi in the Spring 
2005 Construction Lawyer, the standards found 
in the DHS and Department of Transportation 
(“DOT”) regulations666 “may establish a general 
standard of professional care or best practice that 
666 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 15 (DHS) and 49 C.F.R. pt. 1520 
(DOT).
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should be followed…”667 These standards seek to 
protect information related to critical infrastruc-
ture by, among other things, restricting its dissem-
ination to “persons with a need to know.”668 They 
also require that such records be conspicuously 
marked and contain a disclosure limitation state-
ment.669 Finally, the C.F.R. provides for penalties 
for a failure to safeguard the protected informa-
tion.670 It is the suggestion here that such standards 
be incorporated into a Uniform Act regarding the 
protection of critical infrastructure as it pertains to 
local public works projects.
Further, requesters under the FOIA, or the Uni-
form Act proposed herein, could be required to file 
a form similar to the DoJ Form 361, “Certificate 
of Identity,” such as is required with all Privacy 
Act requests.671 This simple form asks that a per-
son identify themselves sufficiently in exchange 
for the government’s release of information. As 
referenced above, certain critical infrastructure 
information may be releasable to persons with a 
“need to know;” e.g., engineering firms, govern-
ment contractors, etc.
In addition, neither the above referenced construc-
tion plans and specifications, nor any protected 
critical infrastructure information, should be sent 
electronically due to the dangers of interception 
and proliferation in cyberspace. The Oxford Uni-
versity website contains this common sense warn-
ing:
Although we now take the email for grant-
ed, it is important to realise [sic] that - in 
its most basic form, at least - it is not nec-
essarily a very secure or private means of 
communication. In fact, email has often 
been likened to the use of the postcard in 
667 Christopher H. Alonzi, Protecting Security-Sen-
sitive Plans and Specifications for Local Public Works 
Projects, Constr. Law. (Spring 2005).
668 49 C.F.R. pt. 15.
669 Id.
670 Id.
671 Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
conventional postal systems: it is open to 
being read or tampered with during trans-
mission, and it might not even actually 
come from the person who apparently sent 
it.672
It is almost tautological that there is much danger 
in sending sensitive documents via e-mail in to-
day’s climate of sophisticated hackers and spam-
mers.
Thus, even if one could draft a Uniform Act as set 
out above, the question becomes how to induce 
the states to incorporate it into their statutes. Giv-
en that the federal government has clearly taken 
the lead in this area, one approach would be the 
time-honored “carrot-stick” approach occasion-
ally used by the federal government to promote 
uniform laws among the states in areas where it 
may not constitutionally mandate that they do so.
The federal government could offer a financial 
inducement to the states in terms of highway con-
struction funding, as it did with the introduction of 
uniform speed limits on Interstate Highways, and 
in the implementation of a national drinking age of 
21. The National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 
1984673 was passed on July 17, 1984 by Congress, 
and essentially required the states to legislate and 
enforce 21 years as the minimum age for purchas-
ing or possessing alcoholic beverages. Under that 
federal statute, a state not enforcing the minimum 
age would be subjected to a ten percent decrease 
in its annual federal highway apportionment.674
This provision was challenged by South Da-
kota and found to be constitutional by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the case of South Dakota v. 
Dole.675 As the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently 
672 Peter Higginbotham, Oxford University Com-
puting Services, Introduction to Security Issues in Email 
- PGP, S/MIME and SSL, © Univ. of Oxford (February 
2004), available at http://www.oucs.ox.ac.uk/email/secure.
673 23 U.S.C. §158.
674 23 U.S.C. §158(a)(1).
675 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-208 
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noted, “[T]here are a variety of methods, short of 
outright coercion, by which Congress may urge 
a State to adopt a legislative program consistent 
with federal interests. As relevant here, Congress 
may, under its spending power, attach conditions 
on the receipt of federal funds...”676 Since this 
method of attempting to achieve legal uniformity 
throughout the states has passed constitutional 
scrutiny, it could be used to implement a Uniform 
Act in state open records laws.
Conclusion
Protecting critical infrastructure information in 
and of itself will not prevent terrorists from plan-
ning and attempting attacks on U.S. soil. Howev-
er, the measure is a necessary link in the chain of 
national security and local public safety. By put-
ting up legal roadblocks which our citizens with a 
legitimate need to know may circumnavigate, we 
may be saving countless lives by delaying a ter-
rorist attack even for a few days or weeks. Those 
days and weeks may be all the precious time that 
intelligence and law enforcement authorities need 
to thwart a terrorist’s plans to poison the water 
well or destroy some other asset of critical infra-
structure. However, our current laws protecting 
critical infrastructure information should be made 
more consistent and exhaustive in their extent and 
in their applicability. In the current war on terror, 
that is not too high a price to pay.
5.3 Federal Preemption of State Open 
Records Laws After September 11
by Stephen Gidiere677
(1987).
676 New York v. U. S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (citing 
and discussing Dole).
677 Stephen Gidiere is a partner in the law firm 
of Balch & Bingham LLP, a southeastern regional law 
firm. Mr. Gidiere’s practice encompasses a wide range of 
administrative law matters, including government informa-
tion, environmental, and energy law. He is author of The 
Federal Information Manual, a book published by the 
American Bar Association about the Federal of Informa-
tion Act and other federal information laws. He frequently 
publishes articles in the legal and popular press on a variety 
 In the wake of the events of September 11, 
2001, and the resulting international war on terror-
ism, governments in the United States at all lev-
els—federal, state, and local—have changed the 
way they do business. Some of these changes are 
subtle; others dramatic. At the federal level, the 
Department of Homeland Security was created—
the first new secretary-level executive department 
since the Department of Defense was created in 
1947—causing a wholesale realignment of many 
federal agencies and their duties.678 Some states 
have followed suit with similar structural chang-
es. 
 In addition to changes in their own political 
structures, governments have modified the way 
they interact with each other. In the area of gov-
ernment records, one significant change in this 
regard is the increase in information sharing be-
tween and among federal, state, and local govern-
ment officials. The need for sharing information 
as a method for preventing terrorism was memo-
rialized, among other places, in the 9/11 Commis-
sion Report and a subsequent Executive Order on 
the subject.679 
 Despite the call for—and initiation of—in-
creased sharing of homeland security related in-
formation since September 11, little attention has 
been paid to the legal problem of how to manage 
public access to such shared information as it 
changes hands. For example, when sensitive in-
formation is given to a state agency by a federal 
agency, do federal information laws follow that 
information? Or do state laws take over? Do both 
apply? The answers to these questions are some-
of information law topics. 
678 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 101-557).
679 Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, § 13.1 (July 22, 
2004); Exec. Order 13356, 69 Fed. Reg. 53599 (Aug. 27, 
2004) (instructing the Director of Central Intelligence to 
develop common standards for sharing terrorism informa-
tion with other agencies in the intelligence community, 
other agencies with counterterrorism functions, and state 
and local governments).
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times not clear and often depend on the type of 
information at issue and who is providing it. 
 The general rule is that federal law preempts 
state law 1) if Congress passes a statute that ex-
pressly preempts state law; 2) if Congress pre-
empts state law by occupation of the entire field 
of regulation; or 3) if the state law conflicts with 
federal law due to impossibility of compliance 
with state and federal law or when state law acts as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the federal 
purpose.680 The first two instances are considered 
express preemption; the third is termed implied 
preemption. Thus, federal preemption could theo-
retically dictate what information held by states 
must be disclosed or protected from disclosure. 
 However, federal preemption has never had 
much of a place in the realm of open records 
laws.681 As discussed below, for a variety of rea-
sons, federal information laws generally do not 
preempt state open records laws. With limited 
exceptions,682 this trend has continued even after 
September 11. 
 The purpose of this article is not to make a val-
ue judgment as to whether there should be more 
680 See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 
1487 (1995); Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. Univ. 
of Washington, 884 P.2d 592 (Wash. 1995).
681 See, e.g., Abbott v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health 
and Mental Retardation, 212 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App. 2006) 
(holding that federal Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and implementing regula-
tions did not preempt state open records law); Newsday, 
Inc. v. State Dept. of Trans., 10 A.D.3d 201 (N.Y.A.D. 
2004) (holding that 23 U.S.C. § 409 did not preempt state 
open records law with respect to reports about hazard-
ous intersections); Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. 
Univ. of Washington, 884 P.2d 592 (Wash. 1995) (holding 
that federal Freedom of Information Act does not preempt 
state law so as to require nondisclosure of unfunded grant 
proposal).
682 See, e.g., ACLU v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 
649 (N.J. Super. 2002) (holding that regulation promul-
gated by United States Immigration and Naturalization 
Service preempted state law requiring disclosure of infor-
mation about inmates in state prisons).
or less preemption of state open records laws, or 
to argue in favor of greater openness or secrecy in 
government. Rather, this article shows how certain 
aspects of current law and practice generally pre-
vent federal preemption of state information laws 
and explores two approaches to federal-state rela-
tions that have developed in response to homeland 
security concerns. 
I. The Federal-State Disconnect on Open Re-
cords 
 There is now, and always has been, a pro-
nounced disconnect between federal and state 
laws regarding open records. Federal and state 
open records laws, in general, have nothing to do 
with each other, even though they may apply at 
times to the same document or information. 
 Consider, for example, the federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA),683 the overarching statute 
governing disclosure of federal records. FOIA re-
quires the disclosure of any federal agency record 
to any person making a request for it, subject to 
nine statutory exemptions.684 Several inherent fea-
tures of FOIA limit its ability to control the flow 
of information that is exchanged or shared among 
federal and state governments. 
 First, FOIA is limited in application to federal 
agency records.685 Under Supreme Court prece-
dent, whether a particular document is an “agency 
record” depends on, among other factors, what en-
tity or person controls the document. Under the 
two-part test established by the Supreme Court, 
a record is an “agency record” under FOIA if it is 
1) created or obtained by an agency, and 2) in the 
agency’s control.686 As to the “agency control” re-
quirement, the Supreme Court explained that “[b]y 
control we mean that the materials have come into 
683 5 U.S.C. § 552.
684 Id.
685 Id. § 552(f)(2) (definition of “record”).
686 Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 144-46 (1989). See 
also Burka v. Department of Health and Human Services, 
87 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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the agency’s possession in the legitimate conduct 
of its official business.”687 The Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit has established a more specif-
ic test to determine whether a given record is “in 
the agency’s control.” The D.C. Circuit considers 
four factors: 
1) the intent of the document’s creator to 
retain or relinquish control over the re-
cords; 2) the ability of the agency to use 
and dispose of the record as it sees fit; 3) 
the extent to which agency personnel have 
read or relied upon the document; and 4) 
the degree to which the document was in-
tegrated into the agency’s record system or 
files.688 
 Accordingly, documents created by state or 
local governments and actually submitted to the 
federal government in the course of its official 
business may become agency records subject to 
disclosure under the FOIA once in the hands of 
the agency.689 Moreover, a record may be in the 
constructive control of an agency and qualify as 
an “agency record.”690 Conversely, just because a 
document is in an agency’s possession does not 
mean it is an agency record—for example, the cre-
ator of the document may not have intended to re-
linquish control over the document, and the docu-
ment may thus only be “on loan” to the agency. 
 Second, even if FOIA’s requirements did “fol-
low” a particular record, FOIA only applies to fed-
eral agencies. The FOIA incorporates and refines 
the definition of “agency” contained in the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA) (of which the FOIA 
is a part).691 The APA generally defines “agency” 
687 Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 145.
688 Burka, 87 F.3d at 515. (quoting Tax Analysts v. 
Department of Justice, 845 F.2d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 
1988), aff’d on other grounds, 492 U.S. 136 (1989). See 
also State of Missouri v. Department of the Interior, 297 
F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying four factors from 
Burka).
689 State of Missouri, 297 F.3d at 750.
690 Burka, 87 F.3d at 515.
691 5 U.S.C. § 552(f).
to mean “each authority of the Government of the 
United States, whether or not it is within or sub-
ject to review by another agency, but does not in-
clude,[] for the purposes of the FOIA, Congress, 
United States courts, governments of United States 
territories or possessions, or the government of 
the District of Columbia….”692 FOIA adds more 
description to this general definition. Under the 
FOIA, the term “agency as defined in [the APA] 
includes any executive department, military de-
partment, Government corporation, Government 
controlled corporation, or other establishment in 
the executive branch of the Government (includ-
ing the Executive Office of the President), or any 
independent regulatory agency.”693 Thus, states 
and local governments are not subject to FOIA, 
and their records are not either. The better rea-
soned decisions have held that FOIA does not pre-
empt state open records laws.694 
 Even if states and their records were subject 
to FOIA, it would not necessarily result in the 
uniform treatment of homeland security related 
information. FOIA is a disclosure statute, not an 
information protection statute. In other words, 
FOIA itself does not require withholding of ex-
empt material by entities subject to its disclosure 
requirement (other federal statutes may do so in 
some limited situations, a topic discussed later). 
Instead, agencies generally have discretion wheth-
er or not to invoke a FOIA exemption to avoid 
disclosure in a particular case.695 This means that, 
692 Id. § 551(1)(A)-(D) (emphasis added).
693 Id. § 552(f)(1).
694 Progressive Animal Welfare Society v. Univ. of 
Washington, 884 P.2d 592 (Wash. 1995) (holding that 
federal Freedom of Information Act does not preempt 
state law so as to require nondisclosure of unfunded grant 
proposal). But see Brady-Lunny v. Massey, 185 F. Supp. 2d 
928 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that names of federal inmates 
need not be disclosed under state open records law because 
Exemption 7(C) of the FOIA protected such information).
695 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 
(1979) (“We simply hold here that Congress did not design 
the FOIA exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure.”). 
See also Bartholdi Cable Co. Inc. v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission, 114 F.3d 274, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“The fact that information falls within one of the FOIA 
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even if states were subject to FOIA, there could 
(and likely would be) uneven application of its 
exemptions given that they often require consid-
erable interpretation to cover homeland security 
information.696 
 FOIA, of course, is not the only federal law 
dealing with the disclosure and protection of in-
formation. There is a host of other statutes mak-
ing certain types of information either expressly 
public or confidential.697 Courts have generally 
required that these statutes speak directly and ex-
pressly about prohibiting public disclosure in or-
der for federal preemption to apply.698 
II. Two Case Studies in Federal Preemption: 
CEII and CII 
 Two different case studies illustrate how the 
issue of federal preemption has been handled (or 
not handled) in the context of homeland security 
related information since September 11. The first 
involves a regulatory initiative by the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to pro-
tect “critical energy infrastructure information” or 
“CEII.” The second involves a statutory program 
exemptions does not necessarily mean that the agency 
cannot disclose the material. FOIA’s exemptions simply 
permit, but do not require, an agency to withhold exempted 
information from the public.”).
696 Stephen Gidiere & Jason Forrester, Balancing 
Homeland Security and Freedom of Information, 16 Nat. 
Resources & Env’t 139 (2002). (analyzing potential ap-
plication of FOIA Exemptions 1, 2, 4, and 7 to homeland 
security related information).
697 See, e.g., P. Stephen Gidiere III, The Federal In-
formation Manual, Appendix 8-1 (Amer. Bar Assoc. 2006) 
(cataloging dozens of statutes other than FOIA that deal 
with information protection).
698 Compare ACLU v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 
649 (N.J. Super. 2002) (holding that regulation promul-
gated by United States Immigration and Naturalization 
Service preempted state law requiring disclosure of 
information about inmates in state prisons), with Abbott v. 
Texas Dept. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 212 
S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that federal Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
and implementing regulations did not preempt state open 
records law).
administered by the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (“DHS”) that protects “critical infrastruc-
ture information” or “CII.” Although CEII and 
CII may actually cover some of the same kinds 
of information, they represent two very different 
approaches to the issue of federal preemption. 
 A. FERC and Critical Energy
 Infrastructure Information 
 Following September 11, FERC was one of 
the first federal agencies to formally revise its in-
formation handling and dissemination practices to 
reflect the threat of terrorism. FERC is an inde-
pendent agency that regulates the interstate trans-
mission of natural gas, oil, and electricity as well 
as the construction and operation of hydropower 
projects. FERC’s primary statutory authorities for 
its regulatory activities are the Natural Gas Act 
(“NGA”) and the Federal Power Act (“FPA”). In 
carrying out its mission, FERC collects informa-
tion from regulated entities about the construction, 
design, operation, and vulnerabilities of facilities 
that generate and transport energy. FERC collects 
information in routine filings, like the Form 715 
that operators of electricity transmission facilities 
must file annually, and also as part of its enforce-
ment and compliance activities. 
 After September 11, FERC immediately rec-
ognized that much of the information it collects 
and makes available could be useful to a terror-
ist plotting an attack against American infrastruc-
ture. Within a month of the September 11 attacks, 
FERC issued a statement of policy announcing 
that it would remove from its website and pub-
lic reading room “documents, such as oversized 
maps, that detail the specifications of energy fa-
cilities licensed or certified under [Part I of the 
Federal Power Act and Section 7(c) of the Natu-
ral Gas Act].”699 FERC’s action “affected tens of 
thousands of documents.”700 
699 66 Fed. Reg. 52917 (Oct. 18, 2001).
700 68 Fed. Reg. 9857, 9858 (March 3, 2003).
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 FERC followed up this initial move with a 
rulemaking to formalize changes to its informa-
tion policy. On January 16, 2002, FERC issued 
a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) that set out its general 
position on the treatment of previously-public 
documents and sought public input on a series of 
related questions.701 The NOI was intended to “as-
sist the Commission in determining what changes, 
if any, should be made to its regulations to restrict 
unfettered general public access to critical energy 
infrastructure information, but still permit those 
with a need for the information to obtain it in an 
efficient manner.”702 Ultimately, FERC amended 
its regulations to create a new category of pro-
tected information known as “critical energy in-
frastructure information” or “CEII.”703 
 The intricacies of the CEII rulemaking and 
its implementation are beyond the scope of this 
article. Two aspects of the rule, however, are im-
portant to note before considering how the rule 
deals with the issue of federal preemption. First, 
the rule only applies to certain types of informa-
tion about critical energy infrastructure that is oth-
erwise exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.704 
Therefore, for CEII, the issue of how to deal with 
information that may be shared with a variety of 
government entities reflects the limitations inher-
ent in the FOIA, as discussed in Section I. Second, 
the rule does not prohibit all public access to CEII, 
but instead sets certain conditions on release such 
as the execution of a non-disclosure agreement.705 
 FERC struggled with the issue of federal pre-
emption from the beginning of the CEII rulemak-
ing. The issue was particularly relevant for FERC 
because state agencies, such as state public ser-
vice commissions, also have regulatory jurisdic-
701 67 Fed. Reg. 3129 (Jan. 23, 2002).
702 Id.
703 67 Fed. Reg. 57994 (Sept. 13, 2002) (notice of 
proposed rulemaking); 68 Fed. Reg. 9857 (Mar. 3, 2003) 
(final rule) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 388.112, .113). 28 18 
C.F.R. § 388.113(c)(1).
704 18 C.F.R. § 388.113(c)(1).
705 18 C.F.R. § 388.113.
tion over owners and operators of energy facilities 
and thus collect and maintain CEII. Complicating 
the matter even further, both the FPA and the NGA 
contain provisions obligating FERC to make cer-
tain information available to the state commis-
sions.706 
 Thus, FERC had to decide the level of access 
to CEII that state commissions would receive and 
whether the restrictions on use that apply to other 
requesters, such as those contained in non-disclo-
sure agreements, would apply to state commis-
sions. The issue of federal preemption is at the 
heart of this dilemma. In the CEII NOPR, FERC 
cautiously asserted that “the Federal FOIA law 
may trump state FOIA law where the information 
at issue is Federal information.”707 
 The single case cited by FERC for this propo-
sition, however, did not stand for such a sweep-
ing statement.708 In response to commenter’s 
concerns, FERC clarified in the final rule that 
preemption would only apply “to state agency 
requests to FERC for CEII that the Commission 
had generated or collected.”709 But FERC further 
explained that “[i]t does not make sense for the 
Commission to release information to the State 
706 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824h(c) (Federal Power 
Act); 15 U.S.C. § 717p(c) (Natural Gas Act).
707 67 Fed. Reg. at 58002.
708 The case FERC cited—United States v. Nap-
per, 887 F.2d1528 (11th Cir. 1989)—holds that a state 
agency may be required to return a record to the federal 
agency it was received from upon receipt of a request for 
the record under state law. More recently, Congress ad-
dressed the concept of federal agencies “loaning” records 
to state agencies in one specific context when it created by 
statute a class of protected information termed “sensitive 
homeland security information” or “SHSI” as part of the 
Homeland Security Information Sharing Act (HSISA), Pub 
L. No. 107-296, §§ 891-899, 116 Stat. 2252 (codified at 6 
U.S.C. §§ 481-484). Congress provided that “information 
obtained by a State or local government from a Federal 
agency under this section shall remain under the control of 
the Federal agency, and a State or local law authorizing or 
requiring such a government to disclose information shall 
not apply to such information.” 6 U.S.C. § 482(e).
709 68 Fed. Reg. at 9865.
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Agencies with no agreement to protect the infor-
mation, at least to the extent permitted by law.”710 
Thus, FERC required state commission to follow 
the same request procedures for CEII as any other 
requestor. This includes submitting a written re-
quest to the CEII Coordinator and demonstrating 
a need for and willingness and ability to protect 
the information. FERC will presume that state 
commissions “have a need to know information 
within their state involving issues within their re-
sponsibilities.”711 A nondisclosure agreement with 
a state agency will contain provisions requiring 
the agency to give FERC notice of any request for 
the CEII under state law,712 thus giving FERC the 
opportunity to “take action to prevent release of 
the information.”713 
 So, in the end, FERC did not rely on federal 
preemption at all. Instead, it adopted a practical 
approach of controlling possession and applica-
tion of state disclosure laws through the use of 
nondisclosure agreements and advance notice of 
a request under state law. 
 B. DHS and Critical Infrastructure
 Information 
 Congress took a very different tack when it 
created statutory protection for a class of infor-
mation termed “critical infrastructure informa-
tion” or “CII.” CII is a class of information cre-
ated by a subtitle of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 designated the Critical Infrastructure In-
formation Act of 2002 (CIIA).714 The statute de-
fines CII as “information not customarily in the 
public domain and related to the security of criti-
710 Id.
711 Id.
712 Id. at 9866.
713 Id.; 67 Fed. Reg. at 58002 (citing United States v. 
Napper, 887 F.2d at 1530 (11th Cir. 1989)).
714 Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 211-215, 116 Stat. 2150 
(codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 131-134).
cal infrastructure715 or protected systems.”716 CII 
that is voluntarily provided to a “covered federal 
agency” (DHS is the only such agency at present) 
is protected from, among other things, disclosure 
by any federal agency under the FOIA.717 So, in 
FOIA parlance, the HSA contains a new FOIA 
Exemption 3 provision protecting CII.718 The CII 
program is administered by DHS, and DHS has 
issued final rules that detail how CII is to be sub-
mitted, marked, handled, and shared.719 
 A purpose of the CII designation is to foster 
sharing of information about critical infrastruc-
ture, much of which is possessed by the private 
sector. By providing protection from public dis-
closure, the statute seeks to encourage the private 
sector to voluntarily share information that it oth-
erwise would not. In order to achieve the ultimate 
goal of preventing or responding to terrorism, CII 
collected by DHS must be shared with other fed-
eral officials, state and local governments, and 
members of the private sector, as appropriate. It’s 
at this point that the thorny and persistent problem 
of how to extend federal protection for the infor-
mation comes into play. 
 For CII, Congress tackled the problem head 
on. CII, Congress provided, “shall not, if provid-
ed to a State or local government or government 
agency [] be made available pursuant to any State 
or local law requiring disclosure of information or 
records [or] otherwise be disclosed or distributed 
to any party by said State or local government 
agency without the written consent of the person 
or entity submitting such information.”720
715 The HSA defines “critical infrastructure” by 
cross-referencing the definition of that term in the USA PA-
TRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1016(e), 115 Stat. 401 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e)). See 6 U.S.C. § 101(6).
716 6 U.S.C. § 131(3).
717 Id. § 133(a)(1).
718 See Section 8.3 (discussing FOIA Exemption 3).
719 71 Fed. Reg. 52262 (Sept. 1, 2006) (codified at 6 
C.F.R. Part 29).
720 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(E)(i), (ii).
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 In its final rule, DHS imposed even more 
specific requirements on States and local govern-
ments receiving CII. DHS’s rules say that “State 
and local governments receiving [CII] will ac-
knowledge in such arrangements the primacy of 
[CII] protections under the CII Act; agree to assert 
all available legal defenses to disclosure of [CII] 
under State, or local public disclosure laws, stat-
utes or ordinances; and will agree to treat breaches 
of the agreements by their employees or contrac-
tors as matters subject to the criminal code or to 
the applicable employee code of conduct for the 
jurisdiction.”721 
 Thus, the CII provision seems to be a clear 
statement of Congress’ intent to completely pre-
empt state open records laws with respect to CII. 
At a minimum, this provision and the implement-
ing DHS regulations result in implied federal pre-
emption because it would be impossible to comply 
with both this federal law and a state open record 
law calling for disclosure. 
III. Conclusion 
 Few would dispute that strong federal leader-
ship is needed to combat and respond to terrorism. 
Unlike with economic or social policy, defense 
against terrorism is not one of those areas of gov-
ernment that lends itself to the proverbial “states 
as laboratories” approach. And with information 
disclosure, in particular, public release of a piece 
of information by just one jurisdiction would ren-
der moot efforts by other jurisdictions to keep the 
information confidential—once information is in 
the public domain, it is difficult if not impossible 
to bring it back. And, in fact, while states could 
voluntarily recognize federal laws and prohibi-
tions regarding homeland security information in 
their own open records statutes ensuring uniformi-
ty, few states have actually done so.722 If we want 
721 6 C.F.R. § 29.8(b).
722 For a review of how states have responded to 
September 11 in amending or not amending their open 
records laws, see generally The Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press, State Open Government 
a uniform approach to the handling and disclosure 
of sensitive homeland security information, fed-
eral preemption is a practical necessity. 
 Many would dispute, however, that federal 
law should step in to comprehensively (or even 
selectively) preempt state law in the area of open 
records. And, by and large, this has not happened 
since September 11. The case of CII thus stands 
as an outlier in information law—a clear preemp-
tion of state disclosure laws for a specific type of 
homeland security information. The CII provision 
has come under sharp criticism, as an overly broad 
and unnecessary new disclosure exemption.723 But 
few could argue that Congress’ and DHS’s clear 
commands about CII are not a more efficient ap-
proach to information control as compared, for 
example, to relying on a fiction that federal in-
formation is simply “on loan” to a state or local 
government and can be retrieved to avoid a public 
request under state law. 
 Even with six years of perspective and experi-
ence since September 11, it is hard to say which 
approach—or combination of approaches—works 
best to encourage information sharing among all 
levels of government while protecting from pub-
lic disclosure only that information that truly de-
serves protection. Thorny questions of federal-
ism and separation of powers have existed in this 
country since—and before—its inception. Noth-
ing has happened in the years since September 
11 to suggest that those questions will subside. In 
fact, the back and forth of the federalism debate is 
Law and Practice in a Post-9/11 World (2007). Most 
states that have amended their open records laws to protect 
more information post9/11 have done so by enacting their 
own unique exemptions. At least one state, however—Ala-
bama—has opted to follow the federal lead on protecting 
information about critical infrastructure and has incorpo-
rated directly into state law the federal law on “critical 
infrastructure” and “critical energy infrastructure informa-
tion.” See Ala. Code § 36-12-40.
723 See, e.g., Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, The Freedom of 
Information Act Post 9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to 
Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Homeland 
Security, 53 Amer. Univ. L. Rev. 261 (2003).
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in some ways the grease that keeps our democracy 
humming along. That debate is sure to continue. 
5.4 Federal Freedom of Information Act-
Driven Coverage of the Department of 
Homeland Security: A Pilot Study
by Charles N. Davis, Ph.D.
Without question, one of the most important de-
velopments in the new century has been the Unit-
ed States’ response to the horrific terrorist attacks 
of Sept. 11, 2001. While much scholarly attention 
has been devoted to coverage of the global confla-
grations attendant to the war on terror, relatively 
little attention has been paid to coverage of the 
creation of one of the world’s largest bureaucratic 
apparatuses – the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity. 
 Congress and the President created the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (“DHS”) in response 
to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.724 In 
the days following the terrorist attacks, a dizzy-
ing array of government employees from agencies 
throughout Washington and beyond scrambled 
to provide assistance to the Bush Administra-
tion.725 The inevitable red tape and interagency 
communication barriers quickly gave rise to the 
idea that there should be one unified department 
to combat and respond to future terrorist attacks 
on U.S. soil.726 In just over a year, that idea grew 
into a sprawling new Cabinet-level agency with a 
sweeping mandate, two dozen subordinate agen-
cies and thousands of employees overseeing a vast 
multitude of programs.727
724 Jessica Reaves, Homeland Security: A Primer, 
Time (Online Ed.), Nov. 19, 2002, available at http://www.
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,391161,00.html [here-
inafter Reaves].
725 Id.
726 Id. President Bush’s initial proposal of a Cabinet-
level Department of Homeland Security called for “sub-
stantially transforming the current confusing patchwork 
of government activities into a single department whose 
primary mission is to protect our homeland.” 
727 President Bush initially established an Office 
of Homeland Security by Executive Order on October 
 The creation of DHS marked the first major 
government restructuring since the creation of the 
Department of Energy in 1977, and the creation of 
the nation’s third largest federal agency.728 With 
an initial budget of $37 billion, DHS encompasses 
170,000 workers from twenty-two agencies, in-
cluding the Secret Service, Border Patrol, Coast 
Guard, and Customs Service.729 The Department’s 
mission to coordinate counter-terrorism measures 
and preemptive defense is carried out through the 
Department’s four divisions: border and transpor-
tation security; emergency preparedness and re-
sponse; countermeasures for chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear attacks; and an intelli-
gence clearinghouse.730
 The massive dimensions of DHS, and its 
multi-agency structure, make it a daunting task 
for journalists to cover effectively. Its creation 
came with a blanket Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) exemption for private industries sup-
8, 2001. See Press Release, The White House, Executive 
Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security (Oct. 
8, 2001). Senators Joseph Lieberman and Arlen Specter 
subsequently introduced Senate legislation to create a 
Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. See Press 
Release, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
Lieberman, Specter Offer Homeland Defense Legisla-
tion (Oct. 11, 2001), available at http://www.senate.
gov/<diff>gov<uscore>affairs/101101homedefpress.htm. 
After President Bush officially supported the creation of 
a Department of Homeland Security in early June 2002, it 
was only a matter of time before the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (“HSA”) passed in the House and Senate. The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 passed the United States 
House of Representatives in July 2002, but disputes over 
workers’ rights, as well as other controversial provisions, 
impeded passage until after the November 2002 elections 
gave both houses of Congress a Republican majority. See 
Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, The Freedom of Information Act 
Post-9/11: Balancing the Public’s Right to Know, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, & Homeland Security, 53 Am. 
U.L. Rev. 261 (Oct. 2003).
728 General Accounting Office, Major Management 
Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland 
Security 3, 2003, available at http://www.gao.gov/
pas/2003/d03102.pdf.
729 Supra note 5, at 6.
730 Reaves, supra note 1.
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porting the nation’s critical infrastructure, yield-
ing a great deal of critical editorial coverage early 
in the Department’s history.
 The critical infrastructure exemption in no way 
exempts the vast majority of DHS records, how-
ever, raising the question of how and to what ends 
journalists and other FOIA users are employing the 
Act to access documents from DHS and its agen-
cies. To examine the use of FOIA within DHS, the 
researcher examined coverage of the Department 
and each of its major subsidiary agencies since its 
creation, looking specifically for coverage gener-
ated by use of FOIA. The purpose of this study is 
to determine how journalists have used FOIA to 
bring important information regarding the Depart-
ment to the public’s attention and to examine the 
nature and extent of information flow from DHS 
to the press and public. Knowing how journalists 
are using FOIA to access information about the 
Department is crucial to understanding the depth 
and breadth of information flow, and serves as an 
important barometer of how effectively the press 
is monitoring one of the most important functions 
of modern government. The use, or lack of use, of 
FOIA by journalists is a telling sign of the quality 
of coverage of homeland security by the Ameri-
can press.
 Coverage of the Department and its agencies 
must be viewed in light of the fact that journalists 
have paid a great deal of attention to chronicling 
the increasing trend towards federal government 
secrecy over the last six years. Literally hundreds, 
if not thousands, of stories documenting the rise in 
federal governmental secrecy dominate any schol-
arly examination of the mass media treatment of 
the broader subject of FOIA. Without repeating 
all of the significant findings, the totality of the 
secrecy bears mention.
 In the year following the September 11 at-
tacks, the government classified 11.3 million 
documents, which jumped to 14.2 million the fol-
lowing year and 15.6 million the year thereafter.731 
The increase in pages classified was followed by 
stories detailing a substantial drop, since fiscal 
year 2001, in the number of previously classified 
pages that the government declassified.732 Much 
journalistic attention was also devoted to the post-
Sept. 11 trend of agencies removing government 
documents from web sites and publicly available 
databases.733 The press also thoroughly reported 
the fact that federal agencies relied increasingly on 
statutory exemptions to deny requests for records 
sought under the FOIA.734 According to a study 
of 22 agencies by the Coalition of Journalists for 
Open Government, the use of FOIA exemptions to 
deny requests jumped by 22 percent between the 
years 2000 and 2004, even though the total num-
ber of FOIA requests to these agencies dropped 
by 13 percent during the period studied.735 Most 
surprisingly, the increase had no apparent connec-
tion to national security. Use of FOIA Exemption 
l, which protects classified information, actually 
dropped during this same period.736
 Against such a backdrop of press opposition to 
federal secrecy, one would expect vigilance where 
the Department and its agencies are concerned. In-
deed, had this study focused on editorial commen-
731 Peter M. Shane, Symposium, Federal Secrecy 
Policy after Sept. 11 & the Future of the Information 
Society, Introductory Essay: Social Theory Meets Social 
Policy: Culture, Identity And Public Information Policy 
After September 11, 2 ISJLP I (Winter 2005-2006), citing 
David Nather, Classified: A Rise in ‘State Secrets’, 63 CQ 
WEEKLY 1958, 1960 (2005) [hereinafter Shane].
732 Supra note 8, citing Nather, at 1965.
733 John Podesta, Need to Know: Governing in Secret, 
in A Little Knowledge: Privacy, Security, & Public 
Information After Sept. 11, 11, 13-14 (Peter M. Shane, 
John Podesta, and Richard C. Leone, eds., 2004); Laura 
Gordon-Murnane, Shhh!!: Keeping Current on Govern-
ment Secrecy, Searcher: The Magazine for Database 
Professionals, Jan. 2006, at 35, 36.
734 Coalition of Journalists For Open Government 
(CJOG), When Exemptions Become the Rule (undated 
document), at 2-3, available at http://www.cjog.net/docu-
ments/Exemptions_Study.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2007).
735 Ibid.
736 Shane, supra note 8, at 2.
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tary rather than news content, the findings would 
have told a very different story, one of almost 
uniform opposition to federal information policy 
and increased secrecy, and one of robust support 
for greater openness under the FOIA. Analysis of 
news coverage utilizing FOIA tells quite a differ-
ent story, however. Examination of the news cov-
erage of a broad sample of American newspapers 
provides broad evidence that the press is vastly 
underutilizing the FOIA where the Department 
and its agencies are concerned.
Methodology
 To examine coverage of the Department and 
its subsidiary agencies, the researcher conducted 
a series of Lexis-Nexis searches to identify a wide 
range of stories involving DHS and its major sub-
sidiary agencies. To examine overall coverage of 
each agency, the researcher conducted searches of 
the top 10 U.S. newspapers by circulation737 from 
November 2001 to August 15, 2007 for each of 20 
distinct agencies.738 Each article retrieved by the 
737 The 10 newspapers, as ranked by the Audit 
Bureau of Circulation, are USA Today; The Wall Street 
Journal, The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, 
Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, New York Daily News, 
Philadelphia Inquirer, Denver Post and Houston Chronicle. 
All but the New York Daily News and Philadelphia In-
quirer are archived in Lexis-Nexis; those newspapers are 
available in the Newsbank database, which was searched as 
well.
738 Each newspaper was searched for all articles men-
tioning “freedom of information” and the following agency 
names: the Department of Homeland Security; the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency; U.S. Customs; the Trans-
portation Security Agency; Immigration and Naturalization 
Service; the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; 
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; the Office 
for Domestic Preparedness; the Strategic National Stock-
pile and/or National Disaster Medical System; the Nuclear 
Incident Response Team; the Domestic Emergency Support 
Teams; the National Domestic Preparedness Office; CBRN 
Countermeasures Programs; Environmental Measurements 
Laboratory; the National BW Defense Analysis Center; the 
Plum Island Animal Disease Center; the Federal Computer 
Incident Response Center; the National Communica-
tions System of the Department of Defense; the National 
Infrastructure Protection Center; the Energy Security and 
search was then reviewed to determine whether 
the content was discussing an issue generated by 
a FOIA request; glancing mentions of the Act and 
articles discussing FOIA generally were eliminat-
ed, as well as editorials, letters to the editor and 
other non-related content. 
 In addition to the agency-specific searches, the 
researcher also looked more broadly at national 
newspaper coverage by conducting a search in the 
general news library of Lexis-Nexis for all articles 
containing the terms “freedom of information” and 
“homeland security” from Sept. 1, 2007 to Sept. 
1, 2005.739 Each article was analyzed to determine 
whether the story was the result of a FOIA request, 
or merely a peripheral mention of the Act. The goal 
was to identify stories in which a FOIA request 
generated some portion of the article’s content, and 
to exclude articles discussing the relative merits of 
FOIA or arguments for and against greater access, 
editorials and other related content. 
 After all the text was analyzed, the following 
questions were asked:
What was the role of FOIA in the story? 
Could it be said that FOIA served as the 
catalyst for the story?
If FOIA was used to obtain the informa-
tion that served as the genesis of the story, 
what information was sought, and what in-
formation was obtained? 
What agency or agencies produced the 
documents, and was there any indication 
of denial or redaction? 
What subject(s) were covered by the story, 
and what did the FOIA-driven information 
add to understanding of the story?
Assurance Program; the Secret Service; and the United 
States Coast Guard. The departments were obtained from a 
DHS web page entitled “History: Who Became Part of the 
Department?” available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm
739 The general news search was limited to a two-year 
timeframe by the Lexis-Nexis database, yielding 2,129 
articles. Of those, 1,601 articles were eliminated, leaving 
528 articles for the analysis.
1.
2.
3.
4.
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 As with all qualitative analyses, the results 
will be subjective. The success of this study can 
only be judged by how persuasive, informative 
and comprehensive the analysis is. The results 
offer a detailed snapshot – albeit an unscientific 
sample – of the use of FOIA to examine DHS and 
its subsidiary agencies by journalists. 
Findings
Agency Coverage: 2002-2007
 The dominant theme of the findings overall 
is a relative paucity of FOIA-driven coverage 
of DHS and its subsidiary agencies. While iso-
lated areas of the massive agency have generated 
some FOIA-driven coverage, much of the cover-
age can best be described as episodic and fleet-
ing in nature. Few, if any, American newspapers 
are devoting regular reporting resources to any 
of the 20-plus entities encompassing the home-
land security apparatus, and the result is a lack 
of any sense of systematic journalistic scrutiny 
using FOIA to inform the public of the operations 
of one of the nation’s most critical governmental 
operations.
 The agency-specific content searches provide 
the most convincing evidence of a relative lack 
of FOIA-driven coverage. Overall, the researcher 
found just 60 FOIA-driven stories from the first 
mentions of DHS in 2001 to present (August 2007) 
– in 23 agency searches for the agency name and 
“freedom of information” – in each of the top 10 
U.S. newspapers in circulation – a total of 230 
searches. 
 Of the 230 searches, only nine agencies yield-
ed any FOIA-driven coverage: the Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service; the United States 
Coast Guard; the United States Customs Service; 
the Department of Homeland Security (general 
search); the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency; the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice; the Office for Domestic Preparedness; the 
United States Secret Service; and the Transporta-
tion Security Administration. 
 The following agencies yielded no FOIA-
driven coverage from 2001-2007: the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center; the Strategic 
National Stockpile and/or National Disaster Med-
ical System; the Nuclear Incident Response Team; 
the Domestic Emergency Support Teams; CBRN 
Countermeasures Programs; Environmental Mea-
surements Laboratory; the National BW Defense 
Analysis Center; the Plum Island Animal Disease 
Center; the Federal Computer Incident Response 
Center; the National Communications System of 
the Department of Defense; the National Infra-
structure Protection Center; the Energy Security 
and Assurance Program; and the United States 
Coast Guard.
 Given the range of agencies, the number of 
news stories examined and the length of time un-
der examination, it is clear that few stories utiliz-
ing FOIA to again access to records target DHS or 
its subsidiary agencies. Of the nine agencies that 
produced the 60 FOIA-driven stories, none was 
the subject of more than a dozen stories, and the 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and 
the Office for Domestic Preparedness were the 
subject of three stories and one story, respectively. 
The heaviest coverage, beyond that for DHS itself 
(18 stories), was directed at the Secret Service (13 
stories); the TSA (5 stories); and FEMA (5 sto-
ries). 
 Though surprisingly small, the agency-specif-
ic coverage contained several examples of stories 
that shed light on important news regarding the 
Department and its activities. For example, The 
New York Times used FOIA to document the role 
of contractors across the government, including 
DHS, using records to demonstrate that competi-
tion, intended to produce savings, appears to have 
sharply eroded. The analysis by The New York 
Times shows that fewer than half of all ‘’contract 
actions’’ -- new contracts and payments against 
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existing contracts -- are now subject to full and 
open competition. Just 48 percent were competi-
tive in 2005, down from 79 percent in 2001, the 
story said.740 
 Another important contracting story used 
FOIA to reveal the contents of a federal audit that 
calls into question $303 million of the $741 million 
spent to assess and hire airport passenger screen-
ers for the Transportation Security Administration 
after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.741 The 
story details how officials at the fledgling agen-
cy lost control of the spending in the rush to hire 
60,000 screeners to meet a one-year congressio-
nal deadline. The audit, performed by the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency at the TSA’s behest, spot-
lights scores of expenses: $20-an-hour temporary 
workers billed to the government at $48 per hour, 
subcontractors who signed out $5,000 in cash at a 
time with no supporting documents, and $4.4 mil-
lion in “no show” fees for job candidates who did 
not appear for tests. 
 Given the centrality of border security and the 
important role that the U.S. Customs Service and 
Immigration and Naturalization Service play in 
the roiling debate over immigration policy, sur-
prisingly few stories using FOIA to cover either 
agency have appeared in the years since the cre-
ation of DHS. The stories that have appeared pro-
vided important glimpses into agency policy, and 
suggest that many similar stories merit attention 
from the press.
 For example, a May 2007 Associated Press 
story relied on FOIA-driven analysis by the Trans-
actional Records Access Clearinghouse showing 
that U.S. immigration officials tried to deport only 
12 people on terrorism-related charges from 2004 
740 Scott Shane & Ron Nixon, In Washington, Con-
tractors Take On Biggest Role Ever, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 
2007, A1.
741 Scott Higham & Robert O’Harrow Jr., The High 
Cost of a Rush to Security; TSA Lost Control of Over $300 
Million Spent by Contractor to Hire Airport Screeners 
After 9/11, N.Y. Times, June 30, 2005, A1.
through 2006. That group of 12 represented “a tiny 
fraction of the 814,073 people the government 
tried to remove from the country during those 
three years,” the story said, while acknowledging 
the figure understates the anti-terrorism effort by 
the Homeland Security Department’s immigration 
agencies.742 The story offered a brief, though in-
formative look at a rather significant data set ob-
tained through the FOIA – data that could be used 
by reporters to tell a variety of stories about the 
enforcement efforts of two DHS agencies, Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement and Customs 
and Border Protection.
 A 2003 Denver Post story used the FOIA to 
obtain documents central to an underreported issue 
stemming from DHS immigration enforcement 
efforts: bed space for illegal immigrants detained 
by authorities.743 The story provided an excellent 
overview of the nationwide expansion of a DHS 
program critical to immigration enforcement that 
would help security officials hold as many as 8,000 
more suspected illegal immigrants a day. The story 
found that the current population of about 22,000 
detainees represents the fastest-growing segment 
of America’s federal prison population, and used 
records to inform readers of an important, though 
certainly controversial, DHS policy. 
 Another intriguing 2003 story by the Associat-
ed Press tracked federal prosecutions of terrorism 
cases since the Sept. 11 attacks, using FOIA-gen-
erated documents to show that such prosecutions 
have increased tenfold since authorities expanded 
the types of crimes classified as related to terror-
ism or international security.744 The AP again used 
742 Michael J. Sniffen, Study questions deportation 
effort; Few people were targeted on charges related to ter-
rorism, Associated Press in Houston Chronicle, May 
28, 2007, A8.
743 Bruce Finley, More prison beds for migrants Feds 
seek space to accommodate crackdown on illegal immigra-
tion, Denver Post, Dec. 7, 2003, A1.
744 David Pace, Terror-connected crime stats soar; 
Prosecutions up tenfold since 9/11; INS, Social Security 
play big role, Associated Press in Houston Chronicle, 
Feb. 14, 2003, A2.
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TRAC data obtained by the FOIA, concluding that 
during the year that began 19 days after the attacks 
on New York and Washington, federal prosecutors 
charged 1,208 individuals with crimes they classi-
fied as related to terrorism or international secu-
rity, compared with 115 the previous year.
 The story found that the focus on terrorism pre-
vention and prosecution hadn’t appeared to have 
drained resources away from other federal law 
enforcement activities, as many experts, includ-
ing then-U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
predicted shortly after Sept. 11, 2001. The TRAC 
data showed that terrorism-related prosecutions 
accounted for just 1.3 percent of all federal crim-
inal cases in 2002. Prosecutions for all types of 
crimes increased by 3.6 percent in 2002, with ter-
rorism cases accounting for one-third of that total. 
The story also noted that TRAC obtained the re-
cords after a two-year court battle with the Jus-
tice Department over the Freedom of Information 
Act.
 Given TRAC’s systemic use of the FOIA to 
aggregate enforcement data, it is surprising that 
numerous stories in subsequent years utilizing 
the data were not produced. The fleeting attention 
paid to such an important story is inexplicable, 
given the availability of the data and the impor-
tance of the topic, yet the researcher found less 
than 10 media mentions of the data from 2004 to 
August 2007.
 Given its highly public profile and resonance 
in the American psyche following the Sept. 11 at-
tacks, it’s not surprising that the Transportation 
Security Administration’s airport security appa-
ratus has generated as much FOIA-driven cover-
age as any DHS agency. A number of stories used 
TSA records to break stories about enforcement 
issues at American airports, demonstrating the ef-
fectiveness of the FOIA in obtaining a wide range 
of information about one of the most visible and 
important parts of the DHS.
 For example, a 2003 Washington Post story in-
formed readers that Los Angeles International Air-
port officials uncovered 12 airport screeners with 
felonies or other criminal backgrounds just weeks 
after the federal government said it “rescrubbed” 
the backgrounds of its workforce there.745 Several 
of the 12 screeners working for the TSA had crim-
inal records related to “unlawful, use, sale, distri-
bution or manufacture of an explosive or weapon” 
and held security badges that provide access to se-
cure areas of the airport for more than 200 days in 
most cases.746
 Documents obtained under a FOIA request 
showed that the 12 screeners, who “were certified 
by the TSA as not having a disqualifying history,” 
were later determined by the airport to “have a 
disqualifying criminal history.” An additional 59 
out of more than 2,000 screeners were flagged for 
further review of their pasts after the airport con-
ducted fingerprint-based checks. 
 Another impressive use of FOIA-generated 
documents examined air security fines at airports 
across the country, finding wide disparities in 
TSA’s penalties for carrying banned items. The 
Wall Street Journal’s 2005 story examined data on 
fines from across the nation, concluding that while 
those carrying banned items face the potential for 
heavy fines, the reality depended a great deal on 
the airport in question.747
 The documents provided a great deal of telling 
anecdotes for the reporter, who used them to pro-
vide a highly informative look at the TSA’s fines:
At the airport in Manchester, N.H., last 
year, for instance, nearly 700 people were 
745 Sara Kehaulani Goo, Airport Finds That More 
Screeners Are Questionable, Wash. Post, June 12, 2003, 
A3.
746 Ibid.
747 Laura Meckler, Air-Security Fines Under Scru-
tiny --- Analysis of Data Finds Wide Disparities In TSA’s 
Penalties for Travelers Carrying Banned Items, Wall St. 
J., June 28, 2005, D1.
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fined for carrying prohibited items, while 
at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport -- 
which had nearly 12 million more people 
passing through security during that time 
-- just 35 penalties were issued. At New 
York’s La Guardia, 286 passengers were 
fined last year. But just a few miles away, 
at John F. Kennedy International Airport, 
only 83 people were penalized.
 Overall, the story showed that fines are rare 
-- the vast majority of people who try to bring 
prohibited items through airport security aren’t 
fined at all. In 2004, the TSA collected more than 
seven million prohibited items from passengers, 
of which 81,600 were firearms, explosives, box 
cutters and knives with blades over three inches. 
But it levied fewer than 14,000 fines altogether in 
2004, the story said. 
General Coverage: 2005-2007
 To gain a better sense of the national cover-
age in a broader spectrum of news media, the re-
searcher conducted a search in the general news 
library of Lexis-Nexis for all articles containing 
the terms “freedom of information” and “home-
land security” from Sept. 1, 2007 to Sept. 1, 
2005.748 Each article was analyzed to determine 
whether the story was the result of a FOIA re-
quest, or merely a peripheral mention of the Act. 
The goal was to identify stories in which a FOIA 
request generated some portion of the article’s 
content, and to exclude articles discussing the 
relative merits of FOIA or arguments for and 
against greater access, editorials and other related 
content. The general news search was limited to a 
two-year timeframe by the Lexis-Nexis database, 
yielding 2,129 articles. Of those, 1,601 articles 
were eliminated, leaving 528 articles for the anal-
ysis.
748 The general news search was limited to a two-year 
timeframe by the Lexis-Nexis database, yielding 2,129 
articles. Of those, 1,601 articles were eliminated, leaving 
528 articles for the analysis.
 The breadth of the more recent coverage across 
the 100-plus newspapers archived in the Lexis-
Nexis database offered a more diverse cross-sec-
tion of coverage on a far wider range of topics. 
Despite the fact that the search generated far more 
coverage overall, the episodic nature of most of 
the coverage made it difficult to detect much in the 
way of any systemic, repeated coverage of DHS. 
Many stories were isolated instances of FOIA use 
by a single newspaper or wire service, yet the far 
more aggressive use of the FOIA to produce news 
coverage of the agency is noteworthy for it reveals 
several productive information flows that demon-
strate the effectiveness of the Act.
 To be sure, there are excellent examples of 
the FOIA being utilized by journalists to tell im-
portant stories about the DHS. The Department’s 
grants program was the subject of a number of 
informative stories, some fueled by records ob-
tained by reporters using state public records laws 
and the federal law, while others documented the 
secrecy surrounding the grants in their state. For 
example, an August 1, 2004 Denver Post story de-
tailed reporters’ unsuccessful efforts to learn what 
Colorado’s $122 million in anti-terrorism funding 
was used for, even in the broadest terms.749
 Colorado officials denied the Post access to 
any information about what state first-responders 
bought with those funds, and noted that other states 
have made such records public. The story noted 
that the volunteer fire department in tiny Estes 
Park, Colo., won a grant for $88,000 in 2002, cit-
ing a records request granted by the federal Home-
land Security Department.750 The story noted that 
the funds were used for health screenings and per-
sonal training, prompting discussion of the merits 
of such spending where infrastructural shortages 
exist. Regardless of the relative merits of the pro-
gram, which state and local officials defended as 
a much-needed defense against firefighter health 
749 Chuck Plunkett, Anti-terror funds under fire, Den-
ver Post, Aug. 1, 2004, C-01.
750 Ibid.
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issues, the debate is a useful example of the utility 
of such records and evidence of the potential for 
the press and public to access such records from 
the federal agency.
 The Chicago Daily Herald also used the FOIA 
to access hundreds of records detailing homeland 
security spending in 127 metropolitan Chicago 
communities, producing a detailed look at the 
many uses of grant funds, from protective gear 
for first responders to a $12.85 million commu-
nication system for Cook County, Illinois.751 The 
analysis raised several important questions about 
spending priorities and approaches in funding 
homeland security at the local level, and included 
a community-by-community listing of purchases. 
A companion story documented the inability of 
many of the communities to respond adequately 
to the information requests, highlighting the fact 
that access to local homeland security spending 
records often is not a federal DHS issue, but one 
of compliance with state FOI laws.752 The city of 
Chicago – which had received $65.8 million from 
2002 to 2005 – refused to detail even general ar-
eas in which the money was spent.753 Several other 
stories used funding records obtained from DHS 
and state homeland security agencies to explore 
spending in Michigan754 and New Jersey,755 for ex-
ample.
 Several stories illustrated the uneven nature 
of access to records under state public records 
laws. The Journal News of Westchester County, 
New York, provided a telling illustration in a 2005 
story detailing the newspaper’s difficulties in ob-
751 Sara Burnett & Kara Spak, Gas masks, a treadmill 
and T-shirts in suburbs, homeland security spending is all 
over the map, Chicago Daily Herald, Sept. 12, 2005, 1.
752 Sara Burnett & Kara Spak, Targeting Terror: Did 
Security Spending Hit The Mark?, Chicago Herald, Sept. 
12, 2005, 2.
753 Ibid.
754 Tim Younkman, Terrorist attack launched wave 
of federal funds to Bay County, Bay City Times, Sept. 10, 
2006, A1.
755 Paul Brubaker & Tom Meagher, Following the 
Money, Bay City Times, Sept. 10, 2006, A01.
taining bridge inspection data – a story with added 
importance given the Minneapolis bridge collapse 
this summer.756 Faced with denials of the data in 
New York, reporters sought the same data for the 
Golden Gate Bridge, and received a complete 
copy of the 35-page report from California state 
officials via e-mail. While the reporters received 
most of the report from the Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey, officials redacted substan-
tial portions of the document, citing homeland se-
curity concerns. The story provided a comparative 
approach to access laws seldom seen in the cov-
erage, launching an important discussion about 
safety and secrecy.
 A story in Pitch Weekly, the New Times 
weekly in Kansas City, offered a blow-by-blow 
account of a reporter’s futile attempts to gain ac-
cess to records detailing the state’s spending of $1 
million in funds received through the federal Buf-
fer Zone Protection Program.757 The story docu-
mented the reporter’s attempts to gain access to 
the documents, and highlighted stories in Alaska, 
Washington, D.C., and Arizona in which reporters 
successfully sough the same records.
 Other stories used DHS records to examine the 
growth of the so-called “no-fly” list,758 intelligence 
operations that implicated antiwar groups,759 the 
growth of the U.S. terror watch list,760 the reliance 
on Internal Revenue Service records in terrorism 
investigations,761 and a number of other issues. 
756 Bruce Golding, Calif. more forthcoming than N.Y. 
with bridge inspection data, Journal News of Westches-
ter County, Nov. 27, 2005, 5A.
757 Eric Barton, Secret Security; Where’s Missouri’s 
anti-terror money going? Don’t ask, Pitch Weekly, June 
8, 2006, 1.
758 Eric Lichtblau, Papers Show Confusion As Watch 
List Grew Quickly, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2004, A9. 
759 Eric Lichtblau & Mark Mazzetti, Military Docu-
ments Hold Tips on Antiwar Activities, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
21, 2006, A18.
760 Karen DeYoung, Terror Database Has Qua-
drupled in Four Years; U.S. Watch Lists Are Drawn from 
Massive Clearinghouse, Wash. Post, Mar. 25, 2007, A1.
761 Dalia Naamani-Goldman, Anti-terrorism program 
mines IRS records, L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 2007, C1.
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The stories show, again and again, the effective-
ness of the FOIA in generating coverage of the 
Department, providing evidence of productive in-
formation channels and fueling some of the more 
newsworthy topics that have emerged in the years 
since the creation of the agency.
 The Department’s records have been used to 
tell important domestic policy stories unrelated to 
terrorism as well. For example, several stories in 
the past two years have used the FOIA to exam-
ine FEMA’s post-Katrina response. The Houston 
Chronicle, for example, cited a Mobile, Alabama 
Press-Register story examining FEMA spend-
ing records, finding, among other things, that 
the agency ordered 415,000 box lunches from a 
Mobile company for $6.2 million – an average of 
$14.85 per lunch. 
 Another story examined the lack of diversity 
among FEMA senior staff, finding, thanks to a 
FOIA request, that of the 19 senior executives of 
the agency in 2005, one was a person of color.762 
The story used the records to foster a broader dis-
cussion of the cultural issues facing persons dis-
placed by the storm, mixing the records-driven 
reporting with interviews in an important feature 
story.
 
Conclusion
 The risk of terrorism, and the government’s 
response to that threat, represents one of the most 
compelling stories of the age. As expected, the 
number of articles on the DHS and its subordi-
nate agencies increased dramatically after 9/11. 
Use of FOIA to generate stories related to DHS 
increased as well, but a broad sampling of stories 
from a wide variety of sources showed little or no 
increase as a percentage of the universe of cov-
762 Colleen O’Connor, Katrina, then culture shock, 
Denver Post, Sept. 25, 2005, L1.
erage. Such a finding is supported by studies of 
FOIA use by reporters generally.
 Despite the widespread belief that journalists 
are among the heaviest users of the federal Free-
dom of Information Act, studies have shown that 
the news media file far fewer FOIA requests than 
businesses or lawyers.763 Examination of a large 
sample of journalistic coverage of the DHS and its 
subordinate agencies shows that where reporters 
have used the FOIA to produce documents from 
the DHS, the press has generated important work 
that provides meaningful scrutiny of the depart-
ment’s many activities. Against the backdrop of a 
war on two fronts and continuing terrorist threats, 
perhaps no agency is as important for Americans 
to understand, and yet the research shows that few 
news outlets are devoting the personnel and re-
sources needed to fully leverage the potential of 
the FOIA in the homeland security arena.
 This pilot study raises several questions that 
should form the basis of future research into cov-
erage of the agency. Quantitative content analysis 
could be employed to gain a better sense of the 
nature of the coverage, examining such issues as 
tone, topic selection and the effects of coverage on 
audiences. The researcher has requested the FOIA 
logs of all DHS agencies, in a study that will bet-
ter document the actual level of FOIA use by jour-
nalists and non-journalists alike. Survey research 
could be utilized to examine the attitudes of jour-
nalists and homeland security officials alike on 
matters related to information policy. Much work 
remains to be done to maximize information flows 
from DHS while addressing legitimate homeland 
security concerns.
763 Jane Kirtley, Tapping into the government, Com-
municator, Vol. L, No. 6, 31-32 (1996). See also The 
Heritage Foundation, Few Journalists Use the Federal 
Freedom of Information Act: A Study by the Center for 
Media and Public Policy, (2001).
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Terror Investigations
Synopsis
.1	Promises and Pitfalls in Counterterrorism Investigations	by	Jarret	
Brachman
6.1 Promises and Pitfalls of 
Counterterrorism Investigations
by Jarret Brachman
The specter of terrorist attacks in the United States 
continues to test the government’s efforts and 
ability to balance between bolstering liberty and 
ensuring order. Since 9/11/2001, both the ways 
in which investigative agencies in this country 
conduct their work on the federal, state and lo-
cal levels influences, as well as the outcomes of 
those investigations, directly impact that delicate 
balancing effort. 
In the United States, counterterrorism investiga-
tions generally include acquiring and pursuing 
leads, gathering evidence, making arrests, con-
ducting training, collecting and sharing intelli-
gence, and responding to terrorist related threats 
and incidents. The promises and pitfalls involved 
in each one of these processes can arise from any 
of three different areas: the actors involved in in-
vestigating terrorism related attacks and plots; the 
social, political and legal environment in which 
these investigations occur; and the ongoing inter-
action between the actors and their environments. 
There have been several cases from which to draw 
important lessons learned for conducting future 
counterterrorism investigations. Some of the cas-
es are domestic, including the Lackawanna Six, 
the Portland Seven, the Fort Dix Six, the North 
Virginia Jihad group and others. American coun-
terterrorism cases, for whatever reason, seem to 
pale in comparison to international terrorism plots 
in terms of the acquired capabilities and level of 
sophistication. Some of the more concerning in-
ternational terrorism investigations include the 
Toronto cell, the London airliner plot, the Brit-
ish fertilizer plot and a variety of others. Each 
of these investigations provide insights into the 
challenges of interagency coordination, timing of 
interdiction, dealing with overwhelming amounts 
of information, public misidentification of sus-
pects, and investigating complex transnational 
networks. 
This piece will provide an examination of previous 
counterterrorism investigations and discussions in 
order to further collective understandings about 
these processes and develop recommendations 
for avoiding pitfalls while leveraging opportuni-
ties for American counterterrorism investigators 
drawing heavily on analysis of actual terrorism 
investigations. To do this, the article will first pro-
vide a historical background of America’s terror-
ism related struggle to combat terrorism. This sec-
tion demonstrates that American thinking, policy 
and laws related to terrorism are constantly in flux 
over broad swaths of time. Importantly, it provides 
the necessary long-term context for any discussion 
on challenges of counterterrorism investigations. 
Second, the article teases out certain steps within 
the counterterrorism investigation process that 
have posed challenges and provided opportuni-
ties to investigators recently. Drawing on publicly 
available empirical evidence, the article highlights 
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key decision-points and consequences of a variety 
of counterterrorism investigations. 
American History with Counterterrorism In-
vestigations
Although one could feasibly tell the American 
story through the lens of the crimes that have pre-
occupied American attention and resources mind, 
it is also clear that what society considers ‘crimi-
nal’ behavior has evolved to some extent. Laws 
change. Collective attitudes morph. The ‘crimi-
nal,’ as most scholars who study it would attest, is 
an inherently social phenomenon, as clear as some 
behaviors seem to be. Terrorism, understood today 
as an act of violence perpetrated against a non-
combatant target in order to make a political state-
ment, seems to be a behavior that is considered 
timelessly wrong. It shocks the collective psyche. 
It violates the public trust. The reality is, however, 
that the American public has never agreed about 
what constitutes ‘terrorism,’ making it difficult for 
those tasked with conducting investigations on it 
to operate with the full public support and back-
ing. 
American history between the early 1880s and 
1920s is full of stories of violence and the strug-
gle by societies as well as governments to put that 
violence in context. While this era is integral to 
understandings of contestation over “who” and 
“what” should be associated with “terrorism,” it is 
all too often glossed over in historical analyses of 
it. Analysis of the texts during this period reveals 
that social actors in this period, as in the previous 
historical eras examined above, contested how 
terrorism was understood and what the metrics 
were for classifying someone as fitting under its 
rubric. 
In his 1880 dedication of the Soldier’s Monument 
in Painesville, Ohio, President James Garfield 
gave what reporters subsequently described as an 
“eloquent tribute to the slain of the war.”1 In Gar-
1 A Speech by Gen. Garfield, N.Y. Times, July 5, 
field’s brief remarks, he observed that the lessons 
derived from the monument include: the need to 
understand, “sacrifices for what we think,” the 
“immortality of the truth,” and what the American 
people must do to sustain itself in the face of “ter-
rorism.”2 Terrorism, for President Garfield, meant 
the widespread use of violence by rogue groups 
domestically, particularly those thwarting recon-
struction efforts in the South. As this article high-
lights, the American public was in no way agreed 
upon that understanding or any other regarding 
what constituted terrorism, who employed it, who 
suffered from it or how it ought be countered, 
however. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Ameri-
can public had become highly attuned to devel-
opments in matters concerning anarchist violence. 
Anarchism, as its advocates and those sympathetic 
to their underlying political agenda publicly con-
tended, was best conceived of as a protest against 
the rule of might, and an assertion of the rule of 
right. Anarchism, its apologists would argue, “be-
lieve in the rule of morality rather than in the rule 
of the politicians.” Seeking to legitimize anarchists 
as a group, this author makes a strategic clarifica-
tion between militants employing anarchism as 
legitimation for their violence, and non-violent 
believers in the ideology.3
In September of 1901, the New York Times exam-
ined a connection between the “possibility of there 
being a general Anarchist lot in the assassination of 
President McKinley and the supposed connection 
of Emma Goldman with the conspiracy, of another 
Anarchist queen more famous…Teresa Brugnoli, 
better known as La Bella Teresa.” By linking her 
with Bresci, the assassin of Italian King Humbert 
in 1900 and describing her as being “in Europe 
what Emma Goldman is in America,” the Times 
sought to help the American public, and law en-
forcement community by default, understand her 
1880, at 1.
2 Ibid.
3 Two Kinds of Anarchists, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 
1916, at 10.
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as a security threat. Quoting her as having said: 
“Nihilists, Fenians, Anarchists, or whatever you 
call yourselves, your object is the same. You can 
only evoke the terrorism of assassination by strik-
ing at the lives of rulers and statesmen – whether 
King, Emperor, Czar, or Republican President,” 
the American public began to understand, and de-
mand, that law enforcement do something to not 
only respond to terrorism in this country, but stop 
it before it happened. This feeling would become 
even further solidified in the American collective 
response to the violent activities perpetrated by 
the Ku Klux Klan. 
A number of groups, most affiliated in some way 
with the Ku Klux Klan, arose during the early 20th 
century, causing significant public disturbances. 
Beginning as early as 1922, Governor John M. 
Parker and Attorney General A. V. Coco, both 
of Louisiana, provided President Warren Hard-
ing, Attorney General Daugherty and William J 
Burns, Chief of the FBI, with “an array of facts 
concerning the Ku Klux Klan terrorism in their 
State.” Their goal, according to reports, was not 
to admit defeat. To the contrary, Governor Parker, 
“was emphatic in asserting that the officers of the 
State Administration were capable of handling the 
Ku Klux Klan situation as far as Louisiana was 
concerned and that there was no intention of ap-
pealing to the Federal Government to assume any 
jurisdiction.” What Parker claimed he needed to 
rid Louisiana of the “masked organization” who 
perpetrated “certain outrages” and “horrifying 
crimes,” was federal assistance to stop trans-state 
support of these groups.4 Contestation over what 
level of government should engage in counterter-
rorism investigations became very heated at this 
time in American history. 
In 1928, Ohio Attorney General, Arthur L. Gil-
lion, filed suit against the KKK in that state. One 
man testified in the course of the investigation 
that various organizations working for the KKK 
4 Louisiana To Fight the Klan Without Federal Aid 
Now, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1922, at 1.
carried out a “program of terror, including public 
whippings, burning churches, and theaters, mak-
ing threats, illegal liquor raids and engaging in 
guerrilla warfare.”5 Further complicating matters, 
the investigation found that some of the violence 
“was closely associated with units of State gov-
ernment,” including the Ohio National Guard.6 
In the 1930s, an organization known as “The 
Black Legion” began operating in the Midwest-
ern United States. Founded by William Shepherd, 
the Black Legion was an offshoot organization of 
the Ku Klux Klan. At its peak, the group’s total 
membership was estimated between 20,000 and 
30,000, centered in Detroit, Michigan. Members 
were known to wear black uniforms with a skull 
and crossbones insignia. According to the FBI at 
the time, “this cult-type organization operated in 
the Midwest in the 1930’s supposedly to protect 
the United States from various forms of isms.”7 
They were believed to have been responsible for 
many murders of alleged communists and social-
ists, notably Earl Little, father of Black activist, 
Malcolm X.8 Terrorism, by this time in American 
investigative history, was understood as relating 
to political and social groups who pursue objec-
tives considered to be violent and discriminatory 
against others under the cover of darkness. The 
KKK was not the only counterterrorism challenge 
facing American investigators, though. 
On 15 February 1933, President Franklin Roos-
evelt had just concluded a speech in Miami, Flori-
da when, according to reporting, an “assassin fired 
five shots from his gun.”9 While Roosevelt went 
unharmed, Chicago Mayor Anton Joseph Cermak 
5 Klan Terrorism in Ohio Pictured By a Witness, 
L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 1928, at 9. 
6 Ibid.
7 See the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Free-
dom of Information website on historical investigations 
into the Black Legion at: http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/
blackleg.htm.
8 For more information about the Black Legion, see 
Peter H Amann, Vigilante fascism: The Black Legion as an 
American hybrid, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
9 Assassin fires on Roosevelt; Bullet Hits Chicago 
Mayor, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1933.
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was shot and subsequently died on 6 March 1933. 
The perpetrator, Joseph Zangara, was described by 
press accounts as a brick mason who had been in 
Miami two months before seeking kill the Presi-
dent. Available historical records show no attempt 
by social actors to link Zangara with the notion 
of terrorism. To the contrary, police statements 
and media reporting actually portrayed the man 
as dimwitted and mentally unstable. For instance, 
one report observed, “Zangara’s face was white 
with suppressed excitement as he answered the 
[interrogation] questions. His hands jerked ner-
vously. He moved constantly, vibrantly. Between 
rational statements, he relapsed into irrational 
spasms.”10 In one statement, police reported that 
Zangara proclaimed, “I’d kill every President. I’d 
kill them all; I’d kill all the officers.”11 
While December 7, 1941 was a day that would 
“live in infamy” in the American mindset, it 
would not, however, be fit into the American pub-
lic lexicon for acts of terrorism. The only asso-
ciation of the Pearl Harbor attack with terrorism 
can be found in an obscure news report about how 
a Japanese pilot en route to bomb Pearl Harbor 
with his Japanese air force compatriots ran out of 
gas and was forced to land on a Hawaiian island. 
Wandering on the Hawaiian island up to five days 
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the article goes 
on to write that “the story of this terrorism…is a 
dramatic one,” where because the islanders did 
not yet know of the bombing, allowed the pilot to 
roam freely on the island. When the Japanese pilot 
established contact with two other Japanese sym-
pathizers, they were able, according to the article 
to recover the guns from his air craft and “were in 
control of the village.” After a fight between an is-
land resident and the Japanese pilot, the pilot was 
killed.12 The term’s usage in this context does not 
seemed attached to, nor asserting any particular 
historical motif about how to understand terror-
ism. 
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 The Sheboygan Press (WI), Jan. 2, 1942, at 15.
The American public was also applying the label 
of terrorist against participants of the Japanese by 
the early 1940s. In 1942, the FBI was aggressively 
rounding up “known and suspected members of 
the toughest alien Japanese group in San Francis-
co.”13 The raids were said to have been based on 
documentary evidence seized in previous raids on 
Japanese secret societies, that the local group was 
a “front” for the ruthless and dread Black Dragon 
Society, most nationalistic and terroristic of all 
Japanese secret bodies. Nat J.L. Pieper, Northern 
California FBI chief who directed the roundups, 
said some of the Japanese already in custody had 
admitted the secret nature of the local society. Mr. 
Pieper also declared “proof of the organization’s 
intense nationalistic program, and direction under 
the Black Dragon Society, has been found.” And 
in public discussions about the death of Mitsuru 
Toyama, referred to widely as a “terrorist leader” 
and “unofficial emperor” of Japan, publics con-
tested that his lead of the Black Dragon Society, 
a group that was notorious for targeted assassina-
tions as well as known as a group of “drug ped-
dlers, brothel keepers, smugglers and swindlers that 
swarmed into China from Japan to take advantage 
of the turmoil during the Chinese revolution.14
The onset of the Cold War introduced a new en-
emy within American popular discourse, commu-
nists. President Truman used the term terrorism to 
help generate Congressional and public support 
for massive U.S. assistance to Greece. 
The very existence of the Greek state is to-
day threatened by the terrorist activities of 
several thousand armed men, led by Com-
munists, who defy the government’s au-
thority at a number of points, particularly 
along the northern boundaries. A Commis-
sion appointed by the United Nations Secu-
rity Council is at present investigating dis-
13 FBI Raids Jap Terrorists, San Francisco News, 
Mar. 31, 1942.
14 Toyama of Japan, Terrorist Leader, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 6, 1944, at 23.
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turbed conditions in northern Greece and 
alleged border violations along the frontier 
between Greece on the one hand and Alba-
nia, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other. 
Meanwhile, the Greek Government is un-
able to cope with the situation. The Greek 
army is small and poorly equipped. It needs 
supplies and equipment if it is to restore 
the authority of the government through-
out Greek territory. Greece must have as-
sistance if it is to become a self-supporting 
and self-respecting democracy.15 
Using the term terrorism to cast a negative light on 
the communist insurgents challenging the Greek 
government, President Truman was launching 
what would be the first of a fifty year policy of 
supporting democracy against the forces of com-
munism worldwide. Interestingly, the first jus-
tification of the Cold War is rooted in Truman’s 
argument that these forces are terrorist in nature. 
The term would continue to be used and contested 
as public actors sought to justify a shift in U.S. 
policy in the establishment of the CIA. 
In the initial discussions of establishing the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, Major General William J. 
Donovan, director of the Office of Strategic Ser-
vices (OSS), proposed what he envisioned as an 
organization very different from the “terroristic 
character of a Gestapo” – which the CIA, in its ear-
liest inception, was being compared to in certain 
Washington circles. On the contrary, according to 
the article, what would be the future organization’s 
“personnel would be without police authority over 
United States citizens and would operate only from 
the point of view of information and interpreta-
tion.” According to the article, “control of this or-
ganization is vested with Congress. Congress could 
therefore prevent its being turned into an agency 
for terrorism by limiting its appropriation.”16
15 Harry S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Ses-
sion of Congress, (Mar. 12, 1947),available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm. (last visited May 24, 
2004).
16 Donovan Upheld On Peace Spy Plan, N.Y. Times, 
At the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, Ger-
many, the Palestinian group, Black September, a 
group designated as terrorists by the U.S. govern-
ment, took the Israeli Olympic team hostage, lead-
ing to the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes, five of the 
eight kidnappers, and one German police officer.17 
The group demanded the release and safe passage 
to Egypt of 234 Palestinians jailed in Israel, and 
an additional two in German prisons. Israel’s re-
sponse was immediate and absolute: there would 
be no negotiation. The German authorities, under 
the leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt rejected 
Israel’s offer to send an Israeli special forces unit 
to Germany. The German police who took part in 
the operation had no special training in hostage 
rescue operations. 
After this incident, publics significantly ques-
tioned their governments about security prepared-
ness. Counterterrorism moved from the negative 
conceptions that it carried with it as a legacy from 
Algeria and British contexts, and increasingly 
became seen as something governments needed 
to provide for their countries. And governments 
began to realize that there were stratifications 
across their ability to fight hijackers and kidnap-
pers. The legacy of the 1972 Olympics would go 
on to inform how every government thought about 
the worst-case scenario when they hosted future 
games. It also became a standard recollection for 
any discussion about security preparedness within 
American media reports from that point forward. 
Leading up the 1984 Olympics public contesta-
tion over the social fact of terrorism was intense. 
By this time, federal policymakers had fully em-
braced the idea that terrorism was a something that 
could be measured, tracked and fought; academ-
ics embraced the notion that terrorism could be 
studied, parsed, categorized and discussed histori-
cally; and publics had embraced the idea that there 
Feb. 13, 1945, at 14.
17 See “One Day in September: The Full Story of the 
1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and the Israeli revenge 
operation,” (New York: Simon Reeve, 2000).
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were actors known as terrorists who intended to 
kill them for any number of reasons. The Olym-
pics held in Los Angeles, California in 1984 led 
to some novel discussions and actions by the U.S. 
government regarding terrorism. In the lead up to 
the event, Los Angeles Police Chief, Daryl Gates, 
took a trip to West Germany, Israel, Britain and 
France where he “consulted at length with secu-
rity authorities” about preventing terrorism. The 
Los Angeles police then brought in Shaul Roso-
lio, a former Israeli chief police commissioner, 
where he “held private meetings for several days 
with law enforcement and Olympics security of-
ficers.” Intelligence sources, according to reports, 
had been reflecting possible violence at the games 
spurned from either conflict in Central America 
or anti-Turkish sentiment.18 In a controversial and 
unprecedented move, the FBI “did what no other 
counterterrorist team in the world has done: show-
cased its capability to rescue hostages with mini-
mum loss of life” by running a high-profile hos-
tage-rescue scenario. FBI Assistant Director, O.B. 
Revell noted that the simulation was designed to 
“demonstrate to anyone who might engage in ter-
rorist acts that we have this capability.”19 One of 
the most concerning threats for Americans leading 
up to the 1984 Olympics were Armenian groups. 
The FBI Director singled out the Armenins as a 
principal threat, a statement that further strained 
the relationship between law enforcement offi-
cials and the Armenian community in the United 
States, according to media reports. The director of 
a for-profit terrorism research center argued that 
Armenian terrorism “is not tremendously unlike 
the Italian community in organized crime cases 
years ago,” particularly in how the “law-abid-
ing Italian community resisted cooperating with 
us because of the feeling that they shouldn’t talk 
about their own.”20
18 Kenneth Reich, Gates, Terrorism Experts Meet 
About Olympics, L.A. Times, June 7, 1983, at SD_A3.
19 Evan Maxwell & Roland Ostrow, Displays Arse-
nal For Olympics, L.A. Times, Mar. 10, 1984, at A25.
20 Evan Maxwell, Fear of Armenian Terrorism at 
Games Spurs Both Anger, Calls for Cooperation, L.A. 
Times, July 28, 1984, at A1.
An unnamed intelligence official interviewed by 
The New York Times contested, “gathering in-
telligence about terrorism, particularly trying to 
penetrate terrorist groups, is considered one of the 
toughest jobs in the intelligence business.”21 Try-
ing to free himself and his organization from the 
mounting public pressure about what was needed 
to fight terrorism, this official represents the type of 
defensive relationship policymakers began to find 
themselves in during the 1980s, seeking to find 
the precarious middle ground between over-react-
ing and under-performing. The Defense Depart-
ment faced a similarly difficult task. In December, 
1983, for instance, reports highlighted how the 
Department of Defense, “in response to criticism 
that the United States military is not equipped to 
fight terrorists, [was] hastily preparing proposals 
for confronting the problem for review by Defense 
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger,” department of-
ficials announced. While the DOD was actively 
asserting its need to prepare to counter terrorism 
“anti-terrorism experts in universities, research 
institutes and consulting firms across the coun-
try,” media reports contested the departments’ 
statements, contending that the military’s “sudden 
interest in terrorism would fade.”22 
The FBI was not free from such public demands 
either. They made particular efforts to enhance 
both their ability to combat terrorism as well as 
public visibility of those efforts. For instance, 
they announced the development of a computer 
system for analyzing intelligence, where “tidbits 
from around the country and the world are fed 
into computers and go to our analysts for inves-
tigative guidance…the computer tracks move-
ments and associations. It relates incidents in one 
part of the country with another through a license 
plate or similarity of names,” said an FBI offi-
cial. 
21 Intelligence: Too Much Information, Too Little 
Evaluation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1983, at 51.
22 Joel Brinkley, Pentagon Hastily Drafts Measures 
on Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1983.
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Despite the fact that the media heralded the “dra-
matic drop in the number of major terrorist inci-
dents” since the bombing of the TWA Flight 840 
and of the American embassy in Kuwait, some 
argued as fact that “the Reagan administration’s 
anti-terrorism effort is almost universally regard-
ed as a failure.” This theme was reinforced by a 
book on terrorism called “Best Laid Plans: The 
Inside Story of America’s War Against Terror-
ism,” written by two investigate journalists.23 In 
the book, they seek to demonstrate the complexi-
ties of responding to terrorism as the president. 
Additionally, they argue that terrorism experts are 
unrelenting, criticizing a president for being too 
harsh one day in dealing with terrorists and too 
soft the next.”24
Others, including the presidents themselves, sought 
to argue that the President needs to be freed from 
conventional constraints in fighting terrorism be-
cause it is an unconventional threat. One article 
highlights how both Presidents Carter and Reagan 
“challenged the legality of the Vietnam-era War 
Powers Resolution, and asserted that the president 
needn’t notify Congress of every covert operation 
– particularly if he believes that such notification 
might jeopardize lives.” A Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney General in the Reagan Administration publicly 
asserted with regards to this point that “Congress 
has got to make it clear that the rules don’t apply 
to [fighting] terrorism.”25
In the aftermath of the hijacking of a Kuwaiti Air-
ways 747 for 16 days, the hostage-takers made 
demands to release colleagues from prison. The 
Kuwait government refused their demands, which 
elicited praise from many American actors who 
argued, for example, that “the forces opposing 
global terrorism are the stronger this week for 
Kuwait’s firm decision not to give in to hijacker 
23 David Brooks, No Way to Win Anti-Terrorism 
Game, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1988, at 11.
24 Ibid.
25 Robert S. Greenberger, Free the Presidency to 
Fight Terror, Wall St. J., Dec. 19, 1985, at 28.
demands.”26 President Reagan condemned anoth-
er bombing, this time against the U.S. Embassy 
in Beirut, saying, despite continuing threats from 
“the worldwide terrorist movement,” the United 
States “can’t crawl in a hole some place and stop 
performing.”27 In April 1984, President Reagan 
signed a secret directive described by officials as 
a broad charter for “taking the offensive” against 
terrorism.28 But in the aftermath of the Beirut em-
bassy bombings, many began criticizing President 
Reagan for not living up to his comments a week 
after his inauguration where he promised America 
“swift and effective retribution” for terrorist acts. 
In an effort to defend Reagan, Secretary of State 
George Schultz argued that terrorism “is really a 
form of warfare” and therefore needed to be han-
dled cautiously, particularly when hostages were 
involved.29
In 1984, the Christian Science Monitor contended 
that “as the seizure of a Kuwaiti jetliner this week 
shows, skyjacking has become much less a mode 
of transportation than a means to terrorist ends.”30 
Attempts like these by social actors to delineate 
key moments in time or critical junctures are those 
that denote a change in the dominant trajectory. In 
this case, it was the fact that hijackers used planes 
to get themselves to countries they otherwise 
might not have been able to – Cuba and Iran were 
particularly common destinations – as well as a 
means to publicize their political events. 
The Reagan Administration, moving forward 
with plans for action against international terror-
ism, considered whether to exempt punitive raids 
against terrorists from its policy against assassina-
26 Not a Victory for Terrorism, Christian Science 
Monitor, Apr. 22, 1988, at 15.
27 John M. Goshko, Reagan Decries Attack, Stays 
Firm on Terrorism, Wash. Post, Sept. 21, 1984, at A1.
28 Ibid.
29 Brad Knickerbocker, US Officials Search for 
Practical Ways to Combat Terrorism, Christian Science 
Monitor, Oct. 18, 1984, at 1.
30 Peter Grier, Hijacking is Down, But Aims Have 
Changed, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 7, 1984, at 
1.
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tions, officials said in 1985. Toward that end, State 
Department lawyers had apparently been examin-
ing centuries-old piracy laws to see whether they 
offer legal justification for attacking or capturing 
terrorists. A senior White House official contested 
the “war whooping in the media and the Congress 
about what we ought to do in Beirut,” instead the 
official argued that “most of what is called for in 
the fight against terrorism is just painstaking po-
lice work, on a global scale.”31
This reassessment included looking to the exam-
ples of the European government who, in 1986, 
began authorizing new surveillance and identifica-
tion polices. The French Interior Minister asserted 
a new framework for governments and societies to 
understand counterterrorism by saying, “It’s time 
to start terrorizing the terrorists.”32 Contrary to the 
American strategy to place pressure on nations 
perceived as sponsoring terrorism, Europeans ar-
gued that their efforts monitoring publics had been 
paying off. The plan, including the “possibility of 
an ID check, limits the terrorist’s sense of freedom 
to act,” one French government official argued. 
“The terrorist will know he can’t so easily hide 
behind his anonymity,” said another.33 The U.S. 
government seemed less enthusiastic about taking 
more aggressive efforts domestically, including 
anything that could be construed as limiting civil 
liberties. Director of the Federal Protection and 
Safety Division of the General Services Admin-
istration contended, “If we shut [public buildings 
and monuments] down, then that is what the ter-
rorists want us to do, to shut down the operations 
of the government.” Free and unconstrained ac-
cess to “symbols of a free society,” should not be 
changed, he argued.34 
31 Doyle McManus, Assassination Ban May Not Ap-
ply in Anti-Terror Raids, L.A. Times, July 13, 1985, at 1.
32 Roger Ricklefs, Europe Getting Tougher With Ter-
rorists, Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at 38.
33 Ibid.
34 Warren Richey, Security vs. Openness in the U.S. 
Capital, Christian Science Monitor, May 6, 1986, at 3.
The Modern History of Counterterrorism In-
vestigations 
U.S. Government understandings of terrorism con-
tinued to morph through the 1990s, in large part due 
to the changes occurring around the world in both 
thinking about and combating terrorism. For in-
stance, in late 1989, an unofficial meeting of Unit-
ed States and Soviet terrorism experts produced 
“ambitious proposals for joint action between the 
superpowers.” The former CIA Deputy Director 
of Central Intelligence, Ray Cline, argued that “it 
is clear to me that in the back of their minds the 
Soviets now see terrorism is a threat to the Soviet 
Union, not just the United States.” Cline went on 
to say that the Soviets “would like to get on the 
side of the angels on this one.”35 The British Gov-
ernment drastically altered their counterterrorism 
infrastructure in 1992 by unleashing their intel-
ligence agency, MI5, against terrorism. Britain’s 
Home Secretary told the British House of Com-
mons that “MI5, now virtually free of its commit-
ment to fighting communist regimes, was taking 
over from the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard) 
the ‘lead responsibility’ for countering Irish ter-
rorism in Britain.” The decision, according to an 
unnamed senior British official, was triggered by 
a April 1992 Irish Republican Army bomb attack 
in London’s financial district that ripped through 
an entire city block, disrupting the operations of 
dozens of banks and other financial institutions.36
Under President Bill Clinton, the United States 
continued to face attacks that publics and the gov-
ernment construed as being terrorism. President 
Clinton had been in office for just 38 days when a 
group of Islamic radicals bombed the World Trade 
Center, killing six people and injuring more than 
1,000. Public reaction did not immediately attribute 
the explosions to terrorism. The new president’s 
reaction seemed to many, almost disengaged. He 
35 Scott Armstrong, US-Soviet Panel Drafts Antiter-
ror Plan, Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 2, 1989, at 8.
36 Alexander MacLeod, British Spy-Catchers Set 
Sights on Domestic Terrorism, Christian Science Moni-
tor, May 13, 1992, at 6.
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pleaded with the American people and the people 
of New York to “keep your courage up and go on 
about your lives. I would discourage the American 
people from overreacting to this.” Clinton assured 
Americans that he had put forth “the full, full re-
sources of the federal law enforcement agencies 
- all kinds of agencies, all kinds of access to in-
formation - at the service of those who are trying 
to figure out who did this and why.” He also said 
he would implement a policy of “continued moni-
toring.” Clinton said the United States was “abso-
lutely determined to oppose the cowardly cruelty 
of terrorists, wherever we can.” Federal law-en-
forcement authorities in New York concluded that 
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the radical Egyptian 
cleric seen widely as providing ideological inspi-
ration to the bombers, “knew details of the plot 
to detonate bombs across the city and assassinate 
several officials but were waved off of arresting 
him at the last minute by the Clinton Administra-
tion, Government officials said today.”37 Accord-
ing to the Administration, they decided to allow 
him to remain at-large because they had an ongo-
ing electronic surveillance on him and thought he 
was more useful as a source into the murky world 
of Islamist extremism than he would be as a tacti-
cal source or legal boon.38
In preparation for the first anniversary of the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, the New York Po-
lice Department “sent bomb-sniffing dogs to sur-
vey landmarks like the Empire State Building, the 
Statue of Liberty and other likely targets of terror-
ism. The dogs hunted inside but made a special 
survey of the perimeters, part as a show, said John 
F. Timoney, the chief of police.” He clarified the 
act as a way to “let them know whoever ‘they’ 
are, that we haven’t forgotten.”39 From the start, 
many saw President Clinton as approaching the 
investigation as a law-enforcement issue. In do-
37 David Johnston, Sheik Was Aware Of Bombing 
Plot, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1993, at A1.
38 Ibid.
39 Matthew L Wald, How Does the World Look 
Through the Eyes of Aspiring Terrorists, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
6, 1994, at E3.
ing so, he limited the types of resources that could 
be brought to bear on the attacks, particularly that 
of the intelligence agencies. For example, the 
evidence gathered by FBI agents and prosecu-
tors came under the protection of laws mandating 
grand-jury secrecy—which meant that the law-en-
forcement side of the investigation could not tell 
the intelligence side of the investigation what was 
going on. “Nobody outside the prosecutorial team 
and maybe the FBI had access,” says James Wool-
sey, who was CIA director at the time. “It was all 
under grand-jury secrecy.” 
Another problem with Clinton’s decision to assign 
the investigation exclusively to law enforcement 
was that law enforcement in the new administra-
tion was in turmoil. When the bomb went off, 
Clinton did not have a confirmed attorney gener-
al; Janet Reno was awaiting Senate approval. The 
bombing barely came up at Reno’s Senate hear-
ings. The focus of much of the media’s coverage 
of the U.S. Government’s counterterrorism efforts 
following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing were 
focused on defending against domestically-rooted 
groups. While federal and state investigators fo-
cused increasing attention on movements of the 
far right “white supremacists and paramilitary 
groups in the wake of the bombing, many of the 
legal powers they sought in the emotional after-
math of the blast to aid the gathering of evidence 
have not been enacted.”40 And since that attack, as 
this article identifies, “arrests on terrorist charges 
have been made nationwide, and federal agents 
have confiscated truckloads of weapons, includ-
ing machine guns and pipe bombs, ammunition, 
explosives of every description, chemicals and 
deadly poisons.”41 
In his address to honor the victims of the Okla-
homa City bombing, President Clinton vowed to 
petition Congress for broad new powers to fight 
40 John Kifner & Jo Thomas, Singular Difficulty in 
Stopping Terrorism: Lone Fanatics Can Still Slip Through 
Web of Tougher Surveillance, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1998, at 
24.
41 Ibid.
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terrorism, including “creation of a domestic coun-
terterrorism center headed by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation” and expanded surveillance ca-
pacity ascribed to the federal authorities. Clinton 
ordered a review of security at all federal build-
ings and renewed the U.S. Government’s commit-
ment to fighting terrorism both domestically and 
abroad. According to the article, Clinton’s pro-
posals “would reverse a two-decade trend away 
from Federal surveillance of government critics, 
which was curtailed after disclosures of wide-
spread abuses and harassment of civil rights and 
antiwar protesters in the 1960’s and 70’s.” The ar-
ticle cites Philip S. Gutis, media relations director 
for the American Civil Liberties Union, as saying 
that “we are concerned about an overreaction that 
would threaten to sweep away the constitutional 
principles that have shaped our society and remain 
at the core of our liberty.”42
And then on June 25, 1996, a truck bomb explod-
ed outside the Khobar Towers barracks in Dhah-
ran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 American soldiers 
and wounding hundreds more. President Clinton 
vowed to bring the killers to justice. “The cowards 
who committed this murderous act must not go 
unpunished,” he said angrily. “Let me say again: 
We will pursue this. America takes care of our 
own. Those who did it must not go unpunished.” 
The next day, Clinton reiterated that, “we will not 
rest in our efforts to find who is responsible for 
this outrage, to pursue them, and to punish them.” 
Calling the attacks an “outrage” rekindled public 
memories of previous terrorism discourse. 
In an editorial, the author writes that “the Govern-
ment has the power under existing law to crack 
terrorist groups. If the FBI and other agencies 
need more money or manpower, the White House 
and Congress should provide it – but not a license 
to interpret the Constitution as they see fit.”43 The 
42 Todd S. Purdum, Ease Restrictions: Liberties 
Groups Worry about ‘Overreaction’ to Bombing Attack, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1995, at A1.
43 Don’t Legislate in Haste, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 
1995, at A22.
FBI at this time “opened a high-technology, $20 
million operations center at its headquarters this 
week to give officials better tools to manage as 
many as five crises at once. The efforts by FBI 
officials in 1996 to handle three big cases at the 
same time – the Olympic bombing in Atlanta, the 
explosion of T.W.A. Flight 800 off Long Island, 
and the Khobar Towers truck-bombing in Saudi 
Arabia – made it clear that a new center was neces-
sary.” The article continues, “the Bureau’s fastest 
growing component, its Counterterrorism Center, 
is arrayed in the offices around the high-technol-
ogy center – as is its violent crime unit, which 
handles domestic attacks.”44 Clinton’s proposals 
would cost $1.5 billion over five years, adding 
around 1,000 new Federal agents, and importantly, 
seek to amend the landmark Posse Comitatus Act 
of 1878 to allow military experts to help civilian 
authorities investigate crimes involving ‘weapons 
of mass destruction.’”45 But FBI Director Louis 
Freeh contested at a Senate oversight hearing that 
“it is clear that we were told to investigate domes-
tic terrorism differently from foreign terrorists,” 
indicating bureaucratic confusion with regards to 
the priorities and instrumentalities for handling 
various types of attacks based on definition.46 
In response to political fire from House Speak-
er Newt Gingrich, President Clinton stated that 
“nothing can justify turning this bill into a po-
litical football…we have kept politics completely 
out of our fight against terrorism. We kept it out 
of our mourning. We kept it out of our law en-
forcement efforts…” The bill at the time planned 
to create a ‘Domestic Counterterrorism Center’ 
counterpart to the CIA’s already existing Counter-
terrorism Center which focused on foreign threats 
but prohibited by law from spying on American 
citizens.47 Reports highlighted how Congress, ac-
44 Crisis Center Is Expanded and Updated By the 
F.B.I., N.Y Times, Nov. 22, 1998, at 39.
45 Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks More Anti-Terror-
ism Measures, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1995, at A1.
46 Francis X. Clines, F.B.I. Chief Seeks Orders For 
Inquiries, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1995, at A25.
47 Tim Weiner, Clinton Urges Fast Action on Terror-
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cording to Gingrich, was, “reluctant to give the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation more authority to 
fight terrorism because lawmakers felt the Bureau 
had mishandled the investigation of files given to 
the White House.” The “rushed effort to pass new 
antiterrorism legislation last week before Con-
gress left for its August recess failed when Senate 
Democrats refused to accept a House-passed ver-
sion that left out two White House proposals.”48
The 1998 Embassy bombings triggered discussion 
about “coordinating an effort with European and 
African nations to roll up the terrorist networks of 
Osama bin Laden.” United States officials said that 
they believe that the question is not “whether Mr. 
Bin Laden will strike again, but when.” Reports 
sought to clarify that “Mr. Bin Laden has been a 
focus of attention at the CIA, Counterterrorism 
Center for years, and he has been identified in a 
Presidential finding that authorizes covert action to 
combat international terrorism.”49 Gerecht, a for-
mer CIA Middle Eastern specialist, begins articu-
lating that “the guiding tenet of terrorism is to do a 
lot with a little. From the Assassins in the Middle 
Ages to Osama bin Laden, terrorists have aimed at 
targets that will help magnify their real strength.” 
This editorial, pointing to that component of the 
terrorist method, asks why the Clinton administra-
tion authorized the issuance of State Department 
bulletins warning American citizens of potential 
attacks during the holiday season. Arguing that 
“this was free advertising for anti-American ter-
rorists, feeding perceptions that the Middle East’s 
holy warriors have scared the United States.”50 
Gerecht states that “counterterrorism operations 
in the Central Intelligence Agency – in theory the 
cutting edge of our effort – aren’t in good shape. 
Bloated, intellectually undernourished, and lin-
guistically bereft, the CIA Counterterrorism Cen-
ism Bill, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1995, at A18.
48 F.B.I. Blamed For Lack of Bill on Terrorism, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 5, 1996, at A18.
49 James Risen, U.S. Directs International Drive on 
Bin Laden Networks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1998, at A3.
50 Reuel Marc Gerecht, Alarmism Abets the Terror-
ists, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1999, at A29.
ter generates more heat in Washington than it does 
overseas….The Clinton Administration should 
understand that neither United States citizens nor 
foreign intelligence services are helped by Wash-
ington periodically screaming ‘fire.’”
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sought to 
put things in perspective, observing, “this is a con-
frontation not so much of armies as of values and 
emotions; of reason versus hate; of faith versus 
fear. It is not as much a clash between cultures 
or civilizations; it is a clash between civilization 
itself and anarchy -- between the rule of law and 
no rules at all. In this struggle, our adversaries 
are likely to avoid traditional battlefield situa-
tions because there, American dominance is well 
established. We must be concerned, instead, by 
weapons of mass destruction and by the cowardly 
instruments of sabotage and hidden bombs. These 
unconventional threats endanger not only our 
armed forces, but all Americans and America’s 
friends everywhere. We must understand that this 
confrontation is long term. It doesn’t lend itself 
to quick victories. To prevail we must summon 
our courage, and we must equip ourselves with 
a full range of foreign policy tools. Our armed 
forces must remain the best led, best trained, best 
equipped and most respected in the world.”51
When border police arrested a man last Decem-
ber for smuggling bomb parts from Canada, the 
authorities suspected a plot to turn the millen-
nial New Year celebration into a terrorist fiasco 
and the Customs Bureau immediately reinforced 
security along the border. Amid intense public-
ity, President Clinton asked Congress to increase 
spending by $300 million for efforts to counter in-
ternational and domestic terrorism. A senior Clin-
ton administration official was quoted as saying, 
“In each of the last two years we have made a set 
of concentrated proposals involving counterter-
rorism and threats to critical infrastructure, and 
51 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Re-
marks to the American Legion Convention, New Orleans, 
Louisiana (September 9, 1998). As released by the Office 
of the Spokesman U.S. Department of State.
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Congress has just plain not caught up…In a cou-
ple of cases which we think are really important, 
they really haven’t put their money where their 
mouths are.” The article cites Congress’ failure 
to fund any of the $24 million requested by the 
Clinton administration to expand the number of 
JTTF offices around the country. According to the 
article, “some experts say delays are exacerbated 
because fighting terrorism is assigned to myriad 
federal agencies, whose spending is controlled by 
a variety of committees and laws.”52
Interagency Cooperation Today
Before 9/11, international law enforcement coop-
eration specifically on the issue of terrorism was 
case-by-case. Consider, for instance, that Latvian 
Interior Minister Mareks Seglins, State Police 
chief and Security Police chief held talks in Sep-
tember 2000 with the FBI director, Louis Freeh, in 
Riga where they agreed on additional assistance 
by the FBI in investigating the [two] explosions 
at a supermarket in Riga in mid-August through 
forensic tests and investigation methodologies. 
Reksna said that most of the required forensic 
tests in the Centers department store blast case 
had already been carried out but a great amount 
of materials had to be screened again and again to 
find as much evidence as possible. Director Freeh 
said that crimes such as the department store blasts 
were very difficult to solve in general and the pub-
lic support was vital. Cooperation in dealing with 
the most important problems, like drug trafficking 
and computer crimes, was also discussed at the 
talks with the FBI head, the Latvian State Police 
chief said.53
Since 9/11, a variety of regional and international 
partnerships have emerged centered on improving 
counterterrorism investigations. Old security al-
lies have grown closer, like the U.S., Canada and 
Britain. New security partners have emerged, like 
52 Steven A. Holmes, Antiterrorism Spending Falls 
Short, Administration Says, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2000, at 
18.
53 Tallin Baltic News Service, Sept. 18, 2000.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. With each successful 
venture into international counterrorism investiga-
tions, the precedent and practicality grows stron-
ger and more enduring. Consider the 2002 and 
2004 bombings against popular tourist targets in 
Bali, Indonesia that reinforced the importance for 
countries in that part of the world of developing 
sustainable working relationships with regional 
partners In the past five years, that region has seen 
a strengthened commitment from law enforce-
ment agencies to work collaboratively. 
Joint terrorism investigations have helped in the 
systematic dismantling of the Jemaah Islamiah 
network, with the Indonesian National Police play-
ing an instrumental role in the arrest of hundreds 
of suspected terrorists, including senior JI figures. 
The co-operation between Indonesian and Austra-
lian authorities has also led to advances in foren-
sic and bomb data capabilities that are being used 
to track terrorists and respond to terrorist incidents 
across the world. For example, the disaster victim 
identification protocols formulated during the in-
vestigation into the first Bali bombings have been 
adopted as the international standard. According 
to some reports, the Jakarta Centre for Law En-
forcement is a regional training and educational 
facility that has been operating for three years and 
has educated approximately 2,000 police and se-
curity students from across the region who gain 
skills in how to combat all forms of transnational 
crime and terrorism. 
India has begun cooperating on counterterrorism, 
albeit in a very selective way, with its neighbor 
Pakistan. The Indian National Security Adviser, 
M. K. Narayanan has said that he has “pretty good 
evidence” of the Pakistani ISI’s [Inter-Services In-
telligence’s] involvement in the Mumbai that blasts 
would be shared with Pakistan after “certain legal 
issues” are clarified and hoped this would be done 
before the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries 
meet in New Delhi on this issue. “If the anti-terror-
ism mechanism goes forward and we see there is a 
great deal of cooperation forthcoming from Paki-
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stan and there is a great deal of comfort between 
India and Pakistan, then maybe we could (share 
intelligence),” Narayanan said on the “Devil’s Ad-
vocate” programme on CNN-IBN when asked if 
intelligence would be shared with Pakistan. “That 
(sharing intelligence) is our ultimate hope. But 
that’s at a much later stage,” he added. Narayanan 
said the mechanism would mostly deal with ongo-
ing investigations and sharing of information and 
could look into issues like money laundering. The 
counterterrorism coordination mechanism will be 
headed by a special secretary or additional secre-
tary, which is aimed at putting Pakistan “on the 
spot” and that it will be given a “fair opportunity” 
before India decides whether the mechanism is 
working or not. “If every time we give them infor-
mation, we get a negative answer, then we know 
the mechanism is not working and we have to see 
what to do,” he said.54
Another important joint counterterrorism inves-
tigative effort is that between Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan, who established that relationship by 
investigating the terror attacks in Uzbekistan in 
spring and summer 2007, Kazakh Ambassador 
Tleukhan Kabdrakhmanov told a news confer-
ence in Tashkent. “A joint Uzbek-Kazakh team is 
looking for the masterminds behind the terror at-
tacks in Uzbekistan,” he said. The team was set up 
following a series of attacks in the capital and the 
Tashkent and Bukhara regions in March and April 
of 2007, which resulted in the deaths of 47 people, 
including the 33, and injuring 35. The joint investi-
gative team is also looking for the organizers of the 
Tashkent bombing attacks outside the Prosecutor 
General’s Office and the U.S. and Israeli Embas-
sies on July 30, 2007. The prosecution services, 
the Interior Ministries and special services of the 
two countries are maintaining close cooperation on 
these attacks in particular working in Jambul region 
and moving to the South Kazakhstan region.55
54 New Delhi PTI News Agency in English Oct. 
22, 2006, “India To Share Intelligence With Pak Only at 
a Later Stage;” interview referred to in the report to be 
telecast by CNN-IBN at 1500 GMT Oct. 22, 2006.
55 Moscow Interfax in English 1227 GMT, Aug. 24, 
Spain and France too have made plans to establish 
a joint police teams in order to investigate interna-
tional terrorist networks, the head of Spain’s po-
lice and civil guard, Joan Mesquida, told reporters 
in October 2007. “We want to set up joint inves-
tigation teams aimed at dismantling international 
terrorism networks and their financing,” he told 
a joint news conference with his visiting French 
counterpart Frederic Pechenard.56 “We want to 
move forward with the analysis of the use of the 
Internet as an important tool for proselytizing for 
this type of terrorism,” he added. The teams will 
be modeled on the cooperation that already exist 
between Madrid and Paris in the fight against the 
armed Basque separatist group ETA. Of the 354 
members or supporters of ETA who have been ar-
rested over the past four years, 138 -- nearly 40 
percent -- were detained in France which has tra-
ditionally been used as a rear base by the group, 
said Mesquida.57 
Perhaps more than any other country, however, 
the United States has made interagency coordi-
nation and joint investigations a priority since al-
Qa`ida’s attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent 9/11 
Commission Report recommending a number of 
steps to increase integration within the American 
counterterrorism community. Since the establishe-
ment of the agency now charged with the mandate 
of fostering interagency coordination, sharing and 
integration, the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) has made important strides.
Questions of When to Move
At some point during the course of an investiga-
tion law enforcement needs to make the decision 
to intervene in order to thwart an impending disas-
ter. Investigators must decide between their ability 
to acquire enough evidence to ensure successful 
prosecution and prevention of a cell from going 
2004.
56 Oct. 16, 2007, “French Police To Set Up Joint Ter-
rorism Investigation Teams” -- AFP headline. 
57 Ibid.
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operational. Premature interdiction can mean that 
prosecutions are protracted or failed because they 
are forced to rely more on circumstantial evi-
dence. 
Police in Victoria and New South Wales, Australia, 
for instance had recently identified and wrapped up 
a cell for stockpiling explosive chemicals and that 
authorities under the logic that they were preempt-
ing what they believed to be an imminent attack, 
although they said they were unaware of the exact 
target. At 0230 the morning of the police raids, 
hundreds of security officers descended on Syd-
ney and Melbourne. Supported by heavily armed 
counter-terrorism units, and with helicopters hov-
ering overhead, hundreds of officers searched 
15 properties in New South Wales. Police Com-
missioner Ken Moroney announced that in New 
South Wales, six persons, five of them Australian, 
were arrested in the raids after a sixteen-month 
counterterrorism investigation. Named Operation 
Pandanus, the investigation followed the suspects’ 
movements and established the links between 
Sydney and Melbourne. At some point, however, 
investigators determined that they could no lon-
ger wait and had to interdict in order to prevent a 
terrorist act from occurring. This decision would 
lead to significant debate between senior law en-
forcement officials who argued “the intelligence 
that we’ve been receiving has been consistent 
back over the last couple of years,” and senior po-
litical officials, including the Prime Minister, who 
pointed to specific and new intelligence that led 
them to issue the order to wrap up the cell.58 The 
ongoing tension between law enforcement and ci-
vilian policymakers regarding the timing of mov-
ing from the investigation phase to the arrest and 
prosecution phase occurs in nearly every single 
case. 
In a more well-known instance of this debate play-
ing out publicly, British intelligence services were 
58 Melbourne Radio (Australia), Nov. 08, 2005, 
Excerpt from ABC Radio National’s “The World Today” 
programme.
widely criticized for failing to monitor and disrupt 
planning for the July 2005, transit bombings in 
London. The Intelligence and Security Committee 
of Parliament - in the most authoritative report on 
British intelligence weaknesses - argued that the 
British agencies should have paid greater atten-
tion to the threat from homegrown terrorism and 
should have posted a more watchful eye on the 
movements of terrorist suspects between Britain 
and Pakistan. 
Two years later, another debate would ensue, this 
time whether British and American investigators 
jumped too quickly on a cell that was not neces-
sarily in the final stages of operationalizing their 
plot to destroy a dozen trans-Atlantic airliners us-
ing liquid explosives. In this case, Rashid Rauf, a 
lead suspect, was being watched by international 
security agencies after the British government re-
ceived a tip that he was in Pakistan: “He has been 
staying here for quite some time and has been 
under strict surveillance since then,” a Pakistani 
intelligence source said. “His calls to Britain and 
internet communications have been under surveil-
lance that helped in revealing the plot.” Britain’s 
intelligence services had been watching some of 
the suspects since the informant tipped them off 
in December 2005. Following Rauf’s arrest, one 
of his associates is understood to have phoned the 
UK urging those alleged to have been involved in 
the plot to speed up their plans. The call was in-
tercepted by British intelligence and triggered the 
decision to arrest the suspects. It was this deci-
sion, however, within the course of the investiga-
tion that has opened significant debate. A careful 
reading of open source reporting seems to sug-
gest that the United States government pushed the 
British government to arrest Rashid Rauf before 
they were prepared to, even possibly threatening 
to “render” him or pressure the Pakistani govern-
ment to arrest him. According to some reports, 
British security was concerned that Rauf be taken 
into custody “in circumstances where there was 
due process,” according to one official, so that he 
could be tried in British courts. 
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The American government would then, according 
to some reports, pressure the British government to 
move on arresting the entire cell shortly thereafter, 
again earlier than the British government was pre-
pared. British officials knowledgeable about the 
case said British police were planning to continue 
to run surveillance for at least another week to try 
to obtain more evidence, while American officials 
pressured them to arrest the suspects sooner. The 
officials spoke on condition of anonymity due to 
the sensitivity of the case. In contrast to previous 
reports, one senior British official suggested an at-
tack was not imminent, saying the suspects had 
not yet purchased any airline tickets. In fact, ac-
cording to some officials, several members of the 
attack team had not yet obtained passports.59
On June 2, 2006, a Canadian police tactical unit 
burst into the family’s Mississauga home with 
weapons drawn, a scene repeated around the To-
ronto area that day when over 500 law enforcement 
and security personnel broke-up a suspected ter-
rorist building and Toronto offices of the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service. Charges against the 
group include participating in or contributing to 
the activity of a terrorist group, including training 
and recruitment; providing or making available 
property for cell that they had been investigating 
for several years. Thirteen men and four youths 
were arrested in this massive police sweep against 
men alleged to be part of an Al-Qa’ida-inspired 
cell plotting to bomb several targets such as the 
Toronto Stock Exchange terrorist purposes; and 
the commission of indictable offences, including 
firearms and explosives offenses, for the benefit 
of or in association with a terrorist group. Ac-
cording to the Crown’s synopsis, which was made 
public by a defense lawyer, the alleged terror plot 
was dubbed Operation Badr. 
It included storming the Parliament Buildings and 
beheading politicians until their demands were 
met that Canada pull out of Afghanistan and re-
59 U.S., U.K. at odds over timing of arrests, By Aram 
Roston, Lisa Myers, and the NBC News Investigative Unit.
lease Muslim prisoners from Canadian jails. By 
mid-March 2006, the group had reportedly split 
after Ahmad and Amara disagreed on tactics - 
the former is alleged to have preferred the idea 
of shooting sprees, whereas the latter wanted to 
conduct truck bombings. Plans were underway by 
the spring to procure ammonium nitrate, a fertil-
izer that can be used to make bombs, according to 
the synopsis. The Canadian decision to interrupt 
the cell at that time was justified as a result of two 
major themes: investigators believed that they had 
enough evidence to support a successful prosecu-
tion and that they could no longer afford to follow 
the cell’s plotting without threatening the security 
of Canada. 
New Trends: Intelligence-Driven
Investigations
Counterterrorism operations depend for their ef-
fectiveness on local communities that must share 
repugnance over terrorist ideology and methods, 
and be willing to trust and work with the authori-
ties. It can be a tall order, especially for Mus-
lim communities that feel unfairly targeted and 
blamed. A working relationship between commu-
nities that might harbor jihadists, local police, and 
intelligence agencies becomes especially impor-
tant in cases of homegrown terrorism. MI5 and 
the British police have been involved in a lengthy 
surveillance of some of the suspects, dating back 
months. Security officials sprung their trap when 
they obtained evidence that planning for the air-
line bombings was moving forward, and that there 
was a threat the alleged plot might be exposed in 
public, driving the perpetrators underground and 
out of reach. 
A publication ban prohibits reporting any of the 
court evidence and is a common tool used in the 
United Kingdom to mitigate the bias of a prospec-
tive jury pool. In this case, before the ban was es-
tablished, significant levels of information were 
publicly released. It is alleged, for instance, that 
in 2004 Canada’s spy service, CSIS, began moni-
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toring radical Internet websites and their users, 
focusing in on one group espousing anti-Western 
views in particular. Two men in particular piqued 
their interest: Fahim Ahmad, 22, and his friend 
Zakaria Amara, 21. By late 2005, the RCMP had 
launched its own investigation. Mubin Shaikh, a 
well-known member of Toronto’s Muslim com-
munity, has gone public with his role as a police 
agent who infiltrated the alleged cell. Shaikh, who 
is expected to be a key witness for the prosecution, 
has admitted that in December 2005 he helped lead 
what police allege was a “training camp,” where 
men reportedly played paintball games, trained 
for an attack and made a jihadist video imitating 
warfare. A second police agent, whose identity 
has never been made public, reportedly acted as 
the supplier. On June 2, the RCMP’s anti-terror-
ism task force deployed officers on two fronts: a 
major undercover operation to deliver three tons 
of ammonium nitrate and a massive police raid 
that netted the 17 arrests. 
This investigation represents a textbook example 
of how to conduct intelligence-led policing, or 
letting the case lead investigators to unravel and 
take-down the entire network by relying more on 
community based knowledge, including infor-
mants, by patiently running all leads to ground 
and trying to bring down the entire network, not 
simply the foot-soldiers or the dons. It shows how 
interagency collaboration and coordination can 
yield incredible results and is a case-study for law 
enforcement to transcend the ‘one agent-one case’ 
approach. 
Handling Too Much Information
Counterterrorism investigators are often required 
to analyze vast amounts of data within short time 
frames. Intuitively, the more information one has 
at one’s disposal, the better outcome one might 
imagine would result: knowledge is power after 
all. At the same time, however, the reality is that 
most law enforcement agencies are understaffed, 
under-funded, lack the necessary tools for con-
ducting automated data exploitation and the deep 
substantive expertise in-house to allow them the 
ability to quickly scan, filter and use that informa-
tion to benefit that investigation. There are, there-
fore, two challenges for investigators: acquiring 
as much relevant information as possible and find-
ing the necessary resources to analyze and use that 
information in a way that supports ongoing inves-
tigations. 
On the side of collecting information, the Austra-
lian counterterrorism community has handled this 
challenge by establishing a national security tele-
phone hotline. The hotline has proven a valuable 
tool for connecting and investing the national pub-
lic into their attempt to identify and pursue leads 
related to terrorist threats. The hotline receives 
about 1000 calls a month and every call does re-
quire some level of follow-up by investigators, 
which invariably consumes resources and man-
power. The Australian government has decided, 
however, that the benefits wrought by such an ini-
tiative outweigh the bureaucratic costs. Govern-
ment officials do acknowledge though, that only 
some of those calls have led to active investiga-
tions. 
Other communities have sought to establish simi-
larly minded programs like New York City’s “If 
you see something, say something,” program. 
Building on the success of its widely recognized 
“See Something, Say Something” security aware-
ness advertising campaign, the MTA has unveiled 
a new series of posters that reinforce the effort to 
enlist customers to join the police and MTA em-
ployees as the eyes and ears of the system. The 
new in-system posters present photographs that 
show bags left in various transit locations on sub-
ways, trains, buses, and platforms and add a new 
element: Be Suspicious of Anything Unattended. 
Their goal is to raise customer awareness of the 
types of potential threats and to report such items 
to an MTA employee, a police officer, or the anti-
terrorism hotline, 888-NYC-SAFE. The posters 
draw on the lessons transportation officials have 
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learned in the past two years, especially from 
meetings with transportation officials from Ma-
drid after the March 11 railroad bombings, said 
MTA Executive Director Katherine N. Lapp. Ac-
cording to William A. Morange, the MTA’s direc-
tor of security, officials in Madrid said that sev-
eral passengers interviewed after the bombings 
remembered seeing the unattended knapsacks that 
turned out to contain the bombs, but did not alert 
anyone. The posters feature a bright yellow-or-
ange background. 
The MTA expects that the new campaign will lead 
to many reports that prove harmless—a result it 
is willing to live with—and are working to find 
ways, especially in the subway system, to mini-
mize the schedule delays they cause when police 
officers and bomb-sniffing dogs are called in to 
investigate. Since March, the MTA has received 
many more calls, and its bomb-sniffing K-9 units, 
which respond to calls of suspicious packages in 
Metro-North Railroad and Long Island Rail Road 
stations, Grand Central Terminal, and Penn Sta-
tion, have been increasingly busy. They responded 
to 71 calls in January, 104 in March, and 124 in 
April. 
Sometimes, the vast amount of information com-
bined with the need for one agency to deliver in-
formation to another agency can lead to mistakes. 
During the 2007 Glasgow airport attack, Austra-
lian investigators sought to aid their British col-
leagues. “The organisation and the investigation 
team in particular has worked to a deadline to 
achieve those ends, and at the same time meeting 
some of the obligations that we have at an interna-
tional level to provide some answers back to the 
UK,” he said. Australian investigators also pointed 
that they had a very basic problem in communi-
cating what relevant information that they did find 
given the massive time difference between them 
and the United Kingdom, making it nearly impos-
sible to carry-on extended conversations during 
normal business hours. 
The fact is, however, that when the British gov-
ernment acknowledges publicly that, “up to two 
dozen” counterterrorism investigations are op-
erating across the country at any given time, the 
ability to concentrate limited resources and make 
clear distinctions between the prioritization of 
investigations, the differences and relationships 
among domestic terrorism cells, and the tracking 
of financing streams from source to cell becomes 
a very complicated business. “Despite the appar-
ent breakthrough, it would be wrong to assume 
that in the case of groups like Al-Qa’ida it is a 
question of just one throw of the dice,” one source 
said. “There are a series of interlocking cells. Cells 
overlap... certainly in this case, we can’t be certain 
that everything has been disrupted.” 
Public Investigative Mistakes
Because of the highly public nature of counter-
terrorism investigations that occur in the immedi-
ate aftermath of an attack, investigative missteps 
often become front-page news stories. Consider 
the incident occurring after the May 11, 2004 al-
Qa`ida styled synchronized bombing train bomb-
ings in Madrid, Spain in which 191 were killed 
were wounded as a result. Investigators, desperate 
for leads, found what they believed to be a finger-
print from a suspect named Brandon Mayfield, an 
American convert to Islam practicing law in the 
United States. The FBI assisted Spanish police by 
comparing latent fingerprints found nearby on a 
bag of detonators against its massive fingerprint 
database, which includes prints from former U.S. 
soldiers. Mayfield served in the U.S. Army. 
Two FBI examiners and a unit chief eventually 
narrowed the fingerprint match to Mayfield. Span-
ish police conducted their own analysis and con-
cluded that the print was not Mayfield’s. The FBI 
disputed that finding, dispatching an examiner to 
Madrid to press its case. Mayfield was arrested 
three weeks later amid media leaks about the on-
going investigation. The case has become a potent 
symbol for civil liberties advocates who argue that 
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it shows how easily the government can abuse its 
powers to detain alleged terrorism suspects under 
relaxed standards of probable cause. 
Justice Department spokeswoman, Tasia Scoli-
nos, issued a statement emphasizing that the FBI 
was not aware of Mayfield’s Muslim faith when 
he was first identified as a suspect and that in-
vestigators “did not misuse any provisions of the 
USA Patriot Act.” Scolinos also said the FBI has 
implemented reforms to avoid a similar mistake 
in the future. A report released in March by Jus-
tice Department Inspector General, Glenn A. Fine, 
found that although Mayfield’s religion was not a 
factor in his initial identification, it contributed to 
the FBI’s reluctance to reexamine its conclusions 
after challenges from Spanish police. Fine also 
found that the FBI used expanded powers under 
the Patriot Act to demand personal information 
about Mayfield from banks and other companies, 
and that the law “amplified the consequences” of 
the FBI’s mistakes by allowing other government 
agencies to share flawed information. The U.S. 
government did agree to pay $2 million in order 
to settle the lawsuit. Under the terms of the settle-
ment filed in U.S. District Court in Portland, the 
government also issued an apology to Mayfield 
for the “suffering” caused by his wrongful arrest 
and imprisonment. It acknowledged that the or-
deal was “deeply upsetting” to Mayfield and his 
family.60
Recently, Australian counterterrorism investiga-
tors made a similarly public misstep in accusing 
Dr. Mohamed Haneef with having provided sup-
port to a terrorist organisation plotting attacks in 
Britain by giving his mobile phone SIM card to a 
relative later linked to the failed plan to bomb cen-
tral London and Glasgow airport. The Australiian 
commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) ended up dropping the terror charge in the 
Brisbane Magistrates Court against Haneef after a 
60 Dan Eggen, U.S. Settles Suit Filed by Ore. Law-
yer, $2 Million Will Be Paid For Wrongful Arrest After 
Madrid Attack, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 2006, at A03.
review of the investigation, on the basis that Ha-
neef’s arrest was a mistake. 
It was revealed during the course of the review 
that Haneef’s SIM card was not found at the scene 
of the Glasgow attack, as Commonwealth prose-
cutors had alleged at Haneef’s bail hearing, but in 
Liverpool. “I’ve never seen such an incompetent 
explanation of what’s going on from the Federal 
Government,” Haneef’s defense attorney said to 
the press.61 The Australian DPP responded in an 
attempt to defend the process, saying, “The police 
investigation has been thorough, I make no apol-
ogy for that, nor should I in a terrorism investiga-
tion in this country.” We have done our job well 
in this instance, we have done our job profession-
ally.” 
In another Canadian counterterrorism case, the 
name of a possible “peripheral witness” in an 
anti-terrorism investigation of two other men was 
given to U.S. authorities by the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, a key counterterrorism investi-
gative arm of the Canadian government. The U.S. 
entered the name on its “Visa Viper” flight watch 
list for possible terrorism suspects, which itself 
has been plagued with problems, not the least be-
ing the mistaken entry of the name of U.S. Senator 
Edward Kennedy as an individual banned from air 
travel as a security risk. When this individual tried 
to fly to the United States and was denied, the case 
became a public headache to the Canadian gov-
ernment, who had to then determine whether he 
should have been on the blacklist or not. 
In an effort to avoid these mistakes, Transport 
Canada has been trying to create a domestically 
produced no-fly list that is as error-free as pos-
sible. “We want to get it right the first time,” said 
Vanessa Vermette, a spokeswoman for Transport 
Canada. Transport Canada has yet to publish final 
regulations for this list, however, leaving commer-
cial air carriers to sort through the mess of foreign 
61 Cosima Marriner & Sarah Smiles, “Haneef ‘not a 
significant focus’ of UK inquiry,” The Age, July 23, 2007.
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databases, partial and problematically constructed 
watch lists and the best instincts of employees 
when deciding to deny someone a boarding pass 
as a security risk. The challenge to the creation of 
this list is that passengers may be blacklisted as 
a security risk even if the supporting intelligence 
does not meet the evidentiary threshold that would 
allow authorities to issue an arrest warrant. In an 
effort to deal with this impending problem, Trans-
port Canada officials say they plan to incorporate 
an appeals process so that passengers blacklisted 
by mistake can get their names removed from the 
list.62
Special Circumstances
Sometimes agencies involved in counterterrorism 
investigations encounter new and unforeseen cir-
cumstances. The Dutch General Intelligence and 
Security Service (AIVD) had not been actively 
monitoring what its translators did with the ma-
terial on which they were working. Supervisors 
left it up to the translators themselves to decide 
which tapped conversations should be kept and 
which could be discarded on a daily basis. One 
former AIVD translator, Outman Ben A., has been 
accused by the AIVED of leaking state secrets to 
radical Muslims. Ben A., a Nijmegen resident of 
Moroccan origin, was arrested on 30 September 
2004 on suspicion of violating state secrecy and 
leaking information to individuals suspected of 
terrorism. Ben A. was involved in a high-profile 
counterterrorism investigation, likely that of the 
Hofstad network during which time he allegedly 
leaked highly confidential information to this net-
work in Amsterdam. On 25 September 2003, the 
AIVD received information to the effect that a per-
son from an Islamist terrorist network had AIVD 
information. The next day, police raided the home 
of Hassan O. in Utrecht, and found two A4 sheets 
containing secret AIVD information. “Mush-
abarad,” the Arabic term for “secret service,” was 
62 Jeff Sallot & Colin Freeze, Four Years Later, No-
Fly List Remains Grounded; Air Carriers Left With Only a 
Hodgepodge of Databases, Partial Watch Lists, Instincts, 
The Globe and Mail, July 06, 2006.
written on one of the letters found. After Ben A.’s 
arrest, the AIVD sought to publicly minimize the 
damage that this translator had caused to the in-
vestigation but more information is presumed to 
have been leaked to the terrorist cell.63 
In other cases, no centralized investigative effort 
exists until it is started in the form of a special 
task force. Consider the aftermath of the Mum-
bai train bombings that killed 11 and injured more 
than 70 others. Maharashtra Chief Minister, Su-
shil Kumar Shinde, came out immediately after 
the attack arguing that it was unreasonable to ex-
pect the intelligence agencies to have averted the 
blast. Because they were working with very little 
background knowledge on the cell that perpetrat-
ed the attack, the state government had to set up a 
special terrorism investigation cell from scratch. 
After facing extensive criticism, the state govern-
ment sought to publicly respond, both in the form 
of prevention and investigation: they increased the 
number of nakabandis [checkpoints] and began 
investigating specific leads into the case. The state 
had received intelligence reports, for instance, of 
possible strikes on August 15, January 26 and De-
cember 1.64
Future Challenges for Counterterrorism In-
vestigations 
Thirteen Moroccans standing trial in Brussels in 
2007 posed a major test for the new antiterror-
ism act and the investigation methods used by the 
Belgian police and State Security Service. The 
investigation, according to a recent report, began 
in 2002 when police in Maaseik, a municipality 
in the Limburg province of Belgium, received an 
anonymous phone call from someone about three 
non-native Limburgers: Abdallah Ouabour, Kha-
lid Bouloudo, and Lahoucine al-Haski. The three, 
the caller reported, had recently made a trip to the 
63 Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad, “Poor Monitoring 
of AIVD Translators,” Jan. 08, 2005.
64 The Asian Age correspondent, Mumbai bomb was 
very sophisticated, New Delhi, The Asian Age, Mar. 15, 
2003.
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Middle East and they had gone from well-inte-
grated citizens to outwardly devout Muslims with 
long beards and conservative dress. Such tips had 
become increasingly common, both in Belgium 
as well as throughout Europe as citizens became 
more focused on sudden behavioral changes of 
Muslims.65
The Maaseik police, however, did communicate 
the tip the Belgian State Security Service, prompt-
ing the creation of, “Operation Asparagus,” the 
first mention of which occurred on Christmas Eve 
in 2002, when the Belgian Security Service bugged 
the telephones of a snack bar and two cyber cafés, 
shadowed and photographed suspects and con-
ducted covert searches of their homes. The service 
also gathered information with foreign secret ser-
vices and Interpol, the international information 
service of the police. About six months later, the 
Moroccan secret service called the Brussels-based 
office of the State Security Service with the mes-
sage: “During an interrogation with Nouredine 
Nafia, a Moroccan citizen and the cofounder and 
one of the leaders of the GICM who has already 
been sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, he re-
vealed the names of the members of the Belgian 
GICM branch.” 
GICM, or the Moroccan Islamic Combatant 
Group, is a radical Islamic movement which came 
into being in the wake of the Afghan Mujahidin 
resistance movement against Soviet troops. The 
suspect also told his interrogators that the move-
ment has dormant cells in the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Spain, France, 
and Belgium. Brussels immediately requested all 
available information on the names given to them, 
and, according to the report, Belgian investiga-
tors went to Paris and Casablanca themselves to 
begin acquiring more information. Wherever the 
police put suspected GICM members behind bars, 
Belgian investigators turned up with photographic 
records and reports of the Belgian Security Ser-
65 Frank Demets, Fundamentalist or Terrorist? Brus-
sels Knack, Nov. 16, 2005. 
vice. In a prison in Paris, six GICM members con-
firmed Nafia’s statements to Belgian investiga-
tors, who, although had never heard of the names 
of the Belgian suspects, did recognize their faces 
in pictures. 
Since March 2004, right after the Madrid attacks, 
some of the suspects were being kept in pretrial 
custody in the jails of Vorst and Sint-Gillis. Three 
other suspects would be arrested in September 
2004. The 13 GICM members who are now stand-
ing trial in Brussels have been charged of several 
criminal offenses, including recruiting terrorists, 
criminal association with a view to perpetrating 
attacks, raising funds for terrorist attacks, and 
forging passports and other documents (for some 
suspects, this is the only charge). For most of the 
cell, however, the public release of details in their 
cases reveals only one corroborated link between 
all 13 of them. The media has pounced on this 
seeming lack of clear evidence among the sus-
pects. 
In other cases, the link between cell members, 
however, was much more overt and concerning: 
they exchanged phone numbers and stored them 
-- some of them in coded format -- in the address 
books of their mobile phones. On some occa-
sions, two suspects were involved in the same 
penal offense: Mourad Chabarou, a friend of the 
two Madrid suspects, was allegedly implicated in 
an armed robbery; Rachid Iba lent his passport to 
smuggle Lahoucine al-Haski into Belgium; Kha-
lid Bouloudo was reportedly even photographed 
in Usama Bin Ladin’s company. When the house 
of Mostafa Lounani was searched, the authori-
ties found some diagrams of metal detectors and 
a hastily drawn schematic of a detonation device 
for a mobile-phone-controlled bomb. The ques-
tion is whether these charges will suffice to put 
the 13 suspects in jail for 15 to 20 years. One of 
the defense attorneys publicly argued that “despite 
all phone taps, observations, and special investi-
gation methods, the 28,000-page dossier does not 
substantiate a single hard fact.” He said, “They 
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have no confessions, no concrete plans of attacks; 
they even do not have any recordings of conver-
sations in which the suspects discuss the Madrid 
or Casablanca attacks. If the legal authorities in 
Northern Ireland used the same rigid rules as the 
Belgians do, 50 percent of the Belfast population 
would be in jail. Since January 2004, however, 
when the Belgians established their new antiter-
rorism act, the legal definition of terrorism is no 
longer limited to plotting or perpetrating attacks. 
At the trials of Nizar Trabelsi and Tarek Maaroufi, 
both of whom were convicted by a Belgian judge, 
the legal authorities still had to prove the exis-
tence of such plans. At present, however, one can 
be brought before a criminal court simply for hav-
ing maintained contacts with terrorists -- although 
the Council of State in its evaluation of the bill 
strongly recommended using the “most restrictive 
interpretation of terrorism.” As news reporting 
has identified, the GICM trial will therefore be a 
serious test for the new antiterrorism act and lead 
to a heated discussion on the means and purpose 
of the investigation. 
Conclusion
The United States government, as do other gov-
ernments, faces innumerous challenges in its 
ongoing effort to improve America’s ability to 
conduct counterterrorism investigations. Some 
of these challenges center around collecting and 
handling information, including, recognizing and 
designating “terrorism” information as such; pro-
tecting operationally sensitive information while 
making it as widely available as necessary and 
ensuring that constitutional rights of individuals 
are not violated through information sharing prac-
tices. Other challenges revolve around the organi-
zational and bureaucratic reality of investigating 
terrorist plots, including, clarifying roles, respon-
sibilities, and information needs of the members 
of the counterterrorism community; developing a 
considered approach to information sharing across 
Federal, state, and local levels in ever increasing 
numbers of networks and databases emerge. Fi-
nally, there are the basic challenges of investigat-
ing highly complex, opaque and fluid organiza-
tions underwritten by an ideology that is poorly 
understood in this country. 
Those involved in counterterrorism investigations 
must therefore be innovative, flexible, aggressive 
and persistent in doing their jobs. Bureaucratic 
structures do not typically evolve to meet current 
threats until the threats have themselves already 
morphed again. It is therefore imperative that law 
enforcement, homeland security, first responder and 
intelligence professionals gain the necessary con-
cepts and insights about this enemy that they need 
to act dynamically in a dimly lit environment. 
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International Approach
Synopsis
.1	Freedom of Information in the State of Israel: Legislation, Assimi-
lation and Case Law	by	Institute	of	Terrorism	Research	and	Response
.2	The French Approach to Open Government in Light of Security 
Threats Post September 11, 2001	by	Vanessa	Brochot
7.1 Freedom of Information in the State of 
Israel Legislation, Assimilation and Case 
Law
by Nissan Ratzlav-Katz and Ranan Tal
Introduction
This paper sets forth an overview of Freedom of 
Information (FOI) legislation and related major 
case law of the State of Israel, as well legislative 
or judicial exemptions and exceptions to those 
laws as of May 2007. In addition, the paper will 
provide a general overview of public and profes-
sional perceptions of Israeli FOI legislation, and 
the level of assimilation of those laws. 
Part I of this paper opens with a description of the 
main provisions of Israel’s Freedom of Informa-
tion Law, 5758-1998, the FOI Law’s statutory ex-
ceptions, exemptions and limitations, as well as its 
subsidiary legislation. In addition, Part I presents 
a brief overview of certain laws that include pro-
visions relevant to FOI. 
Furthermore, in order to present Israeli freedom 
of information legislation and exceptions in a 
manner most coherent with the “State Open Gov-
ernment Law and Practice in a Post-9/11 World” 
document supplied by the Center for Terrorism 
Law at St. Mary’s School of Law, Part I includes 
a thematic subdivision of the FOI exceptions into 
the categories delineated in the aforementioned 
document: critical infrastructure; cyber security; 
first response; political structure; public health; 
and terror investigations. 
Following the legislative overview, Part II of this 
paper presents major case law surrounding the 
issue of freedom of information in Israel. Part II 
will summarize major relevant cases preceding 
passage of the FOI Law that contributed to its 
legislation. Part II will also present an overview 
of security-related case law from the period after 
passage of the Freedom of Information Law. 
Part III addresses public and professional percep-
tions and assessments of FOI legislation, as well 
as the level of assimilation of the FOI provisions 
on the part of state authorities and public bodies. 
Part IV notes the changes, if any, in Israeli FOI 
legislation and practice as a result of the 9/11 at-
tacks in New York and Washington in 2001 and 
their aftermath. 
Part I - Public Information Legislation,
Exemptions and Exceptions 
The primary legislation governing the right of the 
public to access information collected and held by 
public bodies in the State of Israel is the Freedom 
of Information Law, 5758-19981, which declares 
1 http://www.police.gov.il/english/Information_Ser-
vices/Law/xx_5759_1998.asp, last viewed June 29, 2007. 
Note that the translation of the provisions of the Freedom 
of Information Law used in this paper is, to a large extent, 
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in Section 1: “Every Israeli citizen and resident 
has the right to obtain information from a pub-
lic authority, according to the stipulations of this 
law.” The law went into effect as of May 1999. 
A “public authority” for the purposes of the FOI 
Law (as per Section 2) is any governing or leg-
islative body, municipal or national, any court or 
other judicial authority established by legislation, 
any company owned or operated by the national 
or municipal government, and “[any] other agency 
fulfilling a public function, which is a controlled 
agency... as determined by the Minister of Jus-
tice, with the approval of the Knesset Constitu-
tion, Law, and Justice Committee; such a ruling 
may apply either to all the activities of the agency, 
or only to certain activities.” “Information” is de-
fined by Section 2 of the FOI Law as, “Any in-
formation in the possession of a public authority, 
whether written, recorded, filmed, photographed, 
or computerized.”
Section 12 of the FOI Law sets forth the restricted 
right to public information ascribed to a non-resi-
dent, non-citizen of Israel. The law will apply to 
such an individual only “regarding information 
concerning his rights in Israel.”
The FOI Law mandates the designation of an em-
ployee in each public authority who will be re-
sponsible for implementation of the provisions of 
the law (Section 3). The public authorities are also 
required, under Section 5 of the FOI Law, to pub-
lish an annual report on their activities and func-
tions. 
A request for information under the FOI Law is 
to be submitted in writing to the designated em-
ployee in the public authority from which the pe-
original to ITRR and Nissan Ratzlav-Katz or modified 
from the foregoing English text on the Israeli police web 
site. The web reference is provided herein for reader con-
venience. An online Hebrew version of the FOI Law can be 
found on the Knesset web site, at http://www.knesset.gov.
il/laws/special/heb/freedom_info.htm (last viewed June 29, 
2007). 
titioner is seeking information (Section 7(a)). The 
petitioner’s request must be answered within 30 
days, although this period can be extended for a 
maximum of an additional 30 days (Section 7(b)). 
Section 7(a) of the FOI Law stipulates explicitly 
that the petitioner “shall not be required to state 
the reason for his request.” 
In the event of a request for information about a 
third party or that is liable to harm the interests 
of a third party, the public authority must inform 
said third party of the request (Section 13(a)). The 
third party then has 21 days to file his objections to 
release of the information. Third party objections 
may be “pursuant to the stipulations of any law” 
(Section 13(a)) and may result in a full or partial 
rejection of the petitioner’s information request. 
In the event of a rejected request for information 
or a rejected third party objection, there is no stat-
utory process to challenge the decision within the 
public authority, but the petitioner or the affected 
third party is entitled to appeal the decision to an 
Administrative Court within 30 days of the rejec-
tion (Section 17 (a)). The court has the discretion 
to order release of all or part of the information 
requested by the appellant (Section 17(d)). 
Exemptions, Exceptions and Limitations
Several partial, conditional or absolute statutory 
limitations on the right to obtain information from 
government agencies are delineated in three sepa-
rate sections of the FOI Law. 
Section 8 entitles a public authority to reject a re-
quest for information in the event that there exists 
a technical difficulty of some kind in obtaining 
the information, or that to do so would require “an 
unreasonable allocation of resources,” or that the 
information can be obtained through another ac-
cessible source. 
Section 9 defines “information that must not be 
provided, or that there is no obligation to pro-
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vide.” 9(a) lists the types of information that may 
not be released to the public. This includes infor-
mation that may harm national or individual se-
curity or safety, national foreign relations, or an 
individual’s privacy, as well as any information 
otherwise statutorily forbidden from publication. 
In addition, Section 9(a)(2) prohibits the publica-
tion of “information on matters regarding which 
the Minister of Defense, for reasons of preserving 
state security, has specified in an order, with the 
approval of the Joint Committee2.” 
As distinct from information that may not be re-
leased, Section 9(b) lists categories of informa-
tion that “a public authority is not obliged to pro-
vide....” This includes any information: 
the revelation of which may “disrupt the 
proper functioning of the public author-
ity;”
regarding public policy still in formation; 
“regarding negotiations with a concern or 
person outside the public authority;” 
regarding internal discussions of the au-
thority, including “recommendations given 
for purposes of decision-making, except 
for consultations established by law;” 
“concerning internal management of the 
public authority, which does not concern 
the public, and is not of importance to it;” 
“to which commercial or professional 
confidentiality applies.... [or] concerning 
2 A joint committee of the Knesset Constitution, 
Law and Justice Committee and the Knesset Foreign Af-
fairs and Defense Committee (the “Joint Committee”). Ac-
cording to Section 15 of the FOI Law, “(a) Meetings of the 
Joint Committee shall be classified, unless decided other-
wise; (b) The Joint Committee is entitled to determine that 
an order approved by it under Sections 9 or 14 shall not be 
published in the Official Gazette of the Israeli government, 
either all or in part.”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
commercial or professional matters linked 
with a person’s business, the disclosure of 
which is liable to cause real harm to his 
professional, commercial, or economic 
interests, except for information that is 
(a) information about materials emitted, 
spilled, removed, or discharged into the 
environment, or (b) results of noise, odor, 
or radioactive measurements not conduct-
ed on private property;”
“obtained by the public authority on con-
dition of confidentiality, or that the disclo-
sure of which is liable to jeopardize the 
obtaining of further information;” 
“concerning the work methods and pro-
cedures of a public authority engaged in 
enforcing the law, or which has legal au-
thority to investigate, supervise, or clarify 
complaints, if disclosure of the informa-
tion is liable to (a) harm action to enforce, 
supervise, or clarify complaints made to 
the authority, or (b) harm investigative or 
legal processes, or the right of a person to 
a fair trial, or (c) cause the disclosure, or 
possibly lead to the disclosure, of the exis-
tence or identity of a confidential informa-
tion source;” 
“concerning the disciplinary affairs of a 
public authority employee....;” or
“the disclosure of which will affect the pri-
vacy of a deceased person.”
Most court appeals filed pursuant to the FOI Law 
have followed such 9(b) rejections of information 
requests. 
Section 10 guides the public authority in issuing a 
rejection of a request for information: “In consid-
ering a refusal to provide information under this 
law, based on the provisions of Section 8 and 9, 
the public authority will take into account, among 
7.
8.
9.
10.
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other things, the interest of the applicant in the in-
formation, if cited in the request, and the public 
interest in the disclosure of the information, for 
reasons of maintaining public health, security, or 
the environment.” Pursuant to Section 11, a public 
authority may also disclose partial information, 
rather than issuing a blanket rejection, identifying 
the information as such (unless doing so will harm 
the state or any person under Section 9(a)(1)). 
Section 14 lists those state agencies and authori-
ties that are exempt from the FOI Law, and to 
which, therefore, the provisions of the FOI Law 
shall not apply. They are (subsection 14(a)(1) 
through (11)): 
“intelligence agencies of the Israel De-
fense Forces, and other military units that 
the Minister of Defense, with the approval 
of the Joint Committee, has listed in an or-
der, for reasons of state security;”
“the General Security Services (GSS) and 
security units in public authorities, in mat-
ters directed by the GSS or on its behalf;” 
the Institute for Intelligence and Special 
Tasks (known colloquially and interna-
tionally as “the Mossad”); 
the Ministry of Defense’s Security Unit; 
“units in the Prime Minister’s Office and 
the Ministry of Defense dealing primarily 
with state security or foreign relations,” as 
determined by specific order; 
“the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, 
and the nuclear research centers for which 
it is responsible;” 
“the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Center for 
Political Research, disarmament affairs di-
vision, policy planning division, and other 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs divisions that 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the 
approval of the Joint Committee, has listed 
in an order, for reasons involving state se-
curity or foreign relations;” 
“any agency or authority with legally del-
egated investigative authority, regarding 
information collected or accumulated for 
investigative purposes, and regarding in-
telligence information;” 
“the Israel Police intelligence and inves-
tigative apparatuses, and additional units 
that the Minister of Internal Security, with 
the approval of the Joint Committee, has 
listed in an order;”
“the Israel Prison Service – regarding its 
intelligence and security apparatuses;” 
and 
“any quasi-judicial authority whose func-
tion is to discuss the medical situation of a 
person – regarding its internal processes.”
In addition, subsection (d) exempts from the pro-
visions of the FOI Law any information or records 
that a public authority transferred to the state ar-
chives pursuant to the Archives Law, 5715-1955. 
Subsection (b) of Section 14 authorizes the Min-
ister of Justice, with the approval of the Knesset 
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, to tem-
porarily add an authority, agency or category of 
information to the foregoing list. The period of 
such an order shall not exceed six months. 
Subsection (c) authorizes the Minister of Justice, 
with the approval of the Knesset Constitution, 
Law and Justice Committee, to exempt from the 
FOI Law any corporation founded by a municipal 
authority or any corporation established by law, 
“while taking due notice of the degree of harm li-
able to be caused to the economic or business ac-
tivity of the corporation.” 
8.
9.
10.
11.
.	International	Approach	 299
Subsidiary Regulations and Orders
Shortly after passage of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Law, 5758-1998, the ministers authorized 
thereby to formulate regulations, or to extend or 
delimit the law’s provisions, issued several sub-
sidiary orders and regulatory provisions: 
Freedom of Information Regulations, 
5759-1999, pursuant to Sections 4, 5 and 
19 of the FOI Law, determines the time 
and place for the required publication of 
a list of all public authorities, their respec-
tive administrative regulations and by-
laws, their annual freedom of information 
reports, the annual reports of the public au-
thority personnel charged with implement-
ing the provisions of the FOI Law, as well 
as the bylaws of municipal authorities.
Freedom of Information Regulations 
(Fees), 5759-1999, determines the fees to 
be charged in connection with every re-
quest for information submitted to a public 
authority, and the limitations and exemp-
tions thereof. Three fees are fixed in these 
regulations: a fee levied upon making a 
request for information; a handling fee 
for locating and sorting the requested in-
formation, set according to a fixed hourly 
rate; and a production fee, levied to cover 
costs of making a copy of the requested 
information. Delivery or processing of 
the requested information is dependent on 
payment of the foregoing fees. 
An individual requesting information 
about himself is exempt from the request 
fee and partially exempt from the handling 
fees. A public authority may not charge a 
request fee or a handling fee for informa-
tion that it is obligated to publicize pursu-
ant to Section 6 of the FOI Law (adminis-
trative regulations and municipal bylaws). 
1.
2.
Freedom of Information Order (Defense 
Ministry Units to Which the Law Will Not 
Apply), 5759-1999, pursuant to Section 
14(a)(5) of the FOI Law, extends the ex-
emption of security-related agencies from 
the requirements of the FOI Law to in-
clude the Weapons Development Author-
ity and the Weapons and Technological In-
frastructure Development Administration. 
Freedom of Information Order (Police De-
partment Units to Which the Law Will Not 
Apply), 5759-1999, pursuant to Section 
14(a)(9) of the FOI Law, extends the ex-
emption of police intelligence and inves-
tigative units from the requirements of the 
FOI Law to include the Special Counter-
Terrorism Unit, the Negotiations Unit, and 
the Bomb Technicians Squad. 
Freedom of Information Order (Prime 
Minister’s Office Units to Which the Law 
Will Not Apply), 5759-1999, pursuant to 
Section 14(a)(5) of the FOI Law, extends 
the exemption of security- or foreign af-
fairs-related agencies from the require-
ments of the FOI Law to include the Prime 
Minister’s Diplomatic Adviser, the Army 
Secretariat, the National Security Council, 
most departments of the Nativ intelligence 
organization, Prime Minister’s Office per-
sonnel in charge of informants, and the 
Biological Research Institute. 
Freedom of Information Order (Subject 
Matter About Which a Public Author-
ity Will Not Provide Information), 5759-
1999, pursuant to Section 9(a)(2) of the 
FOI Law, designates certain information 
that may not be provided to the public “for 
reasons of preserving state security.” How-
ever, the order specifies that it does not ap-
ply to information that the public authority 
previously made public. 
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Censored in this order is any information 
regarding the Israel Defense Force’s de-
ployment, bases, operations, units, train-
ing, systems, strategies, plans, equipment, 
preparedness, reserve forces, or stockpiles, 
as well as budgetary or quantitative infor-
mation that can reveal the foregoing. The 
order also prohibits the revelation of in-
formation related to: “plans and means of 
preparing for an emergency in the defense 
establishment or in the Prime Minister’s 
Office”; the development and purchase 
of weapons systems; the personal details 
of personnel in or with the defense estab-
lishment whose identities have been con-
cealed by an authorized defense official; 
security-related joint activities, relation-
ships or trade with foreign bodies, includ-
ing the existence and activities of defense 
delegations abroad, and any material, intel-
ligence, know-how or equipment received 
or delivered in those contexts, or acquired 
by clandestine means or from confidential 
sources; the considerations and data form-
ing the basis of government policy re-
garding foreign security-related trade; the 
search for missing individuals or hostages, 
with the exception of someone who has a 
personal interest in that information. 
Finally, the order prohibits the release of 
any information related to those bodies 
exempted from the provisions of the FOI 
Law (Section 14(a)(1-7)) that has been 
collected or generated in the course of any 
oversight, control, review, or inter-office 
activities. 
Freedom of Information Order (Designa-
tion of a Public Authority for Which the 
Effective Date of the Law is Postponed), 
5759-1999. Three such orders postponed 
for a year or less the effective date of the 
FOI Law for three specific government 
agencies: the nation’s municipal authori-
7.
ties, the Wages Unit in the Ministry of Fi-
nance, and the Nativ intelligence agency. 
A separate law, the Freedom of Informa-
tion Order (Effective Date for the Israel 
Defense Forces), 5759-1999, postponed 
the effective date of the FOI Law for the 
armed services until December 31, 2000. 
Related and Pre-FOI Law Legislation
Several existing laws and several sections of laws, 
most of them passed prior to the Freedom of In-
formation Law, 5758-1998, relate to aspects of 
public access to information. The primary such 
laws and regulations follow: 
The Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, 
was passed to protect an individual’s pri-
vacy from undue infringement by another. 
In addition to protection from invasions of 
privacy (such as spying, eavesdropping, 
using a person’s image for profit, disclos-
ing a person’s private affairs, etc.), this law 
regulates the registration and maintenance 
of automated databases, both those held 
by the government (Section 24) and by the 
private sector. It requires any person main-
taining a database to report the existence, 
use, creation method and protective mea-
sures of that database to a governmental 
registrar.
Section 13 of this law establishes the 
right of any person to examine informa-
tion about him or her held in a database. 
Exceptions to this provision are (Section 
13(e)): databases maintained by the po-
lice, military intelligence, the domestic 
secret service (General Security Services, 
also known as “Shabak”) and the Institute 
for Intelligence and Special Tasks (also 
known as “the Mossad”); databases main-
tained by the tax authorities for purposes 
of internal information sharing; and when 
state security, national foreign relations or 
1.
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any law require that such information not 
be disclosed. The subsection also allows 
for the Minister of Justice, in consultation 
with the Minister of Justice or the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, to exempt from public 
scrutiny databases that include informa-
tion that state security or national foreign 
relations require not be disclosed (herein-
after classified information); on the condi-
tion, however, that a person may examine 
information that is not classified informa-
tion about himself or herself maintained in 
the same database. 
Appeal of a refusal to allow access to a da-
tabase is to be made before a Magistrate’s 
Court. The penalty for illegally revealing 
information held in a database, or for not 
registering such a database, or for using 
such information for purposes other than 
those, for which the database was created, 
is one year in prison. A member of the in-
telligence unit of the military, the General 
Security Services, the “Mossad,” and the 
police is exempt from prosecution for vio-
lation of the privacy law, insofar as his ac-
tion was legally authorized. 
The Archives Law, 5715-1955, establishes 
the State Archives, a department in the 
Prime Minister’s Office, and determines 
the deposit and regulation therein of archi-
val material from state institutions or from 
private individuals. Archival material for 
deposit in the State Archives is defined as 
originating in the pre-State period, from 
authorities no longer in existence, or ma-
terial that “is no longer required for use 
and is not permitted to be destroyed....” 
The State Archivist is responsible for mak-
ing the archival material available for re-
search. 
The Secret Monitoring Law, 5739-1979, 
establishes rules, regulations and limita-
2.
3.
tions on collecting information from or 
about an individual by clandestine means, 
especially by concealed listening devices. 
The Administrative Regulations Amend-
ment Law (Decisions and Reasonings), 
5719-1958, affirms and regulates the obli-
gation of a public authority, including the 
courts, to provide the reasoning behind its 
decisions in response to requests or peti-
tions from the public. 
The Criminal Registration Law, 5741-
1981 (see Section 12, which establishes 
the right of a person to examine informa-
tion about himself or herself in the crimi-
nal register). 
The Patient’s Rights Law, 5756-1996 (see 
Section 13, which establishes the obliga-
tion of a medical professional to inform 
a patient of medical information that will 
enable the patient to make an informed de-
cision regarding possible treatment). 
Obligatory Tender Regulations, 5753-1993 
(see Section 17(a), which obligates a pub-
lic authority to provide the tender docu-
ments [RFP] to any person or organization 
filing a request to receive them). 
Banking Ordinance, 1941 (see Section 
15a, which prohibits the publication or 
revelation of information or documenta-
tion received pursuant to the ordinance; a 
similar provision appears in the Israeli tax 
code).
The State Health Insurance Law, 5754-
1994 (see Section 26(e), which obligates 
the public health insurance agencies to pub-
licize information about their services). 
Entry to Israel Law, 5712-1952 (see Sec-
tion 13a(e), which obligates the authorities 
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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to inform an individual held in custody by 
immigration or security services of his 
rights). 
Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, 5751-
1991 (see Section 35(k), which establishes 
the right of a mentally ill person to receive 
information regarding his illness). 
Crime Victim’s Rights Law, 5761-2001 
(see Section 4(c), which establishes the 
right of a victim of crime to receive infor-
mation regarding criminal procedure, his 
or her rights, and the possible defenses 
against crime. Subsidiary legislation reg-
ulates the publication of information for 
public use regarding potential defenses 
against crime). 
Special Education Law, 5748-1988 (see 
Section 7, which obligates the responsible 
public authority to inform parents of the 
rights of their special-needs child and the 
various educational frameworks avail-
able). 
Social Workers Law, 5756-1996 (see Sec-
tion 7, which establishes the right of a per-
son to receive information from a social 
worker regarding said person’s case). 
Transportation Regulations, 5721-1961 
(see Section 195c, which obligates the 
licensing authority to provide a person 
seeking or renewing a driver’s license the 
findings of medical tests said person un-
derwent in the context of licensing, as well 
as the reasoning behind any licensing re-
sults thereof). 
Museums Regulations, 5745-1984 (see 
Section 10, which obligates museum au-
thorities to publicize information for visi-
tors and the general public regarding exhi-
bitions and activities in public museums). 
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
A special case appears in the Emergency 
Powers Law (Detentions), 5739-1979, 
which establishes the authority of the De-
fense Minister to issue an order that an 
individual be placed in administrative de-
tention; i.e., without charges, and only for 
reasons of state or public security (for an 
initial period of up to 48 hours, with subse-
quent periodic judicial review every three 
months). Under the regulations governing 
administrative detention (Section 6(c)), 
the judge reviewing the detention order is 
entitled to review evidence in exclusion 
of the detainee or detainee’s counsel and 
to order that such evidence remain classi-
fied. 
Exceptions and Exemptions to FOI Laws, by 
Category
The following is a thematic subdivision of statu-
tory exceptions to Israeli freedom of information 
provisions as per the categories delineated in the 
“State Open Government Law and Practice in a 
Post-9/11 World” document supplied by the Cen-
ter for Terrorism Law at St. Mary’s University 
School of Law.
Critical Infrastructure
While there are no public information statutes that 
address this category as sui generis, Section 9(a) 
of the Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998, 
prohibits the providing of information that “may 
harm... public safety...” if made public. 
As most infrastructure and utilities companies in 
Israel are controlled, if not established and oper-
ated entirely, by the government, the provisions of 
the FOI Law apply to them by way of Section 2, 
which includes such government companies in the 
definition of “public authority.” 
Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998
Section 14(a)(7) exempts “the Israel Atomic Ener-
17.
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gy Commission, and the nuclear research centers 
for which it is responsible.” 
Freedom of Information Order (Defense Ministry 
Units to Which the Law Will Not Apply), 5759-
1999 The order extends the exemption of secu-
rity-related agencies from the requirements of the 
FOI Law to include the Weapons Development 
Authority and the Weapons and Technological In-
frastructure Development Administration.
Cyber Security
Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981
Section 2 defines a “violation of privacy” as, 
among other things, “audio monitoring forbid-
den by law” (subsection 2), “visually recording a 
person in his private domain” (subsection 3), “the 
use of a person’s name, title, picture or voice for 
profit” (subsection 6), “violation of a confidential-
ity obligation established in law” (subsection 7) or 
by agreement (subsection 8). 
Chapter 2 of the Protection of Privacy Law, “Pro-
tection of Privacy in Databases,” regulates the reg-
istration and maintenance of databases (defined in 
subsection 7 as a “center for storing information 
by means of an automatic data analysis system”), 
both those held by the government (Section 24) 
and by the private sector: “A person shall not 
maintain or store a database that is not listed in 
the Register, and a person shall not use informa-
tion contained in a database other than for the pur-
poses for which the database was established or 
the purpose for which the information is intended” 
(Section 8). 
Subsection 12(a): “The Register will maintain in 
his office a register of databases open to public 
examination.” 
Section 13 of this law establishes the right of any 
person to examine information about himself or 
herself held in a database. 
Subsection 13(a): “Any person, personally or by 
written power of attorney or such person’s legal 
guardian, is entitled to examine or information 
about himself or herself stored in a database.” 
Subsection 13(b): “A person maintaining a data-
base shall present information, requested pursuant 
to subsection (a), in Hebrew, Arabic or English.” 
Subsection 13(c): “Information regarding a per-
son’s health will not be provided except through 
a doctor; the doctor shall be permitted to keep 
information from a requesting party for medical 
reasons alone.” 
Exempt from the above freedom of information 
provisions are: databases maintained by a “secu-
rity service” (subsection 13(e)(1)), as defined in 
subsection 19(c) - the police, military intelligence, 
the domestic secret service (General Security Ser-
vices, also known as “Shabak”) and the Institute 
for Intelligence and Special Tasks (also known as 
“the Mossad”); databases maintained by the tax 
authorities for purposes of internal information 
sharing (subsection 13(e)(2)); and when state se-
curity, national foreign relations or any law require 
that such information not be disclosed (subsection 
13(e)(3)). Subsection 13(e)(4) also allows for the 
Minister of Justice, in consultation with the Min-
ister of Justice or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
to exempt from public scrutiny databases that in-
clude information that state security or national 
foreign relations require not be disclosed (hereaf-
ter: “classified information”); on condition, how-
ever, that a person may examine information that 
is not classified information about himself or her-
self maintained in the same database. 
Section 15: Appeal of a refusal to allow access 
to a database is to be made before a Magistrate’s 
Court.
Section 17: The penalty for illegally disclosing in-
formation held in a database, or for not registering 
such a database, or for using such information for 
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purposes other than that for which the database 
was created, is one year in prison. 
Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998
Subsection 14(a)(8) exempts from the general pro-
visions of the FOI Law “any agency or authority 
with legally delegated investigative authority, re-
garding information collected or accumulated for 
investigative purposes, and regarding intelligence 
information.” 
Freedom of Information Order (Subject Matter 
About Which a Public Authority Will Not Provide 
Information), 5759-1999
Section 2 exempts from the FOI Law informa-
tion about, among other things, the Israel Defense 
Force’s training, systems, plans, equipment, pre-
paredness, reserve forces, or stockpiles, as well 
as budgetary or quantitative information that can 
reveal the foregoing. Also exempt is information 
about the development or purchase of weapons 
systems. 
Subsection 2(15) of the order prohibits the release 
of any information related to those bodies exempt-
ed from the provisions of the FOI Law (as per sub-
section 14(a)(1-7) thereof) that has been collected 
or generated in the course of any oversight, con-
trol, review, or inter-office activities. 
First Response
Freedom of Information Order (Subject Matter 
About Which a Public Authority Will Not Provide 
Information), 5759-1999
Subsection 2(7): For reasons of national security, 
a public authority shall not provide information 
regarding “plans and means of preparing for an 
emergency in the defense establishment or in the 
Prime Minister’s Office.”
More broadly, Section 2 also exempts from the FOI 
Law information about the Israel Defense Force’s 
training, systems, plans, equipment, preparedness, 
reserve forces, or stockpiles, as well as budget-
ary or quantitative information that can reveal the 
foregoing. Also exempt is information about the 
development or purchase of weapons systems. 
Subsection 2(15) of the order prohibits the release 
of any information related to those bodies exempt-
ed from the provisions of the FOI Law (as per sub-
section 14(a)(1-7) thereof) that has been collected 
or generated in the course of any oversight, con-
trol, review, or inter-office activities. 
Political Structure
The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Commit-
tee - one of the two committees that jointly review 
ministerial requests to add or extend exemptions 
to the FOI Law - is the only Knesset committee 
that holds its meetings behind closed doors. It has 
six subcommittees that also hold classified ses-
sions.
Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998
Section 14(a)(5) exempts “units in the Prime Min-
ister’s Office and the Ministry of Defense dealing 
primarily with state security or foreign relations, 
which the Prime Minister or the Minister of De-
fense has listed in an order, with the approval of 
the Joint Committee.” 
Section 14(a)(7) exempts “the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs Center for Political Research, disar-
mament affairs division, policy planning division, 
and other Ministry of Foreign Affairs units, which 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the approval 
of the Joint Committee, has listed in an order, for 
reasons involving state security or foreign rela-
tions.”
The “Joint Committee” is defined as consisting 
of the members of the Knesset Constitution, Law 
and Justice Committee and the Knesset Foreign 
Affairs and Defense Committee. According to 
Section 15 of the FOI Law, “(a) Meetings of the 
Joint Committee shall be classified, unless decid-
ed otherwise; (b) The Joint Committee is entitled 
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to determine that an order approved by it under 
Sections 9 or 14 shall not be published in the Of-
ficial Gazette of the Israeli government, either all 
or in part.”
Public Health
Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998
Section 14(a)(7) exempts “the Israel Atomic Ener-
gy Commission, and the nuclear research centers 
for which it is responsible.” 
Freedom of Information Order (Prime Minister’s 
Office Units to Which the Law Will Not Apply), 
5759-1999
Subsection 1(6) of the order extends the exemp-
tion of security- or foreign affairs-related agencies 
from the requirements of the FOI Law to include 
the Biological Research Institute. 
Terror Investigations
Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998
Section 9(a): “A public authority shall not pro-
vide...
(1) Information, the disclosure of which may harm 
state security, its foreign relations, public safety, 
or the safety or well-being of a person.”
....
Section 9(b): “A public authority is not obliged to 
provide... 
(7) Information obtained by the public authority 
on condition of confidentiality, or that the disclo-
sure of which is liable to jeopardize the obtaining 
of further information; 
(8) Information concerning the work methods 
and procedures of a public authority engaged in 
enforcing the law, or which has legal authority 
to investigate, supervise, or clarify complaints, if 
disclosure of the information is liable to (a) harm 
action to enforce, supervise, or clarify complaints 
made to the authority, or (b) harm investigative or 
legal processes, or the right of a person to a fair 
trial, or (c) cause the disclosure, or possibly lead 
to the disclosure, of the existence or identity of a 
confidential information source...”
Section 14(a) lists those public authorities given 
blanket exemption from the requirements of the 
FOI Law. The authorities relevant for this themat-
ic category alone, i.e., those involved in counter-
terrorism investigations and intelligence, include: 
“The intelligence agencies of the Israel 
Defense Forces, and other military units, 
which the Minister of Defense, with the 
approval of the Joint Committee, have 
listed in an order, for reasons of state se-
curity;”
“The General Security Services and secu-
rity units in public authorities, in matters 
directed by the General Security Services, 
or on its behalf;”
“The Institute for Intelligence and Special 
Tasks;”
“The Unit in Charge of Security in the 
Ministry of Defense;”
“Units in the Prime Minister’s Office and 
the Ministry of Defense dealing primar-
ily with state security or foreign relations, 
which the Prime Minister or the Minister 
of Defense has listed in an order, with the 
approval of the Joint Committee;” 
....
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Center 
for Political Research... and other Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs units, which the Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, with the approval of 
the Joint Committee, has listed in an order, 
for reasons involving state security or for-
eign relations;” 
“Any agency or authority with legally del-
egated investigative authority, regarding 
information collected or accumulated for 
investigative purposes, and regarding in-
telligence information;”
“The Israel Police intelligence and inves-
tigative apparatuses, and additional units 
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
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which the Minister of Internal Security, 
with the approval of the Joint Committee, 
has listed in an order;”
“The Israel Prison Service – regarding its 
intelligence and security apparatuses.” 
....
Freedom of Information Order (Police Depart-
ment Units to Which the Law Will Not Apply), 
5759-1999 
The order extends the exemption of police intel-
ligence and investigative units from the require-
ments of the FOI Law to include the Special Coun-
ter-Terrorism Unit, the Negotiations Unit, and the 
Bomb Technicians Squad. 
Freedom of Information Order (Prime Minister’s 
Office Units to Which the Law Will Not Apply), 
5759-1999
The order extends the exemption of security- or 
foreign affairs-related agencies from the require-
ments of the FOI Law to include, among others, 
most departments of the Nativ intelligence organi-
zation and the Prime Minister’s Office personnel 
in charge of informants. 
Part II - Freedom of Information Case Law
Selected Case Law Prior to the Freedom of In-
formation Law, 5758-1998
In the 1962 case, The Israel Film Studios v. 
Gary (HCJ 243/62 16 IsrSC 2407), Justice Lan-
dau wrote, regarding the principle of freedom of 
speech (upheld in the landmark Kol Ha’am case, 
SCD 73/58 Kol Ha’am Ltd. v. the Interior Minis-
ter, 7 IsrSC 871): “A regime that arrogates to itself 
the right to determine what is good for the citizen 
to know, ultimately determines what is good for 
the citizen to think; and there is no greater contra-
diction than this to true democracy, which is not 
directed from above.” 
In HCJ 337/66 Pitel v. the Tax Authority of the 
Municipality of Holon 21(1) IsrSC 69, the court 
10)
11)
addressed and upheld the citizen’s “right to review 
information [held by a public authority] in which 
he has legitimate interest.” The court inferred this 
right to access information “not only from the ar-
ticles of the law, but also because common sense 
and elementary decency between the citizen and 
the government dictates it.” 
The right of the citizen to information held by the 
state was again recognized, and further explained, 
in a 1970 case decided by the High Court of Jus-
tice (HCJ 142/70 Shapira v. Jerusalem District 
Committee of the Israel Bar Associaton 25(1) 
IsrSC 325), in which Justice Cohen wrote: 
The argument that in the absence of any 
legal obligation to disclose I am entitled 
to conceal and not reveal, can be proffered 
by a private individual or body...but it is 
not available to an authority that fulfills a 
statutory function....[A] public authority is 
created solely to serve the community and 
has no interests of its own. Everything it 
has, it holds as a trustee and has no ad-
ditional, different or separate rights or du-
ties of its own, over and above those that 
derive from its position as trustee or are 
vested in or imposed on it by virtue of en-
acted provisions.
In Zichroni (HCJ 243/82 Zichroni v. the Managing 
Committee of the Israel Broadcasting Authority 
[IBA] 37(1) IsrSC 757), the issue was an IBA di-
rective that forbade broadcasting interviews with 
“public figures” who were known to support the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. The petitioner 
argued, and the court recognized, that the public 
had a right to receive full information about events 
in Israel and abroad. However, Justice Levin also 
noted that the said right would not be upheld in the 
event that, in doing so, “damage would be caused 
to the vital interests of the State or an individual.” 
In a later decision (HCJ 680/88 Shnitzer v. the 
Chief Military Censor 42(4) IsrSC 617), which 
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was important for setting conceptual limits on the 
security exception to the right of free speech (and 
by extension, to the right to receive information), 
the court stated: “Security is a means to an end. 
The goal is the democratic regime, which is a re-
gime of the people that facilitates personal free-
doms.” Therefore, the court said, a determination 
of “near certainty” of real danger was required be-
fore censorship of free speech would be allowed. 
While the courts had thus far clearly recognized 
the right of an individual to receive information 
about himself or herself held by a public author-
ity, and they had likewise defined and clarified the 
right of free speech, the courts had not yet rec-
ognized a right to receive information of public 
(rather than individual) interest. 
In fact, in the 1989 case Ben v. the Minister of 
Justice (HCJ 414/89 43(4) IsrSC 327), the High 
Court of Justice rejected a petition requesting that 
the Ministry of Justice provide information on the 
extent and method of wiretaps carried out pur-
suant to the Secret Monitoring Law, 5739-1979. 
The petitioners, as journalists, claimed that their 
right to the requested information was the natural 
corollary of their own obligation to provide full 
and accurate information to the public. The court, 
however, found that the petitioners were simply 
unable to demonstrate that the respondents were 
under any statutory obligation to provide the re-
quested information. 
In great contrast, just one year later, in the land-
mark Shalit case (HCJ 1601/90 Shalit v. MK Shi-
mon Peres and Others 44(3) IsrSC 353), the High 
Court of Justice upheld a petition to force the La-
bor party to disclose political agreements it had 
reached with other parties in its efforts to form a 
coalition government. In Shalit, the justices em-
phasized that the matter of publication of informa-
tion such as political agreements should be reg-
ulated by legislation; however, they also agreed 
that, in the absence of such legislation, they were, 
per Justice Barak, obligated “to give expression 
to the basic principles contained in our system of 
law.” 
As it was expressed by Justice Shamgar in that 
unanimous decision, “Freedom of public opinion 
and knowledge of what is happening in the channels 
of government are an integral part of a democratic 
regime, which is structured on the constant sharing 
of information about what is happening in public life 
with the public itself. Withholding of information is 
justifiable only in exceptional cases where security 
of the State or foreign relations may be impaired or 
when there is a risk of harming some vital public 
interest.” 
Justice Barak said, “From the [public official’s] duty 
of trust follows the obligation of disclosure, as well. 
...Information in his possession is not his private 
‘property.’ It is ‘property’ that belongs to the public, 
and he must bring it to the notice of the public.”
The Shalit decision gave a judicial impetus to 
those seeking to influence the legislature to pass 
a freedom of information statute. However, there 
were several failed efforts in the next few years 
for the Knesset to codify the freedom of informa-
tion (although a specific obligation to publicize 
political coalition agreements was legislated). Fi-
nally, public pressure and the 1994 establishment 
of a state committee for the drafting of a proposed 
Freedom of Information Law eventually led to the 
ratification of the Freedom of Information Law, 
5758-1998.
Selected Case Law Subsequent to the Freedom 
of Information Law, 5758-1998 - Security and 
Counter-Terrorism
Since the passage of the FOI Law, as noted by Yu-
val Rabin and Roy Peled, “Many of the applica-
tions submitted to the authorities concern citizens’ 
personal affairs, or other non-controversial mat-
ters. Information in respect thereof was provided 
quite freely even before the Law was legislated.” 
(Rabin, Y. and Peled, R. (2005) “Between FOI 
Law and FOI Culture: The Israeli Experience” in 
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Open Government: a journal on Freedom of In-
formation Volume 1 Issue 2; published on July 26, 
2005).
Court cases involving rejected petitions for infor-
mation of interest to the general public have been 
filed primarily by the Association for Civil Rights 
in Israel, environmental groups, the Freedom of 
Information Movement, and journalists. Such cas-
es have been, with time, defining the application of 
the FOI Law in practice (especially regarding defi-
nitional issues, such as the meaning of “public au-
thority” in relation to universities, the meaning of 
the “internal discussions” exception, as well as the 
rights of third parties to prevent disclosure, and the 
like). Most such cases are settled in District Court, 
in its capacity as Administrative Court, serving as 
the court of first instance for review of rejected re-
quests for information pursuant to the FOI Law. 
The following are three recent cases that focus on 
or reference security or counter-terrorism issues 
from the perspective of the FOI Law. 
In The Israeli News Company Ltd. v. the Trans-
portation Ministry (AA 454/02 2004(2) Takdin-
District Court 3587), the court discussed the ques-
tion of a journalist’s right to examine the internal 
ombudsman’s report of a government ministry. 
After a detailed review of the purpose of the FOI 
Law and the laws relevant to internal ombuds-
man’s and State Comptroller’s reports, the judge 
notes that the Police Ministry (now the Internal 
Security Ministry) published the findings of its in-
ternal ombudsman despite the partial exemption 
from the FOI provisions enjoyed by the police de-
partment (per Section 14(a)(9) of the FOI Law). 
The judge further writes, “There are special in-
stances in which the legislature explicitly deter-
mines that internal reports are not to be publicized 
unless the authority so decided specifically, ac-
cording to individual considerations on a case-by-
case basis. Thus it is in the case of investigations 
in the military....” 
In The Freedom of Information Movement in Is-
rael v. Israel Airports Authority (AA 1555/06 
[unpublished]) - which the presiding judge called 
a “fanciful” petition, adding that “it would have 
been better had it never been filed” - the Freedom 
of Information Movement requested that the court 
compel the Israel Airports Authority to provide 
it with information regarding the standards guid-
ing airport security personnel in security checks, 
without specific profiling criteria but including 
the information as to what ethnic origin, religion 
and gender said profiling is based on, if any. 
The Airports Authority acceded to the request in 
part, providing protocols of the committee for 
security checks of the Arab population, although 
only following petitioning of the appeal. The Air-
ports Authority also explained that its security 
profiling standards are set by the General Secu-
rity Services, noting that during the last 4-5 years, 
about 1,600 complaints had been filed by civil-
ians. In response, the appellant requested to know 
what actions were taken within the Authority, if 
any, as a result of the aforementioned complaints. 
The District Court dismissed the appeal, holding 
that the Airport Authority security agency falls 
under Section 14(a)(2) of the FOI Law, stipulating 
that said law shall not apply to security agencies 
in public authorities in matters guided or set by 
the General Security Services, as is the case re-
garding airport security checks. Furthermore, the 
court held, the information requested is protected 
from disclosure under Section 9(a)(1), by which 
information the disclosure of which may harm 
state security, its foreign relations, public safety, 
or the safety or well-being of a person, shall not be 
provided. The information is thereby also protect-
ed under Section 9(a)(4) prohibiting disclosure of 
information barred by any law.
The court found the appellants attempt to distin-
guish between “specific profiling criteria” and 
profiling criteria related to gender, religious and 
ethnic origin to be an irrelevant distinction. The 
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said profiling characteristics, the court said, can-
not be seen as discriminatory in the context of 
public safety. 
In conclusion, the court determined that the re-
spondent fully answered the appellant’s questions 
regarding the security checks standards, and did 
not even apply the full extent of the protection 
provided to it by the law. The criteria used for pro-
filing will remain undisclosed. However, as for 
the appellant’s inquiries regarding the authority’s 
treatment of complaints, this information must be 
provided to the appellant. 
Following the District Court’s ruling, an appeal 
was filed with the Supreme Court by the Freedom 
of Information Movement. As of June 2007, the 
appeal has yet to be adjudicated. 
In MK Zehava Gal’on v. the Governmental Com-
mittee for the Examination of Events During the 
2006 Lebanon Campaign (HCJ 258/07 [not yet 
published]), the High Court of Justice heard the 
direct petition of MK Gal’on that the said Com-
mittee publish the protocols of its hearings imme-
diately. The Committee argued that after submit-
ting its entire report to the government, it would 
publish those sections of the protocols that would 
not endanger state security or other protected in-
terests. 
The High Court of Justice ruled that the basic 
presumption is that public access to information 
contributes to, rather than hinders, the judicial or 
quasi-judicial process. Adjudication in plain view, 
the court explained, both deters from bias within 
the judicial system and contributes to public con-
fidence in that system. 
The principal of public access was also deter-
mined to be based on the public’s right to know 
and on the duty of disclosure to which the pub-
lic authority is subject, as enacted in the Freedom 
of Information Law. According to the court, the 
presumption is that, where not dictated otherwise 
by interests of national security, the Committee’s 
proceedings must be made public. 
Regarding the more general conflict between FOI 
and national security, the court ruled that the bal-
ance between them must preserve national secu-
rity, but also, and at the same time, must minimize 
the infringement on the freedom of information. 
The correct balance of these values cannot be set 
in advance, for it is a matter of the probability of 
harm to national security within the specific cir-
cumstances of the given case. 
Part III - Perceptions and Assimilation
According to several observers of the Israeli le-
gal system and activists promoting freedom of 
information in Israel, the country does not have 
a strong tradition of open access to government 
agencies and information. There is a “basic suspi-
cion” among government authorities of allowing 
public access to their data, according to Roy Peled 
of the Freedom of Information Movement in Is-
rael3, “which is apparently related to the security 
situation and to a tradition... f centralized govern-
ment.” 
The Freedom of Information Law itself, passed 
unanimously in the Knesset in 1998, was the re-
sult of years of intensive work by a coalition of 
social pressure groups. As Peled and Yuval Rabin 
write:4
“In 1992, a number of non-governmental orga-
nizations established the ‘Coalition for Freedom 
of Information.’ The Coalition operated several 
years with both Opposition and Coalition Knes-
set members, and led to the submission of draft 
private laws, which never progressed beyond the 
3 Interviewed by ITRR on Apr. 12, 2007, at Mr. 
Peled’s organizational headquarters in Rishon Lezion, 
Israel. 
4 Y. Rabin & R. Peled, Between FOI Law and FOI 
Culture: The Israeli Experience, Open Government: a 
journal on Freedom of Information, Vol. 1 Issue 2, 
July 26, 2005.
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first reading.” The draft stated: “In 1994, public 
pressure led to the establishment of a public com-
mittee, headed by a District Court judge (retired), 
which consisted of a journalist, a representative 
of the Association for Civil Rights, and represen-
tatives from the relevant government ministries. 
After a year of intensive work, the committee sub-
mitted its proposal for the text of the Freedom of 
Information Law to the Minister of Justice. This 
proposal was integrated with that of some Knesset 
members, but three more years of discussions in 
the Knesset committees, and significant changes 
in the committee’s proposal, were required before 
the Law was ratified, in May 1998.”
Shortly after the passage of the FOI Law, there 
were some favorable or neutral news and opinion 
articles in the general media, yet interest quickly 
waned.5 However, in more recent years, as more 
cases have been filed and, in many instances, 
brought to the attention of the media by interested 
parties, there has been more general publication of 
those cases with potentially dramatic public im-
pact6 (such as the request to publicize the Lebanon 
War Commission findings, the request for infor-
mation showing potential conflicts of interest of 
leading political figures, the request for informa-
tion regarding the appointment of senior govern-
ment company directors, etc.). 
The professional literature, on the other hand, ad-
dressed the issue of freedom of information before 
passage of the FOI Law. Since then, the literature 
has primarily focused on FOI Law implementa-
tion. 
Just prior to the legislation of the FOI Law, Profes-
sor Yitzhak Zamir wrote a book entitled Adminis-
trative Authority (Jerusalem: Nevo, 1996, in He-
brew), in which he reviewed the case law current 
at the time of his writing regarding the public’s 
access to information. Zamir wrote, “In our writ-
5 Ibid. 
6 Movement for Freedom of Information, http://
www.foim.org.il/main/NewspapersArticles.aspx, last 
viewed June 24, 2007.
ings, we have tried to show that a more balanced 
and even-handed approach is necessary” when 
addressing the conflicting values of secrecy and 
public access. “The burden of proof that secrecy 
is legitimate and necessary is on the one seeking 
secrecy, that is, on the government itself. ....These 
[proposed] measures neutralize the natural adher-
ence of the authority to secrecy and assure greater 
protection of the right to know and the right to 
freedom of speech, which are foundation stones of 
the democratic regime.” 
In a later book, a seminal work entitled The 
Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of 
Information Law (Tel Aviv: Israel Bar Associa-
tion, 2000), Professor Ze’ev Segal declares, “The 
right to freedom of information is included in the 
right of a person to take part in the operation of a 
democratic regime while knowing the facts.” Se-
gal addresses the issue of security and the freedom 
of information, as well, and concludes that “the 
appropriate interpretation of the Freedom of In-
formation Law and its exceptions... must give full 
meaning and legal weight to the Shnitzer decision. 
It is a case that is worthy of being a touchstone 
for judicial decisions... in appeals of refusal by a 
public authority to disclose information based on 
‘concern for harm to state security.’“ 
Segal claims that the decision in the matter of 
Shnitzer pushed Israeli society “a generation 
ahead” in relation to the right of the public to re-
ceive information in matters of a security-related 
nature. “The decision has not lost its interpretive 
inspiration even after ratification of the FOI Law,” 
he concludes. 
Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon 
Barak delivered a speech entitled “Freedom of 
Information and the Court” in honor of the pub-
lication of Prof. Segal’s book, in which Barak de-
tailed his own view of the relatively newly minted 
statutory freedom. His speech was included in the 
academic quarterly Kiryat HaMishpat 3 (2003). 
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In a paper delivered at the 66th Annual Interna-
tional Federation of Library Associations and In-
stitutions in Jerusalem in August 2000, Dr. Deb-
bie Rabina, at the time of Rutgers University, 
delivered a paper entitled Access to Government 
Information in Israel: Stages in Continuing De-
velopment of a National Information Policy. In 
her paper, Dr. Rabina reviewed the freedom of in-
formation situation current at the time and argued 
in favor of leveraging Israel’s library system to fa-
cilitate and promote open government provisions 
and publications. 
An important article that has become a basis for 
subsequent discussions of the FOI Law appeared 
in the academic law journal Hamishpat in 2003. 
Entitled The Freedom of Information Law: The 
Law and the Reality, by Hillel Sommer, it ex-
amined the faulty application of the FOI Law in 
practice. Suggesting, as have others, that the Is-
raeli public is unaware of its rights of access to 
information due to the lack of a tradition of open 
government, Sommer writes, “The Israeli public 
does not know, at this stage of application of the 
Freedom of Information Law, how to ask.” 
Sommer goes on to explain the ways in which 
the authorities had failed, as of 2002, to imple-
ment the FOI Law effectively, if at all. He notes 
that, often, the individual appointed as the party 
responsible for responding to FOI Law requests 
for information was oftentimes also assigned as a 
spokesperson for the same public authority. Thus, 
he or she was faced with a conflict of interest in 
the event that the requested information was not 
flattering to the organization in question. A sec-
ond way in which authorities had failed the pub-
lic was in encouraging the citizenry not to seek 
information. They did so by means of producing 
complicated, poor or non-existent FOI materials. 
As of 2002, Sommer also noted a systematic ig-
noring of requests filed by the public. Finally, he 
also claimed that those authorities that did reply to 
requests often provided capricious and irrelevant 
refusals to provide information. 
Notably, Roy Peled of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Movement said7 that the situation has im-
proved somewhat since Sommer wrote his article; 
however, the public authorities still are relatively 
reluctant to provide information, so their refus-
als have become more sophisticated and based 
around as-yet ambiguous provisions of the law. 
On the other hand, a brief review of the govern-
ment web sites shows that they nearly all have 
Freedom of Information access points (the extent 
of the information on each site is still limited) and 
there is a general government web portal8 that has 
as its home page an interactive Freedom of Infor-
mation site declaring, “You have the right to re-
ceive information from the public authorities....” 
with links to various government offices and other 
types of public information. 
In 2005, Dr. Yuval Karniel, one of the originators 
of the FOI Law, wrote a Case Comment: The New 
Freedom of Information Law in Israel is Tested 
by Its Supreme Court for Open Government: a 
journal on Freedom of Information, Vol. 1 
Issue 2 (July 26, 2005). In that article, he exam-
ined the court’s decision in Administrative Peti-
tion Appeal 1825/02 The State of Israel and the 
Ministry of Health v. the Association of Homes for 
the Elderly (unpublished), and argued that the Su-
preme Court erred in adopting a “balancing test,” 
and rejecting a “special harm test” proposed by 
a lower court, to determine if the disclosure of a 
particular piece of information has been justifiably 
refused pursuant to FOI Law subsection 9(b). 
In the same issue of Open Government, Rabin 
and Peled’s article, Between FOI Law and FOI 
Culture: The Israeli Experience, appeared, as 
well. In it, they, like Sommer, argued that there 
had been “a very partial implementation of the 
law.” Among other conclusions, Peled and Rabin 
7 Interview with Mr. Peled, at Freedom of Informa-
tion Movement headquarters in Rishon Lezion, Isr (Apr. 
12, 2007). 
8 Israeli Government, Free Information Portal, 
http://free.info.gov.il/Lapam/MainPage/main_table.asp, last 
viewed June 24, 2007.
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recommend that there be increasing pressure put 
on public authorities to execute their obligations 
pursuant to the FOI legislation by means of ad-
ministrative supervisory bodies and/or court judg-
ments. 
Finally, as a sign, perhaps, of the progress made in 
FOI awareness in recent years, on Thursday, June 
21, 2007, the Almagor terror victims association 
referred to the FOI Law in a letter its leadership 
wrote to Defense Minister Ehud Barak. In the let-
ter, Almagor demanded to receive the names of 
those Fatah terrorists transferred by Israel from 
Gaza to Egypt and to Judea and Samaria (the 
“West Bank”) in the wake of the Hamas takeover 
of the Gaza Strip. Almagor also sought the iden-
tity of the official who made the decision to allow 
the transfer and information on how the decision 
was reached. 
“According to the Almagor activists, they have 
a right to all the information requested under the 
spirit and provisions of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Law.... In addition, Almagor referred to the 
Crime Victims Law, under which “we have a right 
to know where those who harmed us are locat-
ed.”9
Part IV - 9/11
The infamous 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York 
and Washington in 2001 clearly woke American 
legislators and political leaders, as well as the 
American people, to a reality in which their demo-
cratic norms of behavior and legislation were sud-
denly faced with a grave challenge from a clearly 
undemocratic and cynical domestic and interna-
tional threat. The subsequent offensive America 
launched on the centers of terrorism in the wake 
of 9/11 also presented a challenge of balancing 
freedom with the need for secrecy. 
9 Israel National News, http://www.israelnational-
news.com/News/News.aspx/122837, last viewed June 25, 
2007
Israel has been facing the legal and moral chal-
lenges of the war on terrorism essentially since 
its foundation. Therefore, the events of 9/11 and 
their aftermath did not have any effect on Israeli 
freedom of information legislation or on security-
related case law, other than in passing reference 
where relevant to the facts of a specific case. 
On the contrary, the events of 9/11 and similar 
events around the world have brought in their 
wake delegations of officials, law enforcement 
professionals, attorneys, etc. from around the 
world - but especially from the United States - to 
Israel to learn from Israel’s bitter and challenging 
experience in fighting terrorism.10 
7.2 The French Approach to Open 
Government in Light of Security Threats 
Post September 11, 2001
by Vanessa Brochot
“A victim of international terrorism, on its own 
soil, as well as abroad, France demonstrated long 
ago its determination to fight all aspects of terror-
ism, regardless of the perpretrators.”11 Contrary to 
other countries such as Ireland, the French con-
stitution of 1958 did not include any exceptional 
juridictional statutes because the political climate 
at the time did not mandated such foresight, as ter-
rorism did not begin to appear on French soil until 
much later than the framing of the constitution of 
the “Fifth Republic.” Although French homeland 
was spared from attacks for a long time, the events 
of 1970 were to rapidly change the “tone.” The 
legendary passivity of French politics, combined 
with a heavy “Human Rights” syndrome, inher-
ited from the French Revolution, had contributed 
to make our country “a welcoming land,” if you 
10 Israel121c, http://www.israel121c.org, last viewed 
June 29, 2007. Other examples are linked by Israel21c on 
this web page, as well. 
11 On the ministry of foreign affairs’ website 
“France and the fight against terrorism,” available at 
http://diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/france_829/decouvrir_france_
4177/france-a-z_225 9/politique-etrangere_2628/france-
lutte-contre-terrorisme_6074.html.
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will, that some like to rightfully compare-in my 
opinion-to a haven, much appreciated by foreign 
terrorists. This, in turn, also had a debilitating ef-
fect on terrorism repression in other European 
countries such as Italy, Germany or Spain.12
While the number of total victims is without com-
parison to that of the events of September 11, I 
invite you nonetheless, to consult the list of all 
acts of terrorism commited in France from 1974 
until today on the website of “SOS Attentats.”13 
French anti-terrorist legislation cannot be studied 
or understood without taking a close look at the 
terrorist events which took place on French soil: it 
is always following such attacks that French anti-
terrorism legislation has been enacted as if the law 
reacted to attacks being perpetrated, attacks which 
had not been anticipated by such laws.
Following the attacks of the first French terror-
ist group, General de Gaulle and the OAS (Or-
ganization of the Secret Army)14 set up special 
jurisdictions to find out who were the authors of 
these attacks, he then entrusted their judgement 
to the State Court of Safety.15 The establishment 
of specialized jurisdictions is characterized by 
its derogatory aspect with regards to civil rights, 
created out of emergency but founded on a text 
of law, anticipating clearly their conditions and 
rules of existence; they often appear to be an arbi-
trary manifestation of the political public power. 
12 Fabienne VIRICEL, Franco-Irish comparative 
studies of special juridictions in terrorism matters, study is 
available on the Juripole website, www.juripole.fr.
13 See http://www.sos-attentats.org/justice-liste-at-
tentats.asap?cat_id=Attentats&lan_id=fr
14 The OAS (secret army organization) was a clan-
destine French political/military organization whose meth-
ods were based on terrorist actions. It was created February 
11, 1961 after a meeting in Madrid between Jean-Jacques 
Susini and Pierre Lagaillarde. It regroups the partisans 
supportive of the “French Algeria” movement through 
armed conflict. The acronym OAS first appeared on walls 
in Algiers on March 16, 1961, accompanied by the slogan, 
“Algeria is French and it will remain French.” The name 
OAS purposely references the Resistance’s secret army.
15 In France, the 63-22 and 63-23 laws created the 
Court of State Security on January 15, 1963.
The State security court was no exception to this 
“rule:” its derogatory procedure being a “strong” 
departure from common civil rights (extension of 
police custody, up to 10 days in the absence for-
mal charges, the authorisation of searches or con-
fiscations as authorized by article 17, the ability 
to go beyond the basic rights of the parties as to 
informing them of their rights and of the charges 
facing them as proposed by article 21, the pos-
sibility of extending custody without formal re-
view by a prosecuting magistrate, etc.) was highly 
criticized, especially more so as this Court would 
subject individuals to the same statute as military 
personel and deprived the accused of the right to 
a trial by jury. In his book. “The Permanent Coup 
d’Etat” published in 1964, François Mitterrand 
blamed this legislation, thus as soon as he became 
president in 1981, he removed it following a bill 
by Robert Badinter, then Minister of Justice. The 
congressional shuttle rescinded this law (article 
no. 81-737) on August 4, 1981; the following year 
another law established that the “crimes and of-
fenses against the fundamental interests of the 
nation” must be judged under the statute of civil 
rights legislation.
In light of these elements, it is therefore possible for 
us to ponder French reaction in regards to the mili-
tary decree relative to the “detention, treatment and 
judgement of non-American citizens in the fight 
against terrorism” which was signed by the Presi-
dent of the United States on November 13, 2001. 
This decree proposed in particular the creation of 
exceptional military tribunals to consider judging 
non-U.S citizens. However, in order to understand 
“the general indignation” of the international com-
munity and of international organizations such as 
Amnesty International, we must pay closer scruti-
ny to the aforementioned decree as it includes sub-
stantial differences from the French State Security 
Court document and especially in regards to the 
contempt of the international standards prohibiting 
discriminatory treatment based in particular on na-
tionality (as foreign nationals are the ONLY ONES 
elligible to be tried before these special courts).
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During the Seventies, another government project 
created great turmoil: “project SAFARI”. This 
project proposed to identify each citizen by a 
number and to inter-connect that number to an 
identification database of all personal administra-
tion files. This project raised concerns about the 
dangers of certain applications for data processing 
and created worries about general cataloging of 
the population. It led the government to establish 
a commission under the auspices of the Ministery 
of Justice so that the Ministry could put forth spe-
cific measures to guarantee that the development 
of future data processing will include the respect 
of privacy, as well as that of personal and pub-
lic liberties. This “Data-Processing and Freedoms 
Commission,” chaired by Bernard Chenot, pro-
posed, after many meetings and much debate, to 
create an independent authority: the CNIL (Na-
tional Commission on Data Processing and Liber-
ties).16 At the end of the year 1977, a bill was re-
16 A pluralist electorate composed of 17 commis-
sioners : 4 parliamentarians (2 representatives, 2 senators), 
2 members of the economic and social council, 6 represent-
atives of the higher jurisdiction, (2 State advisors, 2 advi-
sors from the Supreme Court of Appeals, 2 advisors from 
the State Audit’s office), 5 qualified personalities appointed 
by the National assembly’s President (1 personality) by 
Senate president (1 personality), 3 personalities from the 
council of Ministers. The member’s terms of office is of 5 
years or for the parliamentarians, of an equal period corre-
sponding to their elected terms. To conduct their missions, 
the CNIL members rely on various services.
*An independent expert: 12 of the 17 members are elected 
by assemblies or by their local districts. The CNIL elects 
its President from amongst its members; it answers to no 
authority; the ministers, public experts, heads of com-
panies, public or private, cannot oppose the actins of 
the CNIL for any reason and they must pursue all useful 
measures to facilitate its task. The president freely recruits 
its collaborators.
*An administrative expert: The CNIL’s budget is applied 
against the budget of the State. The agents of the CNIL 
are contracted by the State. The CNIL’s decisions can be 
the object of appeal within the administrative jurisdiction. 
Facing the dangers to civil liberties that computers pose, 
the main purpose of the CNIL is to protect privacy and the 
freedom of the individual. It is given the responsibility of 
making sure that “Data processing and Liberties” laws are 
respected, and is therefore entrusted 5 main missions: to 
inform, to guaranty rights to access, to list public files, to 
viewed by Congress, before becoming the current 
law no. 78-17 of January 6, 1978, which relates to 
data processing in regards to “personal files and 
freedoms.”17
The measures undertaken by the socialist govern-
ment of the time repealed the State Security court, 
repealed the “Peyrefitte law,”18 as well as began 
a policy of decentralization. These measures con-
control and to regulate.
17 It would be interesting to conduct a compara-
tive study between the SAFARI project and its American 
counterpart regarding their aviation/transportation/security 
dynamics; and the conditions for entry into U.S. territory, 
which were adopted on November 19, 2001 (the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act) and re-enforced on May 
5, 2002 by a law which reinforced the conditions for entry 
into the homeland (Enhanced Border Security and Visa En-
try Reform Act). Since March 5, 2003, these measures have 
imposed standards of communication from the airline com-
panies to customs services and to U.S. security agencies, as 
well as personnel information relative to their passengers 
coming from the U.S., under penalty of tighter controls, 
of fines, and of refusal of landing rights and authorization. 
Negotiations between the United States and Europe have 
ended several years of uncertainty regarding the conditions 
under which the American authorities obtain European air 
passengers’ data and information (“PNR data”). The agree-
ment, which has been ratified, between the United States 
and the EU, goes back to numerous guaranties that were 
defended by the European CNIL. The PNR data (“Passen-
ger Name Records”) is information which is collected from 
the airline passengers at the time commercial reservations 
are made. It allows one to identify the traveler’s itinerary, 
the flights being taken, home contact information (home 
phone number), custom services requested on flight such as 
specific dietary preferences (vegetarian, Asian, Kosher, etc) 
as well as speciall needs requested based on the passen-
ger’s health.
18 These two points appeared amongst the 110 
propositions of the presidential program of candidate Mit-
terrand. Peyrefitte’s law number 81-82, stated “security and 
liberties law,” extends the matters of police’s prerogatives 
in regards to identity control and red-handed crime, as well 
as those of the prosecution limiting the freedoms of assess-
ment from a judge, (restricted possibilities for suspended 
sentences, substitution of sentences and mitigated circum-
stances) and by so lessening the rights of the defense. This 
law passed on 2nd of February and it appeared at the JO on 
3 February 1981, partially compiled from a decision of the 
constitutional council - decision number 80-127 DC which 
was ratified on 19 and 20 of January 1981.
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tributed to the temporarily silence the separation-
ist terrorists such as the FLNC (National Libera-
tion Front of Corsica), ETA (Basque Indepence 
Group), or FRS (Front for the Release of Brit-
tany), although this lull proved of short duration. 
As early as 1985, a new wave of attacks would 
engulf France. In reaction, the French Govern-
ment put in place a special antiterrorist legislation 
of which the law of September 9, 1986 is the key-
stone. A new substitute civil rights legislation was 
then voted into law in order to close the gap in the 
statute born out of the establishment of the law of 
1963 relating to the State Security Court, and in 
order to allow a quick and effective repression of 
terrorism.
The question here is not to deny the effects of Sep-
tember 11 on French policy and legislation but to 
show that the effects of this one event were not as 
described by the press: circulation of the stand-
ards, Patriot Act French style, etc.
The projections with most effect were carried out 
by the European Union: as of September 12, 2001, 
the Presidency tasked the following boards “Jus-
tice and Interior Affairs,” “Transportation,” and 
“Ecofin” (Ecomics and Finance) and challenged 
them to prepare suitable measures in regards to 
police response, homeland security, justice and to 
fight against the financing of terrorism. The For-
eign Ministers met the same day, asking the Presi-
dency, the Commission and Mr. Javier Solana to 
propose an improvement of the joint policy in 
these fields.19 
The Ministers of Justice of “the Fifteen” (nation 
members of the European Union) have, as of 6 
December 2001, proposed a framework document 
relating to the fight against terrorism; a document 
19 Information report submitted and statement given 
by the National Assembly Delegation for the European Un-
ion regarding the fight against terrorism: A revealing factor 
in the progress and indequacies of the European Union, 
presented by M.Alain Barreau, Representative (Deputy), 
report no. 3504, registered by the office of the President of 
the National Assembly on 20 December 2001, page 7.
which makes it possible to blend both the penal 
legislations of the Member States with regards to 
the definition and to the sanctions stemming from 
acts of terrorism. It is not worthy to mention that 
this legislative framework is largely inspired by 
the French legislation. 
In addition, without the particular context of the 
attacks of September 11, the European warrant 
for arrest could not have been set up so quickly, 
taking into account the reservations expressed by 
the Italian government. This document blesses the 
removal of the political control which was tra-
ditionally attached to procedures of extradition. 
“What was a political act now becomes a legal 
document....We are talking about a major stage in 
the establishment of a European legal entity. The 
newly created European warrant for arrest consti-
tutes in itself a genuine mandate for arresting and 
for turning-over a person. It allows for the direct 
handing-over of wanted individuals from one le-
gal authority to another, while guaranteeing their 
fundamental rights and freedoms. This ambitious 
and innovating project modifies drastically the na-
ture of the penal/legal co-operation: it is no longer 
a traditional cooperation of State to State but the 
direct execution of a court order in the spirit of the 
concept of the recognition of judicial court deci-
sions.20
As for France, a country already sensitized to the 
risks of Islamist terrorism, a European country 
more affected by international terrorism (not less 
than 23 acts of terrorism between 1986 and 1996), 
the effects of September 11 are more about strate-
gic and military reflexion than about the need to 
reinforce the legal arsenal. An information paper 
issued by the French National Assembly-report 
no. 346021 (Note: French National Assembly is the 
20 Ibid, page 20.
21 Information report submitted and applied through 
article 145 of the National Commission of Defense regula-
tion and of the armed forces in conclusion of the delibera-
tions of a mission for information on the consequences of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks for France. This report (No. 3460, 
registered with the National Assembly’s presidential office 
1	 Selected	Essays	on	State	Open	Goernment	Law	and	Practice	in	a	Post-9/11	World
equivalient of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives) points in this same direction. The report 
mentions “a rediscovery of the founding principles 
of defense, globality, and permanence,”22 it focuses 
upon the improvements still needed to be carried 
out in order to fight against terrorism effectively: 
civil protection, strategic importance of informa-
tion sharing, military aspects, etc. The attacks of 
September 11 raise true questions about dissuasion 
in general and nuclear dissuasion in particular.
In France, the concept of defense was clarified in 
the first article from edict no. 59-147 dated Janu-
ary 7, 1959, a pilar as it relates to the general or-
ganization of defense. The first indented line stip-
ulates that “the object of defense is to insure that 
at any time, under all circumstances and against 
all forms of aggression, the safety and the integ-
rity of the territory, as well as the life of the popu-
lation.” The general framework of this ordinance 
is thus still suitable in the sense that it covers 3 
dimensions: a military aspect to preserve the vital 
interests of the country; a civil aspect relating to 
the protection of the populations on the territory; 
and an economic dimension. Ultimately, if the tra-
ditional concept of defense, vis-a-vis an enemy 
identified in a defined state of judicial war, be-
comes blurred, it is to the benefit of security acts 
with vaguer boundaries, but the principles of the 
ordinance of January 7, 1959 are not called into 
question because of it. On the contrary, what we 
are witnessing is “a restoration of global defense 
which is supported within the framework of the 
fight against international terrorism; the effective-
ness of civil means and military personnel resides 
first of all in their complementarity.”23
Since 1986, French antiterrorist legislation has been 
supplemented by 5 new texts. Among all these laws, 
only the law of November 15, 2001 was not sub-
mitted to the Constitutional Council. “This law fol-
on 12 December 2001) was presented by Representatives 
Mr.Paul Quiles, Mr. Rene Galy-Dejean and Mr. Bernard 
Grasset.
22 Ibid, page 68.
23 Ibid, pp 71-72.
lowed the trauma caused by the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, and the consensual character of the adopted 
provisions explain the absence of ‘saisine.’”24. (See 
Translator’s note) The major evolution which fol-
lowed the events of September 11 in regards to anti-
terrorist legislation is law no. 2006-64 dated January 
23, 2006 which relates to the fight against terror-
ism and bears various clauses relating to safety and 
border control. This law, further removed from the 
events of September 11, caused more criticism. 
Still, is it possible to discuss a security drift or a cir-
culation of the standards from the land of Uncle Sam 
to the Old Continent? Or does it not stem more out 
of a security movement amplified by the violence 
and the fear caused by the attacks of September?
First of all, it is important to analyze the impact of 
the spirit of the enlightenment on the French anti-
terrorist dispositions (I) then it will be appropriate 
to analyze, in light of the events of September 11, 
the evolution of this latter (II).
I. The Imperative French Respect of Rules 
Melting the State of Right and the Fight Against 
Terrorism
France, unlike a country such as Ireland, is not 
simply facing a single independent terrorism. 
24 Pierre Mazeaud, The fight against terrorism in the 
case law of the Constitutional Council, Speech presented 
during a visit to the Supreme Court in Canada, April 24-26, 
2006, p.4. 
Translator’s Note: “Saisine” - The right of saisine is a 
unique concept by which a request is submitted to the court 
for a review of a specific law. The Constitutional Council 
cannot self-impose such request. When the Council was 
created in 1958, only four entities were allowed to “seize” 
such constitutional power: The President, The Prime 
Minister, The President of the Senate and The Prsident of 
the National Assembly (House of Representatives). With a 
revision of the Constitution and by a subsequent Constitu-
tional Amendment dated October 29, 1974, this right has 
since been extended to 60 representatives or 60 senators, 
in order to allow a political minority in Congress to ask for 
control of a specific law in question.
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Therefore, it had to obtain a system, both logisti-
cal and legal, aimed at suppressing terrorism in 
all formats (freedom fighters, Radical Commu-
nists, Internationalists etc.). As in most countries, 
French politicians chose to treat terrorism in a 
global fashion. First of all, it is advisable to study 
the organisational system (A) and then tie to it this 
French balance of “safety/freedom” preserved, by 
the Constitutional Council amongst other entities 
(B).
A. “Organisational Stakes of the Fight Against 
Terrorism”25
“The policy of combat against terrorism is pri-
marily operational, thus privileging the establish-
ment of means of intervention, without posing the 
problem of a particular requirement of legitimi-
zation.”26 Therefore, the entire challenge of this 
fight, besides the preservation of human rights, is 
to insure the cooperation of various branches of 
government including all the difficulties this im-
plies. France made a conscious choice not to en-
trust the burden of terrorism repression to a single 
branch. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind 
that the difficulties of the fight against terrorism 
are due more to the fact that the State cannot resort 
to every means and especially not to means simi-
lar to those of the terrorists. The State must fight 
against terrorism without attacking freedoms, civ-
il rights to which French people and French me-
dia remain viscerally attached. Furthermore, both 
the international and European contexts cannot be 
isolated and the French government must act in 
accordance with the agreements ratified and keep-
ing in mind that the building of Europe necessi-
tates bringing together the political attitudes of all 
member nations.
In order to have a more precise idea of the French 
antiterrorist fight system, the essential body of 
25 Title of a book by Nathalie CETTINA, foreword 
written by Jacques CHEVALLIER, her memoir’s director, 
Works and research Pantheon-Assas Paris II, LGDJ, Mars 
1995.
26 Ibid, p.3.
work remains the reading of the White Paper 
writen by the Government on the subject of home-
land security vis-a-vis terrorism.27 This combat 
rests on 4 essential topics:
to prevent risk, investigate, detect, and 
neutralize;
to improve our systems in place;
to increase our capacities for handling cri-
sis management; and
to reinforce our capacities for managing 
sanctions and sentencing.
Taking into account the limited time and the 
plethora of information regarding these French 
axes of antiterrorist fighting, I am forced to make 
a choice in presenting to you only what seems to 
me primordial, whith the knowlege that this limit-
ing choice will nervertheless deprive us of certain 
information.
• Risk prevention:
Each and every day, this mission mobilizes the 
services of intelligence, the forces of homeland 
security, the antiterrorist magistrates, the armed 
forces and the Diplomatic Corp. More than the co-
operation between the various services, it is the ac-
cess by the services of intelligence and homeland 
security to certain “public access” administrative 
files, as well as the identification of the potential-
ly dangerous travelers which must be authorized, 
and this in spite of the traditional reservations. 
Until law no. 2006-64 (2006), freedom took pre-
cedence over effectiveness and France, contrary 
to its foreign counterparts, did not have access to 
the above mentioned files. The co-operation with 
our foreign partners, initially bilateral, became 
multilateral because of convergences of interest 
or because of shared risks with our partners.
• Improving the system:
This is about concentrating the protection of the 
population. It is spearheaded by the “Vigipirate 
plan” created in October 2001. This plan, well-
known by our fellow-citizens, has double objec-
27 French Documentation, March 2006.
•
•
•
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tives to protect the population, the infrastructures, 
and the institutions as well as to plan counterat-
tacks in the event of attacks. The Plan is represent-
ed by 4 levels going from yellow, the lowest level, 
to the scarlet (bright red) level, the highest, and is 
aimed at preventing the imminent risk of major at-
tacks. Since the installation of the new Vigipirate 
plan in March 2003, the level of alarms has been 
adjusted ten different times.
The protection of the population, just like the reso-
lutions resulting from the investigations, cannot be 
effective without video-surveillance, but France, 
concerned about the respect of the privacy of its 
fellow-citizens, lags behind compared to some 
of its neighbors (to date, there are aproximately 
300,000 video cameras on French soil).
• To reinforce our capacities for crisis man-
agement
• To reinforce our capacities for repair and 
sanctions:
On this matter, France remains a pionneer and the 
consideration of the victim, beyond the penal law-
suit, is a good representation of the originality of 
the system of French compensation. “In 1985, the 
mobilization of the victims gathered within S.O.S. 
Attacks, constrained the authorities to create by 
way of legislation, a system of compensation 
completely disconnected from the penal proce-
dure. Even the term of “terrorism” seemed unac-
ceptable in a context of rights which did not wish 
to integrate this concept in its own legislation. The 
legal recognition became accepted only thanks to 
a mobilization of the public opinion and a public 
awareness campaign, and by a petition organized 
by S.O.S. Attacks with the assistance of the me-
dia; all the while France was confronted with a 
new wave of attacks in February and March 1986. 
In April 1986, a bill relating to the fight against 
terrorism was submitted to Congress. It called 
for increased prevention and increased repression 
against terrorism. The compensation chapter, for-
gotten initially, was introduced in the form of an 
amendment. The idea suggested was to de-budg-
etise the financing of the compensation, so that 
it would become quick and automatic. Law no. 
86.1020 of September 9, 1986 relating to the fight 
against terrorism and to attacks against the safety 
of the State mandated by its article 9 a Guarantee 
fund (hereafter called “the Fund”) which guaran-
tees the integral repair of damages resulting from 
attacks to the individual, as a result of being the 
victims of acts of terrorism based on article L 126-
1 of the Penal code.”28 In accordance with French 
Human Rights spirit, it is important to stress that 
the Fund compensates the victims or their depend-
ants, regardless of their nationality or the legality 
of their residence in France!
The other battle being fought by S.O.S Attacks 
was to change the status of the victims of terror-
ism into that of victims of civil war.29 “This moral 
recognition allows the victims to benefit from free 
health care, to access to military hospitals and, for 
the children affected by terrorism, to access to the 
statute of war orphan. The victims can also take 
advantage of the experience of military doctors in 
regards to post traumatic physical and psychologi-
cal after-effects. More importantly, beyond this 
statute, this law recognizes implicitly that terror-
ism is the new shape of war which touches a civil 
population during times of peace.”30
If the French antiterrorist system tries, as much as 
it can, to maintain this difficult balance between 
personal liberties and security, even if it means a 
certain amount of loss in effectiveness, the legal 
28 Francoise Rudetzki, State of the legislation in 
France: the role played by SOS Attentas, Terrorism, vic-
tims and international penal responsibility, Calman-levy, 
March 2003, page 232.
29 In article 26 of the law of January 23 (JO 25 Janu-
ary 1990), extending the benefits of the Code for military 
pensions for invalids and war victims to the victims of 
acts of terrorism committed from January 1, 1982 forward. 
These have thus been included as victims of war.
30 Francoise Rudetzki, State of the legislation in 
France: role played by SOS Attentats, Terrorism, victims 
and international penal responsibility, Calman-levy, March 
2003, page 236.
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arsenal, and more particularly the penal branch, 
must likewise be registered within a protective 
framework of public freedoms.
B. The Search for Balance: the Place of the 
Constitutional Council
Unlike the law of 2001, all the laws adopted in 
regards to the fight against terrorism are carefully 
screened by the Constitutional Council which as-
serts itself as the guardian of fundamental human 
rights. As recalled by Pierre Mazeaud, President 
of the Constitutional Council until March 2007, 
“terrorism indeed represents such a violent attack 
on law and order and compells such a strong af-
front upon the authorities, that the risks of com-
promising the exercise of fundamental freedoms 
is therefore increased. Therefore, checks and bal-
ances to insure constitutionality must be acutely 
in effect throughout the process.”31 Moreover, if 
the European Convention on humans right author-
izes certain restrictions, under certain conditions, 
to the basic rights it guarantees, the Constitutional 
Council reminded us very recently in its Decision 
no. 2005-532 DC of January 19, 2006 relating 
to the Law regarding the fight against terrorism 
and containing various clauses relating to home-
land security and border controls, “That it is up to 
legislators to ensure cooperation between, on one 
hand, the prevention of attacks on law and order is 
necessary to the safeguard of rights and principles 
of constitutional value, and, on the other hand, the 
exercise of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms 
and privacy and freedoms specifically protected 
by articles 2 and 4 of the Declaration of Human 
Rights and of the citizen of 1789.”32
Under French law, there is no plan to systemati-
cally control legal procedures relating to the fight 
31 Pierre Mazeaud, The fight against terrorism in the 
case law of the Constitutional council, speech presented 
during a visit to the Supreme Court in Canada, April 24-26, 
2006, p.1.
32 9th indented line available on the Constitutional 
Council website: http://www.conseil-constitutionel.
fr/decision/2006/2005532dc.htm.
against terrorism, therefore, such control is option-
al and a priori and this appears to be a fundamental 
difference between the French and the American 
systems. “Insofar as antiterrorist legislation con-
stitutes - fertile grounds regarding the potential 
risks against liberties,” Congressional opposition 
usually seizes control and acts as Counsel in order 
to exert this control.33 As previously noted, only 
the law of November 15, 2001 includes an excep-
tion to this rule34.
This control as applied by the Constitutional 
Council is divided as follows: 
“the Council verifies: 
that new rules relating to the duration of 
police custody do not conflict excessively 
with personal freedom;
that any new procedure regarding attorney 
intervention while in police custody does 
not conflict needlessly with civil liberties, 
nor with the rights of the defense, nor with 
the prerogatives of the legal authorities; 
and 
that the clauses regarding vehicle shots and 
their occupants ensure a balance between 
the respect of privacy and the safeguard-
ing of law and order.”35
Let us now take a more concrete look at the im-
pact of the Constitutional Council on antiterrorist 
laws having been subjected to its review. 
The main pillar of French antiterrorist legislation 
is Law no. 86-1020 dated September 9, 1986 re-
lating to the fight against terrorism improved re-
pression and the prevention of crimes related to 
terrorism within the penal code. This law, known 
33 Pierre Mazeaud, The fight against terrorism in the 
case law of the Constitutional council, speech presented 
during a visit to the Supreme Court in Canada, April 24-26, 
2006, p.4.
34 Law 2001-1062 of November 15, 2001 relative to 
everyday security.
35 Pierre Mazeaud, The fight against terrorism in the 
case law of the Constitutional council, speech presented 
during a visit to the Supreme Court in Canada, April 24-26, 
2006, p.4-5.
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as the law “Chalandon,” set up acts of terrorism 
as separate infractions punishable with increased 
penalties. It also established the monetary fund on 
behalf of victims of terrorism. Furthermore, it spe-
cifically, allowed for specialized magistrates spe-
cifically appointed to the fight against terrorism, 
this was made possible by centralizing discovery 
and trial courts with the Supreme Court of Paris. 
This was done primarily for reasons of security as 
well as in light of the unique procedural mode.
In its decision no. 86-213 DC of September 3, 
1986, the Constitutional Council decided that only 
article 4 of the law relating to the fight against ter-
rorism and dealing with attacks against homeland 
security was declared as not being in accordance 
with the Constitution; however, the definition of 
a terrorist act, combined with another crime, or 
infraction against common law, incriminated by 
the penal code and by virtue of the connection be-
tween these acts “resulting from the actions of one 
person or several and with the goal to seriously 
disturb law and order by means of intimidation or 
terror.” The Constitutional Council ruled that the 
law itself fully satisfied the conditions of precision 
and claririty required by criminal law. “Crimes of 
terroristic nature, as well as certain other types of 
crimes such as those dealing with the traffic of nar-
cotics, are tried in front of courts composed of ap-
pointed judges which are all specialized and pro-
fessional magistrates (a president plus six justices 
or in case of appeal, eight justices). Notwithstand-
ing common legal procedures, no ordinary citizen 
is ever called to sit on these panels.”36 Once again, 
the decision of the constitutional Council ratified 
this choice which Pierre Mazeaud explains in his 
text: “In application of its traditional jurispru-
dence as regards to equality, it was judged that it 
is permissible for the legislator to take into con-
sideration different rules of procedure according 
to facts, specific situations, and to the people to 
which they apply, provided that these differences 
do not proceed out of unjustified discriminations 
and that they are ensured justifiable according to 
36 Ibid.
guarantees of equality, in particular as it relates to 
the respect of the rights of the defense.
In regards to this issue, Pierre Mazeaud believes 
that the differences in established procedures ap-
plied to various alleged criminals, according to 
whether these crimes are terroristic in nature or not, 
tend to thwart the effect of the threats and could 
indeed diminish the peaceful rendition of a judge-
ment and that therefore it did not stem from unjus-
tified discrimination. He also raised the point that, 
by the nature of its composition, the special court 
offered the necessary guarantees of independence 
and impartiality and that the rights of the defense 
were safeguarded when pleading before it.”37
Furthermore, concerning the lengthening of police 
custody as proposed by the law of 1986, the law 
lengthened such custody for a period of up to 48 
hours, the Constitutional Council did not object to 
this decision in consideration of the fact that this 
lengthening was subjected to medical supervision 
and related only to acts of terrorism and that it was 
ordered by a seated magistrate of the special court.
Law no. 90-86 dated January 23, 1990, which 
contains various clauses relating to social security 
and public health. This law allows for the victims 
of acts of terrorism after January 1 1982 to benefit 
from the same rights and privileges granted to civ-
il war victims in accordance to the Military Code 
regulating military disability pensions and war 
victims and, in particular, the right to pensions for 
civilian victims. In its decision 89-69 DC of Janu-
ary 22, 1990, the Constitutional Council decided 
in its article number 1 that “in the body of the text 
of the law carrying various clauses relating to so-
cial security and public health; the following are 
declared to be unconstitutional: - from article 24 
to article 27, the words “Of which the Congress 
will be apprised before December 31, 1990;” and 
up to article 46, the words “in the overseas ter-
ritories.”38
37 Ibid.
38 Constitutional Council, http://www.conseil-consti-
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On the occasion of the development of the new 
penal code, which came into effect on March 1, 
1994 and which replaced the imperial (Napole-
onic) Penal code dating back to 1810, the legis-
lator has this time around, inserted in the penal 
code, not as was the case in 1986 in the code of 
penal procedure, the incrimination of acts of ter-
rorism. “Not only does the New Penal code retain 
specific terrorism infractions, by reference to acts 
with which it associates its policy of incrimina-
tion, but it furthermore fundamentally innovates 
by making a clear and basic distinction between 
three basic types of terrorism: terrorism based on 
the breaching of commonn law, ecological terror-
ism, and terrorism by criminal conspiracy.”39 The 
law which established the new penal code was not 
presented to the constitutional Council, the latter 
could not therefore offer an opinon about this ex-
tension of the concept of acts of terrorism.
Law no. 95-125 dated February 8, 1995 relating to 
the organization of the jurisdictions and of the civ-
il, penal and administrative procedures. This text 
suggests a 30 year term for crimes of terrorism 
and 20 year term for crimes commited in partner-
ship with a terrorist organization. 
Law no. 96-647 dated July 22, 1996 published in 
the Official Law Review no. 170 of July 23, 1996, 
following the attacks which took place during 
the summer of 1995. It is meant to reinforce re-
pression against terrorism and against any attack 
perpretrated against representatives of the gov-
ernment, against public servants, or against any 
person whose work involves public interest. The 
law includes clauses relating to the Department of 
Criminal Investigation. The Constitutional Coun-
cil ruled in its article one that: “article 1 is declared 
to be unconstitutional:”
because it includes within article 4-421-
1 of the penal code the following sub-
tutionel.fr/decision/1989/89269dc.htm.
39 Yves MAYAUD, Terrorism, Knowledge of 
the Law, Private Law, Dalloz, May 1997, p.7.
•
paragraph: “assisting with the entry into 
the country, assisting with the travel or 
transportation or with the residence of il-
legal aliens, as defined in article 21 of or-
dinance no. 45-2658 dated November 2, 
1945 relating to the conditions regarding 
entry and residence of illegal aliens, into 
France;” and
words “for the purpose of discovery,” “un-
less they are authorized by the examining 
magistrate” and the first three subpara-
graphs inserted by article 10 into article 
706-24 of the penal procedural code, inso-
far as they are aimed toward preliminary 
investigation cases;
In regards to article 27 the following words 
“where it will come into effect on May 1, 
1996.”
The Constitutional Council “thus did not hesitate 
in censuring a clause which had been listed among 
the infringements likely to be described as act of 
terrorism; offences relating to assisting illegal en-
try into or assisting with illegal residence in the 
country.
The Council indeed estimated that the legislator 
“had sullied its judgement with obvious dispro-
portion,” insofar as the measures involved were 
not material acts of attacks directed toward the 
safeguarding of property or of people but consti-
tuted normal behavior of assistance to people in 
an irregular situation (in regards to their resident 
status) and that this was not in immediate relation 
with the perpetration of an act of terrorism. The 
Council also noted that if an association with a 
terrorist group is discovered, the finding of facts 
could be continued under other sections of the law, 
such as concealment of criminals or participation 
in a criminal conspiracy.
“This example attests to a valuable system of 
checks and balances which gives the Council a 
•
•
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certain margin for independent decision making 
which is not negligible.”40
Law no. 2001-1062 dated November 15, 2001 re-
lating to “daily security.” Following the attacks 
which occurred in the United States on September 
11, 2001, the French government put into effect 
certain measures meant to “fight more effectively 
threats from terrorism.” These measures, which 
were announced by the Prime Minister on October 
3, 2001 in front of the French National Assembly, 
were presented as amendments to the law on daily 
security, during a Session of the congress. Emer-
gency regulations were therefore adopted, without 
being submitted to the Constitutional Council.
Constitutional law no. 2003-267 relating to a Eu-
ropean warrant for arrest ratified by Congress dur-
ing its session of March 17, 2003. 
Law no. 2004-204 dated March 9, 2004 about the 
adaptation of justice in regards to the evolutions of 
criminality. This law aims to reinforce the effec-
tiveness of the organized rules of penal procedure 
applicable to delinquency and organized crime:
The creation of specialized interregional 
jurisdictions;
The installation of additional means of in-
vestigation for officers of the judiciary po-
lice (concerning the infiltration of the ter-
rorist networks, phone-tappings, searches 
and police custody); and
The extension of the statute of individu-
als who wish to plea bargain, which could 
from now on benefit from a reduction or a 
suspension of their sentence.
During the judgement phase, the introduc-
tion of “appearance based on preliminary 
admission of guilt (guilty plea)” which 
offers the accused a plea bargain which 
includes a reduction of the sentence in ex-
change for an admission of facts.
40 Pierre Mazeaud, The fight against terrorism in the 
case law of the Constitutional Council, speech presented 
during a visit to the Supreme Court in Canada, April 24-26, 
2006, p.7.
•
•
•
•
“It is impossible to discuss all the rules here, such 
as those which authorize night searches, monitor-
ing and surveillance and infiltration missions, the 
freezing of the assets of suspected indiividuals, 
the wiring of locals and vehicles, as well as all 
measures which are from this day forward under 
close control and scrutiny of a seated judge.”41
In a decision dated March 2, 2004, the Constitu-
tional Council censured 2 articles of the bill: one 
which prevented any possibility for future appeals 
from the utilization of certain methods used exclu-
sively for the crimes committed in organized groups 
(gangs); the other dealt with the holding of hearings 
behind closed doors in the event of “guilty pleas.”
French antiterrorist laws succeeded with this 
double challenge: in developing a French system 
which proved reliable while preserving funda-
mental freedoms even though no one can deny the 
recent toughening of the system. 
II. The Need to Fight Efficiently Against Ter-
rorism and the Hardening of Legislative Mea-
sures.
The important point here is to focus on the an-
titerrorist laws post September 11 events, and 
more particularly the latest to date, namely law 
no. 2006-64 dated January 23, 2006 relating to the 
fight against terrorism and which carries miscel-
laneous mechanisms relating to homeland secu-
rity and border control, hereafter known as “law 
2006.” As previously noted, although we cannot 
talk about a circulation of the norms, we must 
however recognize a certain evolution, if not an 
unquestionable evolution, in the French antiter-
rorism system (A); an evolution which is never-
theless supervised (B).
A. A More Rigid Antiterrorist Judicial System.
Already, the laws from 2001 had primed a secur-
ing tendency and a report from the minstry of de-
41 Ibid, p.8.
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fense titled, “Defense against terrorism: A prior-
ity of the Defense Ministry,” published in April 
2006,42 confirms the above. “Since 2001, France 
raises the protection levels for its population and 
its territory.” But rather, it is law 2006 which, we 
must admit, will demonstrate the toughening of 
antiterrorism laws, even if, as underlined by Nico-
las Sarkozy who was then Minister of the Interior, 
during a speech on a proposed law.43 Sarkozy said, 
“Since the attacks of September 11, several legal 
mechanisms - that of chapter V from the law dated 
Nov. 15, 2001 to the law dated March 18, 2003, for 
homeland security and of the law dated March 9, 
2004, which adapted justice to the evolution of the 
criminal acts - have reinforced the state’s ability 
to defend France against the threat of terrorism….
Toward this end, the proposed law is made-up of 
15 articles contained within 8 chapters. Let us note 
that as recalled in the memo showing the condi-
tions of application of law 200644 the latter aims to 
bring forth mainly the most coherent and the most 
complete response as possible to the threat of ter-
rorism, both within the realm of prevention which 
is a more important evolution, but also in regards 
to certain aspects of the text regarding the repres-
sion of acts of terrorism. The law dated January 
23, 2006, also had for its goal to contribute to the 
strengthening of the efficiency of the system of 
security so that it may contribute to the safeguard-
ing of the law and order, and it contains, for this 
reason, certain clauses concerning the administra-
tive police force.”
This presentation of the law of 2006 is articulated 
around these two points: prevention and repression 
of the terrorist acts, the two being mixed - for once, 
contrary to the norm – in this last French law.
42 Ministry of Defense, http://www.defense.gouv.
fr/defense/decouverte/missions/missions_generales/la_de-
fense_contre_le_terrorism, p.7.
43 Law project related to the fight against terrorism 
and including various measures relative to homeland secu-
rity and border control (DECLARED EMERGENCY), no. 
2615, distributed on October28, 2005, p.2.
44 NOR/INT/D07/00071/C, object of circulation is 
the application of the number 2006-64 law signed on Janu-
ary 23, 2006, Paris, 21 July 2006, p.1.
Concerning Prevention
The attention of the CNIL and of miscellaneous 
organizations for the defense of humans rights fo-
cused, in particular, on chapter one which deals 
with clauses relating to video surveillance and to 
two main points which deserve to be underlined: 
The authorization for entities (places of 
worship, trades) to film the accesses to their 
buildings. Competent investigators will 
then be able to view these images (art 1).
In case of emergency, the right granted to 
police commissioners (prefects) to order 
the installation of cameras for a period of 
up to 4 months, in common areas (facto-
ries, industrial or nuclear sites, train sta-
tions...).
Concerning the control of movement and travel 
(chapter II), the law hardens the measures adopted 
until then in the sense that:
It authorizes airline, shipping and railroad 
companies to supply the State with per-
sonal data and other data such as the auto-
matic monitoring of vehicles (photographs 
of the license plates and of the passagers 
in the vehicles). This database is intercon-
nected with data files on cars flights and 
identity checkpoints in effect on trans-bor-
der trains.
Concerning telephone and Internet communica-
tions, (articles 5 and 6), law 2006 provides that: 
Cybercafes must save connection data (ex-
clusive of actual contents), following the 
example of access suppliers. The shelf life 
of the saved data is requested to be one 
year so that competent investigators can 
obtain such data.
Likewise, police officers are allowed to have ac-
cess, within an administrative framework, to cer-
tain files such as visa requests (BIODEV, system 
of delivery for visas of foreign nationals), resi-
dence permits, etc.
•
•
•
•
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Concerning Repression 
Law 2006, in its chapter 4 (articles 11 to 18), it 
supplements the penal device designated to pun-
ish acts of terrorism:
It allows courts to repress more firmly 
criminal conspiracy with intent to com-
mit acts of terrorism, when the conspiracy 
has for its aim to prepare for crimes or at-
tacks upon person(s) and calls for a pun-
ishment of 20 years of incarceration, and 
30 years for the leaders and organizers of 
such crimes.
Likewise, the law plans for an “extradi-
tion” (centralization to the jurisdiction of 
the Paris district for the application of the 
punishment phase), for individuals con-
demned for acts of terrorism. This last 
measure, was highly criticized since it 
makes it nearly impossible for prisoners to 
stay in contact with their families, it com-
pletes the legal organization in the domain 
of the fight against terrorism and it central-
izes the system to the French capital.
For minors aged 16 years old or older, 
who are accused of acts of terrorism, they 
will from now on be judged by a Seated 
Court only made up of professional magis-
trates, like the Special Seated Court for the 
judgement of acts of terrorism commited 
by adults per the law of 1986. Let us note 
that among these magistrates must appear 
nevertheless, two special judges for chil-
dren “the specificity of justice for minors, 
which constitutes one of the fundamental 
principles recognized by the laws of the 
Republic, is thus preserved.”45
Article 17 contains an automatic length-
ening of the maximum time of custody 
when it has to do with terrorism, which is 
“increased from 4 to 6 days when the im-
45 Pierre Mazeaud, The fight against terrorism in the 
case law of the Constitutional council, speech presented 
during a visit to the Supreme Court in Canada, April 24-26, 
2006, p.7.
•
•
•
•
minence of an act of terrorism is demon-
strated or when the need for international 
co-operation requires it imperatively.”46
In its 27th management report, the CNIL specified 
that “the implementation of the antiterrorist law 
of January 23, 2006 involved, for the past year, an 
increase in the number of lawful texts subjected 
to the CNIL and widens the possibilities of access 
and exploitation by police forces regarding data 
initially collected for another purpose. It should 
[also] be specified that the indication by the law 
itself of the conditions regarding the implemen-
tation of such law reduced the autonomy of the 
CNIL.47 Alex Türk evokes “a normative wave re-
lated to the fight against terrorism,” a term with 
which I can only agree because it is all about safety 
measures and not about a circulation of the stan-
dards as suggested by some lawyers, the standards 
(norms), according to these attorneys, being in-
spired by the American model. The fright inspired 
by the attacks of September 11, led democratic 
countries to reinforce their legislation as required 
by the need to insure public safety, a common trait 
to all countries. However, this reinforcement is 
not synonymous with a loss of our freedoms. 
B.Nevertheless “Framed,” and Concilliatory 
Efficiency and the Maintenance of a State of 
Human Rights.
Framed is the correct term here, because the CNIL 
and the constitutional Council came to agreement 
in regards to this law. From the very start, the 
CNIL worried about this above mentioned balance 
and the preliminary draft was subjected to serious 
critics: “serious risks of damage to personal free-
doms,” “introduction of identity checks without 
the knowledge of the people.”
46 NOR/INT/D07/00071/C, object of circulation is 
the application of law number 2006-64 voted on January 
23, 2006, Paris, 21 July 2006, p.6.
47 July 9, 2007, the CNIL presented its 2006 activity 
report and devotes the first part “video surveillance scare” 
to the antiterrorist law voted on January 23, 2006, p.17.
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In its opinion rendered on October 10, 2005,48 the 
CNIL recalls that in accordance with the super-
visory powers which were conferred to it by the 
law of January 6, 1978, it will not be deprived 
from exerting said powers fully and without re-
striction. This, in fact, it did not fail to do. Some 
of the proposals by the CNIL were taken into ac-
count during the congressional debate, including: 
recall of the necessity to respect data-processing 
laws as well as freedoms within the framework 
of the anti-terrorists system (except in regards to 
video surveillance); a clearer definition in regards 
to police forces and National Guard’s (gendarmer-
ie) ability to access such data with the purpose to 
fight terrorism; a clearer definition regarding the 
conditions for enabling access to such data; time 
limits in regards to some access; and request for 
an annual evaluation report to Congress.
In spite of the reservations expressed by the CNIL, 
other provisions of the project were not re-exam-
ined: 
systematic photographing of all vehicles 
and their occupants, traveling through 
certain major thoroughfares (this was de-
clared to be constitutional by the Consti-
tutional Council in its decision of January 
19, 2006);
duplication of purpose from various sys-
tems, the fight against terrorism being only 
one of the reasons for access to such data;
the absence of a clear definition as to the 
people or entities offering access to the In-
ternet and obligated to preserve the data in 
regards to connections; and
the establishment of a central data base to 
control movement and travel inbound or 
outbound from countries located outside 
of the European Union, which itself has 
poorly defined borders.
Congressional opposition also made itself heard 
and in accordance with the right of “saisine” au-
48 CNIL, http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=1957&del
ib[uid]=90&cHash=8b5071634f.
•
•
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thorized by the revisions of October 29, 1974, 60 
senators seized the Constitutional Council. This 
right of saisine of 60 representatives or senators 
allows a political minority to ask for the control 
of constitutionality of a law. The Constitutional 
Council, which receives an increasing number of 
such requests, therefore asserts itself as an effec-
tive guardian of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
Let us recall that the representatives did not hes-
itate to oppose this law: more than 150 amend-
ments were recorded. The text of the law was sub-
mitted to the constitutional Council, criticizing in 
particular articles 6 and 8.
On January 10, 2006, the government delivered its 
observations regarding the opposition to this law.
Concerning article 6, which, as I am reminding 
you, modifies the postal service and electronic tel-
ecommunications codes, the senators, authors of 
“saisine,” assert that the articles of this law ignore 
article 66 of the Constitution as well as the terms 
of articles 2, 4 and 16 of the Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and of the Citizen (DDHC – Declara-
tion des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen - 1789, 
declared after the French Revolution).
Article 66 of the Constitution provides that “no 
one can be arbitrarily held. The legal authorities, 
guardian of personal freedoms, ensure the respect 
of this principle under the conditions as prescribed 
by law.” To this, the government replies that the 
understanding of the aforesaid article leads to 
the following conclusion: it is the legal authori-
ties which have an eminent role in the protection 
of personal freedoms. Moreover, the government 
specifies that it is a question of freedom in regards 
to not being arbitrarily detained and not the other 
aspects of the various individual freedoms as guar-
anteed by the texts and principles of constitutional 
value such as the freedom of coming and going, 
the respect of privacy, etc.
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As for articles 2, 4 and 16 of the DDHC, they 
provide respectively that “the goal of any politi-
cal group is the conservation of natural and un-
deniable human rights. These rights are freedom, 
property, security, and resistance to oppression.” 
“Freedom consists of being able to do all that does 
not harm others, thus, the exercise of the natural 
rights of each person has limits as only within 
those limits which ensure that the other Members 
of society enjoy these same rights. These limits 
can be defined only by Law.” “Any society in 
which the guarantee of such Rights is not assured, 
nor the separation of powers clearly defined, does 
not have a Constitution.” It is important here, to 
notice, as the government in fact did, that “the 
damage likely to be done to privacy under the 
terms of article 6 of the law as submitted, remains 
limited.” The police force and national guard do 
not have access to the contents of the messages 
being exchanged; the right to confiscate is given 
only to a few and clearly defined specific employ-
ees; the technical data likely to be obtained is also 
clearly defined and limited by law; and finally, the 
law specifies the methods by which such system 
is activated.
Concerning article 8, which puts into effect “static 
or mobile automated control systems with de-
scriptive data of vehicles photographying their 
occupants, in all suitable points of the territory, in 
particular at border areas, maritime ports of entry 
or airports as well as on the larger axes of national 
or international transit.” The senators brought up, 
once again, article 66 and article 2 of DDHC al-
leging that the provisions of article 8 conflicted 
excessively with the freedom of movement and 
with the respect of privacy. As recalled by the 
government, “on one hand...the freedom to come 
and go is by no means affected by the article of the 
law being criticized since the passive devices of 
automated control have neither for aim nor for ef-
fect to block the movement of people nor to limit 
their freedom to circulate.... In addition, it should 
be stressed that the damage to the rights and to the 
respect of privacy remains limited and that it is 
justified by the requirements to safeguard law and 
order. The point should also be made that as the 
systems adopted by the legislators contain many 
guarantees.” Moreover, let us remember that “per-
sonal” data collected will be subjected to the pro-
visions of the law of 1978 and thus to the CNIL.
On January 19, 2006, the Constitutional Coun-
cil took a decision regarding the law “relating to 
the fight against terrorism which carried various 
clauses relating to security and border controls.” 
The Constitutional Council did not declare these 
clauses to be unconconstitutional as they, on one 
hand, prove their usefullness in regards to the 
fight against terrorism and criminality; however, 
on the other hand, with the limitations and precau-
tions with which they were issued from the point 
of view of the protection of privacy.
The Constitutional Council nevertheless censured 
the reference in regards to the “repression” of acts 
of terrorism as it appeared in article 6 of the law as 
originally submitted. The capture and processing 
“of traffic data,” as foreseen by this article, having 
been born out of pure administrative police op-
erations and having being placed solely under the 
responsibility of the executive power, thus do cre-
ate a finality to the prevention of acts of terrorism, 
but they do not ignore the principle of separation 
of powers, nor do they encroach upon the repres-
sion of such acts, which belongs to the power of 
the legal authorities.
Concerning the photographing of vehicles and 
their occupants, the Constitutional Council es-
timated that, taking into account the guarantees 
foreseen by legislators, these measures were apt to 
ensure the respect of privacy and the safeguarding 
of law and order. Once again, you can note that the 
control exerted by the Constitutional Council is a 
control of proportionality.
As for the rest, concerning the duration of police 
custody in particular, neither the Constitutional 
Council, nor the authors of saisine, questioned it. 
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However, the Constitutional Council, guardian of 
fundamental freedoms, automatically examined 
these new clauses, which obviously had an impact 
on personal freedom. Like ourselves, Pierre Maz-
eaud explains,49 “the Council evaluated them and 
compared them with constitutional requirements 
on one hand, with the need for necessary interven-
tion by legal authorities, and the safekeeping of 
personal liberties under the terms of article 66 of 
the Constitution, on the other hand, with the need 
for gauging its proportionality.
The Constitutional Council validated them for the 
following reasons: 
these new decisions do not question any 
existing guarantees regarding the first four 
days of police custody, which the Council 
has already validated in its previous deci-
sions;
the new additional extentions can inter-
vene only under “exceptional cases” and 
only in two clearly defined cases: if there 
“is a serious risk of imminent terrorist at-
tack in France or abroad” or if “the needs 
for international co-operation requires it 
imperatively;”
finally, these exceptional extentions can 
only be granted by justified decisions of 
the judge for freedoms and detention, 
judges which are not the same as the ex-
amining magistrate which is in charge of 
the control of information.
Admittedly, one can, and one must, ask oneself 
about the limits beyond which the duration of po-
lice custody could no longer be allowed constitu-
tionally. If the Council considered that such limits 
were not crossed in fact, one could think that nev-
ertheless we are now approaching ultimate limits, 
regarding said custody.
49 Pierre Mazeaud, The fight against terrorism in the 
case law of the Constitutional council, speech presented 
during a visit to the Supreme Court in Canada, April 24-26, 
2006, p.7.
•
•
•
As of January 1999, the FIDH50 (International Fed-
eration of Human Rights) had published a Report 
about an international investigative mission on the 
application of antiterrorist legislation, “France: 
the door open to the arbitrary.”51 The latest law to 
date was no exception and it was spared no criti-
cisms.
Let us recall only that the greatest infringement 
upon human rights is terrorism itself and that the 
“derogatory character of certain rules of French 
law in regards to the fight against terrorism must 
be defended,”52 especially as this derogatory char-
acter is not synonymous with infringement of hu-
man right. 
In this matter let us not suffer from a “holier than 
thou” syndrome; the fight against terrorism and 
all these miscellaneous measures, which are all 
geared toward optimizing the safety of the citi-
zens, are not excessive. If the balance “safety vs. 
Freedom” proves to be delicate, we can only note 
the French system’s effectiveness, combining per-
formance and respect of the expected guarantees 
of a State of rights, in particular thanks to the ac-
tion of the Constitutional Council and to that of 
the CNIL.
50 The aim of the FIDH is to obtain effective 
improvements regarding the protection of victims, the 
prevention of Human Rights abuse and the prosecution of 
those responsible. A broad mandate – FIDH’s mandate is to 
contribute to the respect of all rights as defined in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights. FIDH aims to obtain 
effective improvements in the protection of victims, the 
prevention of Human Rights Violations and the sanctions 
of their perpetrators. Its priorities are set by the triennial 
World Congress and the International board (22 members), 
with the support of the international Secretariat (30 staff 
members).
51 FIDH, http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/france.pdf.
52 Pierre Mazeaud, The fight against terrorism in the 
case law of the Constitutional council, speech presented 
during a visit to the Supreme Court in Canada, April 24-26, 
2006, p.3.
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